INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES IN OLIGOPOLY WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS

This paper examines the foreign direct investment (FDI) versus exports decision of foreign oligopolistic firms under cost heterogeneity. An additional motivation for firms to invest abroad is the technological sourcing via spillovers, which flow from the host more efficient firm to foreign less advantaged firms. For intermediate values of the set‐up costs associated with FDI entry, it is shown that foreign firms choose opposite entry strategies. An equilibrium where the less efficient foreign firm exports whereas the more efficient invests is more likely to happen when foreign firms become more heterogeneous, the larger the trade costs and not too big oligopolistic profitability. Interestingly, the opposite may also be an equilibrium thus finding that the more efficient firm does not choose to invest, a result that emphasizes the relevance of the strategic setting under consideration. The latter result identifies a market failure since welfare in the host market is higher when both firms undertake FDI; a finding that calls attention to how appropriate are host government policies towards internationalization strategies.     

PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION OF EDUCATION IN A R&D-BASED GROWTH MODEL

We develop a R&D‐based growth model with endogenous accumulation of human capital. We investigate the idea that education is a good entering in the preferences of individuals. We seek to analyse how the decisions of individuals to invest in human capital can be altered by changes in economic policies and how they can be reflected on the level of growth in the long run. We show that policy changes affect growth through their effect on the decision of individuals to invest in human capital. The effects obtained depend whether individuals enjoy to acquire education or if they consider it as a ‘bad’. In the absence of any policy intervention, the level of growth can be excessive or insufficient compared with the optimum.     

Investment decisions and coordination problems in a market with network externalities: An experimental study

We study decision-making and the associated coordination problems in an experimental setting with network externalities. Subjects decide simultaneously in every round how much to invest out of a fixed endowment; the gain from an investment increases with total investment, so that an investment is profitable iff total investment exceeds a critical mass. The game has multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria; we find that whether first-round total investment reaches critical mass predicts convergence towards the Pareto optimal full-investment equilibrium. Moreover, first-round investments and equilibrium convergence vary with critical mass and group size in a complex way that is explicable by subtle effects of strategic uncertainty on decision making.     

基于广告效应视角下的地方政府最优招商引资行为分析

招商引资已成为地方政府加快发展的共识。招商引资活动一方面向投资者提供投资地信息 ,另一方面说服投资者到本地投资 ,具有广告行为的效应。本文基于广告效应理论 ,分析了地方政府在追求招商引资收益最大化的情况下 ,招商引资的最优支出行为和招商引资市场在位者之间的策略性行为 ,并探讨招商引资市场中后进入者的最优进入策略。     

Public input competition

Public investment in infrastructure may help create agglomeration economies, by attracting mobile factors such as skilled labour. Competition among regions in public investment can then be destructive. This paper analyzes the Nash equilibria to a simple model of public input competition. Even though the regions are assumed identical, the equilibrium may not be symmetric. The problem with non-cooperative behaviour is not (only) that regions invest too much, but that too many regions may choose to invest. Depending on the parameter values, the Nash equilibrium may be efficient, may be inefficient or may not exist (at least not in pure strategies). Better mobility among regions leads to more aggressive competition. The analysis suggests that rents from public investment may be dissipated by governments' competition to attract mobile factors.     

The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice

Most prior theoretical and experimental work involving auction choice has assumed bidders find out their value after making a choice of which auction to enter. We examine whether or not bidders knowing their value prior to making a choice of which among multiple alternative auction formats to enter impacts their choice decision and/or the outcome of the auctions. The results show a strong impact on auction choice. Subjects with low values choose the first price sealed bid auction more often while subjects with high values choose the ascending auction more often. The number of bidders in each auction, revenue, efficiency and average bidder surplus all end up equalized.     

中国上市公司无形资产投资实证分析

针对中国上市公司对无形资产管理的现状,结合无形资产特点,对中国部分上市公司的无形资产投资进行了实证分析,并对无形资产投资前提、投资额及投资时机进行了研究,以此来构建一个无形资产投资体系。     

Incentives to invest and to give access to non-regulated new technologies

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.     

