The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe

Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle.     

Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union

I discuss possible problems engendered by loss of national monetary policies, and study them from three empirical perspectives. First, are business cycles sufficiently synchronized across EMU member countries? The evidence suggests that economic activity in those countries has become increasingly correlated in the 1990s, and that policy co–ordination has played a role in generating that outcome. Second, are there asymmetries in the mechanisms through which policy affects economic activity? The paper documents that policy transmission was indeed heterogeneous in the member countries, and that structural and financial factors were sensibly related to cross–country differences in the response of output to a monetary policy shock. Third, how is policy implemented in an environment of diverse business cycle fundamentals and transmission mechanisms? Estimation of monetary policy reaction functions finds that the European Central Bank is closer to an aggregate of the central banks in Germany, France, and Italy than to the Bundesbank alone.     

Changes in behaviour under EMU

Using a simple model of the euro area economy, we explore whether EMU has been associated with changes in behaviour both in the run up to Stage 3 and since it started operating. We find that some behaviour has indeed changed; expectations formation, inflation, country dispersion of behaviour, fiscal policy (although the run up to Stage 3 shows a greater change than within it) and monetary policy (with several caveats). However, EMU does not appear to be associated with changes in the labour markets; employment, output growth and productivity. Substantial caution is needed in attributing these changes to EMU as much of the rest of OECD enjoyed similar changes over the same period.     

Measuring fiscal spillovers in EMU and beyond: A Global VAR approach

This paper identifies and measures fiscal spillovers in the EU countries empirically using a global vector autoregression (GVAR) model. Our aim was to look at the sign and the absolute values of fiscal spillovers in a countrywise perspective and at the time profile (impulse response) of the impacts of fiscal shocks. We find moderate spillover effects of fiscal policy shocks originating in Germany and France. However, there is significant variation regarding the magnitude of the spillovers on individual destination countries and country clusters. Furthermore, we find some evidence that German or French fiscal spillovers are stronger on EMU than on non‐EMU countries.     

The effect of monetary policy on output in EMU3: A sign restriction approach

This paper examines the effects of monetary policy shocks on output in the three largest euro area economies – Germany, France and Italy (EMU3) – by applying a new VAR identification procedure. The results show that monetary policy innovations are at their most potent in Germany. However, apart from Germany, it remains ambiguous as to whether a rise in interest rates concludes with a fall in output, showing a lack of homogeneity in the responses. Homogeneity in response to a monetary shock is crucial in a one-size-fits-all framework. Nonetheless, the lack of similarity between the responses, which is hypothesised to cause de-synchronised business cycles in optimal currency area literature, is often based on the premise that monetary policy itself is a major source of business cycle fluctuations. This paper concludes that monetary policy innovations play, at most, a modest role in generating fluctuations in output for the EMU3. Consequently, it is less important whether the effects of monetary policy are homogenous.     

Stock market response to monetary and fiscal policy shocks: Multi-country evidence

A Structural VAR model is employed to investigate the effects of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on stock market performance in Germany, UK and the US. A significant number of past studies have concentrated their attention on the relationship between monetary policy and stock market performance, yet only few on the effects of fiscal policy on stock markets. Even more we know little, if any, on the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on stock market performance when the two policies interact. This study aims to fill this void. Our results show that both fiscal and monetary policies influence the stock market, via either direct or indirect channels. More importantly, we find evidence that the interaction between the two policies is very important in explaining stock market developments. Thus, investors and analysts in their effort to understand the relationship between macroeconomic policies and stock market performance should consider fiscal and monetary policies in tandem rather than in isolation.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Deficit sustainability and inflation in EMU: An analysis from the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

Price determination theory typically focuses on the role of monetary policy, while the role of fiscal policy is usually neglected. From a different point of view, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level takes into account monetary and fiscal policy interactions and assumes that fiscal policy may determine the price level, even if monetary authorities pursue an inflation targeting strategy. In this paper we try to test empirically whether the time path of the government budget in EMU countries would have affected price level determination. Our results point to the sustainability of fiscal policy in all the EMU countries but Finland, although no firm conclusions can be drawn about the prevalence of either monetary or fiscal dominance.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

Abstract. This paper studies the design and effects of monetary and fiscal policy in the euro area. To do so, a stylized two‐region model of monetary and fiscal policy rules in the EMU is built. We analyse how monetary and fiscal rules affect the adjustment dynamics in the model. Both the effects on the individual countries and on the EMU aggregate economy are studied. Three aspects play an important role in the analysis: (i) the consequences of alternative monetary and fiscal policy rules, (ii) the consequences of asymmetries between EMU countries (asymmetries in macroeconomic shocks and macroeconomic structures), and (iii) the role of alternative degrees of backward‐ and forward‐looking behaviour in consumer decisions and inflation expectations.     

Leader of the pack? German monetary dominance in Europe prior to EMU

In this paper, the monetary policy independence of European nations in the years before European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is investigated using cointegration techniques. Daily data is used to assess pairwise relationships between individual EMU nations and ‘lead’ nation Germany, to assess the hypothesis that Germany was the dominant European nation prior to EMU. By and large our econometric investigations support this hypothesis, and lead us to conclude that the only European nation to lose monetary policy independence in the light of monetary union was Germany. Our results have important policy implications. Given that the loss of monetary policy independence is generally viewed as the main cost of monetary unification, our findings suggest a reconsideration of the costs and benefits of monetary integration. A country can only lose what it has, and in Europe the countries that joined EMU — spare Germany — apparently did not have much to lose, at least not in terms of monetary independence. Instead, they actually gained monetary policy influence by getting a seat in the ECB's governing council which is responsible for setting interest policy in the euro area.     

