新闻与石印:<<点石斋画报>>之成立

《点石斋画报》作为晚清文化界的一个标志性事件,开启了中国近代雅谷共赏的“画报”体式。它兼及“新闻”与“美术”,不仅为我们保留了晚清社会的诸面相,还让我们体会到中国美术的嬗变。     

读·者·来·信

人民币升值凸显政府智慧；股权分置改革：“情侣博弈”；《顾雏军之后谁狂欢》见解深刻，引人深思；宏观调控取向：结构与总量之辨；英文索引能否提前；民营石油崛起尚需时日；资本市场应当放眼全球；     

The Fault Line between Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians: A Review Essay

This essay reviews Michael Ambrosi's important but neglected book on the formative period of Keynesian economics. The book traces the evolution of a Cambridge macroeconomic tradition running from Marshall and Pigou to Keynes, and interprets The General Theory as a response to Pigou's analysis of unemployment. Ambrosi also argues that Keynes's disciples, Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson, were, in the 1930s, wedded to a Pigovian methodology and did not immediately recognise that Keynes had redefined the meaning of equilibrium in The General Theory. Keynes's attempt to redefine the analytical basis of neoclassical economics was thwarted, not merely by the neoclassical synthesis, but by those who claimed to be the inheritors and guardians of his vision.     

Keynes,Ricardo and the classical theory of interest

Keynes made harsh and repeated attacks on the work of Ricardo, blaming him particulary for what Keynes called the ‘classical theory’ of interest. Garegnani and others argue that Keynes' criticisms of the classical theory of interest apply to later neoclassical writers, but not to Ricardo. This paper re-examines Keynes' criticisms. It argues that Keynes attacked Ricardoapos;s theory of interest despite his awareness that Ricardo did not hold the ‘classical theory’. Moreover, Keynes not only expressed sympathy for Ricardo's understanding of interest, but his criticisms which do apply to Ricardo do not address Ricardo's theory of interest.     

Joan Robinson and the three cambridge revolutions

Joan Robinson's association with three Cambridge ‘revolutions’—imperfect competition, effective demand and capital theory—is examined in the context of her personal and intellectual partnership with Richard Kahn, John Maynard Keynes and Piero Sraffa. Initially, imperfect competition appeared to have successfully extended marginal analysis to all market forms. It also allowed Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to persuade Keynes to present the main argument of The General Theory in terms of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. By the early 1950s, however, Joan Robinson had rejected the Marshallian methodology and had become a strenuous censor of neoclassical theory. In this paper the origin of her critique is traced to her reading of Sraffa's Introduction to Ricardo's Principles.     

Keynes and the international monetary system: Time for a tabular standard?

This paper discusses proposals for tabular standards in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In particular, we focus on Keynes’ proposal for an international tabular standard (ITS) as the gold standard unravelled in the 1930s. The paper explains the origins of Keynes’ ITS proposal which pegged the value of an international reserve to a broad index of primary commodities, weighted in terms of their value in world production. We argue that the ITS should be viewed as an important and enduring component of Keynes’ ideal long-run vision for anchoring the international monetary system, even post-Bretton Woods.     

Patinkin as a reader of Keynes’ General Theory: Are wage cuts a good remedy to unemployment?1

Abstract

This paper analyses Patinkin's appraisal of Keynes’ concept of involuntary unemployment while focusing on his reading of the General Theory Chapter 19. On several critical issues, Patinkin departs from Keynes’ original matters of concerns. He leans against an individual criterion for unemployment and implicitly endorses Wicksell's understanding of voluntary unemployment as chosen leisure. His appraisal of involuntary unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon ultimately relies on nominal rigidities and assumes the existence of a competitive adjustment process. On all these three critical points, Patinkin departs from Keynes but also initiates the contemporary New Keynesian programme that went even further from Keynes.     

