An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion

We consider an auction setting where the buyers are risk averse with correlated private valuations (CARA preferences, binary types), and characterize the optimal mechanism for a risk-neutral seller. We show that the optimal auction extracts all buyer surplus whenever the correlation is sufficiently strong (greater than 1/3 in absolute value), no matter how risk averse the buyers are. In contrast, we note that a sufficiently risk-averse seller would not use a full rent extracting mechanism for any positive correlation of the valuations even if the buyers were risk neutral.     

A nearly optimal auction for an uninformed seller

This paper describes a nearly optimal auction mechanism that does not require previous knowledge of the distribution of values of potential buyers. The mechanism we propose builds on the new literature on the elicitation of information from experts. We extend the latter to the case where the secret information shared by the experts–potential buyers in our model–can be used against them if it becomes public knowledge.     

The optimal initial allocation of pollution permits: a relative performance approach

The initial allocation of pollution permits is an important aspect of emissions trading schemes. We generalize the analysis of Böhringer and Lange (2005, Eur Econ Rev 49(8): 2041–2055) to initial allocation mechanisms that are based on inter-firm relative performance comparisons (including grandfathering and auctions, as well as novel mechanisms). We show that using firms’ historical output for allocating permits is never optimal in a dynamic permit market setting, while using firms’ historical emissions is optimal only in closed trading systems and only for a narrow class of allocation mechanisms. Instead, it is possible to achieve social optimality by allocating permits based only on an external factor, which is independent of output and emissions. We then outline sufficient conditions for a socially optimal relative performance mechanism.     

Mental processes and strategic equilibration: An fMRI study of selling strategies in second price auctions

This study is the first to attempt to isolate a relationship between cognitive activity and equilibration to a Nash Equilibrium. Subjects, while undergoing fMRI scans of brain activity, participated in second price auctions against a single competitor following predetermined strategy that was unknown to the subject. For this auction there is a unique strategy that will maximize the subjects’ earnings, which is also a Nash equilibrium of the associated game theoretic model of the auction. As is the case with all games, the bidding strategies of subjects participating in second price auctions most often do not reflect the equilibrium bidding strategy at first but with experience, typically exhibit a process of equilibration, or convergence toward the equilibrium. This research is focused on the process of convergence.In the data reported here subjects participated in sixteen auctions, after which all subjects were told the strategy that will maximize their revenues, the theoretical equilibrium. Following that announcement, sixteen more auctions were performed. The question posed by the research concerns the mental activity that might accompany equilibration as it is observed in the bidding behavior. Does brain activation differ between being equilibrated and non-equilibrated in the sense of a bidding strategy? If so, are their differences in the location of activation during and after equilibration? We found significant activation in the frontal pole especially in Brodmann’s area 10, the anterior cingulate cortex, the amygdala and the basal forebrain. There was significantly more activation in the basal forebrain and the anterior cingulate cortex during the first sixteen auctions than in the second sixteen. The activity in the amygdala shifted from the right side to the left after the solution was given.     

Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis

Indicative bidding is a practice commonly used in sales of complex and very expensive assets. Theoretical analysis shows that efficient entry is not guaranteed under indicative bidding, since there is no equilibrium in which more qualified bidders are more likely to be selected for the final sale. Furthermore, there exist alternative bid procedures that, in theory at least, guarantee 100% efficiency and higher revenue for the seller. We employ experiments to compare actual performance between indicative bidding and one of these alternative procedures. The data shows that indicative bidding performs as well as the alternative procedure in terms of entry efficiency, while having other characteristics that favor it over the alternative procedure. Our results provide an explanation for the widespread use of indicative bidding despite the potential problem identified in the equilibrium analysis.     

