Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study

We use experiments to examine whether the auctioning of entry rights affects the behaviour of market entrants. Standard economic arguments suggest that the licence fee paid at the auction will not affect pricing since it constitutes a sunk cost. This argument is not uncontested though, and this paper puts it to an experimental test. Our results indicate that an auction of entry licences has a significant positive effect on average prices in oligopoly but not in monopoly. These results are consistent with the conjecture that entry fees induce players to take more risk in pursuit of higher expected profits. In oligopoly, entry fees increase the probability that the market entrants coordinate on a collusive price path. In monopoly, taking more risk does not make sense since average prices are already close to the profit-maximizing price.     

The effect of entry restrictions on price: evidence from the retail gasoline market

I exploit a change in Spanish regulations to test the effect of the relaxation of entry restrictions on the equilibrium retail price of diesel. In February 2013, a Central Government reform permitted gasoline stations to operate in industrial and commercial areas. Over the following 2-year period, this deregulation led to a high number of new market entrants in these newly designated free entry areas. By isolating markets exposed to entry and markets unaffected by new entrants, and adopting a difference-in-difference approach, results show that gasoline stations exposed to a new market entrant within a one-mile radius lower their prices by an average 1.04%. This result is significant, representing almost one fifth of the average retail margin. Additionally, the results show that the reduction in the equilibrium price is caused by the first market entrant and that the effect decreases over time.     

Price Discrimination, Regulation and Entry in the UK Residential Electricity Market

The residential electricity market in Great Britain has recently been opened to competition and is served by 14 regional incumbents, and up to 15 entrants in each area. This study finds that the incumbents' regulated prices are discriminatory between consumers using different payment methods, and that firms are practising third‐degree price discrimination between areas. The authors discuss the implications for regulatory policy both in the UK and in other countries where electricity markets are being deregulated.     

Pricing Access to a Monopoly Input

What price should downstream entrants pay a vertically integrated incumbent monopoly for use of its assets? Courts, legislators, and regulators have at times mandated that incumbent monopolies lease assets required for the production of a retail service to entrants in efforts to increase the competitiveness of retail markets. This paper compares two rules for pricing such monopoly inputs: marginal cost pricing (MCP) and generalized efficient component pricing rule (GECPR). The GECPR is not a fixed price, but is a rule that determines the input price to be paid by the entrant from the entrant's retail price. Comparing the retail market equilibrium under MCP and GECPR, the GECPR leads to lower equilibrium retail prices. If the incumbent is less efficient than the entrant, the GECPR also leads to lower production costs than does the MCP rule. If the incumbent is more efficient than the entrant, however, conditions may exist in which MCP leads to lower production costs than does the GECPR. The analysis is carried out assuming either Bertrand competition, quantity competition, or monopolistic competition between the incumbent and entrant in the downstream market.     

A DYNAMIC ENTRY AND PRICE GAME WITH CAPACITY INDIVISIBILITY

Strategic market interaction is here modelled as a two‐stage game in which potential entrants choose capacities and next active firms compete in prices. Due to capital indivisibility, the capacity choice is made from a finite grid and there are economies of scale. In the simplest version of the model with a single production technique, the equilibrium turns out to depend on the ratio between the level of total output at the long‐run competitive equilibrium and the firm's minimum efficient scale: if that ratio is sufficiently large (the market is sufficiently ‘large’), then the competitive price emerges at a subgame‐perfect equilibrium of the capacity and price game; if not, then the firms randomize in prices on the equilibrium path. The role of the market size for the competitive outcome is shown to be even more important if there are several available production techniques.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

On the Effects of Suggested Prices in Gasoline Markets

There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices act as a focal point for individual firms when setting their prices. Oil companies announce suggested prices for gasoline stations in the Dutch retail market. We show that, compared to the gasoline spot market price, suggested prices contain additional information that explains retail price changes. We conclude that suggested prices have a horizontal coordinating effect in the sense that retail prices react to information that suggested prices contain and that is unrelated to firms’ costs (i.e., the information that firms use under normal competitive conditions).     

A history of European electricity day-ahead prices

In this article, we examine the development of day-ahead prices in five European markets which became more connected over recent years. Where previous studies examined the convergence of price levels over time, we focus on patterns in estimates for the parameters in a switching regimes model. This makes it possible to distinguish between prices under normal market conditions and under non-normal market conditions, those market conditions that can cause extreme price spikes. We expect that increased connectivity yields additional supply in the short-term and therefore will reduce the impact of price spikes. Our results indicate that the impact of price spikes and volatility decreased over time, that prices behave more random, and that the parameter estimates between various connected markets seem to have converged between the Belgian, Dutch, French, German and Nordic day-ahead markets over the years 2003 through 2010. These results can be explained by increased connectivity and improved liquidity.     

