税收竞争与政治学：双重激励再考察

1引言目前关于资本税收竞争方面的论著浩如烟海,但迄今为止,却鲜有人对税收竞争程度与确定税收的政治过程二者之间的相互作用做出系统分析。不过,Persson和Tabellini早在1992年就对这个问题提出了重要观点,他们强调,在存在税收竞争的情况下,一国投票者通常会通过选择候选人来实现其投票策略,候选人一旦执政将会对资本课以更高的税收,税负会高于中间投票人所意愿的税负。在他们的模型中,假设候选人占有的资本要素少于中间投     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

政治竞争与相互直接投资

This paper investigates a basic question about the international political economy—why is international trade not free? To answer this question, we modified Grossman and Helpman (1994) by considering that interest lobbies make political contributions to both the incumbent government and the political challenger in order to influence the incumbent government’s choice of trade policy. By examining the contribution schedules under a framework of bilateral direct investments, we find that the modified Ramsey rule still holds under our setting.     

Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called ‘one-sided’ and ‘probabilistic’ policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about votersʼ preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a laboratory experiment, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as at the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.     

Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results

Summary We analyze the role of political competition on the type of economic policies that are selected in a one sector model of economic growth. We identify conditions under which neoclassical optimal growth plans occur, and conditions in which political business cycles occur. We find that the ability commit to multiperiod economic policy leads to less political stability of economic plans.Support for this research was provided in part by NSF grant #SES-9022932 to the California Institute of Technology. We are grateful to a referee for pointing out that our results could be extended to supra majority rules, as in Proposition 1.     

Competitive experimentation with private information: The survivor's curse

We study a winner-take-all R&D race between two firms that are privately informed about the arrival rate of an invention. Over time, each firm only observes whether the opponent left the race or not. The equilibrium displays a strong herding effect, that we call a ‘survivor's curse.’ Unlike in the case of symmetric information, the two firms may quit the race (nearly) simultaneously even when their costs and benefits for research differ significantly.     

政治关联对我国民营企业多元化经营的影响

以2010年沪深A股539家民营上市公司为研究对象,实证研究了民营企业董事长的政府背景与企业多元化经营间的关系,并将政治关联分为曾在政府部门任职和担任代表委员两种情况。结果显示：政治关联显著地影响了民营企业的多元化经营,其中有政治关联企业的多元化程度要高于非政治关联企业。在考虑不同地区的市场化水平后,研究发现市场化水平越低的地区拥有政治关联背景的董事长越有可能实施多元化经营。政府干预越强烈,对民营企业的经营影响程度就越大。     

Ramsey pricing and competition: The consequences of myopic regulation

This paper addresses the welfare consequences of applying the Ramsey rule when the regulated firm is not a monopolist in all of its markets. The partially regulated optimum and the outcome of myopic regulation, the Short-Sighted Ramsey Equilibrium (SSRE), are examined in a differentiated duopoly model. In the optimum, the markup of competitive substitute goods is relatively high. In the SSRE, the regulator is likely to set the price of competitive substitute goods lower than optimal, and complementary goods higher than optimal. Strategic reactions by a competitor may reverse the result.I thank Kenneth Train, Michael Crew (the editor), seminar participants at the University of California, Berkeley, and an anonymous referee for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Post-compulsory education: Participation and politics

In a much-cited paper Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) suggest that public spending on higher education is politically sustained by middle- and high income groups voting for a policy which is positive but not generous enough to allow lower income families to overcome the financial constraints that prevent their participation. Using a quantitative model, calibrated to the UK economy, we find that current public spending on post compulsory education corresponds to a political equilibrium. Support for the equilibrium policy comes primarily from low- and middle income groups, indicating that the policy needn't be highly regressive. Credit constraints play a minor role.     

The politics of pollution: party regimes and air quality in Canada

Abstract. Environmental concerns often figure prominently in opinion polls. But do election outcomes actually affect the environment? I test the influence of the party in power on urban air pollution in 13 Canadian cities. The government's political stripe is not reliably associated with positive or negative effects on air pollution. Provincial parties on both the right and the left are associated with elevated levels of some air contaminants. Federal effects also go in contrasting directions. Overall it appears a change in government is unlikely to be a reliable predictor of changes in air pollution. JEL classification: Q51, Q58, D78     

The politics of technology management: influence and tactics in project selection

It is observed that technical information presented in aformalized way is used as ‘rational’ evidence to suport one particular point of view during the process of project selection. This ‘political’ action increases the chances of a favoures course of action being carried through provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided by the rational actor model gives a biased and unrealistic view of the selection process because this political dimension is ignored. In the evidence presented here, and attempt is made to identify the discriminating factors associated with the supportive use of technical information at the level of the individual, the organization and the project. The data indicate that technical information is most likely to be used in a political manner by mature managers working in relatively small, low-tech companies. It is concluded that the supportive role played by technical information is political and symbolic in nature.     

The politics of technology management: influence and tactics in project selection

It is observed that technical information presented in aformalized way is used as 'rational' evidence to suport one particular point of view during the process of project selection. This 'political' action increases the chances of a favoures course of action being carried through provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided that its output lends support to the actor's prior viewpoint. It is argued that the framework provided by the rational actor model gives a biased and unrealistic view of the selection process because this political dimension is ignored. In the evidence presented here, and attempt is made to identify the discriminating factors associated with the supportive use of technical information at the level of the individual, the organization and the project. The data indicate that technical information is most likely to be used in a political manner by mature managers working in relatively small, low-tech companies. It is concluded that the supportive role played by technical information is political and symbolic in nature.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

The Legislator as Political Entrepreneur: Investment in Political Capital

This paper applies the standard Austrian theory of capital investment to the standard interest group model of legislator behavior. Distinguishing between reputational capital and representative capital as interdependent forms of political capital, I argue that legislator behavior (specifically roll call voting) can be explained as entrepreneurial investment in political capital under uncertainty. I discuss several examples in which this approach can potentially add predictive power regarding legislative voting.     

The Political Entrepreneur and the Coordination of the Political Process: A Market Process Perspective of the Political Market

The aim of this article is to apply the Austrian analysis of the entrepreneur to the political process. By distinguishing the political process from the economic process, we will endeavour to show to what extent an analysis in terms of the political market process is both possible and relevant. The existence of an information conveyance which can be assimilated to a price system within the political process, with its resulting profits, are motivating elements for the political entrepreneur. The political entrepreneur is doubly specialised and possesses all the Kirznerian functions of the Austrian entrepreneur as a coordinating agent for the political process.     

Gustav Schmoller's Historico-Ethical Political Economy : ethics,politics and economics in the younger German Historical School, 1860-1917

Gustav Schmoller, the head of the younger Historical School of political economy in Imperial Germany, was characterized as the man who had brought about the ‘decisive turn’ towards Sozialpolitik and had given it a scientific basis. His holistic understanding of political economy became a tradition among German administrative bureaucracy. His economic doctorine must have been seen in the context of a comprehensive social theory linking an idealist statism with an ethical evolutionism against the background of an historicist world view. The paper critically discusses how Schmoller wanted to force these competing streams of thought and their influences among his contemporaries into a developmental model that would harmonize the radical social changes of his day.