Effect of labor market policies on unemployment when firms adapt their recruitment strategy

Firms conduct interviews to select who to hire. Their recruitment strategies affect not only the hiring rate but also job destruction rate as more interviews increase the chances of finding the right worker for the job; a link mostly overlooked in the literature. I model this recruitment behavior and investigate the effects of labor market policies on unemployment. These policies change the value of hiring the right worker, altering firms' incentives to conduct interviews. Policies further affect job creation and destruction when firms adapt their recruitment strategies. Net effect of a policy on unemployment depends on the magnitude of change in job creation versus destruction. Qualitative analysis reveals that the effect of a policy on unemployment is mostly weakened with the introduction of firms' recruitment behavior to the model. Firing taxes still increase unemployment, albeit at a lower rate. The effect of hiring subsidies on unemployment is even reversed: Unemployment increases with hiring subsidies if firms adapt. Minimum wage and unemployment insurance policies are also analyzed.     

Labour market institutions in open economy: Sectoral reallocations,aggregate adjustments,and spillovers

We introduce frictional unemployment in a multiworker heterogeneous firm model with a dynamic matching process, one‐ and two‐sector equilibria, and international markets. A change in labour market policies transforms the share of exporters and affects average productivity. The closure of equilibrium with or without sectoral arbitrage plays an important role in generating macro‐level outcomes for employment subsidies. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, make unemployment and openness rise, independently of sectoral reallocations. We also find that simultaneous implementation of labour market policies remove potential gain in the trade share, and, when it comes to unemployment benefits, may even be detrimental.     

International timber markets and tropical deforestation: the evidence from prices

Some scholars suggest that global timber markets, especially those involving high value species, are a leading cause of tropical deforestation. Despite limited empirical evidence, this hypothesis rests on the assumption that global timber markets respond to a common equilibrating mechanism that provides strong enough incentives for loggers in the tropical regions of the world. This article develops a simple model and taps into a unique data set on timber prices of hardwood and softwood in leading markets to test the global timber markets hypothesis. While we find evidence of a global equilibrating mechanism with potentially significant economic incentives to affect tropical deforestation, our results do not endorse the common conjecture in the literature that timber price shocks in developed countries lead to a homogeneous response in terms of deforestation everywhere in the tropical world. Instead, they invite further development of structural global timber market models to assess the linkages between markets and the consequences of such linkages to deforestation.     

智能制造业创新产出：政府补助与市场竞争是否协同助力

基于2015—2019年中国智能制造行业上市公司数据，探讨政府补助与市场竞争对创新产出的协同作用，研究不同产业类别、不同市场竞争环境以及不同区域下政府补助的异质性效果。结果表明，政府补助和市场竞争对企业创新产出均有显著激励作用，市场竞争正向调节政府补助与企业创新产出的关系；政府补助对智能制造四大行业的创新产出均具有正向激励效应，其中对高端装备和新材料产业的促进作用更显著；在高市场竞争环境下，政府补助对高质量创新产出的促进作用更加显著；分区域看，东、中部地区政府补助对企业创新产出的促进作用更显著，且东部地区政府补助与市场竞争的协同促进作用更强，中部地区次之，西部地区较弱。结论对政府制定智能制造业补助政策、完善创新市场环境、促进政府与市场发挥协同创新作用等具有参考价值。     

Dispersed consumption versus compressed output: Assessing the sectoral effects of a pandemic

I process credit-card consumption data through an input–output model of sectoral linkages to impute the sector-level output responses to the Covid-19 pandemic. The sector-level consumption responses are highly dispersed and even positive for some. Yet, all sectors suffer from output losses. Production of intermediate goods stabilises output. Consequently, the sectoral dispersion of final consumption is higher than the sectoral dispersion of output produced. Sectors that provide intermediate goods are affected less by the pandemic. Many service sectors face the largest losses in output since they depend the most on final consumption.     

