Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

On the Delegation of Powers: With Special Emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe

Elected politicians can choose to decide themselves or to delegate competence. Delegation can occur in the constitutional stage, but is most common in the post-constitutional stage. Furthermore, domestic delegation can be distinguished from international delegation. The authors propose to analyze both delegation decisions within a unified framework and apply it to eight countries of Central and Eastern Europe that have experienced substantial constitutional change recently. The main differences among these countries with regard to delegation are portrayed, their origins are traced and their effects analyzed.     

Co-operation and Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems

This paper focuses on the link between group co-operation and unilateral commitment of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. We show that in case of a failure of negotiation, some countries can decide to commit unilaterally and reduce their emissions. We call this behaviour precautionary commitment. Absence of international agreement does not mean global defection from the environmental issue.We also show that the emergence of a non-co-ordinatedglobal co-operation can result from a strategic actionfrom the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordinating their emissions.     

One-sided provision of a public good through bargaining under representative democracy

We examine a trade-off between strategic delegation and the internalization of interregional externalities through bargaining in the context of political economy. We show that in the case of one-sided provision of a public good, if the public good produced by one region generates a sufficiently significant spillover to another region, then interregional negotiation increases the total surplus of the entire economy.     

International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries

This paper examines the impact of cross-border financial externalities on moral hazards of the banking sector, and an international policy coordination mechanism to reduce the moral hazards of the banking sector considering cross-border financial externalities. We demonstrate that the moral hazard of banking, such as reducing the monitoring efforts, is aggravated by cross-border financial externalities, while the introduction of an international policy coordination mechanism might reduce the moral hazard caused by these externalities. Moreover, international policy coordination is less likely to be sustained when the policy maker is short-sighted and the banking sector has greater political influence. However, when the distortionary cost of a liquidity aids policy is lower with high administrative transparency, and cross-border financial externality is greater, the coordination mechanism is more likely to be sustained. The results imply that efforts to launch an effective international financial coordination mechanism should start with countries with higher administrative transparency, more political stability, and enhanced financial integration.     

Political polarization and international cooperation

We analyze the consequences of political polarization between domestic policymakers for international policy coordination or delegation to a common agency. Coordination is preferred under political polarization if it allows to constrain the policy of policymakers with different policy targets, while delegation allows to determine policies in the future by selecting the appropriate agent. Policymakers have different preferences concerning international coordination and which form it should take. These differences are increasing in political polarization. They agree on delegation if election outcomes are close to being random.     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Mapping the theory of political representation to the empirics: An investigation for proportional and majoritarian rules

We combine roll call votes and referendum decisions on identically worded legislative proposals to identify the effect of electoral rules on the way Swiss Members of Parliament (MPs) represent their constituents’ preferences. We exploit the fact that MPs in both Houses of Parliament are elected in the same electoral districts (the cantons). Yet, in the Lower House, MPs are elected using a proportional rule, while in the Upper House they are elected employing a majoritarian rule. We find that electoral rules matter strongly for political representation. The voting patterns of MPs are fully in line with three theoretical predictions regarding the influence of electoral rules on representation of constituents’ preferences: 1) The probability that a proportional-elected MP accepts a legislative proposal closely follows the share of voters that accept the proposal in the referendum. 2) In contrast, for majority-elected MPs the probability of acceptance is strongly increasing in the share of voter acceptance if the latter is close to the 50% threshold. 3) The estimated probability that an Upper House MP votes “yes” as a function of the share of voters voting “yes” in the referendum has an S-shape form with an inflection point close to 50%.     

Choosing price or quantity? The role of delegation and network externalities

We consider a differentiated duopoly and endogenise the firm choice of the strategy variable (price or quantity) to play on the product market in the presence of network externalities. We model this choice by assuming both competition between entrepreneurial (owner-managed) firms and competition between managerial firms in which market decisions are delegated from owners to revenue-concerned managers. While network externalities are shown not to alter the symmetric equilibrium quantity choice arising in the no-delegation case, sufficiently strong network effects allow us to eliminate the multiplicity of equilibria under delegation and lead to a unique equilibrium in which both firms choose price.     

Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to mitigate climate change

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. It is assumed that when countries cooperate they coordinate their investments so as to minimize the agreement costs of controlling emissions. Further it is assumed that in such cases they also pool their R&D efforts so as to fully internalize the spillover effects of their investments in R&D. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, an agreement formation game is solved in three stages. First, countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories (playing together) and non-signatories (playing individually) select their investment in R&D. Finally, in the third stage, each country decides on its level of emissions non-cooperatively. For linear environmental damages and quadratic investment costs, our findings show that the maximum participation in a R&D agreement consists of six countries and that participation decreases as spillover effects increase until a minimum participation consisting of three countries is reached.     

Tariff bindings and bilateral cooperation on export cartels

Despite the negative international externalities that they generate, export cartels are legal in many countries. We use a repeated game approach to analyze cooperation between a low-income country (LIC) and its high-income country (HIC) trade partner where the HIC agrees to prevent its industry from organizing as an export cartel in return for a combination of improved market access (i.e. a tariff reduction) and a transfer from the LIC. If the LIC is subject to a tariff binding (say because of an existing trade agreement), the transfer it pays to the HIC increases and the scope for bilateral cooperation declines.     