影响欧元区经济增长的因素分析

除2001年以外,欧元区的经济增长水平一直低于世界发达经济体。根本原因是其技术进步相对落后,劳动力市场僵化,失业率居高不下。以价格稳定为首要目标的单一货币政策,有利于其宏观经济稳定,但在一定程度上制约了经济的快速增长;共同财政纪律,有利于其经济顺利推进,但是削弱了各成员国运用财政政策抵御国内经济周期性振荡以及外部经济失衡的能力,尤其在经济衰退时期限制了各国利用扩张性财政政策刺激经济的手段。     

Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion

Six years into the successful operation of European economic and monetary union (EMU), the conduct of the single monetary policy and of national economic policies and the interaction between them continue to be debated by both academics and policy-makers. This paper approaches the debate by assessing the role that strategies, rules and discretion play in the conduct of economic policies in the euro area. From this perspective, it discusses in particular the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB), the rules-based framework for national fiscal policies as laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact and the structural reform efforts under the umbrella of the Lisbon Strategy. It concludes that the current policy framework - with its combination of strategies, rules and constrained discretion - is well suited to deliver stability and growth in Europe, provided it is implemented effectively.     

Is There a Trade‐Off Between Inflation Variability and Output‐Gap Variability in the EMU Countries?

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy in eleven EMU countries for the whole period of the EMS. This is based on the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. To this end, we examine whether the introduction of an implicit inflation targeting by the EMU member countries after the Maastricht Treaty, changed the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. We employ a stochastic volatility model for two sub‐periods of the EMS (i.e. before and after the Maastricht Treaty). We find that the trade‐off varies amongst EMU countries. The implication of these findings is that there are asymmetries in the euro area, due to different economic structures among the member countries of the EMU.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Debt and Punishment: Market Discipline in the Eurozone

This article challenges the conventional wisdom of weak market discipline in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). In so doing, we empirically analyse the dynamics of market discipline for all 27 EU member states between 1992 and 2007. The existing literature tends to assert that markets discipline governments, without measuring whether the interest punishment markets impose actually has the purported effect on government policy. To better grasp the dynamics of market discipline it is essential to consider both sides. Market discipline is thus understood as a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, financial investors react to policy developments. On the other hand, policy-makers react to market signals. We find strong evidence that although the impact of fiscal policy developments on market punishment slightly decreases with monetary integration, government responsiveness to market punishment increases. This runs counter to the conventional narrative of policy-makers banking on bailout from fellow EMU members.     

The transmission of business cyclesImplications for EMU enlargement1

We show that countries characterized by large bilateral trade and financial flows tend to have more correlated business cycles. However, we also find that countries with divergent fiscal policies and highly regulated labour markets are subject to idiosyncratic cycles. Applying these results to the new member states of the EU weakens the optimistic view towards the monetary integration of these countries into the euro area, which is frequently found in the literature. Although our results suggest that extensive trade and financial linkages are likely to result in further increases in business cycle correlation, an increase in labour market regulation and the pursuit of national fiscal policies may result in a counteracting effect.     

EMU and the transmission of monetary policy: evidence from business lending rates

This paper analyses the pass-through of money market rates to short-term and long-term business lending rates in the four largest euro area countries. The main findings of the paper are (1) that since the start of EMU loan rates appear to have become more responsive to money market rate changes in France, Italy and Spain, but not in Germany, and (2) that German loan rates are significantly more sluggish than loan rates in the other three large euro area countries. I also test for non-linear pass-through based on an asymmetric error-correction model but do not find much evidence of non-linearity in euro area interest rate pass-through.The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily represent the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank.     

Monetary–fiscal policy interaction and fiscal inflation: A tale of three countries

We study the impact of the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy on the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation using cross-country data from 1965 to 1999. In a first step, we contrast the monetary–fiscal narrative for Germany, the U.S., and Italy with evidence obtained from simple regression models and a time-varying VAR. We find that the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation is low during periods of an independent central bank and responsible fiscal policy and more pronounced in times of non-responsible fiscal policy and accommodative monetary authorities. In a second step, we use an estimated DSGE model to interpret the low-frequency measure structurally and to illustrate the mechanisms through which fiscal actions affect inflation in the long run. The findings from the DSGE model suggest that switches in the monetary–fiscal policy interaction and accompanying variations in the propagation of structural shocks can well account for changes in the low-frequency relationship between the fiscal stance and inflation.     

Fiscal discipline in EMU? Testing the effectiveness of the Excessive Deficit Procedure

The Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), central to the Stability and Growth Pact, has been criticized from opposite ends. Some blame the EDP for imposing too much fiscal austerity. Others question whether the EDP has any disciplining power at all. To test its actual effects, we construct a real-time database of EDP recommendations and estimate augmented real-time and ex-post fiscal reaction functions for a panel of EMU member states. Overall, we find that a 1% of GDP larger EDP recommendation leads to 0.8–0.9% of GDP of additional fiscal consolidation plans, and 0.6–0.7% of actual consolidation. This result does not extend to countries subject to financial support programs: we find that, while they did implement substantial consolidation measures, in these countries required and delivered consolidation efforts are less connected. Overall, our results suggest that EDP recommendations have substantially shaped fiscal policies in the euro area, especially in the years 2010–2014, when EDP recommendations were most frequent.