WATER QUALITY TRADING IN THE PRESENCE OF ABATEMENT‐COST SHARING

This paper examines how water quality trading interacts with nonpoint‐source abatement‐cost sharing (e.g., as currently practiced by the National Resource Conservation Service through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program [EQIP]) to promote the participation of nonpoint sources in a water quality market, participation that has thus far been noticeably lacking nationwide. As such, an idealized version of water quality trading is envisioned, where water quality trading and nonpoint cost sharing are treated as complementary policy instruments rather than substitutes. Toward this end, the subgame‐perfect equilibrium concept is used to model a “multilateral contracting” relationship between the regulatory authority and nonpoint sources when the regulator has incomplete information about the nonpoint sources' production costs. We characterize ex ante (or second‐best) nonpoint abatement levels when the regulator chooses cost‐share rates in concert with a water quality market. Numerical analysis indicates that current EQIP cost‐share rates would likely be lower and more flexibly determined in the presence of water quality trading. (JEL Q53)     

WATERSHED-BASED EFFLUENT TRADING: THE NONPOINT SOURCE CHALLENGE

In 1996 the Environmental Protection Agency released draft guidelines intended to encourage the development of watershed-based effluent trading systems. Effluent trading systems allow dischargers the opportunity to transfer legal and financial requirements for effluent control in order to lower control costs. To assure that equivalent control is being exchanged, accurate measurement (quantification) of effluent load is necessary. Many argue that measurement of nonpoint source load represents a significant challenge for designing and implementing effluent trading systems. A nonpoint source delivers effluent over a diffuse area. This paper argues that the physical properties of nonpoint source discharge may not offer as significant a barrier to trading as often is presumed. Many measurement challenges are not unique to nonpoint sources, and measurement issues are successfully addressed within a number of local and regional water quality programs. Trading system design can stimulate institutional and technical innovations in nonpoint source measurement.     

Voluntary climate action and credible regulatory threat: evidence from the carbon disclosure project

Journal of Regulatory Economics - This paper examines the role that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s introduction of the Clean Power Plan played in voluntary carbon disclosure by...     

Implementing technology-forcing policies: The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments and the introduction of advanced automotive emissions controls in the United States

Technology forcing is a strategy where a regulator specifies a standard that cannot be met with existing technology, or at least not at an acceptable cost. Using the 1970 U.S. Clean Air Act for controlling automobile emissions as a baseline example, we demonstrate the importance of the regulatory implementation process if regulations are to foster technological change. The 1970 legislation required steep emissions reductions for new 1975 and 1976 automobiles, which presented automakers with major technical and economic challenges. Nevertheless, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency successfully forced the adoption of two marquee control technologies—the catalytic converter in 1975 and the three-way catalyst in 1981. We focus on three factors critical to the implementation process: agency credibility to enforce standards, competitive pressures to drive industry research and development, and uncertainty about technological development.     

STRATEGIC BEHAVIORS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: A CASE OF TRUCKING INDUSTRY

We used trucking industry’s response to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s acceleration of 2004 diesel emissions standards as a case study to examine the importance of accounting for regulatees’ strategic behaviors in drafting of environmental regulations. Our analysis of the time series data of aggregate U.S. and Canada heavy‐duty truck production data from 1992 through 2003 found that heavy‐duty trucks production increased by 20%–23% in the 6 mo prior to the date of compliance. The increases might be due to truck operators pre‐buying trucks with less expensive but noncompliant engines and behaving strategically in anticipation of other uncertainties. (JEL L51, Q25)     

排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的传导机制研究

从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现：排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。     

Children’s health benefits of reducing environmental tobacco smoke exposure: evidence from parents who smoke

This paper uses data from the 1991 National Maternal and Infant Health Survey to estimate propositions derived from a model of intrahousehold allocation, wherein parents engage in a consumption activity (smoking) that produces own utility, while generating environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) that harms their children’s health. We find a statistically significant negative association between sample mothers‘ assessed health of their children and the children’s daily exposures to ETS. Mothers’ average annual willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a 1-hour-per-day reduction in child ETS exposure (about a 17% decrease in daily exposure) is about $150. WTP estimates for respondent mother and child health status further suggest that smoking mothers on average value their child’s health roughly 55% higher than their own health. Helpful comments and suggestions by Scott Atkinson, Donald Kenkel, and two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. Marcy Agee and Stefanos Nastis provided valuable research assistance. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provided financial support through Grant#R82871601, the research has not been subjected to the Agency’s required peer and policy review and therefore does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency     

