Coalitional instability of the distributive Lindahl equilibrium

Summary Bergstrom [3] has showed that the Lindahlian approach to the analysis of public goods may also be used to analyze a model of wide-spread externalities in which agents have preferences defined on allocations rather than on individual commodity bundles. He has provided versions of the first and second welfare theorem for adistributive Lindahl equilibrium and also presented sufficient conditions for its existence. However, we shall show that, in contrast to Foley's [4] result on the core stability of a Lindahl equilibrium, a distributive Lindahl equilibrium need not satisfy coalitional stability. We will provide a robust example in which the unique, distributive Lindahl equilibrium does not belong to the -core defined either as in Scarf [11] or as in Yannelis [12].I would like to thank F. Canova, R. Serrano, M. Spagat, R. Vohra at Brown University, P. C. Padoan at University of Rome and an anonymous referee for their comments. I am also grateful to the participants at the Third Annual MeetingColloquia on Economic Research at I.G.I.E.R. in Milan, Italy, and to the participants at the Citibank Workshop in Economic Theory at Brown University.     

Time varying CAPM betas and banking sector risk

This paper employs the [Bai and Perron, 1998] and [Bai and Perron, 2003] structural break methodology to investigate whether the CAPM betas for banking sector stocks are time invariant. I find evidence for three large structural shifts in my monthly (1941.02-2008.01) sample. The third break corresponds with a decline in the perceived riskiness of banking stocks in the period starting in 2000.04. The banking sector was thus priced to be less risky during the period associated with rising leverage and financial sector risk.     

Currency unions and trade: the effect is large

The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7–45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated.
I have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large, but I am not convinced by Torsten Persson's diagnosis and proposed solution. I apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set, where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time–series as well as cross–sectional evidence. The results are similar to my earlier ones: the effect of a single currency on trade is large.     

Currency unions and trade: how large is the treatment effect?

The impact of a common currency on trade can be grossly mismeasured if countries that belong to currency unions are systematically different from those that do not, and if the relationship between trade and its observable determinants is complex. I argue that such complications are plausible and likely to distort the empirical results of a recent Economic Policy paper by Andrew Rose (Issue 30, 2000: pp. 7–45). Using techniques designed to be robust in this situation, I find that the effects of common currency on international trade are considerably less dramatic and much less precisely estimated.
I have always maintained that the measured effect of a single currency on trade appears implausibly large, but I am not convinced by Torsten Persson's diagnosis and proposed solution. I apply a variety of estimation techniques to a new larger data set, where many more instances of currency union creation and abandonment make it possible to rely on time–series as well as cross–sectional evidence. The results are similar to my earlier ones: the effect of a single currency on trade is large.     

Classical economics and the Great Irish Famine:A study in limits

The Great Irish Famine resulted from two massive failures: the blight that destroyed the potato crop and the non-interventionism of the English government. The first failure, which also occurred in other European countries, was devastating for the Irish who depended on the potato as their main source of nourishment. The second failure was a human failure because English government policy was instructed by classical economics to let the market clear the surplus population from the land and was reinforced by the anti-Irish racism common in England at the time, even among classical economists, notably Nassau Senior and J.S. Mill. For most of the 19th century, the English answer was to ignore the hate and crush the crime which [the land system] produced. In the forty years before 1870 forty-two Coercion Acts were passed. During the same period there was not a single statute to protect the Irish peasant from eviction and rack-renting.—Winston Churchill, The Great Democracies,p. 343. It is commonplace in economic research to assume that the investigator has removed all traces of personal values from his/her work. As Becker (1961, p. 10) implies, that could be a serious error. For that reason, let me state at the outset that I am a first-generation Irish-American, holding dual citizenship in the United States and the Republic of Ireland. My mother and father both were born and raised in County Mayo—the poorest county in western Ireland, where the toll in human lives lost during the Great Famine was staggering. I do not know how many of my own Irish ancestors suffered and died during the Great Famine. What I do know and acknowledge is that my selection of this topic clearly is related to that family background which also very likely influenced the way I have interpreted the evidence presented herein. I concede that someone else sifting through the evidence might come to different conclusions, but I know of no other way to proceed. Supportive comments by Hans Jensen and Peter Danner on earlier drafts are gratefully acknowledged, as are the suggestions made by the editor and an anonymous referee. Any remaining errors are entirely mine.     