A Schumpeterian model of endogenous innovation and growth

A disequilibrium model of endogenous innovation and growth is presented. The behaviour of the agents is supposed to be governed by routines, not by maximization. The entrepreneurs are assumed to invest a fraction of their operating profits in real capital accumulation, and another fraction in R&D. The latter leads to an increase in labour productivity via a R&D production function. In this Schumpeterian model, not only the R&D processes of innovations are considered, but the diffusion processes as well. As in Schumpeter's theory of economic development the economic impact of technical change is considered a disequilibrium phenomenon. Thus, in a capitalist economy characterized by ongoing diffusion processes of innovations, time averages are more important than steady state values even in a long run perspective.     

Coordination of strategic responses to security threats: Laboratory evidence

Laboratory experiments are used to evaluate the extent to which players in games can coordinate investments that diminish the probability of losses due to security breaches or terrorist attacks. In this environment, economically sensible investments may be foregone if their potential benefits are negated by failures to invest in security at other sites. The result is a coordination game with a desirable high-payoff, high-security equilibrium and an undesirable low-security equilibrium that may result if players do not expect others to invest in security. One unique feature of this coordination situation is that investment in security by one player generates a positive externality such that all other players’ expected payoffs are increased, regardless of those other players’ investment decisions. Coordination failures are pervasive in a baseline experiment with simultaneous decisions, but coordination is improved if players are allowed to move in an endogenously determined sequence. In addition, coordinated security investments are observed more often when the largest single security threat to individuals is preventable by their own decisions to invest in security. The security coordination game is a “potential game,” and the success of coordination on the more secure equilibrium is related to the notion of potential function maximization and basin of attraction.      

The importance of higher-order beliefs to successful coordination

Beliefs about other players’ strategies are crucial in determining outcomes for coordination games. If players are to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium, they must believe that others will coordinate with them. In many settings there is uncertainty about beliefs as well as strategies. Do people consider these “higher-order” beliefs (beliefs about beliefs) when making coordination decisions? I design a modified stag hunt experiment that allows me to identify how these higher-order beliefs and uncertainty about higher-order beliefs matter for coordination. Players prefer to invest especially when they believe that others are “optimistic” that they will invest; but knowledge that others think them unlikely to invest does not cause players to behave differently than when they do not know what their partners think about them. Thus resolving uncertainty about beliefs can result in marked efficiency gains.     

Optimal ownership of public goods reconsidered

Consider a non-governmental organization (NGO) that can invest in a public good. Should the government or the NGO own the public project? In an incomplete contracting framework with split-the-difference bargaining, Besley and Ghatak (2001) argue that the party who values the public good most should be the owner. We demonstrate the robustness of their insight when the split-the-difference rule is replaced by the deal-me-out solution. Our finding is in contrast to the private good results of Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998), who show that the optimal ownership structure crucially depends on whether the split-the-difference rule or the deal-me-out solution is used.     

Strategic Delay in a Real Options Model of R&D Competition

This paper considers irreversible investment in competing research projects with uncertain returns under a winner-takes-all patent system. Uncertainty takes two distinct forms: the technological success of the project is probabilistic, while the economic value of the patent to be won evolves stochastically over time. According to the theory of real options uncertainty generates an option value of delay, but with two competing firms the fear of preemption would appear to undermine this approach. In non-cooperative equilibrium two patterns of investment emerge depending on parameter values. In a pre-emptive leader–follower equilibrium firms invest sequentially and option values are reduced by competition. A symmetric outcome may also occur, however, in which investment is more delayed than the single-firm counterpart. Comparing this with the optimal cooperative investment pattern, investment is found to be more delayed when firms act non-cooperatively as each holds back from investing in the fear of starting a patent race. Implications of the analysis for empirical and policy issues in R&D are considered.     

Promoting justice by treating people unequally: an experimental study

Which inequalities among individuals are considered unjust? This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study distributive choices dealing with arbitrarily unequal initial endowments. In a three-person distribution problem where subjects either know or do not know their endowments, we find impartial behavior to be a stable pattern. Subjects either compensate for initial inequalities fully or not at all in both conditions, and they do so more often when they do not know their endowment than when they know it. Moreover, the type and the size of the good to be distributed also affect the frequency of impartial behavior.     

