Implications of incorporating domestic margins into analyses of energy taxation and climate change policies

In most applied general equilibrium (AGE) analyses, the domestic transportation, wholesaling, and retailing services that facilitate the flow of goods and services from producers to consumers are not identified by commodity or use. Because the margins on energy commodities can be substantial, ignoring these domestic margins has important consequences when analyzing the impacts of policies designed to limit greenhouse gas emissions. This paper incorporates domestic trade and transport margins into the GTAP-E model, which has previously been used to analyze climate change policies. Models that do not explicitly incorporate domestic margins over-estimate the reduction in CO₂ emissions from a given carbon tax or under-estimate the level of a carbon tax needed to achieve a specific abatement target when domestic margins are fixed or when the carbon tax is treated as a consumption tax with variable domestic margins. However, this result can be reversed when the carbon tax is treated as an output tax with variable domestic margins.     

Who Should Abate Carbon Emissions? A Note

Economists commonly believe that failure to equalize the marginal cost of carbon abatement across countries implies a loss of global efficiency. Chichilnisky and Heal [(1994), Economic Letters 44, 444] first challenged this consensus a decade ago, demonstrating that, in general, efficiency does not require equalizing marginal abatement costs. This note revisits that important debate. It provides the missing intuition behind Chichilnisky and Heal’s surprising result, explains what critical assumption gives rise to their result, and clarifies the role a social welfare function plays in their model. The implications of Chichilnisky and Heal’s result are increasingly important, given international debate over the preferential role given to developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol and the role those countries will play in future climate negotiations.     

Emissions abatement R&D: Dynamic competition in supply schedules

This paper investigates the optimal environmental policy (the mix of emissions tax and research and development [R&D] subsidy) in a dynamic setting when two firms, producing differentiated products, compete in the output market over time. Firms compete in a differential game setting over supply schedules, which encompasses a continuum of imperfect competition equilibria from Bertrand to Cournot. Although production generates environmentally damaging emissions, firms can undertake R&D that has the sole purpose of reducing emissions. In addition to characterizing the optimal policy, we examine how the optimal tax and subsidy, and the optimal level of abatement, change as competition intensifies, as the dynamic parameters change, and as the investment in abatement technology changes. In this setting, competition increases welfare through its impact on the final goods price. However, lower prices result in larger quantities and more pollution. Our key contribution is to show how the impact of increased competition on welfare depends on the extent of the market and the nature of preferences and technology.     

Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?

International emission trading is an important flexibility mechanism, but its use has been often restricted on the ground that access to international carbon credits can undermine the domestic abatement effort reducing the incentive to innovate and, eventually, lowering the pace of climate policy-induced technological change. This paper examines the economics that is behind these concerns by studying how a cap to the trade of carbon offsets influences innovation, technological change, and welfare. By using a standard game of abatement and R&D, we investigate the main mechanisms that shape these relationships. We also use a numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental and technology externalities to quantify how limits to the volume, the timing, and the regional allocation of carbon offsets affect climate policy costs and the incentive to invest in innovation and low-carbon technologies.Results indicate that, for moderate caps on the amount tradable emissions permits and sufficiently high technology spillovers, global innovation and technical change would increase and that this additional innovative effort could lead to economic efficiency gains. The numerical analysis confirms that when constraints are close to 15% of domestic abatement, efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological spillovers and lower energy prices. Under a broad range of parameters, restrictions are costly for the constrained countries, but always beneficial for unconstrained ones.     

Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curves of the Residential Heating Market: A Microeconomic Approach

In this paper, we develop a microeconomic approach to deduce greenhouse gas abatement cost curves of the residential heating sector. Our research is based on a system dynamics microsimulation of private households’ investment decisions for heating systems to the year 2030. By accounting for household-specific characteristics, we investigate the welfare costs of different abatement policies in terms of the compensating variation and the excess burden. We investigate two policies: (i) a carbon tax and (ii) subsidies on heating system investments. We deduce abatement cost curves for both policies by simulating welfare costs and greenhouse gas emissions to the year 2030. We find that (i) welfare-based abatement costs are generally higher than pure technical equipment costs; (ii) given utility maximizing households a carbon tax is the most welfare-efficient policy and; (iii) if households are not utility maximizing, a subsidy on investments may have lower marginal greenhouse gas abatement costs than a carbon tax.     