Axiomatisches Mißverständnis

From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears thus as a storehouse of abstract forms – the mathematical structures; and so it happens without our knowing how that certain aspects of empirical reality fit themselves into these forms, as if through a kind of preadaptation. (Bourbaki, 1950, p. 231)
So you believe that the application of mathematics to the physical world is a miracle? If so, then I invite you to admire another miracle; I can travel around the world with my American Express card. You say of the second, 'That's just a network. If you step out of it by so much as an inch, your card will be valueless.' Quite so. That is what I am saying about science, nothing more and nothing less. (Latour, 1988, p.221)     

Shares of the Rich and the Rest in the World Economy: Income Divergence Between Nations, 1820–2030

This paper analyses the forces determining per capita income levels of nations over the past millennium and the prospects to 2030. In the year 1000, Asian countries were in the lead. By 1820, per capita gross domestic product in Western Europe and the USA was twice the Asian average. The divergence had grown much bigger by 1950, but by the 1970s, several Asian countries – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore – had achieved considerable catch-up. Since then, there has been a major surge in China and the beginning of a similar phenomenon in India. As a result, the Asian share of world income has risen steadily and, by 2030, will be fairly close to what it was in 1820. I conclude by comparing my projections for 2030 with those of Goldman Sachs, Perkins and Rawski, and Fogel.     

Eriksson on Critical Realism: a rejoinder

Abstract

In this response to Andrew Mearman I argue that his critique suffers from a series of misrepresentations of my paper. For example, Mearman generalizes my arguments about Keynes to be about Critical Realism (CR), and he challenges my criticism of Tony Lawson's arguments by claiming that I have misrepresented CR. In fact the text of my 1998 paper does not support Mearman's claims. Furthermore, since (i) the principal aim of my paper was to question the interpretation of Keynes as a realist, and (ii) Mearman does not present any arguments suggesting how CR in its current form would refute my conclusions, his criticism must be judged doubly misdirected.     

Decentralizing lottery allocations in markets with indivisible commodities

Summary In economies with indivisible commodities, consumers tend to prefer lotteries in commodities. A potential mechanism for satisying these preferences is unrestricted purchasing and selling of lotteries in decentralized markets, as suggested in Prescott and Townsend [Int. Econ. Rev.25, 1–20]. However, this paper shows in several examples that such lottery equilibria do not always exist for economies with finitely many consumers. Other conditions are needed. In the examples, equilibrium and the associated welfare gains are realized if consumptions are bounded or if lotteries are based upon a common sunspot device as defined by Shell [mimeo, 1977] and Cass and Shell [J. Pol. Econ.91, 193–227]. The paper shows that any lottery equilibrium is either a Walrasian equilibrium or a sunspot equilibrium, but there are Walrasian and sunspot equilibria that are not lottery equilibria.This paper is based on Chapter 3 of my doctoral dissertation, written while I was a student at Cornell University. I thank Larry Blume, Yue Yun Chen, David Easley, Aditya Goenka, John Marshall, Bruce Smith, John Wooders and an anonymous referee. I am particularly grateful to Karl Shell and Cheng-Zhong Qin. I thank the Academic Senate at UCSB for financial support.     

Perturbations of Matrices: A theorem on the perron vector and its applications to input-output models

This is a much revised version of my paper The Effects of Errors in Matrices on the Perron Vector: An Application to Input-Output Models, which was presented at the 1987 European Meeting of the Econometric Society, held in Copenhagen. I would like to thank Gerard Sierksma and Albert E. Steenge for valuable discussions and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

Remarks concerning concave utility functions on finite sets

Summary. A direct construction of concave utility functions representing convex preferences on finite sets is presented. An alternative construction in which at first directions of supergradients (prices) are found, and then utility levels and lengths of those supergradients are computed, is exhibited as well. The concept of a least concave utility function is problematic in this context.Received: 28 November 2002, Revised: 28 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, C60.I am indebted to an anonymous referee, Marcel K. Richter and Kam-Chau Wong, for many valuable remarks and suggestions.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
British Shipping and Australia 1920–1930. By K. B urley .
Continuity in History and Other Essays. By A. G erschenkron .
A Guidebook to New Zealand's Future. By W. R osenberg .
The Wealth of the Nation: The National Balance Sheet of the United Kingdom, 1957–1961. By J. R evell .
Essays in Economic History of Australia 1788–1939. Edited by J. G riffin .
Fundamentals of International Economics. By I. W exler .
Teaching Economics. Edited by N. L ee .
Strategic Factors in Economic Development. By N. K aldor .
Consumption Economics: A Multidisciplinary Approach. By M. C. B urk .     

IS THERE A (DOWNWARD SLOPING) DEMAND CURVE FOR VOLUNTEER LABOUR?

ABSTRACT * * I would like to thank the Indiana University Center on Philanthropy and the Irwin Foundation for financial support for my dissertation, which led to many of the ideas contained in this paper, as well as my dissertation advisors at Boston College. I would also like to thank my colleagues at John Carroll University and at the Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Case Western Reserve University, for their advice and comments on previous versions of this paper. All errors, however, remain my own responsibility.
: Are organizations that use volunteers content to accept all of the volunteer labour offered to them, or do they make some sort of demand-side decision as to how much volunteer labour to use? This paper looks for evidence of such a demand curve for volunteer labour in data collected by the Urban Institute in the early 1980s. Evidence is found that organizations are consistent over time in their use of volunteer labour.     

