The role of information in the competition for FDI under uncertainty

This paper mainly focuses on the role of information in the competition for FDI when host countries are not sure of the “fixed cost” differences MNEs are working with to make FDI in different countries. It is found in this paper that as the public information increases and the uncertainty declines, host countries will first provide more and more subsidies to compete for FDI, which will reduce their welfare; then after the current uncertainty has been reduced to a relatively low level, any further reduction in uncertainty will pull down their subsidies and increase their welfare.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing?

In this paper a model of taxation of foreign source corporate income is developed when the output market is not perfectly competitive. Profit shifting policies, similar to those in the new trade literature, are also present in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI). There are, however, important differences to the new trade theory since in case of FDI, (i) corporate taxation and double taxation relief are the policy instruments rather than output or revenue taxes, (ii) countries are not symmetric in the sense that the host country has the first right to tax the multinational's profit and the home country reacts by providing double taxation relief, and (iii) output but not corporate taxation is specific to imperfectly competitive industries. It is argued that (a) variants of a tax credit are analogous to export subsidies, (b) when the home country operates a tax credit system the host country's incentive to capture the multinational's profit is bounded under imperfect competition, (c) when the host country offers a tax holiday the home country should imitate this policy, and (d) in the presence of perfect competitive industries, double taxation relief is a good instrument to target imperfectly competitive industries.     

Foreign direct investment subsidy in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms

This study analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are determining whether to enter or how to serve foreign markets. We show that a small FDI subsidy scheme induces consumption gains and delivers short‐term welfare improvement for the FDI host country if firms differ in productivity. However, the subsidy generates a new problem and results in the wealth reallocation effect, leading to welfare deterioration for the host country in the long run. Moreover, we find that a subsidy program induces a welfare improvement for the host country if it is offered to all domestic producers instead of foreign producers only in the host country.     

Multinational Firms and Strategic FDI Subsidies

A simple three‐stage game model of an international Cournot duopoly, consisting of domestic and foreign multinational firms, is exploited to examine strategic FDI subsidies. While in the first stage the governments decide the optimal FDI subsidies, the firms endogenously choose their FDI levels (or subsidiary plant sizes) in the second stage and their output–export levels in the third stage. Thus, this paper finds that while the outflow and inflow FDI subsidies have different effects on firms’ FDI choices, the FDI subsidies are used as tools for the implementation of strategic policies and that the optimal FDI subsidies vary, depending on whether the governments assess labor employment.     

Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI*

It is widely held that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on economic growth. To test this hypothesis, we perform convergence regressions derived from a theoretical model on the impact of FDI on endogenous technological change in small economies. The model includes FDI externalities that enhance growth, but also shows that FDI can crowd out host country income and reduce local innovation. The empirical analysis employs disaggregated US data for various FDI‐related activities—in addition to the conventionally used aggregate FDI stocks and flows. We estimate the net FDI impact on the convergence rate of per‐capita income to US levels, controlling for human development, financial development, and trade. We find that FDI accelerates convergence for high‐income countries only, otherwise slowing it down.     

Brotherhood of competition: Foreign Direct Investment and domestic mergers

We examine the effects of mergers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and on shaping national policies regarding FDI. In this work we develop a partial equilibrium model of an oligopolistic industry in which a number of domestic and foreign firms compete in the market for a homogeneous good in a host country. It is assumed that the number of foreign firms is endogenous and can be affected by the government policy in the host country. The government sets the policy (subsidies) to maximise social welfare. We allow domestic mergers. Our main results suggest that when the host country government imposes discriminatory lump-sum subsidy in favor of foreign firms, a merger of domestic firms will increase the number of FDI if the subsidy level is exogenous. With an endogenous level of subsidy, a merger of domestic firms will decrease (increase) the welfare if the domestic firms are more (less) efficient.     

Foreign direct investment and income convergence

The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the convergence of income level and growth has been investigated by panel data regressions. Bilateral FDI data from OECD from 1982 to 1997 is used. Income level and growth gaps between source and host countries turn out to decrease as bilateral FDI increases. It is also found that geographical closeness and common language play an important role in convergence in income level and growth.     

