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1.
文章通过研究星美联合股份有限公司(以下简称星美联合),发现国有企业民营化后,接手国有企业的民营企业仍能以较低的利率获得持续稳定的银行贷款,这种融资惯性使企业可以通过高额负债实现资产的迅速扩张.同时,由于民营化并没有改变控股股东的控制权收益,接手国有企业的大股东有强烈的动机通过关联方交易来掏空其利用融资惯性而加速积累的资产,并可以进一步利用破产重组和股权分置改革中的漏洞,逃脱大额银行贷款的约束而金蝉脱壳,从而导致国有资产加倍流失.可见,民营化的真实动机是影响民营化效率的根本因素,控制权与剩余所有权的分离是大股东掏空上市公司的直接原因,而国有资本管理、金融企业贷款管理、上市公司交易监管等方面的缺陷则为民营化后国有资产的加倍流失提供了机会.文章开拓性地研究了控制权收益的具体来源,融资惯性增加了民营化后控股股东的控制权收益,是导致国有资产被加倍掏空的隐蔽渠道.因此,完善金融机构的贷款制度并加强对上市公司掏空行为的监管和惩戒,是避免“国退民进”中利用融资惯性掏空国有资产的基础.  相似文献   

2.
1.构建名副其实的地方国有资产的“委托人”。所谓名副其实的“委托人”,也就是地方政府及其国有资产管理机构作为所辖国有企业的“委托人”,不仅享有企业的剩余控制权,而且享有企业的剩余索取权。这一设想能够较为彻底地解决国有经济长期以来的痼疾。2.国有资本产权的“人格化”。应通过确立国有资本产权在国有企业中的“人格化”的途径来解决,即国有资本产权所有者进入国有企业的治理结构,其具体实现形式是由地方政府(国资委)依照法定程序派出人员进入国有企业的董事会,确立国有资本所有权代表(董事人员)与地方政府(国资委)的派出与被派出…  相似文献   

3.
本文所讲的民营是指政府所有权和控制权之外的所企业,目前国有中小企业的“民营化”改革,是推动企业从“官营”变为“民营”,是使政府对企业的控制权和所有权逐步转移到非国有的或非政府的经济实体的以和所有权的过程,一是政府产权从国有中小企业中退出,由民营企业的产权主体取而代之;二是解放思想,更新观念,加大政府产权置换的力度;三是中国的改革是政论主导型的改革,政府的主动性是目前国有中小企业民营化进程的主要推动  相似文献   

4.
论当前国有企业产权关系的改革   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
我国著名中青年经济学家樊纲先生新年有新论: 他认为中国国有企业亏损的原因,首先不是“经营管理差”“生产效率低”,是由于在分配环节上“工资侵蚀利润”,资本权利被削弱的制度性原因造成,企业亏损的背后,“实质上是一个产权关系问题”。他主张立即着手进行国有资产产权改革,根本目的是界定产权,明确主体,让社会资本“各有其主”,使产权可以在不同主体之间相互自由交易,以适应市场经济的需要。他的具体方案是:国有企业产权多元化,中央与地方按“全国人均国有资产份额”标准进行分配;20%产权分配给企业经理和职工。  相似文献   

5.
本文对2000-2008年期间中国部分竞争性行业国有企业的退出及其主要决定因素进行了研究。通过非平衡面板企业数据,在计算企业效率和界定不同退出行为的基础上,本文运用多项选择Logit模型分析发现,企业效率是决定国有企业退出的重要变量。其中,效率较高的企业更愿意选择民营化退出,而效率低的企业更有可能选择破产清算或打散重组的方式,完全退出国有部门。然而,在2000-2008年的后期,效率对于企业退出的影响程度明显降低。国有企业退出行为的变化,表明了在其背后政府目标的调整。  相似文献   

6.
国有企业民营化,从动态的角度看,是指通过各种方式将国有企业逐渐改制成为民营的企业;从静态的角度看,是指国有企业改革和国有经济布局结构调整后,民营经济在各经济成分中所占的份额居于一个优势的地位。国有企业民营化是国有企业产权制度改革的重要方向,但在国有企业民营化改制中难免出现这样或那样的问题,诸如“国企民营化就是私有化”、“国有资产流失”、“下岗失业人员增多”、  相似文献   

