大科学工程组织结构评价与选择

大科学工程组织结构是大科学工程顺利实施的重要保障。在学者研究的基础上,基于信息熵理论,从结构复杂度、职能复杂度、信息复杂度3个方面构建大科学工程组织结构三维组织复杂度评价模型,并以弱矩阵式组织结构、平衡矩阵式组织结构和强矩阵式组织结构为对象,横向比较大科学工程不同子项目数下3种矩阵式组织结构的组织复杂度变化情况,探究子项目数与3种矩阵式组织结构对大科学工程组织结构组织复杂度的影响机理。结果表明,当大科学工程子项目数较少时（2~6个）,宜采用弱矩阵式组织结构;当大科学工程子项目数较多时（6个以上）,宜采用强矩阵式组织结构。在优化矩阵式组织结构时,不论是何种矩阵式组织结构,重点都应该关注结构复杂度这一影响因素;但当采用弱矩阵时,还应关注职能复杂度这一影响因素。最后,在管理人员具备高水平跨部门沟通能力的基础上,通过降低职能复杂度可有效帮助大科学工程组织结构从弱矩阵升级为强矩阵。     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent

We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is reached. In consent games contributions start low and can be increased; in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased. The equilibrium prediction is free riding in consent games but as much as social efficiency in dissent games. We test it experimentally and confirm that the dissent mechanism yields substantial welfare improvements over the consent mechanism. With experience, subjects contribute on average less than 30% of the endowment in consent games but more than 60% in dissent games. Generally, subjects match the lower of the opponents' contributions: they do not follow when single opponents increase contributions in consent games, but follow when single opponents decrease contributions in dissent games. This asymmetry in the conditional cooperation is predicted by heterogeneity of egoistic and inequity averse types, with individual types being private information.     

RATIONALE FOR DISSENT: THE CASE OF FOMC MEMBERS

This paper investigates monetary policymakers' rationale for dissent to test for a hypothesized difference in policy preferences between bank presidents and members of the Board of Governors. The paper analyzes the cited reasons for dissent, the identity of the dissenter, and uses multiple regression to make inferences regarding the differences.
Examining the identity of dissenters and the given reasons for dissent yields four conclusions, (i) A broad base of bank presidents dissent for tighter policy because they want to control inflation by keeping monetary aggregates within targeted ranges. (ii) On the other hand, board members' dissent for tighter policy is dominated by one man–Henry Wallich—who apparently was disturbed by the inflationary outbreak during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Hi) Several board members dissent for looser policy to stimulate the real economy, (iv) But only a few bank presidents, primarily from the Northeast, dissent for looser policy with the same objective.
Regression analysis supports the assertion that bank presidents dissenting for tighter policy do so to keep monetary aggregates on target in order to control inflation. The analysis confirms Wallich's focus on inflation during the late 1970s and early 1980s. It also allows for the possibility that the various board members dissenting for looser policy either have an inherent preference for looser policy or have diverse reasons for dissent.     

Monitored by your friends,not your foes: Strategic ignorance and the delegation of real authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to exploit any information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information. Both effects are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirm the prediction that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the interest alignment between managers and workers. Managers also show some preferences for control that seem to be driven by loss aversion. We also find mild evidence for hidden benefits and costs of control. However, behavioral biases have only limited effects on organizational outcomes.     

Employee types and endogenous organizational design: An experiment

When managers are sufficiently guided by social preferences, incentive provision through an organizational mode based on informal implicit contracts may provide a cost-effective alternative to a more formal mode based on explicit contracts and active monitoring. This paper reports the results from a stylized laboratory experiment designed to test whether subjects in the role of firm owner rely on the social preferences of other (‘employee’) subjects with whom they are matched when choosing which payoff version of a simple trust game these employee subjects should play (‘the organizational mode’). Our main finding is that they do so, albeit in a different way than theory predicts. The importance of the first mover's social preferences for trusting behavior is recognized by the owner subjects, but the significant (first order) impact second movers’ social preferences have on trusting behavior of first movers seems to be overlooked.     