Sequencing strategies in large, competitive, ascending price automobile auctions: An experimental examination

This paper reports on a large-scale field experiment testing strategies available to a seller participating in simultaneous competitive sequential ascending price automobile auctions. Every other week, the seller offered approximately 100 vehicles for sale in an auction environment in which several competing sellers offered on the order of 3000 vehicles. The experiment tested various sequences in which the seller could offer the vehicles, such as high values first or low values first. Surprisingly, and contrary to intuition drawn from the theory of single item and single seller auctions, the worst performing sequence from those tested is for the seller to order vehicles from highest to lowest values. The best sequence is to group the vehicles by type and offer the low valued vehicles first and then move to offer the higher valued vehicles.     

The economic impacts of drought on the economy of Iran: An integration of linear programming and macroeconometric modelling approaches

In this paper, we provide economy-wide estimates of the costs of drought in the cropping sector of the Iranian economy, using a linear programming model to estimate the direct costs on agriculture, and a macroeconometric model to trace the indirect impacts on the rest of the economy. The results indicate that a severe drought such as the one that occurred in the crop year 1999-2000 imposes a direct cost of 1605 million USD, equivalent to 30.3% of the total value added of the cropping sector in Iran. This, in turn, leads to a 12.7% reduction in the value added of other agricultural sub-sectors (livestock, fisheries and forestry). In the rest of the economy, the manufacturing and service sectors experience value added declines of 7.8 and 3.7%, respectively. In addition, there is a substantial decrease in investment in the agricultural, manufacturing and service sectors. Thus, such a drought reduces overall GDP by about 4.4%, and it would also result in decreased non-oil exports, increased food imports, and a rise in inflation. The results of some drought mitigation simulations are reported in brief. Such estimates strengthen the case for increased attention to drought strategies and management in agriculture in Iran and elsewhere.     

The law of small numbers: investigating the benefits of restricted auctions for public procurement

A commonly accepted view in the academic literature is that dispensing with competition may only be beneficial when tendering complex contracts. However, restricted auctions are frequently used among EU member states to procure small contracts. In this article, we investigate this paradox. Using an original data set of 180 contracts used by a local public buyer of social housing between 2006 and 2009, we show that limiting competition may enable economies to be made on transaction costs while the most efficient bidders still come forward, and that abuses such as corruption or favouritism do not result. To our knowledge, this article is the first to shed light on the advantages of using restricted auctions when tendering small simple contracts.     

The dynamics of technological partners: a social network perspective

The selection and establishment of research partners is increasingly important in innovation and strategic research. Using a panel dataset of patents by 2846 researchers from a large US biotechnology company between 1976 and 2013, we examined the relationships between spanning structural holes and partner dynamics, which are captured by the entry of new partners and the persistence of existing partners. Then, we tested the possible moderating effect of dynamic exploratory ability. Based on the results of negative binomial regression models with fixed effects in the longitudinal design, we found that spanning structural holes was negatively associated with the entry of new partners and positively associated with the persistence of existing partners. Furthermore, exploratory ability positively moderated these relationships. Aside from having managerial implications for innovators, the findings of our interdisciplinary study are relevant for research on partner dynamics, strategy research, and exploration processes.     

The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis

Summary. This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares. Received: July 4, 2001; revised version: October 31, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has benefited from a number of comments from the anonymous referees. Correspondence to: C. At     

Transition economies and trust building: a network perspective on EU enlargement

Many transition economies are characterised by a relativelyrudimentary institutional framework. Weak legislative structuresand the absence of effective market regulation and propertyright enforcement rules diminish the chance of mutually profitablebusiness transactions and—more generally—restrictthe chances for innovation and sustainable growth. Against thisbackground, we analyse the extent to which more efficient governancemechanisms can contribute to a more favourable business environment.In doing so, we adopt a network perspective. We argue that bothin developed market economies as well as in centrally plannedeconomies much of economic exchange takes place in networks.However, the characteristics of these networks, in particularthe concept of trust, can differ significantly. This leads usto conclude that the real challenge of the process of economictransition is connected to building new economic exchange networks.In this paper, we discuss this argument and analyse how thecurrent enlargement of the EU into Eastern Europe may favourablyaffect this process of institutional change in the accessioncountries.     

