Economic Growth with Imperfect Protection of Intellectual Property Rights

This paper examines the growth effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection in a quality-ladder model of endogenous growth. Stronger IPR protection, which reduces the imitation probability, increases the reward for innovation. However, stronger protection also gradually reduces the number of competitive sectors, in which innovation is easier than in monopolistic sectors. With free entry to R&D, the number of researchers in each remaining competitive sector increases, but the concentration of R&D activity raises the possibility of unnecessary duplication of innovation, thereby hindering growth. Consequently, imperfect rather than perfect protection maximizes growth. Welfare and scale effects are also examined.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Private patent protection in the theory of Schumpeterian growth

We develop a Schumpeterian growth model with privately optimal intellectual property rights (IPRs) enforcement and investigate the implications for intellectual property and R&D policies. In our setting, successful innovators undertake costly rent protection activities (RPAs) to enforce their patents. RPAs deter innovators who seek to discover higher quality products and thereby replace the patent holder. RPAs also deter imitators who seek to capture a portion of the monopoly market by imitating the patent holder's product. We investigate the role of private IPR protection by considering the impact of subsidies to RPAs on economic growth and welfare. We find that a larger RPA subsidy raises the innovation rate if and only if the ease of imitation is above a certain level. With regards to welfare, we find that depending on the parameters it may be optimal to tax or subsidize RPAs. Thus a prohibitively high taxation of RPAs is not necessarily optimal. We also show that the presence of imitation strengthens the case for subsidizing R&D.     

The role of diminishing returns in neo-Schumpeterian growth theory

Summary. This paper generalizes Segerstrom [5], a dynamic general equilibrium model of endogenous growth through quality improvements in which innovation and imitation are modeled as the outcomes of research and development (R&D) races. Specific factors introduced into the technologies of both R&D activities achieve diminishing returns to scale in R&D. The comparative-static results of subsidies to R&D activities depend on the degree of diminishing returns to scale in R&D. When there is (is not) a sufficient degree of diminishing returns to R&D, a subsidy to innovative activity increases (decreases) innovative activity. Received: July 8, 1994; revised version: June 9, 1997     

Imitation and innovation driven development under imperfect intellectual property rights

Developing countries employ about two-fifth of the world's researchers, originate one quarter of world expenditures on R&D, and their inventions are subject to imitation. Nevertheless, the previous literature focuses on North–South setups in which the South is restricted to imitating northern inventions. To analyze the effects of IPR policies on developed and developing countries, we extend this literature to allow not only for southern innovation and imitation of northern goods, but also for imitation targeted at southern innovations. We find the effects of IPRs on R&D and welfare to be non-monotonic and dependent on innovation efficiency and an innovation threshold in the South. For sufficiently strong IPRs the South engages in original R&D and stronger IPRs promote southern innovation, welfare, and a reduction in the North–South wage gap. Below the threshold, a strengthening of IPR protection fails to promote innovation and decreases welfare. Stronger IPRs exclusively for southern firms can benefit both regions by shifting southern resources from the imitation of northern goods to original southern innovation.     

R&D intensity,economic growth and firm-size growth: theory and practice

This article proposes a theoretical knowledge-driven horizontal research and development (R&D) endogenous-growth model to explain, for 10 innovative countries, the co-movement of the respective R&D intensity, economic growth and firm-size growth, by exploring short-medium-run and long-run growth effects. Bearing in mind some recent literature, we improve the R&D technology, by considering that R&D is more labour intensive through time as complexity increases, that the diffusion of designs is affected by coordination, organizational and transportation costs, and that a potential entrant will come up with the right idea is reduced because of the presence of a larger number of entrants. We show that when the economy is not initially in a steady state, it can take a saddle path towards the unique and locally saddle-path stable interior steady state. Both transitional-dynamics and steady-state behaviours of our theoretical model are then consistent with, respectively, the time-series and the cross-sectional evidence.     

Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms’ R&D strategy choice

In this paper a firm’s R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firm characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This yields three types of equilibria, in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms’ equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms’ incentives to engage in R&D, while excessive competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics.     

Cooperation or competition in R&D when innovation and absorption are costly

This article analyzes cost-reducing R&D investments by firms that behave non-cooperatively or cooperatively. Firms face a trade-off between allocating their R&D investments to innovate or to imitate (absorb). We find that the non-cooperative behavior not only induces more imitation (absorption) but also, for the most part, more innovation investments. Only the cooperative behavior, however, ensures that R&D investments are allocated efficiently to innovation and to imitation (absorption) in the sense that any given amount of industry-wide cost reduction is obtained for the minimum overall R&D costs.     

University patents,R&D competition,and social welfare

Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

Innovation and imitation under imperfect patent protection

The paper develops a model in which the spillover of R&D is a consequence of a rational investment in imitation. The model incorporates the innovator's choice between patenting and secrecy as a protection device. The analysis demonstrates that an increase in patent breadth always discourages resorting to secrecy, whereas the influence of increased patent life is the opposite with large spillovers. An increase in patent life can also reduce innovative activity with large spillovers. Under endogenous imitation, short patents are socially optimal.     

The Sun Also Rises: Productivity Convergence Between Japan and the USA

The growth process for a technological leader is different from that of a follower. While followers can grow through imitation and capital deepening, a leader must undertake original research. This suggests that as the gap between the leader and the follower narrows, the follower must undertake more genuinely innovative R&D and possibly face a slower overall growth rate. The results of a dynamic panel equilibrium-correction model of productivity growth suggest that the productivity gap with the USA had a strong effect on the growth of Japanese manufacturing, and that changes in R&D intensity also made a significant contribution. Moreover, the effect of the productivity gap was significantly higher in industries that had higher R&D intensities, higher levels of human capital, and were more open to exports. This paper is based upon Chapter 5 of my D.Phil. thesis at the University of Oxford. It was partly written while I was a Visiting Scholar at the Foundation for Advanced Information & Research, Tokyo, and was supported by a Sanwa Bank Foundation Research Fellowship and ESRC grants R000234954 and R000237500.     