Measurement distortion and missing contingencies in optimal contracts

Summary Theory suggests that optimal contracts should include many contingencies to achieve optimal risk sharing. However, in practice, few contracts are as complex as theory suggests. This paper develops a model which is consistent with this observation. The lack of risk sharing results from the interplay of two factors. First, contingencies must be based on information produced by measurement systems, which may be manipulable. Second, when two parties to a contract meet, they often have incomplete information. The type of contract offered may reveal information about the party who proposes it. Different types of agents have different preferences over contingent contracts, because they have different abilities to manipulate the measurement system. These differences in preferences allow the parties to signal their types through the contracts they offer. Noncontingent contracts may be chosen in equilibrium because they are the only contracts which do not give any type an incentive to distort the measurement system and, hence, do not reveal information about the party proposing the contract.We have benefited from conversations with Oliver Hart, Rick Lambert, Michael Riordan and Jean Tirole and the comments of Michel Habib, Nick Yannelis and two anonymous referees. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8920048 and SES-8720589 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Choices of organizational structures in religious organizations: a game theoretic approach

This study has extended the work done by Allen [Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27 (1995) 97] and others who attempted to show a relationship between a denomination’s doctrine and its organizational structure. While Allen’s work resulted in a one-to-one mapping between doctrinal beliefs and organizational structure, this study has argued that there exists a continuum of structures that are consistent with a particular church’s doctrine. The church’s ultimate organizational structure is a game theoretic outcome resulting when churches attempt to maximize membership subject to the constraints imposed by their doctrines. We examine how churches’ organizational structures depend on the extent to which members are willing to sacrifice their structural preferences to hold on to their doctrines. Consistent with Allen’s outcome, our result indicates the further apart are the doctrines held by two churches, the greater the variation in their structural organization. This paper also examines the relationship between churches’ organizational structures and the degree of the majority church’s majority.     

Towards a framework to understand purpose in Futures Studies: The role of Vickers' Appreciative System

There have been comments recently about the efficacy of Futures Studies (and scenario planning) projects, relating to confusion on knowledge aggregation and methodology, which can be summarised in the question: “how to determine the purpose of such projects”. The lack of a purpose framework makes it difficult for ‘clients’ initiating such projects to determine if outcomes meet their original expectations. This paper proposes a framework to help understand the nature, objective and purpose of Futures Studies (and scenario planning) projects, which we will argue helps to overcome these concerns. The proposed framework is based on Vickers' definition of an Appreciative System, highlighting how decision making involves three areas of judgment — reality judgment, value judgment, and instrumental judgment. It will be argued that decision-makers and policymakers call for Futures Studies projects when they become aware of an organizational deficiency in one or more of these areas.Each element, alone or in combination, could form the basis of a purpose definition for a Futures Studies project, and, therefore, needs to be considered to ensure that the project meets client expectations and is experienced as purposeful and rewarding. The paper elaborates on each of the three elements, and then discusses their integrated nature. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of Appreciative System theory for three key players in the decision making process, the organizational leadership, the professionals and the organization at large involved in the practice of Futures Studies (and scenario planning) projects.     

A Signaling Model of Multiple Currencies

In this paper, we demonstrate that it may be socially optimal for countries to have different currencies, even though they have no possibility of independently controlling their money supplies. We assume that agents have heterogeneous preferences over goods of different national origin, and that these preferences are private information. We prove three results. First, for a range of parameters, it is optimal for different countries to have different currencies so that buyers can more efficiently signal their preferences over goods to sellers. Second, if it is socially optimal to have different national currencies, then it is socially optimal for sellers to sell lower quantities to buyers bearing foreign currency. Finally, it is only necessary to have two monies if cross-country trade is optimal.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: F33     

Patience and time consistency in collective decisions

We present experimental evidence regarding individual and group decisions over time. Static and longitudinal methods are combined to test four conditions on time preferences: impatience, stationarity, age independence, and dynamic consistency. Decision making in groups should favor coordination via communication about voting intentions. We find that individuals are neither patient nor consistent, that groups are both patient and highly consistent, and that information exchange between participants helps groups converge to stable decisions. Finally we provide additional evidence showing that our results are driven by the specific role of groups and not by either repeated choices or individual preferences when choosing for other subjects.     

Optimal Pollution Abatement Under ‘Sustainable’ and Other Social Time Preferences

This paper analyses optimal pollution abatement expenditure and the pricing of pollution under alternative social time preferences, including ‘sustainable’ preferences, defined as those that are consistent with two axioms of sustainable development introduced by Chichilnisky (Land Econ 73:467–491, 1997). These axioms state essentially that neither the welfare of present nor future generations ought to be favoured over the other in determining the socially optimal path of economic development. The method is to calibrate a modified Ramsey model of optimal global growth and saving, where pollution is generated by the global output of goods and services. Pollution in turn reduces output. The simulation results illustrate how sensitive the optimal pollution price and abatement expenditure can be over time to assumptions about the social time preference rate. They also show that ‘sustainable’ preferences impose a lower burden on future generations in terms of the pollution price and abatement expenditure. Hence there is a case for governments to make explicit their value judgments about intergenerational welfare, in the context of their notion of sustainable development, when setting target pollution abatement levels and pollution prices over time.     