Foreign direct investment and income inequality: Does the relationship vary with absorptive capacity?

There has been little systematic empirical literature on the linkage between income inequality and FDI (Basu and Guariglia, 2007; Tsai, 1995). This paper analyzes the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on income inequality and asks whether the relationship depends on absorptive capacity or not, by using a cross-sectional dataset taken from 54 countries over the period 1980–2005. We adopt the endogenous threshold regression model proposed by Hansen (2000) and Caner and Hansen (2004) and find strong evidence of a two-regime split in our sample. That is, FDI is likely to be harmful to the income distribution of those host countries with low levels of absorptive capacity. By contrast, our results support the perspective that FDI has little effect on income inequality in the case of countries with better absorptive capacity. It is also shown that international trade can lead to more equal income distribution.     

The Interaction Between FDI and Infrastructure Capital in The Development Process

This paper focuses on the possible interaction between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the host country’s infrastructure base. Its central hypothesis is that the effect of FDI on per capita real income depends, at least in part, on the size of the recipient country’s infrastructure. This hypothesis is tested in a panel of 46 countries and 5-year averages over the 1980–2000 period using the size of three types of infrastructure capital: telecommunication, power generation, and network of roads or highways. The results indicate that the size of the host country’s infrastructure base helps to improve the marginal effect of FDI on real income.     

FDI、集聚与东道国利益:一个空间经济学的分析框架

基于空间经济学理论探讨外商投资与东道国利益之间的关系,我们可以发现,在短期内,东道国的国民收入主要取决于其国内要素禀赋的存量,与外资流入的多少并无直接联系;在长期内,外商投资也不能在东道国产生累积循环作用,从而不能形成有效的产业关联效应。而在东道国是大国的情形下,它可以运用较大的贸易政策空间对资本的流动实施宏观调控,并成为制造业的集聚中心。     

FDI and Income Inequality—Evidence from Latin American Economies

This paper analyzes whether foreign direct investment (FDI) has contributed to the wide income gaps in Latin America. Panel cointegration techniques as well as regression analysis are performed to assess the impact of inward FDI stocks on income inequality among households in Latin American host countries. The panel cointegration analysis typically reveals a significant and positive effect on income inequality. There is no evidence for reverse causality. The findings are fairly robust to the choice of different estimation methods, sample selection and the period of observation.     

出口导向贸易政策与发展中国家间FDI竞争——基于寡占竞争模型的理论分析

文章建立了一个两国竞争模型,重点分析了进口关税与出口补贴等战略贸易政策对发展中国家吸引FDI竞争的影响。研究发现:(1)当两国都采取出口补贴的外资激励政策时,工资水平和进口关税对发展中国家间FDI竞争并没有直接影响;(2)对全要素生产率较高的国家来说,当两国的关税水平都较高时,出口补贴政策增加流向本国的FDI,而当两国关税水平大幅下降后,出口补贴政策反而不利于本国FDI竞争。文章的结论对当前我国战略引资和出口退税等政策的调整具有重大的指导意义。     

Privatization Neutrality Theorem: When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives

This paper examines the privatization neutrality theorem when a public firm pursues general objectives other than welfare maximization. This theorem states that when the government gives firms optimal subsidies, welfare is exactly the same before and after privatization. However, we present a seemingly paradoxical result. When a public firm incorrectly assumes that subsidies change the welfare size, privatization is necessarily welfare neutral, whereas when the public firm correctly recognizes that subsidies only bring about income redistribution, without affecting welfare, the situations in which neutrality holds are limited.     

