风险追逐条件下基于补偿策略及回购契约的供应链协调

供应链风险偏好问题是当前的研究热点,以往学者在研究供应链协调策略时多考虑供应链成员是风险中性的情形,较少考虑当供应链成员为风险追逐或风险厌恶的情形。本文在总结前人研究结果的基础上建立了由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链模型,双方构成了一个Stackelberg主从博弈模型,供应商为领导者,零售商为追随者。并假设该供应链模型在随机市场需求条件下,采用供应链补偿策略及回购契约进行协调。在此基础上,本文研究了当供应链有一方是风险追逐而另一方是风险中性条件下的供应链协调策略,并将结论与供应链双方均为风险中性条件下的协调策略进行了对比分析,分别得出了不同风险偏好组合备件下,供应商和零售商的最优协调策略。最后得出结论：无论供应链成员的风险偏好如何,当供应商将订货补偿策略与回购契约一起使用时,可以在保持回购价格不变的情况下达到供应链的协调。     

考虑成本利润率的供应链优化与协调

文章研究了以成本利润率为目标优化函数,在收益共享契约下,构建单一供应商和单一零售商构成的供应链优化与协调模型.建立未提供收益共享契约和提供收益共享契约、零售商风险中性和风险规避的不同情形下的决策模型,给出不同情况下的最优订货量及实现供应链协调的收益共享系数的区间范围.研究认为:收益共享契约下的零售商最优订货量大于未提供收益共享契约下的最优订货量;不论是否提供收益共享契约,利润最大化为优化目标的零售商最优订货量均高于以成本利润率最大为优化目标的最优订货量;此外,研究给出了零售商的最优订货量与收益共享系数的关系.     

公平偏好下收益共享契约供应链协调

供应链收益分配过程中零售商往往表现出公平偏好行为,文章研究了市场需求是随机的两阶段供应链中收益共享契约与供应链协调问题。在随机市场需求的收益共享契约基本模型的基础上,构建了考虑零售商公平偏好的收益共享契约模型,并通过数值分析了零售商公平偏好对收益共享契约协调供应链的影响。研究结果表明,将公平偏好这一行为因素引入到收益共享契约协调供应链问题中具有理论和实际意义,对收益共享契约具体的协调策略产生影响。     

多零售商环境下中国石油企业供应链收益共享契约研究

本文以中国石油企业供应链为研究对象,基于博弈论思想,构建了普通契约模型和收益共享契约模型,并分别求出两种契约条件下零售商、供应商以及整条供应链的收益,同时求出了收益共享契约中的利润分配比例系数。通过算例分析,证明合适的收益共享契约可以起到协调石油供应链的作用。     

供应链契约研究方法文献述评

近年来,通过制定供应链契约来协调供应链的研究迅速增长,而针对供应链契约的研究假设进行梳理的研究并不多。本文对供应链契约的研究假设进行了归纳和总结,并对四种常见的供应链契约（批发契约、回购契约、收益共享契约、数量弹性契约）的最新研究加以综述和讨论。     

风险规避零售商加盟的闭环供应链协调契约设计

考察了分散独立决策和集中联合决策情况下,产品销售及废旧产品回收均由风险规避零售商负责的闭环供应链中节点企业的优化决策与协调问题。研究发现,分散独立决策情形下,双重边际化效应在有风险规避零售商加盟的闭环供应链中也存在;收益费用共享契约能够实现风险规避型闭环供应链的协调。     

鲜活农产品供应链协调研究——基于风险规避的收益共享契约分析

供应链协调是鲜活农产品供应链高效运作的基础。本文通过引入新鲜度因子和风险规避系数的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了由专业合作社和超市构成的鲜活农产品供应链协调问题,分析了收益共享契约机制下供应链成员的最优定价策略及供应链成员风险规避行为对批发价和零售价的影响。数值分析结果表明,鲜活农产品批发价随着新鲜度、收益共享率的增大而增大;零售价随着零售商风险规避程度的增大而减小;而批发价随着生产商风险规避程度的增大而减小,随着零售商风险规避程度的增大而增大。要改变现状应通过大力培育农产品流通组织,提高流通主体组织化程度;设计合理的收益共享机制和风险分担机制,协调供应链成员利益;加强农产品流通基础设施建设及先进物流技术的应用等措施,提升供应链整体绩效,提高鲜活农产品流通效率。     

风险厌恶假设下的供应链利润分享契约协调机制研究

笔者考查具有风险厌恶偏好的由生产商主导的两级供应链,利用均值方差方法分析利润分享契约机制对供应链协调的影响,提出了考虑风险因素情况下的利润分享契约机制,得出集中决策下供应链达成协调的充要条件.笔者讨论分散决策情况的斯塔克尔伯格博弈均衡解,并通过数值分析研究验证:分散决策时无法实现供应链的协调.相比较于风险中性的情况,风险厌恶假设下供应链的收益会产生效率损失,而且成员越厌恶风险,损失越大.     

需求不确定环境下二级供应链协调契约机制研究

本文研究单一制造商、单一零售商组成的二级供应链面对需求不确定环境如何建立协调机制使得供应链各节点企业达到共赢的局面,分别建立集中决策模型,分散决策模型,为使得在各自为政的决策模式下不伤害整体利益,本文分别采用数量折扣契约和回购契约来协调供应链.     