Salt or Sludge? Exploring Preferences for Potable Water Sources

Decision makers often use information about public preferences to guide public policy. Several disciplines gather information on preferences through surveys by asking respondents to make hypothetical choices over potential policies. However the context of the choice question differs between approaches, with some failing to make the full consequences of the respondent’s choice explicit in the question. In this study we investigate whether question context matters, by exploring whether economic and psychology approaches yield a similar understanding of community preferences towards a large-scale recycled wastewater scheme. We find that stated preferences differ depending on whether the preference question is contextualised using economic incentives. The findings provide insight into the implications of inappropriately contextualised preference questions, methodological considerations in attitude identification and estimation, and the diversity of values and public attitudes towards recycled wastewater.     

The Decentralization of Information Processing in the Presence of Interactions

We propose a model of organizational decision making, in which information processing is decentralized. Our model incorporates two features of many actual organizations: aggregation entails a loss of useful information, and the decision problems of different agents interact. We assume that an organization forms a portfolio of risky assets, following a hierarchical procedure. Agents' decision rules and the organization's hierarchical structure are derived endogenously. Typically, in the optimal hierarchical structure, all agents have one subordinate, and returns to ability are at least as high at the bottom as at the top. However, these results can be reversed in the presence of returns to specialization.     

Collusion and group lending with adverse selection

In an environment with correlated returns, this paper characterizes optimal lending contracts when the bank faces adverse selection and borrowers have limited liability. Group lending contracts are shown to be dominated by revelation mechanisms which do not use the ex post observability of the partners' performances. However, when collusion between borrowers under complete information is allowed, group lending contracts are optimal in the class of simple revelation mechanisms (which elicit only the borrower's own private information) and remain useful with extended revelation mechanisms.     

Cognition,Redundancy, And Learning In Organizations

What exactly does it mean for something to be an ‘organization’? How do we know when something is organized? What exactly is organizational learning? We attempt to attack some of these questions by turning to cybernetics and the mathematical theory of information In the work of Atlan and von Foerster we find provocative attempts to describe the processes of self-organization in terms of such variables as redundancy and information content. Using the running example of a monastery library we attempt to explicate these approaches and connect them to economic concerns.     

Foreign Aid and Recurrent Cost: Donor Competition, Aid Proliferation, and Budget Support

Recent empirical studies reveal that effectiveness of aid on growth is ambiguous. The authors consider aid proliferation—excess aid investment relative to recurrent cost—as a potential cause that undermines aid effectiveness, because aid projects can only produce sustainable benefits when sufficient recurrent costs are disbursed. They consider the donor's budget support as a device to supplement the shortage of the recipient's recurrent cost and to alleviate the misallocation of inputs. However, when donors have self-interested preferences for the success of their own projects over those conducted by others, they provide insufficient budget support relative to aid, which results in aid proliferation. Moreover, aid proliferation is shown to be worsened by the presence of more donors.     

Information Systems Project Abandonment: A Case of Political Influence by the Stakeholders

This paper serves as a stimulus to investigators to examine the role organizational politics plays in decisions leading to the abandonment of information systems (IS) projects. While prior research has identified the development of IS projects as a highly political process, where stakeholders may be more concerned about furthering their self-interests than about contributing to the overall success of the project, there has been little research on identifying the political factors contributing to IS project abandonment. Our case demonstrates six types of political action that took place that caused an electronic commerce (e-commerce) project to be abandoned. Finally, when analyzing mistakes and their principal causes, there is one important lesson that we should learn. That is, all organizations make mistakes and there is the potential for learning from project abandonment experiences.     

A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior

This paper addresses how an organization becomes a bureaucracy . Bureaucratization emerges from a self-enforced norm of reciprocity between agents in an organization who exchange favors and promote subgoals which differ from the objective of the firm. Such collusive behavior becomes harder and harder to prevent over time. As a result, incentive schemes lose their flexibility and bureaucratization becomes a necessary equilibrium phenomenon in the long run. The distribution of agents' private information, their preferences for the future and the force of the social norm of reciprocity are analyzed in terms of their effects on the long-run behavior of the organization and on the speed of the bureaucratization process.     

Ambiguity,data and preferences for information – A case-based approach

We model decision making under ambiguity based on available data. Decision makers express preferences over actions and data sets. We derive an α-max–min representation of preferences, in which beliefs combine objective characteristics of the data (number and frequency of observations) with subjective features of the decision maker (similarity of observations and perceived ambiguity). We identify the subjectively perceived ambiguity and separate it into ambiguity due to a limited number of observations and ambiguity due to data heterogeneity. The special case of no ambiguity provides a behavioral foundation for beliefs as similarity-weighted frequencies as in Billot et al. (2005) [3].