Does membership in international organizations increase governments’ credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers

This paper analyzes whether nation-state governments can increase their credibility by becoming members of international organizations. It is hypothesized that the degree of delegation to international organizations can improve the credibility of nation-state governments. This hypothesis is tested by introducing three new indicators for international delegation. On the basis of panel data for up to 136 countries and the time period from 1984 to 2004, membership in international organizations is significantly and robustly linked with better credibility, here proxied for by country risk ratings.     

External economies as a mechanism of agglomeration in EU manufacturing

Productive externalities are significant determinants of agglomeration, not deeply studied at the industry and international level. We analyse the impact on productivity growth of technological externalities, both inter- and intraindustry, national or international, at the industry level for the EU countries and the period 1995–2002. The results confirm the advisability of considering international externalities when countries are taken as regions, whose omission underestimates national spillovers. Together with national endowments and a central geographical position, the growth of productivity is encouraged by national and international specialization as a general result; moreover, it is fuelled by stronger interindustry spillovers and productive diversification, a result more evident for high technology industries, while lower technology industries are more sensitive to the omission of international externalities. Economic integration seems to be relevant, because supranational regions with less friction for goods and factor movements are more likely to take advantage of external economies as a mechanism of productivity growth and agglomeration.     

Direct democracy in Australia: Voter behavior in the choice between constitutional monarchy and a republic

Opinion polls conducted throughout the 1990s indicate most Australians favor a republic. A referendum making that constitutional change, however, was defeated. This paper investigates whether voters employ a loss-minimization rule, as opposed to a value-maximization rule, when making political decisions. Based on the predictions of each rule, political strategies are devised and compared to the official arguments employed by republicans and monarchists during the period preceding the vote. Empirical research relates voting outcomes at the individual voter level to influences that are likely to be correlated with political risk aversion. The results are consistent with the conclusion that voters do not employ value-maximization rules.     

(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.     

Intergroup Economic Inequality Across Countries: An lntroductory Essay

The article identifies, neutrally, several factors together making for world governance, by whatever name. These are a desire by people to participate in the making of decisions that affect them in important ways and the growth of international political externalities. The analysis is conducted with consideration given to the nature and scope of governance, vis-à-vis government, the role and significance of international organizations, and the logic of representative democracy. The result amounts to a political equivalent to the merger solution for externalities.     

A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action

In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the environmental benefits of cooperation, the incentive to expand energy consumption, and the incentive to adopt the cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an Integrated Assessment Model with a game-theoretic structure we find that the equilibrium abatement of the coalition composed by OECD countries would be moderate, in line with the Pledges subscribed in Copenhagen, but increasing. The mitigation strategy would consist of investments in energy R&D and deployment of cleaner technologies with high learning potentials. International knowledge and technology externalities would facilitate the diffusion of cleaner technologies in non-signatory countries, offsetting the free-riding incentive and reducing their emissions. If the OECD group curbs emissions beyond the optimal equilibrium level, reaching reduction rates between 40 and 45 % below 2005 levels in 2050, the benefits of technology externalities would no longer compensate the effect of lower fossil fuel prices. Our results suggest that a moderate unilateral climate policy could induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatory countries and that policies promoting the international transfer of technologies and knowledge could represent an effective complement to mitigation targets.     

Unlikely Pivotal States in Competitive Free Trade Agreement Diffusion: The Effect of Japan's Trans-Pacific Partnership Participation on Asia-Pacific Regional Integration

How can a state with dysfunctional trade politics spur the negotiation of major free trade agreements (FTAs)? Using the case of Japan's participation in the trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), we develop an analytical framework on FTA diffusion that takes into account multidimensional (economic, legal and political) competitive pressures, and the ability of states to act as pivots in triggering FTA cascades. We disaggregate the makeup of a pivotal state into two main components – capability and credibility – and underscore Japan's significant latent capabilities, but also its serious credibility shortcomings. The TPP's boost to Japan's credibility raised the possibility of significant economic, legal and political externalities for specific countries which responded by accelerating FTA initiatives that had long stalled: the trilateral China–Japan–Korea FTA, a 16-state East Asian FTA and the Japan–European Union trade negotiations. This study extends the theoretical frontier in policy diffusion studies by clarifying the combination of factors that allows some states, but not others, to activate the externalities behind the dissemination of defensive FTAs.     

Does delegation of fiscal policy to an independent agency make a difference? Evidence from intergovernmental transfers in India

One area of fiscal policy in which several countries have delegated responsibility to an independent agency is the distribution of national resource transfers across regional and local governments. Such delegation is expected to promote equity and efficiency, and mitigate distortions created by political incentives. This paper tests whether delegation to an independent agency indeed makes a difference by contrasting the impact of partisan politics on two types of fiscal transfers to states in the Indian federation over a period of time, 1972–1995. The pattern of evidence shows that, while the transfers that are determined by the central political executive are indeed distributed to favor particular states that are politically important for the central ruling party, the transfers that are delegated to an independent agency serve to constrain such partisan impact.