Policy Forum: Designing a Carbon Price Policy: Using Market‐Based Mechanisms for Emission Abatement: Are the Assumptions Plausible?

Support for using market‐based mechanisms (carbon taxes or emission‐trading systems) to deal with climate change is based on a number of premises. This article discusses those premises, focusing on the claim that the promise of ever‐rising implied carbon prices under such market‐based mechanisms will support induced innovation in low‐ or no‐carbon technologies. It notes that this claim assumes that promise to be credible and sufficient to induce the innovations required. It argues that the assumed credibility of such very long commitments is questionable, and hence, even in the best of worlds, the implied benefits are unlikely to arise. For a small country like Australia, the problems are then compounded by the absence of a credible, global agreement on emission reduction. Given that, the marginal benefits of investing in carbon abatement are likely to be very low or negative.     

Basic goods,the effects of commodity transfers and the international economic order

A two good, two region and three income group macro model is constructed to explore possible effects of aid on distribution of welfare. One region, the North, has two income groups characterized by different endowments and proportions of consumption of the basic and the luxury goods. We study policies that result in transfers of goods from the high income group of the North to the South. In one case, the transfer is of luxury or investment goods; under the conditions, it is shown to produce a change in relative prices that induces an increase in the welfare of the North and decreases the welfare of the South, even under conditions of (Walrasian) stability of the markets. In a second case, the high income group in the North transfers, instead, basic goods to the South. It is shown that under the conditions an increase in welfare of the South can only occur at the expense of a decrease in welfare of the low income group in the North. Therefore, in general, aid in the form of commodity transfers cannot be relied upon to equalize overall welfare: under the conditions there is necessarily a trade-off between more North-South equality and greater equality within the North. When aid is endorsed to pursue NIEO objectives, a close examination of international and domestic markets seems in order, so as to avoid the conditions studied here. The formation of (international) coalitions among the different groups is also discussed.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

Technology Transfer and Merger Activities with Trade and Tariffs

In order to better understand the effects of globalization on merger incentives this paper considers a set of commonly observed mergers whereby a restructured target (with improved managerial or technical capability) continues to supply the market. In contrast to the market‐concentrating merger literature it finds that trade barriers tend to encourage mergers, including potentially welfare‐reducing, tariff‐jumping mergers. Multilateral trade liberalization, however, encourages welfare‐improving mergers. Hence, and despite the skepticism of regulatory authorities towards the existence of cost synergies as a consequence of mergers, this paper suggests that in order to assess the impact of trade liberalization under the WTO on merger incentives, and consequently on prices, quantities, and welfare, accurate information on ex ante cost differences and the transferability of managerial and technical techniques is required.     

The Welfare Cost of Autarky: Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807–09

The United States came close to complete autarky in 1808 as a result of a self‐imposed embargo on international shipping from December 1807 to March 1809. Monthly prices of exported and imported goods reveal the embargo's striking effect on commodity markets and allow a calculation of its welfare effects. A simple general‐equilibrium calculation suggests that the embargo cost about 5 percent of America's 1807 GNP, at a time when the trade share was about 13 percent (domestic exports and shipping earnings). The welfare cost was lower than the trade share because the embargo did not completely eliminate trade and because domestic producers successfully shifted production toward previously imported manufactured goods.     

Growth and optimal policies in an R&D-growth model with imperfect international capital mobility

In this paper, we examine the effects of international capital mobility on innovation, growth, and optimal growth policies in a small open economy with R&D-driven growth. Households can borrow funds from an imperfect international capital market to finance their investment in R&D firms. We show that the economy can reach a higher growth rate if international capital is more mobile. This result is consistent with recent empirical findings. Moreover, we show that the common growth-enhancing policies, such as patent protection and the R&D subsidies, have an additional negative welfare effect when households can access the international capital market. Accordingly, the optimal patent protection and R&D subsidy should be smaller when the degree of international capital mobility is higher.     