International Trade, Bargaining and Efficiency: The Holdup Problem

In the presence of product market imperfections and holdup, we identify allocative and productive efficiency gains resulting from international trade. Under a bilateral monopoly in a closed economy, inefficiencies arise in both input and output markets. Trade in final goods has a procompetitive effect in the product market. This in turn triggers an increase in output, which raises incentives for the upstream firm to invest and helps reduce the hold-up problem.
JEL classification: F 12; F 13; F 15     

技术需求与智能制造技术创新——数字经济的导向性赋能机制

智能制造技术创新是持续推动制造业高质量发展的关键动力。为探究制造业技术需求、数字经济赋能对非市场与市场导向下智能制造技术创新的作用机制，基于技术创新需求拉动理论，引入数字经济赋能构建投入-产出两阶段模型。分析发现，当政府研发补贴较高时，劳动替代需求与智能制造技术创新投入呈倒U型相关，对智能制造研发投入产生挤出效应；以效率提升为主的技术市场需求通过影响企业智能制造技术创新投入，间接推动技术创新产出。有调节的中介模型检验表明，数字经济赋能正向调节市场导向的智能制造技术创新产出，但对非市场导向的技术创新不具赋能作用。在充分利用数字经济发展优势的同时，应依托需求拉动机制开发更多需求侧政策工具，进一步激发智能制造技术创新。     

Effects of changes in outputs and in prices on the economic system: an input–output analysis using the spectral theory of nonnegative matrices

The (physical) output adjustment model and the price adjustment model are presented. By the two models we quantitatively analyze the influences of alterations of one sectoral (physical) gross output and of one sectoral price on another sectoral (physical) gross output and on another sectoral price, respectively. Hence, a basic nature of the Ghosh inverse and a fundamental character of the monetary Leontief inverse are obtained. The proposition that a matrix of intermediate output (input) coefficients alters if the vector of output (price) adjustment coefficients is nontrivial holds, if and only if this matrix is C-irreducible. It is impossible that (i) the adaptation of output system causes all sectoral final output rates (or input multipliers) either to rise or to fall collectively, or (ii) an adjustment of price system causes all sectoral value-added rates (or output multipliers) either to increase or to decrease jointly. However, maybe (i) a change of output system enables some sectoral final output rates (or input multipliers) to rise (fall) and all others to be constant, and (ii) an alteration of price system enables some sectoral value-added rates (or output multipliers) to increase (decrease) and all others to be fixed, whose necessary and sufficient condition is that the matrix of intermediate output (or input) coefficients has at least one non-final (or non-initial) class. The proposition that the vector of final output rates (or input multipliers) changes if the vector of output adjustment coefficients is nontrivial is true, if and only if the matrix of intermediate output coefficients has only one final class. The proposition that the vector of value-added rates (or output multipliers) alters if the vector of price adjustment coefficients is nontrivial holds, if and only if the matrix of intermediate input coefficients has only one initial class. The necessary and sufficient conditions and the matching economic explanations for possibility and uniqueness of the economic adjustment that enables (i) all sectors to have a uniform final output rate (or input multiplier), and (ii) all sectors to have the same value-added rate (or output multiplier) are respectively given. I would like to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions.     

R&D, Imperfect Competition and Growth with Human Capital Accumulation

This paper studies the long‐run consequences of imperfect competition on growth and the sectoral distribution of skills within an R&D‐based growth model with human capital accumulation. We find that steady‐state growth is driven only by incentives to accumulate skills. In the model imperfect competition has a positive growth effect, while influencing the allocation of human capital to the different economic activities employing this factor input. Contrary to general wisdom, the share of resources invested in R&D turns out not to be monotonically increasing in the product market power and its correlation with the equilibrium output growth rate is not unambiguous.     

Structural change,the push-pull hypothesis and the Spanish labour market

This paper proposes a small-scale general equilibrium model of structural transformation with a non-agricultural labour market characterized by search frictions. The model is used to investigate the role of sectoral TFPs as main drivers of structural change and a new growth accounting exercise allows a quantitative reassessment of the importance of the labour reallocation bonus in structural transformation in the presence of labour market frictions. The model is calibrated to data for post-war Spain and its transition from dictatorship to democracy. Counterfactual simulations point towards productivity improvements in agriculture as the main driver, while modifications in labour market institutions affect mainly the labour market itself, with only a modest effect on structural change.     