Competing for Foreign Direct Investment

The paper analyzes 'subsidy games' between countries in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from a third country. The winner of this game results from the interaction of two factors, relative country size and employment gains from FDI: a large (or 'central') country is more likely to attract FDI, and so is a country with high unemployment. The subsidy equilibrium is compared with two alternative solutions: zero subsidies and first-best subsidies. It is shown that total welfare may be greater under subsidy competition than under zero subsidies: the gains from efficient location implied by subsidy competition may more than outweigh the losses from higher subsidies. Moreover, departing from subsidy competition to zero subsidies or to first-best subsidies (without side payments) implies a gain to one country and a loss to the other. This suggests that it may be difficult to reach a consensus to move away from the status quo of subsidy competition.     

The effects of foreign direct investment on private domestic investment: evidence from developing countries

The main objective of this study is to make a contribution to the empirical literature of investment by examining the effects of FDI inflows on private investment in developing host countries. We employ panel data for 91 developing host countries over the period 1970–2000 and estimate our model by a means of system generalized method of moments. The results show that FDI stimulates private domestic investment which supports the “crowd-in-hypothesis”. Moreover, after grouping countries based on their level of income, we find that the positive effects of FDI on private investment in low-income countries depend on the availability of human capital.     

The impact of third-country effects and economic integration on China's outward FDI

The study employs a spatial econometric model to explore the impact of third-country effects and economic integration on China's outward FDI (OFDI). The results show that the pattern of China's OFDI tends toward a complex FDI without third-country effects. The degree of economic integration and host country's political risk both have a negative influence on China's OFDI. Furthermore, greater cultural proximity between China and the host country, as well as greater per capita income (market size), both have significant benefits to China's OFDI. The host country's market opportunity has a significant negative effect on China's OFDI.     

Production subsidies and redistribution

Who gains from stimulating output? We explore a dynamic model with production subsidies where the population is heterogeneous in one dimension: wealth. There are two channels through which production subsidies redistribute resources across the population. First, poorer agents gain from a rise in wages, since—to the extent there is an operative wealth effect in labor supply—they work harder. Second, because a current output boost will raise consumption today relative to the future, thus lowering real interest rates, poor agents gain in relative terms since their income is based less on interest income. We examine optimal redistribution from the perspective of an arbitrary consumer in the population. We show that, if this consumer has commitment at time zero to set all present and future subsidy rates, and for a class of preferences that admits aggregation in wealth, then output stimulation, and hence redistribution, will only occur at time zero; after that, subsidies are zero. A byproduct of our analysis of this environment is a median-voter theorem: with direct voting over subsidy sequences at time zero, the sequence preferred by the median-wealth consumer is the unique outcome. We also study lack of commitment, since interest-rate manipulation is associated with time inconsistency. We analyze this case formally by looking at the Markov-perfect (time-consistent) equilibrium in a game between successive identical decision makers (e.g., the median agent). Here, subsidies persist—they are constant over time—and are more distortionary than under commitment. Moreover, whereas under commitment asset inequality changes initially—in favor of the consumer who decides on policy—it does not under lack of commitment.     

STUDIES OF INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN DENMARK

Income redistribution studies on the macro–economic level have been undertaken in Denmark for the years 1938–39, 1949, 1955, and 1963. By use of national accounts figures and all other available statistics, it was on certain assumptions possible to distribute public sector income and expenditure by income groups.
A quite different approach is used in a Danish redistribution study on the micro-economic level for 1971, which relies solely on the comprehensive data from the family budget survey for that year. Unfortunately this study only relates to employee households.
This paper deals with the 1963 and 1971 studies. First it describes and discusses the differences in methodology between the two studies and indicates some ideas for future studies in this field in Denmark. In the following sections some main results of the two studies are given, briefly for the 1963 study and more comprehensively for the 1971 study. The studies show the great and growing strength of the policy of redistribution through public sector income and expenditure in Denmark.
It is the opinion of the authors that the appearance of redistribution studies based on comprehensive family budget surveys makes for a substantial improvement of redistribution figures, and that the purely micro-level frame of reference makes it possible to interpret the results in a more satisfactory way than before. Furthermore, the appearance of detailed input-output based national accounts data should bring about further improvements in redistribution figures through better data on indirect taxes and subsidies as well as supporting data which are necessary to link the micro and macro levels in a consistent way.     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.