Estimating entrants' productivity when prices are unobserved

Entrant firms are constrained to set lower price–cost markups than incumbents due to idiosyncratic demand shocks faced in the startup phase. Productivity indices suffer from micro-level markup variation and underestimate entrants' productivity, when productivity is measured by nominal sales and expenditures but not quantities. This study makes the first attempt to estimate entrants' productivity by controlling for their markup difference, when prices or quantities are unobserved at the firm-level. The econometric methodology introduces demand side into a structural model of production to account for the price variation. The estimation routine deals with the endogeneity due to unobserved productivity using a control function approach, and retrieves average markups for entrants and incumbents together with a markup-adjusted productivity index. My findings show that entrants set on average lower markups than incumbents in Japanese manufacturing. When productivity is adjusted to markups, entrants are as productive as incumbents, while the standard measures of labor and total factor productivity indicate low productivity for entrant firms.     

EVOLUTION OF THE OIL MARKET AND ENERGY SECURITY POLICY

This paper examines a number of issues that affect the U.S. government's role in responding to future energy crises. The paper argues that we do not adequately understand why oil prices behaved as they did during the two price shocks of the 1970s, and that the market has evolved in ways that will alter future price behavior compared with that of the past. Consequently, it is unwise to formulate energy policies on the basis of specific forecasts of market conditions, or to plan to fight repetitions of past oil market crises. To be effective, energy security policy must be designed to motivate the private sector and other governments to respond in ways consistent with policy objectives.     

Pricing inputs to induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions

We investigate input pricing regimes that induce efficient Make-or-Buy decisions by entrants when there is constant returns in the production of the input(s) and simultaneous noncooperative price competition in downstream retail markets. Necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient Make-or-Buy decisions are derived. The necessary condition shows that input prices are relevant for Make-or-Buy decisions except under restrictive and often unverifiable assumptions on the demand structure, and that the least informationally-demanding way to ensure efficient Make-or-Buy decisions is to price inputs at marginal cost provided changes in the entrant’s cost have a “normal” effect on the entrant’s profit. The conditions also show that pricing the incumbent’s input at the entrant’s marginal cost always ensures efficient Make- or-Buy decisions. The extent to which input prices can depart from marginal cost while still inducing efficient Make-or-Buy decisions increases with the efficiency differential between the incumbent and entrant and with the demand displacement ratio.      

Testing for rational bubbles in the US housing market

The presence of a bubble in the US housing market prior to the 2007 subprime mortgage financial crisis is investigated. This is done by looking into the relationship between house prices and rental prices, known as the price–rent ratio, which is an important measure of a potential deviation between house prices and its fundamental value. Additionally, the interest rate is taken into account since it is an important factor in determining demand for housing mortgages and thereby influencing house prices, and explosive behavior of house prices is considered. These relationships are investigated through a theoretical and econometrical framework. The empirical evidence suggests that there was a bubble in the housing market prior to the financial crisis, even when controlling for the decreasing interest rate and the fundamental information given by the rental price in the period. Explosiveness was the main source of the price increase, such that a bubble was present in the housing market after correcting for other fundamental factors. The econometric procedures used in the analysis may therefore be relevant for monitoring the housing market.     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.     

Price clustering and natural resistance points in the Dutch stock market: A natural experiment

This paper focuses on the tendency of stock prices to cluster at round numbers (like 10, 20, 30, etc. and to a lesser extent 5, 15, 25, etc.) and the related effect of round number price barriers (prices pass round numbers less frequently than other numbers). Two competing hypotheses are tested, using data from the Dutch stock market of the period 1990–2001. After 1 January 1999 stock prices were listed in euros, while guilders were still the currency of daily life until 2002. The aspiration level hypothesis predicts that round number effects in guilders will only slowly disappear. The odd price hypothesis predicts an abrupt change in round number effects after 1 January 1999. Generally, the results are consistent with the odd price hypothesis.     