The macroeconomic impact of foreign labour influx into the industrialized nation state and the complementary policies

This paper makes a numerical assessment on the macroeconomic impact of foreign labor influx into the industrialized nation state allowing free trade in goods but imposing an immigration quota on labor, and then explores the complementary policies for the impact of foreign labor influx. One of the main findings is that immigration itself brings welfare gains only if prices are flexible, but a skill-biased intake policy can bring a much larger welfare gain. The complementary policy options to boost welfare gains by immigration increase are monetary expansion, adopting foreign components more, and influencing foreign demand for intermediate goods indirectly by inviting foreign direct investment. For these policies to cope, the destination country should try to correct the market structure so that prices can be flexible.     

Output‐based rebating of carbon taxes in a neighbour's backyard: Competitiveness,leakage and welfare

We investigate how, in an open economy, carbon taxes combined with output‐based rebating (OBR) perform in interaction with the carbon policies of a large neighbouring trading partner. Analytical results suggest that, whether the purpose of the OBR policy is to compensate firms for carbon tax burdens or to maximize welfare (accounting for global emission reductions), the OBR rate should be positive in policy‐relevant cases. Numerical simulations for Canada, with the US as the neighbouring trading partner, indicate that the impact of US policies on the OBR rate will depend crucially on the purpose of the Canadian OBR policies. If, for a given US carbon policy, Canada's aim is to restore the competitiveness of domestic emission‐intensive and trade‐exposed (EITE) firms to the same level as before the introduction of its own carbon taxation, we find that the necessary domestic OBR rates will be insensitive to the foreign carbon policies. However, if not only the Canadian carbon tax but also an equally high US tax is introduced, compensatory Canadian OBR rates will be up to 50% lower, depending on the sector and on US OBR policy. If the policy objective is to increase economy‐wide allocative efficiency (welfare) of Canadian policies by accounting for carbon leakage, the US policies will have only a minor downward pressure on desirable OBR rates in Canada. Practical choices of OBR rates hardly affect overall domestic economic performance; thus, output‐based rebating qualifies as an instrument for compensating EITE industries without a large sacrifice in terms of economy‐wide allocative efficiency.     

Carbon Taxes and Joint Implementation. An Applied General Equilibrium Analysis for Germany and India

Germany has committed itself toreducing its carbon emissions by 25 percent in2005 as compared to 1990 emission levels. Toachieve this goal, the government has recentlylaunched an environmental tax reform whichentails a continuous increase in energy taxesin conjunction with a revenue-neutral cut innon-wage labor costs. This policy is supposedto yield a double dividend, reducing both, theproblem of global warming and high unemploymentrates. In addition to domestic actions,international treaties on climate protectionallow for the supplementary use of flexibleinstruments to exploit cheaper emissionreduction possibilities elsewhere. One concreteoption for Germany would be to enter jointimplementation (JI) with developing countriessuch as India where Germany pays emissionreduction abroad rather than meeting itsreduction target solely by domestic action. Inthis paper, we investigate whether anenvironmental tax reform cum JI providesemployment and overall efficiency gains ascompared to an environmental tax reformstand-alone. We address this question in theframework of a large-scale general equilibriummodel for Germany and India where Germany mayundertake JI with the Indian electricitysector. Our main finding is that JI offsetslargely the adverse effects of carbon emissionconstraints on the German economy. JIsignificantly lowers the level of carbon taxesand thus reduces the total costs of abatementas well as negative effects on labor demand. Inaddition, JI triggers direct investment demandfor energy efficient power plants produced inGermany. This provides positive employmenteffects and additional income for Germany. ForIndia, joint implementation equips itselectricity industry with scarce capital goodsleading to a more efficient power productionwith lower electricity prices for the economyand substantial welfare gains.     