Marginal abatement cost curves in general equilibrium: The influence of world energy prices

Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are a favorite instrument to analyze international emissions trading. This paper focuses on the question of how to define MACCs in a general equilibrium context where the global abatement level influences energy prices and in turn national MACCs. We discuss the mechanisms theoretically and then use the CGE model DART for quantitative simulations. The result is, that changes in energy prices resulting from different global abatement levels do indeed affect national MACCs. Also, we compare different possibilities of defining MACCs—of which some are robust against changes in energy prices while others vary considerably.     

Real option analysis for effects of emission permit banking on investment under abatement cost uncertainty

The present paper analyzes the investment effects of emission trading scheme (ETS) when emission permits are bankable and there is technological uncertainty with regard to the abatement cost. A real option model is employed to accommodate irreversibility of investment and cost uncertainty. In the absence of abatement cost uncertainty, a bankable ETS reduces a firm's incentive for environmental investment, because the firm can utilize the banked permits for future compliance which act as substitutes for abatement investment. However, when cost uncertainty is prevalent, investment may reduce the opportunity cost of irreversible investment under the banking system, thereby increasing a firm's investment incentive. The condition is derived under which a bankable ETS provides higher investment incentives than a non-bankable ETS does.     

From Judicial Sovereignty to Collective Democracy: The Development of J.R. Commons’ Perspective on Progressive Institutional Change

Abstract:

This article clarifies the significance of “collective democracy” in the works of John R. Commons by comparing it with “judicial sovereignty” in terms of its contribution to “progress.” We can thus answer two issues that Paul D. Bush does not clearly address: (i) what setup for policy formation contributes to progress and (ii) what is the role of economists within a collective democracy? Based on the comparison, the answer to the first question is collective democracy, and regarding the second question, the roles of economists as both economists and “institutional” economists are extrapolated.     

“GATT‐think” with Asymmetric Countries*

We argue that a trade agreement which conforms to GATT’s reciprocity rule benefits the (stronger) less trade‐dependent country at the expense of the (weaker) more trade‐dependent country. Reciprocity is so unfavorable to the weaker country that it may be worse off under reciprocity than under the Nash‐ bargaining solution, a “power‐based” approach to trade negotiations that reflects power asymmetries among trading partners. Our results question Bagwell and Staiger’s (1999 , 2000 ) view of reciprocity as a rule that “serves to mitigate the influence of power asymmetries on negotiated outcomes.”     

U.S. R&D internationalization in less‐developed countries: Determinants and insights from Brazil,China, and India

The growing U.S. R&D internationalization has historically been concentrated in developed countries. However, in the past few decades, the internationalization has moved toward less‐developed countries (LDCs), particularly Brazil, China, and India. What location factors are making some LDCs more “inviting” for U.S. R&D offshore? To answer this first question, we constructed a panel data using secondary data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis regarding the R&D investment made by the majority‐owned foreign affiliates of U.S. parent companies in 71 countries. We then applied a Heckman two‐step correction for selection bias test. The results highlight some important differences between developed countries’ and LDCs’ attractiveness. Based on these initial results, we conducted a detailed analysis of the determinants of U.S. R&D investments in Brazil, China, and India, which revealed that China’s determinants mostly match those found in more developed countries.     

CERCLA AND DEEP POCKETS: MARKET RESPONSE TO THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM

This paper uses event study methods to estimate wealth effects upon shareholders who are named by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) as potentially responsible parties at a Superfund site. Impacts appear to be divided into three periods: an initial program period where stock market effects depend largely on prior visibility of the site, a second period where likely financial impact is more important, and a third period where notification has little association with either visibility or financial measures. However, the expected remediation cost burden is not borne evenly. "Deep-pocket" firms appear to be disproportionately penalized by the market during the second period.     

