我国逃税规模的测算及其经济影响分析

准确地把握逃税规模是对逃税的经济影响进行分析的前提和基础,本文运用现金比率法对我国自1985年到2002年地下经济规模和因地下经济导致的逃税规模进行了测算.同时,还估算了我国地上经济中存在的逃税规模,通过对二者的合并,计算出了我国逃税的总体规模.在此基础上,本文从三个方面着重分析了我国逃税对整个经济的影响:一是逃税对财政收入与GDP的效应,二是逃税的资源配置效应,三是逃税的收入分配效应.最后本文还对我国逃税的治理提出了若干对策建议.     

我国逃税行为的经济学分析

逃税作为一种信息不对称状态下的机会主义行为,在各个国家普遍存在。在转轨经济背景下,我国逃税现象更为严重,它给我们的资源配置及收入分配均带来负面影响。本文在介绍评价A-S经典模型的基础上,结合我国国情,从逃税心理成本的角度拓展了A-S模型的内容,从而更好地解释了我国的逃税现象并据此提出治理逃税行为的政策建议。     

抽样调查中降低无回答率的措施和方法

无回答问题是影响抽样调查统计数据质量和利用效益的一个重要因素，也是非抽样误差的一个重要来源。可通过优选与培训采访人员、加强调查队伍管理、准确定位调查对象、保证问卷的送达率等加以预防，采取物质奖励、消除疑虑、提前告知和事中提醒等加以控制，采用多次访问、替换被调查单位、随机化回答技术等方法来降低无回答率。     

我国“用工荒＂的现状及原因分析

近几年来,我国劳动力市场同时出现了“用工荒”和“就业难”并存的问题,表面上看似矛盾的两者,实际上却反映出我国劳动市场并非是简单的表面的就业矛盾,而是深层次的结构性矛盾。本文通过对近几年全国范围出现的“用工荒”现象进行分析,发现现阶段的“用工荒”呈现新的特点,在此基础上从供需两方面并结合经济因素、制度因素、人口因素对“用工荒”的产生进行分析,提出相应的解决思路和对策。     

我国“用工荒”的现状及原因分析

近几年来,我国劳动力市场同时出现了“用工荒”和“就业难”并存的问题,表面上看似矛盾的两者,实际上却反映出我国劳动市场并非是简单的表面的就业矛盾,而是深层次的结构性矛盾.本文通过对近几年全国范围出现的“用工荒”现象进行分析,发现现阶段的“用工荒”呈现新的特点,在此基础上从供需两方面并结合经济因素、制度因素、人口因素对“用工荒”的产生进行分析,提出相应的解决思路和对策.     

我国社会的“啃老”现象评析

目前，我国城市中出现的“啃老”现象是现阶段我国处于社会结构转型时期，各种社会因素共同作用的结果，具有一定的历史必然性，这种现象一方面会使“啃老”群体产生不劳而荻的思想，难以实现正常的社会就业，另一方面，会给创造更多的社会财富带来更为消极的影响。此现象表明，在当前社会转型期，国家致力于经济发展，忽视了对社会道德规模的控制。     

社会资本影响东亚经济增长吗?——兼与西方经济体比较的视角

“东亚奇迹”、“东亚模式”反映了经济学界对东亚经济快速增长的肯定,在促进东亚经济增长的因素中除了物质资本、人力资本、技术进步等传统因素外,是否还存在着社会资本因素是本文试图回答的问题.本文运用了东亚十一个国家和西方经济体十个国家2000-2008年的面板数据,实证分析了社会资本对东亚经济增长的影响和在不同经济体中作用程度的差异,最后文章就东亚国家培育和发展社会资本给出了相应的对策建议.     

我国产业集群不经济现状分析与对策研究

在已有的文献中，众多学者对产业集群的“规模效应”、“技术溢出效应”等外部经济性进行了分析，并在此基础上将产业集群作为一种提升区域竞争力的企业组织形式大加褒扬．但忽视了在我国目前环境下．有些产业集群存在的一些“不经济”现象。本文通过对我国产业集群存在的“不经济”现象的深刻剖析，探讨了针对各种“不经济”现象的对策，以期实现我国产业集群的良性发展。     

我国人力资本和物质资本对经济增长影响的实证分析

经济增长是一个复杂的社会现象，影响因素很多。随着科技的发展和生产力的提高，人力资本对经济增长的作用越来越大，物质资本对我国经济增长的贡献仍然不可替代。现阶段我国经济发展过程中，要进一步提高物质资本的利用率，加大对人力资本的研究及开发。     

调查问卷中的敏感性问题设计研究

调查问卷中常因碰到敏感性问题而使调查难于顺利完成,文章在分析敏感性问题的成因的基础上,具体从提问方式、调查方法与随机化回答技术三个方面详细阐述了在调查问卷中的敏感性题如何设计,最后提出了设计敏感性问题应注意的问题。     

Political cycle and reported labour incomes in Italy: Quasi-experimental evidence on tax evasion

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon affected by many factors and shaped by policymakers' and citizens' behaviours. Distinct claims about the acceptability of tax evasion between centre-right and centre-left coalitions have clearly emerged in Italy in the last decades. According to the ruling coalition, these different attitudes could have influenced tax compliance, affecting reported incomes of the self-employed, who have much more room to engage in tax avoidance or evasion strategies than employees. Using a longitudinal administrative dataset recording the entire working life of the sampled individuals, we focus on the period 1996–2005 (the only period when a complete bipartisan political cycle took place in Italy) and, following a difference in differences design and carrying out fixed effects estimates, we test whether self-employed earnings, compared to employees earnings, significantly changed after the change in the ruling coalition. We find a clear reduction in self-employed reported earnings when the centre-right coalition ruled.