Fuel Efficiency Improvements: Feedback Mechanisms and Distributional Effects in the Oil Market

We study the interactions between fuel efficiency improvements in the transport sector and the oil market, where the efficiency improvements are policy-induced in certain regions of the world. We are especially interested in feedback mechanisms of fuel efficiency such as the rebound effect, carbon leakage and the “green paradox”, but also the distributional effects for oil producers. An intertemporal numerical model of the international oil market is introduced, where OPEC-Core producers have market power. We find that the rebound effect has a noticeable effect on the transport sector, with the magnitude depending on the oil demand elasticity. In the benchmark simulations, we calculate that almost half of the energy savings may be lost to a direct rebound effect and an additional 10% to oil price adjustments. In addition, there is substantial intersectoral leakage to other sectors through lower oil prices in the regions that introduce the policy. There is a small green paradox effect in the sense that oil consumption increases initially when the fuel efficiency measures are gradually implemented. Finally, international carbon leakage will be significant if policies are not implemented in all regions; we estimate leakage rates of 35% or higher when only major consuming regions implement fuel economy policies. Non-OPEC producers will to a larger degree than OPEC producers cut back on its oil supply as a response to fuel efficiency policies due to high production costs.     

Imports and the structure of retail markets

Abstract We construct a model of trade with heterogeneous retailers to examine the effects of trade liberalization on retail market structure, imports and social welfare. We are especially interested in investigating the transmission of lower import prices into consumer prices and the effects of retail market regulation. The paper shows that changes in import prices may have large effects on consumer prices and import volumes when changes in retail market structure are taken into account, and that restrictions on retailing, as they occur in several countries, may significantly alter this transmission mechanism by reducing imports and raising consumer prices.     

Do national soccer results really impact on the stock market?

This study is a response to Klein et al. (2008), which was highly critical of earlier work by Ashton et al. (2003). This work considering the link between international soccer results and stock market returns was challenged by Klein et al. (2008), who reject the presence and importance of this link. In response, this work provides a reassessment of the link between international soccer results and stock market returns within Ashton et al. (2003). This new analysis extends the original work by using a larger dataset, employing an extended range of tests and allowing for outliers. It is reported that, contrary to the findings of Klein et al. (2008), the link between international soccer results and stock market prices does indeed exist particularly within the sample period 1984–2002 used by Ashton et al. (2003). After extending the dataset to include observations from 2002 until 2009, it is reported that the effect on stock market returns has declined in importance over this period, particularly the impact of wins.     

Import Penetration and Domestic Process Innovation

This paper develops a model of R&D competition between domestic and foreign firms that explicitly incorporates the effect of the market structure. We focus on how differences in costs modify the effects of increases in the number of foreign firms on R&D investments of domestic firms. We show that an increase in the number of foreign firms may have a positive effect on a domestic firm's R&D investment and also show that two trade policies, tariffs or quotas, could have different effects on R&D investments of domestic firms. A welfare analysis shows that greater cost advantages increase social welfare.     

Strategic competition and optimal parallel import policy

Abstract In a two‐country Hotelling type duopoly model of price competition, we show that parallel import (PI) policy can act as an instrument of strategic trade policy. The home firm’s profit is higher when it cannot price discriminate internationally if and only if the foreign market is sufficiently bigger than the domestic one. The key mechanism in the model is that the home firm’s incentive to keep its domestic price close to the optimal monopoly price affects its behavior during price competition abroad. We also analyze the welfare implications of PI policies and show that our key insights extend to quantity competition.     

Greenhouse gas abatement policies and the value of carbon sinks: Do grazing and cropping systems have different destinies?

This paper presents a case study in which the effects of agri-environmental policy on two Mediterranean-type farming systems, grazing dominant and cropping dominant, are contrasted. Two greenhouse gas abatement policies are examined; an emissions taxation policy and an emissions restrictions policy. The study seeks to determine firstly, how the policy impacts on the farming systems, and from that, how the nature of the farming systems impact on the effectiveness of the policy. It is shown that relative costs of abatement are higher for the grazing-dominant farming system. However, in the absence of technological change to aid abatement, the cost of substitution from high emitting enterprises, such as livestock, to low emitting enterprises, such as crop production, will determine the cost of abatement. For both farming systems the restriction policy is found to be more effective and economically efficient than the taxation policy. The analysis found that crediting trees as carbon sinks can significantly reduce the costs of abatement. At predicted emissions permit prices, trees would be adopted by both farming systems to offset farm greenhouse gas emissions.