The Effects of Subject Pool and Design Experience on Rationality in Experimental Asset Markets

Empirical evidence suggests that prices do not always reflect fundamental values and individual behavior is often inconsistent with rational expectations theory. We report the results of fourteen experimental asset markets designed to examine whether the interactive effect of subject pool and design experience (i.e., previous experience in a market under identical conditions) tempers price bubbles and improves forecasting ability. Our main findings are: 1) price run-ups are modest and dissipate quickly when traders are knowledgeable about financial markets and have participated in a previous market under identical conditions; 2) price bubbles moderate quickly when only a subset of traders are knowledgeable and experienced; 3) the heterogeneity of expectations about price changes is smaller in markets with knowledgeable and experienced traders, even if such traders only represent a subset of the market; and 4) individual forecasts of prices are not consistent with the predictions of the rational expectations model in any market, although absolute forecast errors are smaller for subjects who are knowledgeable of financial markets and for those subjects who have participated in a previous market. In sum, our findings suggest that markets populated by at least a subset of knowledgeable and experienced traders behave rationally, even though average individual behavior can be characterized as irrational.     

A laboratory study of advertising and price competition

We use a laboratory experiment to study advertising and pricing behavior in a market where consumers differ in price sensitivity. Equilibrium in this market entails variation in the number of firms advertising and price dispersion in advertised prices. We vary the cost to advertise as well as varying the number of competing firms. Theory predicts that advertising costs act as a facilitating device: higher costs increase firm profits at the expense of consumers. We find that higher advertising costs decrease demand for advertising and raise advertised prices, as predicted. Further, this comes at the expense of consumers. However, advertising strategies are more aggressive than theory predicts with the result that firm profits do not increase.     

The structural effect of cooperatives on price volatility in the European dairy sector

Theoretical models and empirical evidence suggest that high market shares of cooperatives can force investor-oriented firms to pay higher producer prices within a region. In the same vein, cooperatives may force investor-oriented firms to reduce price volatility. We use panel data from 27 European Union member states over the period 2001–2015 to investigate how the market share of cooperatives in a country affects milk price volatility. Our key finding is that a higher market share of cooperatives reduces price volatility at the national level. Volatility is influenced by a number of other variables, such as fluctuation in raw milk production, oil price volatility spillover and the number of dairy processors. Policymakers should consider that the promotion of cooperatives might positively affect price stability in the dairy sector.     

Exchange Rate Passthrough to Export Prices: Assessing Cross‐Country Evidence*

A growing empirical literature reports evidence of a decline in exchange rate passthrough to import prices in a number of industrial countries. Our paper complements this literature by examining passthrough from the other side of the transaction; that is, we assess the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices (denominated in the exporter's currency). We find that the prices charged on exports to the United States are more responsive to the exchange rate than are export prices to other destinations, which is consistent with results in the literature that import price passthrough in the US market is relatively low. In addition, the exchange rate sensitivity of export prices over time has been significantly affected by country‐ and region‐specific factors, including the Asian financial crisis (for emerging Asia), deepening integration with the United States (for Canada), and the effects of the 1992 ERM crisis (for the United Kingdom).     

PRICE DISPERSION,INFLATION, AND WELFARE*

We examine the implications of inflation for both price dispersion and welfare in a monetary search economy. In our economy, if the degree of buyers' incomplete information about prices is fixed, both price dispersion and real prices are increasing in inflation. As the inflation rate approaches the Friedman rule, both price dispersion and welfare losses vanish. If households choose the number of prices to observe, then the optimal inflation rate may exceed the Friedman rule as inflation induces search and, up to a point, raises welfare by eroding market power.     

Market Underreaction and Overreaction of Technology Stocks

Several studies have assessed stock market under- or overreaction of stocks and there is some agreement among them. However, there is much disagreement about what constitutes market underreaction or overreaction, and the conditions that cause it. The substantial variation in results among studies may be partially attributed to the types of firms that are contained in any sample. We investigate this premise by focusing on a sample of technology stocks that experienced an extreme change in stock price, along with a corresponding control sample of non-technology stocks that experienced a similar extreme change in stock price on the same day.

Based on the subsequent stock price behavior of each sample, we find a greater degree of overreaction within extreme positive changes in technology stock prices (winners) than in non-technology stock prices. In addition, we find a greater degree of underreaction within extreme negative changes in technology stock prices (losers) than in non-technology stock prices. When considering winners and losers collectively for technology and non-technology firms, it appears the market is overoptimistic when it initially revalues technology stock prices relative to non-technology stock prices.

The degree of under- or overreaction of technology stocks varies within the sample of technology stocks, and is conditioned on firm-specific characteristics. Overall, our results suggest that technology stocks exhibit unique stock price behavior subsequent to an extreme change in price, and that this unique behavior can even vary among technology firms according to firm-specific characteristics.