Spatial welfare economics versus ecological footprint: modeling agglomeration,externalities and trade

A welfare framework for the analysis of the spatial dimensions of sustainability is developed. It covers agglomeration effects, interregional trade, negative environmental externalities, and various land use categories. The model is used to compare rankings of spatial configurations according to evaluations based on social welfare and ecological footprint indicators. Five spatial configurations are considered for this purpose. The exercise is operationalized with the help of a two-region model of the economy, that is, in line with the ‘new economic geography.’ By generating a number of numerical ‘counter-examples,’ it is shown that the footprint method is inconsistent with an approach aimed at maximum social welfare. Unless environmental externalities are such a large problem that they overwhelm all other components of economic well-being, a ‘spatial welfare economic’ approach delivers totally different rankings of alternative land use configurations than the ecological footprint.      

On economic growth and minimum wages

We offer an analysis of the existence of a positive relationship between minimum wages and economic growth in a simple one-sector overlapping generations economy à la Romer (J Polit Econ 94:1002–1037, 1986), in the case of both homogeneous and heterogeneous labour and without considering any growth-sustaining externalities which the minimum wage can generate. Assuming also the existence of unemployment benefits financed with balanced-budget consumption taxes not conditional upon age, we show that the minimum wage can promote economic growth and welfare despite the occurrence of unemployment. There may also exist a growth- and welfare-maximising minimum wage.     

Agreeing on generalised Darwinism: a response to Pavel Pelikan

Pelikan (J Evol Econ 21:341–366, 2011) develops an interesting conceptual framework that adds to prior work on generalised Darwinism. Despite claims to the contrary we show that it is similar to the approach developed by Hodgson and Knudsen (J Evol Econ 16(4):343–366, 2006a, J Econ Behav Organ 75(1):12–24, 2010a, b), Aldrich et al. (J Evol Econ 18(5):577–596, 2008) and others. Pelikan also mischaracterises the Hodgson–Knudsen position over Lamarckism. We show why the term is misleading (rather than strictly wrong) when applied to social evolution.     

Friedman meets Becker and Mulligan in a monetary neoclassical growth model

We study a neoclassical growth model with the time preference determined by resources spent on imagining future pleasures along the line of Becker and Mulligan (Q J Econ 112:729–758, 1997). We introduce money into the economy via a cash-in-advance constraint and study the effect of higher seignorage taxes or higher monetary growth rates on capital, consumption and welfare in the long run. We find that if the fraction of investment constrained by cash is smaller than a threshold, the negative-monetary-growth Friedman (The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays, 1969) rule does not hold and the optimal inflation rate is positive. Calibrating our model yields a mild optimal inflation rate per annum with a switch from zero inflation to optimal inflation creating a sizable welfare gain in terms of consumption equivalence.     

The determinants of local employment dynamics in Western Germany

This article studies the impact of the local industrial structure on employment dynamics in Western Germany. Following the approach of Combes et al. (J Urban Econ 56:217–243, 2004) for France, local employment growth is decomposed into internal growth resulting from employment changes in existing plants and into external growth determined by employment decisions of newly established plants. The dynamics of both components are estimated simultaneously, taking explicitly into account the timing of the impact of specialization, diversity, and competition in a region. The analysis is conducted for 24 sectors in the West German labor market regions from 1993 to 2002. Estimation results emphasize the positive influence of diversity on both the internal and external employment growth, whereas there is no clear result on specialization. A high degree of competition fosters external employment, but is detrimental to internal employment. Dynamic panel regressions show that static externalities dominate. Importantly, the impact of the local industrial structure on employment dynamics does not differ between small and larger plants, nor are there fundamental differences between Western Germany and France.     

Optimal fixed cost subsidies in Melitz-type models

This paper analyzes the reallocation and welfare effects of fixed cost subsidies in a Melitz-type model. In a closed economy, the planner trades off product variety and average productivity effects. Neither subsidies on entry fixed costs nor on operating fixed costs are welfare enhancing. These results reflect the Pareto optimality of the laissez faire equilibrium. In a “small” open economy à la Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (J Int Econ 78(1):100–112, 2009), an entry fixed cost subsidy does not enhance welfare, while a small operating fixed cost subsidy does. Only the latter affects the relative attractiveness of exporting. The average firm thus realloactes labor from export to domestic activity and operates at a smaller scale, which allows for a larger increase in domestic product variety than in the closed economy.     

