Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

Constitutional Choice and Prosperity: A Factor Analysis

Forempirical purposes most studies on the influence of freedom on prosperity across nations use either aggregate measuresof economic freedom combined with a measure of political liberty,or single components of these aggregates to describe the freedom-variable.For a scholar of constitutional economics, both these approachesdo not seem to be satisfactory. From his theoretical viewpointhe would favor an approach that focuses on properties of thepolitico-economic order that can be interpreted as appropriateconstraints for preferred outcomes. Factor analysis is the methodused in this paper to extract from a pool of components thatdescribe freedom two main factors, namely (1) the appropriatenessof the framework in which the market operates, and (2) the degreeof political interventions into the market process. It is shownthat these two factors have great influence on the prosperityof nations.     

Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited

Buchanan and Tullock's original trade-off model of constitutional design is used to analyze how constitutional design affects post-constitutional rent seeking, and, in turn, how the anticipation of post-constitution rent seeking should lead to modification of constitutional design — specifically with respect to imposing and maintaining effective (composite) supermajority decision rules.     

Constitutional renegotiation: Impediments to consensual revision

In a post-constitutional context, restructuring of constitutional rights often fundamentally alters the role and scope of government. It is therefore important to assess the extent to which consensuality is likely to characterize the process of constitutional revision. This article provides theoretical and empirical grounds for concluding that nonconsensual constitutional revision is often the rule rather than the exception. The endogeneity of politically relevant transaction costs and their manipulation by self-interested political actors in a post-constitutional environment are central to the analysis. I wish to thank Robert Higgs and this journal's referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

创新是我国券商应对国际竞争的必然选择

中国加入世贸组织后，开放证券市场已成必然。然而，我国券商目前的状况，难以形成与国外券商的竞争力。面对开放，只有全力地加速创新，提高自身的营运能力，才有可能走出困境，迎接挑战。     

Reply to Gehrke

This paper responds to Christian Gehrke's comment, and argues that the main conclusion of my earlier paper is sustained—that, contrary to Sraffa, Marx did not ‘adopt’ in any sense of the word the joint product method of treating fixed capital. It agrees with Gehrke that Torrens adopted a form of the joint product method, and that Malthus seems to have followed Torrens in this regard. However, it argues that Ricardo did not adopt the joint product method, not even in the one instance cited by Sraffa. Finally, it argues briefly that Marx's ‘transformation of value’ method of treating fixed capital and depreciation is superior to Sraffa's joint product method.     

From Schumpeterian Democracy to Constitutional Democracy

A critical issue of a constitutional democracy is to determine an optimal limitation of citizens' political liberties. This problem is analysed here within the framework of a parliamentary system of government, and in the context of Rawls' principle of equal political participation. It is argued that optimal barriers to entry into political competition are a function of the legislative decision rules, the domain of collective choices, and the rules for selecting (and dismissing) the executive. Contrary to Schumpeter and Riker who rejected populism (the approach that public policy should be a result of citizens' preferences), we argue that it is possible to reconcile greater citizen participation and liberal democracy with an appropriate institutional design.     

《天坛宪法草案》与民初宪政选择的失败

本文运用宪政制度分析的方法,探讨民国初年《天坛宪法草案》的制度特色。作者认为宪法草案中“超议会制”的政体设计是一种错误的宪政选择,违反了分权制衡与制度变迁的原则,因此无法获得北洋政治集团的支持与推动,这是民国初年民主转型失败在制度层面上的重要原因。