Perfect Bayesian implementation

Summary We study Social Choice Sets (SCS) implementable as perfect Bayesian equilibria of some incomplete information extensive form game. We provide a necessary condition which we callcondition . The condition is analogous tocondition C that Moore and Repullo [1988] show to be necessary for subgame perfect implementation in games of complete information, and it is weaker than the Bayesian Monotonicity condition stated in Jackson [1991]. Our first theorem establishes that Incentive Compatibility, Closure and Condition are necessary for implementation.Our second theorem establishes sufficient conditions. We show that any SCS which satisfies Incentive Compatibility, Closure and a condition called Sequential Monotonicity No Veto (SMNV) is implementable. SMNV is similar in spirit but weaker than the Monotonicity No Veto condition stated in Jackson [1991]. It is also similar to a combination of condition and No Veto Power, which Abreau and Sen show to be sufficient for implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium.This paper is a revised version of a chapter of my dissertation at Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. I would like to thank, without implicating, Faruk Gul, Bob Wilson and especially John Roberts for their constant advice and encouragement. I would also like to thank participants at the 1993 Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society and a referee for comments leading to substantial improvement in the paper. Financial support from Bocconi University is gratefully acknowledged.     

Socially Subjective Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

This study provides a new framework and a new equilibrium concept, which are able to describe the situation where people have various images of the society and have various solution concepts for social outcomes, and where people accept the social outcomes. In socially subjective equilibrium, people have a coherence of their own norms in two senses. One is the consistency of the norm itself. Imagined outcomes should satisfy a certain (subjective) solution concept. The other is the consistency between the imagined outcomes and realized one. These are the main features of our equilibrium concept. This paper forms a part of my doctoral thesis, which is titled “On socially subjective equilibrium”. The first person I would like to thank is my direct supervisor Professor Ken Urai (Osaka University). I obtained a basic idea of the main concept of my doctoral thesis, that is, the solution concept scheme, from Professor Urai. I am grateful to Professor Hiroaki Nagatani (Osaka University) and Professor Ken-Ichi Shimomura (Kobe University), who monitored my works and took efforts in providing me with valuable comments on earlier versions of my thesis. I also obtained a fruitful advice from Professor Kenichi Amaya (Kobe University). Lastly, I specially thank to Kozo Shiraishi (Osaka University).     

Ironing without control

I extend Myerson?s [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.     

Returns of Small Growth Stocks: An Empirical Analysis

I investigate the mean reversion tendency of small growth stocks. Using a carefully articulated research design employing established and empirically tested principles, my findings should support or refute the anecdotal evidence that small growth stocks make superior investments. The primary motivation for the study springs from the documented differential preference among investors for value and growth stocks. Despite evidence that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks, investors retain strong interest in growth stocks. Yet in examining the performance of Business Week’s (BW), smaller capitalization companies (called “Hot Growth Companies”) with respect to the overall financial market, Bauman et al. [2002] found positive excess returns in the pre-publication period but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. A limitation of their study is that their analyses relied on only three criteria: sales, BW rank and return on capital, which do not represent completely a firm’s financial health. I replicate Bauman et al.’s study but use a more robust and representative variable set to test the mean reversal hypothesis — Forbes’ financial criteria — and I focus on six variables. In the current study, I look at 4,200 companies listed in Forbes from 1980 to 2000. The results of the expanded study substantiate Bauman et al.’s [2002] study showing that there are positive excess returns in the pre-publication period, but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. An expanded future study will look at five additional variables to see if they make a significant difference on the effects of the returns of small growth stocks.     

The pareto rule and welfare economics

It is [my] contention... that the wake for all welfare economics is premature, and that welfare economics can be reconstructed with the aid of the concept of demonstrated preference. This reconstruction, however, will have no resemblance to either of the “old” or “new” edifices that preceded it. In fact...our proposed resurrection of the patient may be considered by many as more unfortunate than his demise.     

Essential interest-bearing money

I examine optimal monetary policy in a Lagos and Wright [R. Lagos, R. Wright, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113 (2005) 463-484] model where trade is centralized and all exchange is voluntary. I identify a class of incentive-feasible policies that improve welfare beyond what is achievable with zero intervention. Any policy in this class necessarily entails a non-negative inflation rate and a strictly positive nominal interest rate. Despite the absence of a lump-sum tax instrument, there exists an incentive-feasible policy that implements the first-best allocation.     

Mere quibbles: Bagus and Howden’s critique of the theory of free banking

Despite its title, Philipp Bagus and David Howden’s critique of The Theory of Free Banking does more than merely “quibble” with that book’s arguments; their criticisms of those arguments are such as to suggest that the very foundation upon which my defense of free banking rests is deeply flawed. Here, I defend my work against Bagus and Howden’s criticisms, by showing that they rest upon careless or disingenuous readings of my arguments and a poor grasp of basic monetary economics.