"Il prelievo fiscale corretto si aggira intorno a un terzo del reddito, se invece le tasse sono tra il 50 e 60% è troppo e così è giustificato mettere in atto l'elusione o l'evasione"."The correct tax burden is about one third of the income; it is too much if the tax burden is approximately 50 or 60%, thus it is justified to resort to tax avoidance or evasion."Silvio Berlusconi, speech during the electoral campaign, April 2008.

     

契约理论框架下的企业逃税问题研究

本文以契约理论为切入点对企业逃税行为进行分析,通过在企业所有者和经营者合谋逃税活动中引入线性激励的"可自我执行的协议",构建了一个逃税模型来研究企业逃税主体的决策行为。结果表明:经理人风险态度、逃税边际成本和逃税风险是影响纳税人逃税行为决策的重要因素。     

Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

Tax evasion in Kenya and Tanzania: Evidence from missing imports

In this paper we estimate the amount of tax evasion in customs authorities in both Kenya and Tanzania by calculating measurement errors in reported trade flows between the two countries and correlate those errors with tax rates. We find that the measurement error is correlated with the tax rates in Tanzania. We also introduced a third country into our analysis, the United Kingdom, and tax evasion seems to be more severe in trade flows between Kenya and Tanzania compared to trade flows between the United Kingdom and Kenya/Tanzania. Finally we also find that the tax evasion coefficient is lower in the Kenya–United Kingdom case compared to the Tanzanian–United Kingdom case which suggests that tax evasion is more severe in the Tanzanian customs authority.     

Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

The effect of tax enforcement on tax morale

In this paper we argue that tax enforcement is an additional contextual factor affecting tax morale, one of the most important determinants of tax compliance. By using a unique dataset that merges a representative sample of Italian households with administrative data on tax enforcement, we first find that tax morale is positively correlated with tax enforcement. Second, to deal with possible endogeneity of tax enforcement, we show that results are confirmed in an IV specification using the change in the tax gap at the provincial level as an instrument for tax enforcement. Finally, we provide evidence that the impact of tax enforcement and social environment is stronger at low quantiles of tax morale. Our results show that besides that of lowering the expected value of tax evasion, tax enforcement has an additional and indirect effect on tax compliance through its effect on tax morale.     

Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption*

We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion.     

Social norms and economic growth in a model with labor and capital income tax evasion

Empirical evidence suggests that low-income countries are characterized by high levels of labor and capital income tax evasion while the opposite is true for high-income countries. This paper proposes a model to study the relationship between economic growth and both types of income tax evasion. We show that the existence of a social norm towards tax compliance generates a complementarity between capital and labor income tax evasion which explains the decline of both the share of evaders in the population and the amount of tax evasion when countries accumulate capital. The model predicts that the level of tax morale is positively correlated with both types of income tax evasion and the level of income per capita, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Finally, a higher tax rate increases the share of evaders in the population and aggregate tax evasion.     

The co-evolution of tax evasion,social capital and policy responses: a theoretical approach

The dynamic model presented in this paper intends to account for the evidence, which appears to be particularly significant for Italy, of the incidence of tax evasion in a certain region being negatively correlated with the level of social capital existing in that region. Besides including social capital among the determinants of tax evasion, we extend the model so as to incorporate a mechanism whereby the existing volume of opportunistic behavior—which is proxied by the level of tax evasion—has negative effects on the formation of new social capital, thus helping to explain how regional differences in the endowment of social capital and in the incidence of tax evasion co-evolve and why they tend to be highly persistent. The model seeks also to capture the fact that in a democracy the political determination necessary to effectively repress tax evasion depends on the voters’ propensity toward the phenomenon. Hence, one should expect that–in areas where a relatively large (small) number of citizens are tax cheaters—the consensus in favor of tough policies against tax evasion tends to be weak (strong) and short (long) lasting. Consistently with this intuition, the model shows that regions where social capital is relatively low and tax evasion is relatively high can do better in the long run (i.e., they can reach a steady state characterized by a higher level of social capital and a lower level of tax evasion) when tax-enforcement policies are determined at the national level rather than at the regional level. The opposite holds for regions where social capital is relatively high and tax evasion is relatively low.     

Corporate tax evasion with agency costs

This paper examines corporate tax evasion in the context of the contractual relationship between the shareholders of a firm and a tax manager who possesses private information regarding the extent of legally permissible reductions in taxable income, and who may also undertake illegal tax evasion. Using a costly state falsification framework, we characterize formally the optimal incentive compensation contract for the tax manager and, in particular, how the form of that contract changes in response to alternative enforcement policies imposed by the taxing authority. The optimal contract may adjust to offset, at least partially, the effect of sanctions against illegal evasion, and we find a new and policy-relevant non-equivalence result: penalties imposed on the tax manager are more effective in reducing evasion than are those imposed on shareholders.