政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新决策间双向动态耦合与非线性关系*

本文以新常态下创新驱动的引擎产业——高技术产业为研究对象,通过面板向量自回归方法将政府的直接补贴、税收优惠与企业的资本、人员投入及创新收益同时纳入系统框架,研究政府R&D补贴政策与企业创新行为决策之间的双向动态耦合关系,然后基于动态面板门限回归研究企业创新收益与两类R&D补贴政策间可能存在的非线性关系,并以理论模型与经验研究相结合的方式分析直接补贴与税收优惠影响高技术企业创新的机理及作用效果。研究证实企业增加创新投入是提高创新收益的根本原因;R&D补贴对企业资本投入的“挤入作用”并不明显,但税收优惠能有效激励高技术企业在人员方面的投入;政府“低补贴、低优惠”的双低策略更有利于提高企业的创新收益。     

Labour Market Regulations and the Sectoral Reallocation of Workers: The Case of Trade Reforms

In this paper I highlight the importance of incorporating the institutional features of local labour markets into the analysis of trade reforms. A trade reform is often deemed beneficial because the elimination of trade barriers allows labour to reallocate towards those sectors in the economy in which the country has a comparative advantage. The amount and speed of the reallocation, however, and the post-reform behaviour of output, productivity and welfare, will depend on how regulated the labour market is. First, I document that high firing costs slow down the intersectoral reallocation of labour after a trade reform. Second, in order to isolate the effect of firing costs on labour reallocation, output and welfare after a trade reform, I build a dynamic general equilibrium model. I find that if a country does not liberalize its labour market at the outset of its trade reform, the intersectoral reallocation of workers will be 30% slower, and as much as 30% of the gains in real output and labour productivity in the years following the trade reform will be lost. From a policy standpoint, the message is that while trade reforms are desirable, they need to be complemented by labour market reforms in order to be fully successful.     

Government incentive strategies and private capital participation in China’s Shale gas development

Shale gas development investments are uncertain and irreversible in the initial stage in China. Flexible incentive strategy is needed for governments to guide private capital participation at different development stages. This study aims to provide analysis governments can use to encourage private investment in shale gas projects according to its plans in an extended real options framework. A social benefits variable is introduced to determine the threshold of social benefits that determine whether the government will choose a deferred or instant incentives strategy. By considering the efficiency factor, we show the optimal arrangements of two kinds of incentives: tax cuts and production subsidies, to implement incentive targets. The results indicate that current market demand and social benefits are the key factors that affect the government’s choice of incentive strategy. We also find that the optimal level of incentives, either tax cuts or production subsidies, are independent of current market demand and future market uncertainty under the delayed incentive strategy, but which affect the optimal level of incentives under the instant motivation strategy, and ignoring the negative influence of unpredictable random events on future market demand might lead to insufficient government incentives in this case.     

产业政策提升中国数字企业的全要素生产率了吗？

提升数字企业全要素生产率是促进数字经济高质量发展的必要方式,而产业政策的有效使用将对这一过程起到重要的推动作用。本文利用2007-2020年中国数字行业上市企业的面板数据,实证检验了政府补贴、税收优惠、信贷支持和市场准入四类产业政策对数字企业全要素生产率的影响。研究发现,信贷支持显著促进了数字企业全要素生产率的提升,市场准入则起到显著的负向作用,政府补贴和税收优惠对数字企业全要素生产率的增长无明显效果,该结论在进行一系列稳健性检验后仍保持稳健。异质性和作用机制检验的结果表明,产业政策对数字企业全要素生产率存在产权、企业规模和企业生命周期方面的异质性作用,信贷支持和市场准入则分别通过缓解企业融资约束和加剧企业过度投资的方式影响数字企业的全要素生产率。本文的研究结论对于政府制定更为精准有效的产业政策具有一定的启示意义。     