7.
业绩考核制度可以促进央企创新吗?   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
《经济研究》2016,(12):104-117
关于国有企业是否需要进行民营化改革的问题存在两种对立的观点。一种观点认为只有民营化才能彻底解决国企效率问题,另一种观点则认为民营化不仅不能解决国企现存问题,还可能导致严重的国有资产流失。本文以2009年国资委修订的《中央企业负责人经营业绩考核暂行办法》为切入点,研究这项不涉及民营化的央企高管业绩考核制度对企业创新的作用及经济后果。本文以此次修订为自然实验,采用双重差分法进行检验,发现相对于不受该项制度影响的民营企业来说,央企的创新水平在新政策实施后显著提高。而且,此次修订的考核办法可以显著提高创新对企业价值的边际贡献。上述检验结果意味着,国有企业即使不进行民营化的产权改革,仅仅通过改变高管的激励机制,也可以提高企业效率。因此,民营化很可能并不是解决国有企业效率问题的唯一途径。本文不仅有助于在理论上澄清关于国企民营化改革的争议,而且有助于拓展和深化企业激励机制和企业创新的相关研究。  相似文献   

8.
王钧 《经济导刊》2002,(10):31-37
20世纪90年代以来,国有企业改革的目标被定位于建立“现代企业制度”,“产权清晰”是其标志之一。因此,产权界定成为国有企业产权变动的必经程序。 一、国有资产产权界定的法律框架 国务院的行政规章规定:国有企业中的国有资产属于全民所有,即国家所有。国务院并授权自己代表国家统一行使对国有企业财产的所有权,由其统一领导,对国有资产实行分级行政管理。1990年7月国务院  相似文献   

9.
二十世纪三、四十年代的经济学家认为 ,政府建立国有企业进行生产是解决市场失效的良方 ,发达国家与发展中国家都表现出很强的国有化倾向 ,政府在生产中承担了重要的角色。然而 ,最近三、四十年来 ,随着国有企业问题的暴露 ,随着产权理论与合约理论的发展 ,经济学家开始重新考虑政府生产与私人生产问题。许多经济学家指出 ,国有企业不是解决市场失效的良方 ,私人生产有更高的效率。同时 ,最近二十年来 ,民营化浪潮风靡全球 ,进一步促进了强调私有企业的经济学思维的发展和传播。本文将介绍西方主流经济学家在世纪之交对产权理论的最新思考 ,解释他们论证私有产权有效性的理论和思路 ,并对前苏联东欧国家的民营化实践做出若干剖析 ,以了解民营化研究的动态和借鉴意义。  相似文献   

10.
国有资产经营预算是国家以资产所有者身份获取收入和国家用于资本性投入、发展国有经济的专项预算,是政府财政预算的组成部分,也是国有资产所有权管理的重要手段。 1.国有资产经营预算的编制原则。即遵循“以收定支,量入为出”的基本原则。 2.国有资产经营预算的收入项目。(1)国有资产收益,包括国有企业上缴税后利润。(2)国有资产出售收入,包括国有股权转让收入、国有  相似文献   

11.
Empirical evidence on the effect of managerial autonomy on the performance of state‐owned enterprises (SOE) is surprisingly scant despite autonomy being a preferred reform instrument over partial privatization in many countries. Using longitudinal data on performance contracts of state‐owned enterprises in India, this paper finds that managerial autonomy is associated with significant increases in enterprise profitability and efficiency. Further, using India's unique reform experience where both managerial autonomy and partial privatization were pursued side by side, the paper finds that while the positive effects of autonomy continue post‐partial privatization, the effects of partial privatization on performance are ambiguous. Specifically, once autonomy is controlled for, partial privatization has a positive effect on SOE profitability only after it crosses a critical level of government disinvestment. The findings suggest that organizational reforms such as granting managerial autonomy can be an important policy instrument in improving SOE performance particularly in cases where governments are unable to make substantial disinvestments.  相似文献   