中国通货膨胀的福利成本研究

Inflation is always an important indicator to measure whether economy is stable and healthy. This paper provides a substantive survey of the research on the welfare cost of inflation, and uses the methods of consumer’s surplus and neo-classical general equilibrium models respectively to estimate the welfare cost of inflation in China. The results show that high inflation will cause huge welfare cost in China, so keeping low inflation is beneficial to the entire economic welfare of China. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2007, (4): 30–42, 159     

Good standing and cooperation

Indirect reciprocity is generally considered one of the leading mechanisms to explain how cooperation may emerge by natural selection. The basic intuition is that establishing a reputation of being a helpful individual increases the probability of being in turn helped. Two models have been proposed to describe how indirect reciprocity may work: the standing model (Sugden 1986/2004 in The economics of rights, cooperation and welfare. Blackwell, Oxford.) and the image-scoring model (Nowak and Sigmund 1998a in Nature 393:573–577, b in J Theoretical Biol 194:561–574). Although there is evidence that the former model would perform better under a wide set of circumstances, it is often maintained that it requires individuals with an implausibly large capacity of processing recursive information. In this paper, I argue that this is not actually the case. I further emphasize that even if the hypothesis of indirect reciprocity is unable to give a fair account of the ecological bases of cooperation, it has inspired a deal of research precious to social sciences.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

EFFICIENCY EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN COMMONWEALTH GRANTS TO THE STATES: A CGE ANALYSIS*

This paper describes CSF, a general equilibrium model encompassing factors of relevance to economic efficiency in Federal/State funding including: interstate differences in tax bases and unit costs of State‐provided goods; factor mobility; congestion; State‐government behaviour incorporating the possibility that governments in subsidised States embark on expenditures with low benefit/cost ratios (flypaper effects); fiscal externalities; and non‐discretionary expenditures in each State associated with special national responsibilities. The model is applied to Australia where Federal/State funding is a major political and economic issue. Welfare effects of moving from the present Australian funding system based on fiscal equalisation to a system of equal‐per‐capita grants are calculated. CSF implies that the welfare gain from this move would be small. The most important source of potential welfare gain is a reduction in flypaper effects. The recognition of congestion externalities can eliminate the small welfare gain, but only under seemingly extreme assumptions. The results are not very sensitive to variations in assumptions concerning population mobility and fiscal externalities.     

Evolution of networks—an experimental analysis

It is the main aim of our paper to study network formation in experimental setups in discrete and continuous time. Our design is inspired by the theoretical model on network formation by Bala and Goyal (Econometrica, 68(5): 1181–1229, 2000) as well as the experiments by Callander and Plott (J. Public Econ., 89: 1469–1495, 2005) and Falk and Kosfeld (IEW Working Paper, University of Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland, No. 146, 2003). In particular, we analyze the role of star-shaped networks which are strict Nash-equilibria of the corresponding network formation game. Our experimental results show that strict Nash networks prove to be a good indicator for predicting network formation, particularly in continuous time. In explaining our results, it turns out that, among others, the complexity in coordinating on stars, the inequity aversion against unequal payoff distribution in the network, and the groups’ degrees of activity are the most important determinants for the formation of strict Nash networks.      

Trade Negotiations under Alternative Bargaining Structure

We build a bargaining model, in which a country (leader) decides whether or not to form a free trade agreement with other nations (followers), either through a sequential or a multilateral bargaining procedure. Unlike Aghion et al. ( 2007 , Journal of International Economics, 73, 1–30), in our specification of multilateral bargaining, the leader can collude with all those follower countries who agree to its offer. This has important implications for the choice of sequential and multilateral bargaining by the leader in presence of coalition externalities. Moreover, this bargaining procedure ensures that “stumbling block” equilibrium will never occur.     

Decreasing marginal impatience in a two-country world economy

By using a two-country model with endogenous time preference, this paper examines the dynamic implication of decreasing marginal impatience (DMI). To ensure stability, we assume that one country has DMI whereas the other has increasing marginal impatience (IMI). The resultant equilibrium dynamics differ from what can be inferred from the analysis of the standard IMI model (e.g., Devereux and Shi in J Int Econ 30:1–25, 1991). An increase in fiscal spending, in either country with DMI or IMI, has always contrasting long-run effects on domestic and foreign consumption and hence on domestic and foreign welfare; and the same policy definitely raises the interest rate in the long run.     

Coalitional stability under perfect foresight

Summary. We analyze strategic social environments where coalitions can form through binding or nonbinding agreements and actions of a coalition may impose externalities upon the welfare of the rest of the players. We define a solution concept that (1) captures the perfect foresight of the players that has been overlooked in the literature (e.g., Harsanyi [10] and Chwe [6]) and (2) identifies the coalitions that are likely to form and the “stable” outcomes that will not be replaced by any coalition of rational (and hence farsighted) players. The proposed solution concept thereby offers a notion of agreements and coalition formation in complex social environments. Received: February 12, 1996; revised version: March 3, 1997     

外部性与重工业优先发展

In the framework of a dynamic general equilibrium model, this paper studies how vertical externalities affect the development of heavy industry in a developing economy. The model is comprised of an intermediate and a consumer product sector. The production of both types of goods has pecuniary externalities as they are featured by increasing return to scale. However, the production of an intermediate product has an additional advantage to have externalities through its technological linkage with the production of consumer goods. This is related to the nature of the roundabout production of consumer goods: a larger number of intermediate products lead to higher productivity in the production of consumer goods than do more inputs of a fixed number of intermediate products. Therefore, private investment in the intermediate sector is below the social optimal level. Government subsidies can restore the economy to the social optimum, but they become less needed as the consumer sector grows larger and the advantage of the intermediate good sector diminishes. __________ Translated from Nankai Jingji Yanjiu 南开经济研究 (Nankai Economic Studies), 2007, (2): 3–19     