美国日益重视纳米技术的环境、健康和安全风险研究

随着纳米技术产品市场的不断扩大，纳米技术潜在的环境、健康和安全风险日益突出。旱在2000年美国便设立“国家纳米技术计划”，开始关注纳米技术引发的环境、健康和安全问题。目前美国在此研究领域已处于世界领先地住。美国的五大机构：国立卫生研究院、国家职业安全与健康研究所、国家标准和技术研究院、环保署、食品和药品管理局等担负起对相关研究进行协调与评估的责任。不断完善相关法规，保证负责任地研发和应用纳米技术。     

The impact of public R&D investments on patenting activity: technology transfer at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

ABSTRACT

This paper presents estimates of the impact of public R&D on patenting activity at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Using a time series of public sector agency data, we estimate the per-capita R&D elasticity of new patent applications using a knowledge production function framework model that is an expanded version of what other scholars have used with private sector data. New patent applications are an important step in the technology transfer activities of a federal agency. We estimate this elasticity to be about 2.0. This elasticity value represents an initial estimate of the impact of EPA’s R&D investments on its technology transfer activity.     

Sick of being “Activated?”

Do unemployment insurance (UI) benefit recipients take sick leave more often when facing “activation” by the employment office? We answer this question using administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency on vacancy referrals sent to UI benefit recipients. Applying duration analysis, we find an increased transition rate into short-term sick leave among individuals who had received vacancy referrals from the employment office. We find that while men on average report less sick compared to women, they respond stronger to a vacancy referral. In subsequent steps, we test the hypothesis that the results are driven by real illnesses as opposed to shirking. Our findings do not support this hypothesis. We interpret the findings as evidence of moral hazard behavior and as evidence of a side effect of an activation measure.     

Irreversible abatement investment under cost uncertainties: tradable emission permits and emissions charges

A major concern with tradable emission permits is that stochastic permit prices may reduce a firm’s incentive to invest in abatement capital or technologies relative to other policies such as a fixed emissions charge. However, under efficient permit trading, the permit price uncertainty is caused by abatement cost uncertainties which affect investment under both permit and charge policies. We develop a rational expectations general equilibrium model of permit trading and irreversible abatement investment to show how cost uncertainties affect investment under permits. We compare the resulting investment incentive with that under charges. After controlling for the assumption that random shocks affect the abatement cost linearly, we find that firms’ investment incentive decreases in cost uncertainties, but more so under emissions charges than under permits. Therefore, tradable permits in fact may help maintain firms’ investment incentive under uncertainty.     

Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate

This paper explores the analytical and empirical properties of a new method for emission trading according to a fixed exchange rate. The exchange rate is based on the ratios of the marginal costs of abatement in the optimal solution in order to account for the impact of the location of emission sources on the deposition. It is shown that, generally, this system will not achieve the optimal solution and does not guarantee that environmental deposition constraints are not violated, although total abatement costs are always reduced. A routine was developed to mimic trading as a bilateral, sequential process, subject to an exchange rate. In the example used, results for SO₂ emissions in Europe show that, starting from a uniform reduction, exchange-rate trading achieves higher cost savings than one-to-one trading, without achieving the cost minimum. Sulfur deposition targets are not violated since the initial emission allocation overfulfilled targets at many places. The results are sensitive to: pre-trade emission levels, the transaction costs, the availability of information on potential cost savings and assumptions made on the behavior of trading partners.     

On Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standards

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector (‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) model with Cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm’s long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.     

On deep-rooted problems in China��s economy

China’s economy is currently at a crossroad leading to two different directions. One is to further deepen the reform, concentrate on crucial aspects and relax control over details, govern by non-intervention and let the market play an increasing role and lead the economy; while the other is to enhance the state sector with weakening the private sector, and let the government play a greater role and lead the economy. Which direction should China head for? The answer would undoubtedly be the former. As such, this paper argues that there does not exist the so-called “China Model” and attributes the deep-seated problems caused by those misconceptions in China’s economy to three pairs of “over-emphasis” versus “under-emphasis”, namely, over-emphasis on the government versus under-emphasis on the market, over-emphasis on enriching state versus under-emphasis on enriching the people, and over-emphasis on development versus under-emphasis on public service. Moreover, in regard to how to solve these problems, the paper proposes to further advance the two fundamental transformations of government functions: (1) to transform from a development-oriented government to a service-oriented government, and (2) to transform from an omnipotent government to a limited government.