12.
政治庇护与改制:中国集体企业改制研究   总被引:9,自引:1,他引:9  
公有产权的政治庇护理论认为拥有公有企业控制权的政府会从公有企业的持续经营中获取政治收益(就业、税收、企业利润以及个人福利等),政府或政府代理人的收益将会影响公有企业的改制决策。本文通过1998年至2003年全国规模以上集体企业的大样本数据,检验了政治庇护理论对公有企业改制原因的预测。结果表明,当集体企业为政府或政府代理人贡献的政治收益越高,集体企业在生产投入和产品销售上越依赖于政府,集体企业相对于地方经济越重要时,集体企业越不容易发生改制。这些结果有力地支持了政治庇护理论,并为企业改制政策制定和实施提供了重要的参考依据。  相似文献   

13.
This paper surveys and analyzes the economic literature on ‘privatization’ policies, restricting coverage to policies designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises through increased exposure to competitive market forces. These include asset sales, liberalization (or deregulation) and franchising. The objectives, incentives and constraints of public and private enterprises are examined, and evidence on their comparative performance is analyzed. Public sector revenue effects from asset sale are also explored. On the basis of these considerations, the paper concludes that liberalization is an important ingredient in any policy package designed to improve the operating efficiency of public sector enterprises. Asset sale may enhance the beneficial impact of deregulation but asset sale in the absence of deregulation is unlikely to improve efficiency, and may introduce additional market distortions. Franchising is seen as an appropriate mechanism for privatization when the market is inherently monopolistic and when the government desires to retain control over output and/or price.  相似文献   

14.
This paper examines the effect of the change of state shares in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) on the efficiency of the whole society and the payoff of the government. This issue is addressed by setting up a mixed oligopolistic competition model and dividing the analysis into two cases: closed economy and open economy. The basic results are as follows: If the relative production efficiency of an SOE is too low, complete state ownership is not optimal, and privatization will be a necessary step; however, if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is not too low, complete privatization is not optimal both for the government and from the perspective of social welfare. The results can, to a certain extent, provide theoretical support to the governments idea on the SOE reform. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2004, 1 (in Chinese)  相似文献   

15.
The decline of the government revenue share in GDP has become a major concern for Chinese policy makers and many economists. This article analyzes the reasons and the consequences of low government budgetary revenue in China. It is argued that lowered corporate tax rates, small tax bases, and tax evasions are the main reasons for the decline of government revenue share in GDP. Low budgetary revenues have resulted in low budgetary expenditures and growing budget deficits, stimulated the expansion of extra-budgetary and off budgetary revenues, and made the privatization of state enterprises more difficult. This article also discusses policy options for China.  相似文献   

16.
Causes of privatization in China   总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7  
We test five hypotheses regarding the causes of privatization in China by using firm‐level panel data collected in 11 cities in the period 1995–2001. We have found that privatization is positively linked with hardened firm budgets and the extent of market liberalization, but is constrained by excessive debts and worker redundancy. Firm efficiency and state‐owned enterprises’ financial liabilities imposed on local governments are not factors of influence. These findings match the broad flow of events in China and highlight the role of market building in bringing about efficient institutional changes.  相似文献   

17.
While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.  相似文献   

18.
We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.  相似文献   

19.
I propose a fully rational model of government contracting that explains differences in local government spending from grants and other income. In this model, violations of fungibility arise from dynamic interactions between politicians and interest groups with the ability to raise funds for the local government. The predictions of the model are tested by exploiting unique features of windfalls received by states under a settlement with the tobacco industry. Although windfalls are legally unrestricted, the median state increased spending on tobacco control programs from zero to $2.30 per capita upon receipt of funds. The marginal propensity to spend on such programs is 0.20 from settlement revenue and zero from overall income. States which were not involved in the settlement lawsuits spend less. These results cannot be explained by existing models in the literature.  相似文献   

20.
This paper presents a simple model of a government contemplating the pre-sale reform of a public enterprise. While the government is less efficient at such reform than the eventual owner, failure to reform may be considered an indicator of low commercial value by potential purchasers. Consequently, the government may be unable to avoid socially wasteful restructuring if it wishes to maximize its net sales revenue. The results presented in this paper provide a number of insights and policy recommendations for governments embarking on a privatization program.  相似文献   

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