Spectrum allocation in Latin America: An economic analysis

As elsewhere, wireless markets play a crucial role in Latin American economic growth. Mobile telephone networks increasingly provide the communications infrastructure that has largely been lacking throughout the region. Yet, governments have generally made only modest allocations of bandwidth available to Latin American wireless operators, either absolutely (in terms of spectrum each country could allocate at modest opportunity cost) or relative to countries in North America, Asia and the European Union. Using an empirical model estimated on mobile phone data for international markets, we show that very large social benefits are available to countries that make more spectrum available for mobile phone markets. We conduct simulations using our calibrated model to provide lower bounds for country-by-country gains from larger allocations. We also discuss the impact of alternative regulatory regimes on the feasibility to achieve those social gains.     

An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction

In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were considered by the government: A discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction induces more entry.     

The rebound effect: An evolutionary perspective

The rebound effect presents a major flaw in to energy conservation policies that aim to reduce energy consumption through energy efficiency development. Economics and energy related disciplines have thus far developed tools to measure such a phenomenon. This paper attempts to explain this seeming paradox using a thermodynamic-evolutionary theoretical framework in addition to the traditional economic approach. We here propose that evolutionary systems, such as biological or even economic systems, may rearrange themselves in a more complex fashion under the pressure of an increasing flux of energy, driven by the higher conversion rate of greater efficiency. Higher complexity, due to a greater energy density rate, counteracts the positive effects of energy efficiency. We investigated this hypothesis in the context of the road freight transport system and the productive structure. The qualitative analysis in this paper, further substantiated by figures, provides a link between the dynamics of production patterns and the effect of efficiency in the light of the macro-economic effects of increased energy demand. The analysis departs from a rigorous investigation of the actual energy efficiency evolution in the road freight transport system to develop through a survey of the subsequent worldwide economic revolution in the production system. It is then shown how outsourcing, the key feature of globalization, can be identified as the main source of traffic density growth. Finally, four paradigms are used to stress how the shift in the production system must be considered a leap in structural complexity that consequently serves to increase the frequency of components’ interactions.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

Water accounting for the Orange River Basin: An economic perspective on managing a transboundary resource

The framework for water accounting is applied to an international river basin, the Orange River Basin, which is shared among Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa. Each of the riparian states faces water constraints and relies increasingly on shared international water resources. The countries have adopted the principle of an economic approach to water management, once basin human needs are met, and all but Lesotho have constructed national water accounts to assist in water management. The water accounts for the Orange River Basin bring an economic perspective to water management at the regional level. The accounts include supply and use tables, which are used to compare the contribution to water supply from each riparian state to the amount used. The water accounts are then linked to economic data for each country to calculate water use and productivity by industry and country. There are considerable disparities in water productivity among the countries, which should be taken into account in future decisions about water allocation, pricing and infrastructure development.     

The great depression as a global currency crisis: An Argentine perspective

The Review of Austrian Economics - Many of the works that have tried to understand the proximate causes of the Great Depression have emphasized the consequences of maintaining the Gold Standard...     

Information acquisition and institutions: An organizational perspective

Using a World Bank survey of Chinese firms, I construct a set of measures to capture the extent to which a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition. I find that firms that outsource more are not more likely to involve outsiders in acquiring information. Weakening contracting institutions raises the difficulty of safeguarding information leakage, more so when a firm involves outsiders in information acquisition than when no outsiders are involved. I test this prediction and find that firms under weaker contracting institutions are significantly less likely to involve outsiders in information acquisition.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

Bargaining and network structure: An experiment

We consider bargaining in a bipartite network of buyers and sellers, who can only trade with the limited number of people with whom they are connected. We perform an experimental test of a graph-theoretic model that yields unique predictions about equilibrium prices for the networks in our sessions. The results diverge sharply depending on how a connection is made between two separate simple networks, typically conforming to the theoretical directional predictions. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link, and we find evidence of a form of social learning.