Is the monetary policy rule responsive to exchange rate changes? The case of Indonesia,Malaysia, the Philippines,and Thailand

Extending Obstfeld and Rogoff (J Econ Perspect 9:73–96, 1995), Ball (Monetary policy rules, University of Chicago Press, pp. 127–144, 1999), Svensson (J Int Econ 50: 155–183, 2000), Taylor (Am Econ Rev 91: 263–267, 2001), Gali and Gertler (J Econ Perspect 21:25–46, 2007), and others, this paper finds that central banks in the Philippines and Thailand respond negatively to the current real exchange rate and positively to the lagged real exchange rate whereas central banks in Indonesia and Malaysia do not react to the current or lagged real exchange rate. For the Philippines and Thailand, the null hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients of the current and lagged real exchange rates is zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Central banks in these four countries respond positively to the inflation rate and the output gap, suggesting that the concept of a simple or an extended Taylor rule would apply to these countries. Monetary policy reaction functions for Indonesia and Thailand are steeper than those for Malaysia and the Philippines and would be more responsive to a change in the inflation rate.      

What can we learn from the distribution of trade patterns?

This paper proposes an empirical framework for analyzing the dynamics of trade specialization, using a symmetric transformation of the standard Balassa (Manch Sch Econ Soc Stud 33(2):99–123, 1965) index and the conditional density estimation methods suggested by Hyndman et al. (J Comput Graph Stat 5(4):315–336, 1996). The framework is implemented using data on the cross-sector export and import specialization of the four initial EU Cohesion countries over the last 40 years. We discuss the importance of studying both the distribution’s external shape and the intra-distribution dynamics and why it is interesting to include imports in the analysis. We find a reduction of the overall degree of export specialization in Portugal, Greece and Spain. Conversely, Ireland has the strongest export specialization and there is evidence of an increase over time. The export intra-distribution dynamics reveal persistence of the specialization status in the four countries, especially for high values of the index. In all countries, the degree of specialization is higher for exports than for imports and intra-distribution dynamics reveal more mobility of import specialization than that of exports.     

Conformism and cooperation in a local interaction model

We analyze a local interaction model where agents play a bilateral prisoner’s dilemma game with their neighbors. Agents learn about behavior through payoff-biased imitation of their interaction neighbors (and possibly some agents beyond this set). We find that the Eshel et al. (Am Econ Rev 88:157–179, 1998) result that polymorphic states are stochastically stable in such a setting is not robust. In particular, whenever agents use information also of some agents beyond their interaction neighbors, the unique stable outcome is one where everyone chooses defection. Introducing a sufficiently strong conformist bias into the imitation process, we find that full cooperation always emerges. Conformism is thus identified as a new mechanism that can stabilize cooperation.

Illustrating the importance of Austrian business cycle theory: A reply to Murphy,Barnett, and Block; A call for quantitative study

Murphy et al. (2009) criticize Young’s (2005) test of Austrian business cycle theory (ABCT) using US industry-level quarterly job reallocation data and the federal funds rate as a monetary policy indicator. I argue that not only are Murphy et al.’s specific criticisms misguided; more importantly, they all but completely rule out the type of empirical study that Young (2005) advocates: specifically, one that (1) is quantitative and distinguishes between statistical and economic significance and (2) attempts to exploit a hypothesis that is both a prediction of ABCT and not a prediction of competing monetary theories of the cycle. I argue that empirical studies embodying (1) and (2) are critical to ABCT as a research program. Furthermore, I review the existing econometric studies of ABCT from the last 10 years and conclude that there is much room for improvement along these lines.     

Coase (1937) revisited: Endogenous fiat in firms and markets

Coase (Economica 4:386–405, 1937) observed that, within firms, employees are directed by fiat. Ever since it has been argued that hierarchical control and fiat are institutional attributes of firms. In contrast with this view, there is evidence that the organizational structure of many interfirm relations, from supply networks to franchising, is also hierarchical. To reconcile Coase’s insight with the evidence, I develop a model where the obligations of both a firm’s contractors and its employees cannot be enforced by courts, so they must be self-enforcing. I show that fiat, in the form of relational contracts where the agent obeys the principal in equilibrium, occurs both when the agent is an employee—so the principal owns all the assets—and when she is a contractor—so the agent owns some assets. However, the principal can give more orders to an employee (contractor) when decisions sufficiently above (close to) those that maximize the value of the contractor’s assets are optimal—for instance, because there are strong positive externalities between the assets. The model has several implications for the theory of the firm, the distinction between markets, hybrids and hierarchies, and the choice between in-house provision and outsourcing of public services.