延期付款与零售商努力的供应链协调研究

为解决制造商提供延期付款的商业信用和零售商付出销售努力情形下供应链协调问题,笔者建立了零售商采取联合补货策略下集中协调和分散协调的多产品两级供应链决策模型,设计了价格折扣契约和销售努力成本共享契约两种协调机制,分析了两种契约机制的协调条件与参数设置,得出了零售商偏好价格折扣契约和销售努力成本共享契约协调机制的条件.数值仿真分析说明了两种契约协调机制的有效性,并分析了信用期限对供应链协调的影响.     

基于收益共享契约的三级供应链如何应对突发事件

本文针对一个由供应商-制造商-零售商构成的三级供应链,在考虑随机性需求基础上,探讨突发事件对三级供应链的影响,同时改进了协调供应链的收益共享契约,使之能够应对突发事件。     

需求和路途损耗扰动下双渠道供应链的应急决策

构建了一条由一个零售商和一个拥有线上渠道的生产商组成的易逝品双渠道供应链,假设商品在流通过程中发生一定的路途损耗。建立了突发事件导致市场需求和渠道流通过程的损耗比例同时发生扰动状态下的市场需求模型,求出最优渠道销售价格、销售数量以及生产数量,并设计了改进收益共享契约协调分散决策下的双渠道供应链。研究结果表明:当突发事件导致市场规模和路途损耗同时发生扰动时,供应链具有一定的鲁棒性,改进收益共享契约可以实现双渠道供应链的应急协调。     

Demand disruption and coordination of supply chain via effort and revenue sharing

This article explores the equilibrium behaviour of a basic supplier–retailer distribution channel under demand disruption via effort and revenue sharing contract. This differs from the traditional supply chain coordination model. Firstly, demand is simultaneously affected by retail price and nonprice marketing effort from manufacturers and retailers. Secondly, when the demand is disrupted, this article considers disruptions in the market scale and price sensitivity coefficient. Thirdly, the supply chain coordination model is proposed via effort and revenue sharing contract. In this way, the manufacturer reduces the wholesale price as an incentive for the retailer to share revenue. Finally, the total supply chain profit is greater with contract than no contract. This also constitutes another incentive for the players to follow the effort and revenue sharing contract.     

Channel competition and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with demand and cost disruptions

The impacts of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and coordination of a dual-channel supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer are examined. First, coordination of the dual-channel supply chain without disruption is proposed, by using a revenue sharing contract. Furthermore, the effects of simultaneous disruption of demand and cost on pricing, production and profit are examined from the perspective of partners and the whole supply chain. Optimal prices and quantum of production in the event of disruptions occurring are derived. Suitable changes and improvements in revenue sharing contracts can help coordinate the dual-channel supply chain with disruptions. Finally, the proposed models are further analysed through numerical examples.     

Unidirectional transshipment policies in a dual-channel supply chain

The main purpose of this paper is to study the ordering, transshipment price, wholesale price and contracting decisions of a dual-channel supply chain with unidirectional transshipment. We establish a dual-channel model which consists of a manufacturer, an online shop owned by a manufacturer and a retailer. We first examine the ordering decisions and establish the existence of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Then we study other decisions under two types of transshipment price setting: exogenous and endogenous. Under exogenous transshipment price, we investigate the wholesale price decisions of the manufacturer. And then we find that the transshipment strategy with wholesale price contract can coordinate the supply chain only under a certain condition and cannot accommodate arbitrary divisions of the profit. So we further develop an all-unit quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain and achieve win–win outcome. Under endogenous transshipment price, we use Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution to study the transshipment price decisions and obtain a transshipment price mechanism. We find that the transshipment price mechanism always coordinates the supply chain.     

均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。     

基于滑动价格保值条款的供应链汇率风险管理

基于一个使用批发价契约的跨国供应链,构建了一个滑动价格保值条款来实现上下游节点企业绩效的改进。研究结果表明:当汇率对零售商不利时,降低批发价格会促使零售商订购更多商品;当汇率对零售商有利时,提高批发价格会提升供应商的绩效;滑动价格保值条款对批发价格的修正幅度与上下游企业的期望利润正相关。最后通过算例分析揭示了滑动价格保值条款的管理意义。     

The bullwhip effect on inventory: a perspective on information quality

In recent years, there has been a vast increase in the quantity of information shared across supply chain. We investigate how the timeliness and accuracy of information quality affect the value of information sharing. We use the inventory bullwhip effect (BWE) to measure the value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain consisting of one retailer and one manufacturer. The retailer faces a price-sensitive demand and the price is an AR (1) process. Our study shows if customer demand and retailer’s immediate order are delayed, using retailer’s historical order quantity to forecast can decrease manufacturer’s BWE. If information errors happen, during delivery and utilization, information sharing is not always valuable for the manufacturer. Sometimes, no information sharing can decrease much more of BWE. If information errors occur when the retailer collects demand information, value of information sharing is more significant than when there are no information errors.