政府补助、产权性质与定向增发

政府补助效果是学者高度重视的焦点话题。本文以政府补助为切入点，从一级市场、二级市场分别考察定向增发新股的定价效率以及定向增发收益背后的经济逻辑，并采用随机前沿分析法对2007—2017年间获得政府补助且实施定向增发新股的沪深A 股上市公司进行实证分析。结果发现：定向增发新股发行存在溢价现象，新股上市后也存在溢价现象，政府补助加剧了溢价程度，进而导致定价效率降低，且在国有企业中更严重；发行定价泡沫越严重，定向增发收益越高，同时政府补助对定向增发收益能产生积极影响，且在国有企业中更显著。路径检验结果发现：政府补助作用于定向增发收益可能依赖盈余管理、自主创新以及个股成长这三条路径。上述结果表明，政府补助可能被异化为操纵股价的隐形工具，导致政府补助效果“事与愿违”。     

Using the allocation of emission permits for strategic trade purposes

We show that the presence of transaction costs in emission permit markets challenges the common presumption that grandfathering permits corresponds to lump-sum transfers with no strategic effects on output. Fixed transaction-costs influence firms’ decision to participate in the permits market, while variable transaction-costs affect firms’ output choice by creating a wedge between buyers’ and sellers’ opportunity cost of using permits. Thus, permit grandfathering can be used as a strategic trade instrument even when firms are price takers in the permit markets. Grandfathered permits differ from subsidies in that the stimulus they provide is bounded exogenously and rather limited.     

A two-sector Kaleckian model of growth and distribution with endogenous productivity dynamics

This study extends a two-sector Kaleckian model of output growth and income distribution by incorporating endogenous labour productivity growth. The model is composed of investment goods and consumption goods production sectors. The impact of a change in wage and profit shares on capacity utilisation and output growth rates at the sectoral and aggregate levels are identified. The study reveals short-run cyclical capacity utilisation rates and productivity growth dynamics. Even if the short-run steady state is stable, the capital accumulation rate in the consumption goods sector must decrease more than that in the investment sector for long-run stability. When simultaneous rises in profit shares in both the sectors affect long-run aggregate economic growth differently at a steady state, the distributional interests between the same class in different sectors may hamper the long-run economic growth. A policy message is that the effect of income distribution on industrial output growth is not always beneficial. These phenomena are specific to two-sector models and cannot be observed when using conventional aggregate growth models.     

Optimal Taxation of Risky Human Capital*

In a two‐period life‐cycle model with ex ante homogeneous households, earnings risk, and a general earnings function, we derive the optimal linear labor tax rate and optimal linear education subsidies. The optimal income tax trades off social insurance against incentives to work. Education subsidies are not used for social insurance, but they are only targeted at offsetting the distortions of the labor tax and internalizing a fiscal externality. Both optimal education subsidies and tax rates increase if labor and education are more complementary, because education subsidies indirectly lower labor tax distortions by stimulating labor supply. Optimal education subsidies (taxes) also correct non‐tax distortions arising from missing insurance markets. Education subsidies internalize a positive (negative) fiscal externality if there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in education because of risk. Education policy unambiguously allows for more social insurance if education is a risky activity. However, if education hedges against labor‐market risk, optimal tax rates could be lower than in the case without education subsidies.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

经济政策不确定性与家族企业创新——融资约束及政府补助视角

家族企业作为社会发展的主要参与者，在促进经济增长方面发挥着不可替代的作用。家族企业若想实现长期发展，必然依靠创新。然而，我国家族企业普遍面临创新投入不足、创新产出效率低下等问题。基于2010—2018年中国上市家族企业数据，分析经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新是否存在激励作用。结果发现，经济政策不确定性提高，会对家族企业创新研发活动投入与产出产生正向激励作用，促进家族企业创新。从融资约束与政府补助视角，分析两者在上述正向激励作用中的调节作用。结果表明，对于融资约束小以及受到政府补助的家族企业而言，其受到经济政策不确定性的正向激励作用更显著，有助于其开展创新研发活动。结论不仅验证了经济政策不确定性对于家族企业创新的激励作用，还揭示了融资约束以及政府补助的调节作用，可为政府制定相应补助政策，构建完善的金融市场提供理论支持和经验证据。