Logic,rationality and knowledge in Ramsey's thought: reassessing ‘human logic’

This paper reconsiders Frank Ramsey's essay on subjective probability (1926) as a consistent way to articulate logic, rationality and knowledge. The first part of the essay builds an axiomatic theory of subjective probability based on ‘formal logic’, defining rationality as choice-consistency. The second part seems to open up different horizons: the evaluation of degrees of belief by ‘human logic’. Because of the interest Keynes (1931) had taken in ‘human logic’, it was considered to be a possible alternative to the formal logic underlying the neoclassical theory of individual behaviour. The analysis of Ramsey's method in the entire paper, the relation between logic and rationality it constructs and the conception of uncertainty it reveals, lead me to note on the contrary that Ramsey's human logic was a complementary logic rather than an alternative to formal logic. Defining a standard to evaluate beliefs formation according to a frequentist criterion, it completes a normative representation of rationality which supports an original theory of knowledge that appears more in line with further developments of neoclassical methodology than with Keynesian economics.     

Keynes's realisms

Abstract

Some authors pointed to a realist orientation in Keynes's thought. However, since ‘realism’ is a wide and sometimes equivocal term, one may ask what kind of realism Keynes's realism is. This paper argues that Keynes held to an ontological, logical–semantic and epistemic realism. Whereas ontological realism has metaphysical connections, logical–semantic realism involves a notion of truth, and epistemological realism presupposes a theory of knowledge. The character of the subject matter circumscribes the scope of this last kind of realism. Epistemological realism is related to the role of intuition and convention in Keynes's thought, the meaning and evolution of which is explained.     

Hayek and the Great Depression of 1929: Did he really change his mind?

The aim of this research is to establish whether, and if so in what way, Hayek changed his mind about the Great Depression of 1929.The work is divided into two parts. In the first part, I present the ‘early’ Hayek of the 1930s. Hayek was the great rival of Keynes. Both explained the Great Depression, applying opposing business cycle theories. For Keynes, the crisis was caused by an excess of saving over investment; for Hayek, on the contrary, by an excess of investment over saving. In the early 1930s, Röpke attempted a synthesis, positing that a recession due to overinvestment can degenerate, as in 1929, into a depression caused by oversaving. Hayek examined and rejected Röpke's theory. In the second part, I present the ‘later’ Hayek of the 1970s. After years of silence and solitude, Hayek was unexpectedly awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, precisely for the contribution he made in the 1930s to the theory of the business cycle. Hayek returned to his pursuit of the ghost of Keynes, debated with his friend and rival Friedman, re-examined Röpke's special case and, according to Haberler, changed his mind. In my conclusion, I attempt to resolve the dilemma.     

Kalecki on money and finance

It is argued that Kalecki had a greater appreciation of the role of the monetary sector than has been generally recognized, and that Kalecki presented ideas which can be seen as now embedded in the structuralist post Keynesian analysis of endogenous money and in the circuitist approach. Six key features of Kalecki's monetary analysis are identified. The paper outlines Kalecki's dismissal of the ‘Pigou effect’ and the ‘Keynes effect’, and then discussion the relationship between the ‘principle of increasing risk’ and the nature of the supply of credit. It discusses interest determination in Kalecki's writings and the manner in which he distinguished different types of money.     

Pigou on philosophy and religion

Abstract

This article discusses a group of essays on ethical issues written by Pigou between 1900 and 1908. It is argued that they contain the foundations of his economic philosophy. Pigou's research on the meaning and content of the good merged into his definition of welfare, and his interest in religion as a subjective experience resurfaced in the subjective framework of his economics. A methodological pragmatism informed his economics as well as his ethics; moreover, the endorsement of interpersonal comparisons of the good in the ethical texts was consistent with Pigou's adoption of utility comparisons in welfare economics. Pigou's philosophical pessimism was reflected in his analysis of the economic evils of society, eventually leading to his advocacy of governmental intervention to foster economic welfare. The article contends that Pigou's philosophy derived not only from Sidgwick, as commonly believed, but also from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica.