SLIP SLIDING AWAY: FURTHER UNION DECLINE IN GERMANY AND BRITAIN

This paper presents the first comparative analysis of the decline in collective bargaining in two European countries where that decline has been among the most pronounced. Using establishment‐level data and a common model, we present decompositions of changes in collective bargaining in the private sector in Germany and Britain over the period 1998–2004. In both countries, within‐effects dominate compositional changes as the source of the recent decline in unionism. Overall, the decline in collective bargaining is more pronounced in Britain than in Germany, thus continuing a trend apparent since the 1980s. Although establishment characteristics differ markedly across the two countries, assuming counterfactual values of these characteristics makes little difference to unionization levels. Expressed differently, the German dummy looms large.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE: UNIONS, WORKS COUNCILS, AND EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/HIGH-PERFORMANCE WORK PRACTICES

Drawing on evidence from the United States and Germany, this paper offers a survey of the effects of worker representation (in unions and works councils) and innovative work practices on firm performance. The focus is on the growing links between these two historically separate literatures. The interaction between worker representation and high‐performance work practices provides a practical means of peering inside the black box of collective voice, even if there is as yet no well‐determined hierarchy for productivity performance and certainly no blueprint for the future of unions.     

Trade and unions: Does size matter?

Our empirical analysis builds upon the hypothesis that unions are detrimental to a firm's efficiency. Using a rich survey of German manufacturers, we investigate firm-level determinants on the probability of collective wage bargaining with particular focus on the impact of a firm's engagement in foreign markets. An interesting and very robust finding is that exporters are less likely to engage in union wage bargaining. This finding is in line with a pessimistic perception of unions. The negative effect of collective bargaining can be offset by efficiency gains for larger exporters, who can benefit from operation cost saving effects. Size does matter as larger firms export and may find bargaining with a single entity representing the workforce more convenient than bargaining with each worker individually. We are using firm level information on IT investment as instrument for the export dummy and successfully test for the validity of this instrument.     

Sunk capital,unions and the hold-up problem: Theory and evidence from cross-country sectoral data

In this paper we study the hold-up problem by considering the effect of union bargaining power on the level of investment per worker across sectors characterised by different levels of sunk capital investment. We develop a search and matching model with heterogeneous sectors and ex-post collective wage bargaining and test the predictions of the model using a difference-in-difference approach on manufacturing sector data in a set of OECD countries during the period 1980–2000. We find that union power reduces investment per worker particularly in sunk capital intensive industries. We refine our empirical analysis showing that the underlying hold-up problem is exacerbated when strikes are not regulated after a collective contract is signed and there is no arbitration, while the presence of social pacts may sustain cooperative equilibria that alleviate the hold-up problem. Our results are robust to a series of controls and possible endogeneity of union power.     

Works Councils and Collective Bargaining in Germany: The Impact on Productivity and Wages

This paper investigates the interaction between establishment‐level codetermination and industry‐level collective bargaining in Germany. Based on a bargaining model, we derive our main hypothesis: In establishments covered by collective bargaining agreements, works councils are more likely to be engaged in productivity‐enhancing activities and less engaged in rent‐seeking activities than their counterparts in uncovered establishments. Our empirical analysis confirms this hypothesis. The presence of works councils exerts a positive impact on productivity within the covered industrial relations regime but not within the uncovered regime. The presence of works councils has a positive effect on wages within the uncovered regime but not to the same degree within the covered regime.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Labor relations and productivity growth in advanced capitalist economies

In this paper, we claim that worker rights (including collective bargaining rights, employment protection, and income security) promote productivity growth. We argue that cooperative labor-management relations encourage workers to make positive contributions to technical and organizational innovations that raise labor productivity, and that an industrial relations system that secures strong worker rights fosters cooperative labor-management relations. These arguments are supported by an empirical analysis of long-run productivity growth in 15 advanced capitalist countries. We first develop an index of worker rights and show its positive effect on several indicators of labor-management cooperation. We then develop an index combining measures of worker rights and labor-management cooperation and show its positive effect on the rate of growth of labor productivity.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.     

Understanding wage determination in a multi-level bargaining system: a panel data analysis

This article presents an estimation of the elasticity of actual wages to industry-level collective bargaining thereby quantifying empirically the role of industry-level bargaining on wage determination. For this purpose, we use a unique employer–employee panel dataset covering the entire Belgian employment population over 9 years (1998–2006). Like several other European countries, e.g. Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands, Belgium has a relatively centralised wage bargaining system, with the industry level playing the most important role. Regression results confirm that wage increases collectively decided at the industry level are, on average, fully passed on to individual wages. In addition to industry-level bargaining, we are interested in the supplementary wage increases granted at the firm level, referred to as wage drift or wage cushion in the literature. Our estimates show that wage drift is affected by company size, by the economic performance of the industry and to a much lesser extent by labour market tensions as measured by the local unemployment rate. Interestingly, our results show that industry-level bargaining also takes most of these features into account.     

The one constant: a causal effect of collective bargaining on employment growth? Evidence from German linked‐employer‐employee data

A large number of articles have analysed ‘the one constant’ in the economic effects of trade unions, namely that collective bargaining reduces employment growth by 2–4% points per year. Evidence is, however, mostly related to Anglo‐Saxon countries. We investigate whether a different institutional setting might lead to a different outcome, making the constant a variable entity. Using linked‐employer‐employee data for Germany, we find a negative correlation between being covered by a sector‐wide bargaining agreement or firm‐level contract and employment growth of about 1% point per annum. However, the correlation between employment growth and collective bargaining is not robust to the use of panel methods. We conclude that the results of the literature using cross‐section data might be driven by selection.     

Works council ‘disaffection’ and establishment survivability

This article investigates the association between a measure of works council heterogeneity and plant closings in Germany, 2006–2015. Two datasets are used to identify failed establishments, while institutional heterogeneity is captured by management perceptions of the role of the works council in managerial decision making and also by allowing for works council learning. The potential moderating role of sectoral collective bargaining is also examined. We report that works councils per se are not associated with plant closure. Rather, it is establishments with disaffected councils that display higher rates of closure. The latter result does not obtain where such establishments are covered by sectoral agreements; an outcome that is consistent with the literature on the mitigation of rent-seeking behaviour, and one that also receives support from our finding that plants with dissonant councils are more likely than their consensual counterparts to transition into sectoral bargaining coverage. On the other hand, there is only limited evidence of works council learning.     

Independence of the status quo? A weak and a strong impossibility result for social decisions by bargaining

There are several ethical objections to the dependence on the status quo when bargaining mechanisms are applied to problems of collective choice and, in this context, there is also some discussion about how to define the status quo. Can one think of bargaining mechanisms defined for some set of decision problems or of bargaining solutions for special problems that are independent of the status quo? Under which conditions do they exist? What are the crucial properties of the classical bargaining solutions or of bargaining mechanisms on economic environments implying dependence? These questions are answered by two impossibility results. It turns out that the only crucial assumption we search for is the axiom of “Weak Individual Rationality”. We also point out the consequences of our results for the discussion mentioned above.     

Migration and imperfect labor markets: Theory and cross-country evidence from Denmark,Germany and the UK

We investigate the labor market effects of immigration in Denmark, Germany and the UK, three countries which are characterized by considerable differences in labor market institutions and welfare states. Institutions such as collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection and unemployment benefits affect the way in which wages respond to labor supply shocks, and, hence, the labor market effects of immigration. We employ a wage-setting approach which assumes that wages decline with the unemployment rate, albeit imperfectly. We find that the wage and employment effects of immigration depend on wage flexibility and the composition of the labor supply shock. In Germany immigration involves only moderate wage, but large unemployment effects, since immigrants are concentrated in labor market segments with low wage flexibility. The reverse is true for the UK and Denmark.     

Wages in the East German Transition Process: Facts and Explanations

We analyze wage developments in the East German transition process both at the macro- and at the microeconomic level. At the macroeconomic level, we draw special attention to the important distinction between product and consumption wages, describe the development of various wage measures, labor productivity and unit labor costs in East Germany in relation to West Germany, and relate these developments to the system of collective wage bargaining. At the microeconomic level, we describe changes in the distribution of hourly wages between 1990 and 1997 and analyze the economic factors determining these changes by way of empirical wage functions estimated on the basis of the Socio-Economic Panel for East Germany. The paper also draws some conclusions on the likely future course of the East–West German wage convergence process.     

Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level*

To what extent do firms insulate their workers' wages from fluctuations in product markets? Which firm and worker attributes are associated with wage flexibility at the micro level? We first rely on Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) to estimate dynamic models of sales and wages, finding that in Portugal, workers' wages respond to permanent shocks on firm performance, as opposed to transitory shocks. We then explore the factors associated with wage flexibility, finding that collective bargaining and minimum wages are associated with higher wage insurance by the firm, while the threat of firm bankruptcy reduces it. Managers receive less protection against permanent shocks than other workers.     

Will Deregulating the Labor Market in Australia Improve the Employment COnditions of Women?

This article traces the development of policies designed to reduce gender workforce inequality in Australia. In contrast to earlier centralized and collective approaches, current strategy is founded on individualism and direct workplace bargaining. The location of reform is now the enterprise, with direct bargaining replacing collective standards. Current policy developments have seen gender subsumed under market imperfections and family responsibilities. These policies will remove many of the safeguards of minimum pay and conditions for women workers, especially those who are most vulnerable. When combined with the growth of "nonstandard" jobs the picture is bleak for many workers, especially the low paid. The onus for corrective action now rests with individual employees and workplace managers, with trade unions being marginalized. The authors suggest that a continuation of the current policy will wind back the clock on the employment conditions of women workers in Australia.     

劳务派遣:劳动者就业风险及其保障机制研究

劳务派遣作为一种新型用工、就业形式,近年来在我国发展非常迅速。由于就业政策重效率轻公平,相关法律不完备,以及派遣劳动者维权能力弱,派遣劳动者面临职业发展前景不明晰、同工不同酬、社会保障权利缺失、职业技能培训机会少等就业风险。因此,为维护派遣劳动者的合法权益,必须发挥政府监管、法律规范和劳资集体谈判的共同作用,最终实现劳务派遣工作的"正规化"。     

论采购联盟集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应

文章以中国的制造业外包服务,即出口加工贸易活动为基础,发展了一个有关本国企业的中间品策略性采购联盟与外国垄断性供给者进行集体谈判的非合作性广义Coumot-Nash谈判模型,探讨是否应该建立中间品策略性采购联盟,以及如何运用其集体谈判力实现行业降低成本、保障供给等问题.文章证明本国与外国之间的中间品与最终产品贸易的互补性既增加了建立采购联盟进行集体谈判的迫切性,也复杂化了集体谈判力的价格、销量与福利效应:这些效应既依存于本国策略性采购联盟的偏好这种主观因素,也取决于最终产品需求由线的弹性与曲率、外国企业的技术以及生产专业化程度等客观因素,其中,采购联盟的偏好因素具有重要的影响.     

Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts

We investigate an infinite horizon bargaining problem in which a firm and a worker bargain over two dimensions, quality and wage. The worker has private information about his type. Only the uninformed firm makes an offer and it can offer a menu of quality-wage contracts instead of single one. We show that for all discount factors, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is separating without delay; the firm separates the types of worker with a menu of contracts in the first period. Our result shows that in multi-dimensional bargaining, the "Coase Conjecture" holds in the sense that the game ends in the first period. But it fails in the sense that the uninformed party can preserve the entire bargaining power.     

PURPOSELY INDUCED ASYMMETRTC INFORMATION

The theory of optimal employment contracts under asymmetric information generally assumes that the firm is unable to convince workers about the truth of its reports about the state of the world. However evidence indicates that firms are actually unwilling to reveal information for reasons connected with collective bargaining. The present note sets out a bargaining model which rationalizes this attitude and shows that it may cause employment to diverge from its optimal level.