Optimal patent length and breadth in an economy with creative destruction and non-diversifiable risk

In this paper, I examine the optimal patent shape in an economy in which R&D firms innovate and imitate, households face non-diversifiable risk and there is externality in production and R&D. With non-diversifiable risk, a household’s consumption and investment decisions are interlinked. This economy contains industries of two kinds: monopoly industries with an innovator only, and duopoly industries with an innovator and an imitator. I define patent length as the expected time in which an innovation is imitated, and patent breadth as the innovator’s profit share in an industry after a successful imitation. The government can control patent length by the requirements for accepting a substitute for a patented good, and patent breadth by imposing compulsory licensing and royalties for the patentee after a successful imitation. I show that the stronger the externality in production relative to R&D is, the slower the optimal growth rate, the larger the optimal proportion of duopoly industries, and the longer and narrower the optimal patent.     

The struggle to survive in the R&D sector: Implications for innovation and growth

By allowing for investment activities by research and development (R&D) firms to prevent product obsolescence, we show that if legal patent protection is too strong, a higher R&D subsidy rate delivers insufficient investments for survival in the R&D sector, depressing innovation and growth in the long run.     

Effects of a blocking patent on R&D with endogenous survival activities

This study analyzes the effect of strengthening patent protection for innovation and economic growth by introducing a blocking patent into the endogenous growth model developed by Furukawa (Econ Lett 121(1):26–29, 2013a), which features survival activity of patent holders in the R&D sector with a variety-expansion model. Results show that strengthening patent protection can raise the economic growth rate and social welfare through an endogenous survival investment. Additionally, this study examines the effects of increasing subsidies for R&D. We find that increasing R&D subsidy rate can negatively affect economic growth and social welfare because of the investment for survival activities. This result shows the novel role of a blocking patent in determining innovation effects of R&D subsidies. Furthermore, we analyze the effect of patent breadth which is another patent instrument in this model on innovation and economic growth. Results show that the growth and welfare effects of the profit-division rule and the subsidy rate for R&D may vary with the size of patent breadth.     

GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSING AND THE INTENSITY OF AGGREGATE SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT

We develop a theoretical model in which the sophistication of technologies improves over time due to research and development (R&D) undertaken by software developers in two sectors. In the commercial sector, R&D intensity is driven by economic incentives, whereas in the sector using the General Public License (GPL), it is driven by the preference-based labor supply of individuals. A higher amount of GPL labor allocation generates equilibrium effects that adversely affect commercial software development. When the degree of imitation in the GPL sector is relatively higher than in the commercial sector, or the commercial sector has increasing returns of a limited degree, the R&D intensity in the commercial sector would decline by more than any increases in R&D intensity in the GPL sector. Thus, aggregate R&D intensity in the long run would be reduced. Numerical simulation indicates that this outcome pertains under realistic parameter ranges.     

How does leverage affect R&D intensity and how does R&D intensity impact on firm value in South Korea?

We examine how leverage affects corporate research and development (R&D) intensity, as well as examine the impact of R&D on firm value in South Korea, a country in which corporate-funded R&D intensity is one of the highest in the world. Among our main results, we find that growth opportunities have a positive effect on R&D intensity, while leverage has a negative effect on R&D intensity. When leverage is at an extremely high level, the relationship between growth opportunities and R&D intensity turns from positive to negative. Using instrumental variables, we find that R&D generates an increase in firm value.     

R&D Activities In a Peripheral Region: an Empirical Study with Special Reference to the North East Region of the UK

This study examines the incidence of research and development (R&D) activities, type of R&D undertaken and the incidence of R&D co-operation among manufacturing firms located in a key urban area of the North East England, a peripheral region of the UK. We have found that over 62% of manufacturing firms in this urban growth area to be R&D active, suggesting that R&D active firms tend to be concentrated in urban area s in a peripheral region, as it is the case in the leading regions. However, the incidence of R&D co-operation was found to be relatively low among R&D active firms. It is also found that the key determinants of undertaking R&D to be the existence of a core competence/product and exporting activities. These findings might be of interest to policy makers promoting economic growth via firm’s R&D activities.     

A contribution to the theory and empirics of Schumpeterian growth with worldwide interactions

This paper proposes an integrated theoretical and methodological framework characterized by technological interactions to explain growth processes from a Schumpeterian perspective. Global interdependence implied by international R&D spillovers needs to be taken into account in both the theoretical and empirical models. For this task, spatial econometrics is the appropriate tool. The econometric model we propose includes the neoclassical growth model as a particular case. We can therefore explicitly test the role of R&D investment in the long-run growth process against the Solow growth model. Finally, the properties of our spatial econometric specification allow the explicit evaluation of the impact of home and foreign R&D spillovers.     

Patent claims and economic growth

This study introduces a blocking patent on horizontal R&D into the endogenous growth model of Chu et al. (2012), which features a blocking patent on vertical R&D. Results show that strengthening patent protection on horizontal R&D promotes vertical innovation (quality improvement) but hinders horizontal innovation (variety expansion). This effect of a horizontal blocking patent on directionality of innovation is opposite to that of the vertical blocking patent analyzed by Chu et al. (2012). Results also show that under mild conditions, strengthening a blocking patent on horizontal innovation as well as on vertical innovation can increase economic growth and social welfare.