Progressive taxation and the intensity and timing of investment

This paper examines the effect of progressive taxation on a firm's investment intensity and timing decisions using a real options approach. The firm possesses a perpetual option to invest in a project at any instant by incurring an irreversible investment cost at that time. The amount of the irreversible investment cost determines the intensity of investment that augments the value of the project. Tax progression is specified in a particular case of a constant marginal tax rate with an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. We show that the firm's investment decisions are neutral to tax progression only when the exogenously given tax exemption threshold is sufficiently large. When tax neutrality does not hold, we show that progressive taxation has a perverse effect on investment intensity. Finally, we show that progressive taxation induces the firm to invest earlier as compared to the case under proportional taxation (i.e., in the absence of any tax exemption).     

Tax morale,fiscal capacity,and war

This paper studies the effects of mobilization for war on the development of fiscal capacity and the values of tax compliance (tax morale). We propose a dynamic setting where governments may invest resources to improve the efficiency of the fiscal apparatus and the citizens' tax morality in order to raise the necessary revenues for the defense against a threat (external or internal), and parents optimally choose to transmit their preferences of tax compliance to children. Despite fiscal capacity and tax morale are initially substitutes, we show how a dynamic complementarity may arise in equilibrium from a more efficient transmission of the values of tax compliance in countries with high fiscal capacity, and this may explain why they tend to move together over time. Under reasonable conditions, we obtain that the effect of a higher threat of war on the steady-state level of the culture of tax compliance is negative when fiscal capacity is relatively low, and positive when the latter is large. We show cross-country evidence based on war frequency, fiscal capacity, and tax morale that is consistent with the results of our theory.     

Liquidity and investor confidence in the turn-of-the-month regularity

Ogden (1990) offers a compelling explanation for the ubiquitous turn-of-the-month (TOM) seasonality. He hypothesizes and shows that the clustering of payment dates at the end of the month results in a stock return regularity that is related to increased liquidity and monetary policy. This article introduces investor behaviour into Ogden’s TOM liquidity hypothesis where higher TOM returns depend not only on the availability of increased liquidity but also on investors’ willingness to invest new funds. The empirical evidence is consistent with the argument. When confidence is high, investors’ willingness to invest the increased liquidity results in a TOM regularity. But when confidence is low, a TOM regularity is absent as investors park the increased liquidity. This additional measure of investor confidence provides a more complete explanation of Ogden’s liquidity hypothesis.     

A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial Intermediation

This paper studies a Diamond–Dybvig model of providing insurance against unobservable liquidity shocks in the presence of unobservable trades. We show that competitive equilibria are inefficient. A social planner finds it beneficial to introduce a wedge between the interest rate implicit in optimal allocations and the economy's marginal rate of transformation. This improves risk sharing by reducing the attractiveness of joint deviations where agents simultaneously misrepresent their type and engage in trades on private markets. We propose a simple implementation of the optimum that imposes a constraint on the portfolio share that financial intermediaries invest in short-term assets.     

Taxation and Investment Decisions: A Real Options Approach

The purpose of the paper is to analyse the impact of the tax system on the firm's incentives to invest and disinvest in an uncertain environment. This paper follows the real options approach, which allows us to investigate the value to a firm of waiting to invest and/or disinvest, when payoffs are stochastic and investments partially reversible. The implications for the magnitude and directions of the effects of tax policy are studied; also the case of tax policy uncertainty is examined.     

Designing foresight studies for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NST) future developments

Nanoscience and Nanotechnology (NST) is widely considered as one of the most promising areas of scientific and technological development for future decades. As a consequence, almost every country in the world has chosen to invest significantly in this area. This choice, however, is only a first step in the investment decision process, given that almost any scientific discipline can be taken at the scale of a nanometre. In this paper, it is argued that foresight studies to decide where to invest in the nanotechnology area should be designed in a different way from what is normally done. Nanotechnology, in fact, has specific characteristics that should be taken into account when evaluating its expected impacts and potentialities.