Constitutional tariffs, incidental protection, and the Laffer relationship in the early United States

This article explores an early attempt to establish a constitutional constraint on tariffs utilizing the Laffer Curve relationship. In 1842 John Calhoun suggested that the curve’s revenue maximization apex could be used to differentiate between “Revenue” and “Protective” tariffs independently from the non-judiciable question of legislative motive. When admitted that a tax must actually be collected to remain constitutionally valid, the apex functions as a de facto upper tariff rate constraint. Despite subsequently falling in disfavor, Calhoun’s argument illustrates the importance of political economy on the constitutional level by recognizing conditions that induce policymakers to rationally raise tax rates at the expense.

Buchanan on monetary constitutions

Buchanan’s reflections on monetary issues have been mostly neglected, despite their great interest both per se and for a deeper understanding of his general constitutional endeavour. We will thus propose a comprehensive assessment of Buchanan’s writings on this topic, focusing in particular on the different political models that have been developed to argue in favour of constitutional constraints on the governmental power to create money and on the implications that one can draw from our author’s monetary papers for the structure and the objectives of his constitutional discourse more generally.

Constitutional coordination in unstable party systems: the Brazilian constitution of 1988

Constitutional assemblies are a common feature of many democratic transitions. However, the goal of coordinating constitutional choice would seem nearly impossible when assemblies are comprised of highly fragmented and volatile political parties. Building on Knight’s bargaining model, this article argues that the main challenge to coordination in unstable party systems is the procedural disequilibrium that results from incomplete information over breakdown payoffs. The likelihood of compromise in such circumstances is a function of the ideologies that frame constitutional choice and inform coalition-building. Thus, unstable party systems are not chaotic, although they may be deeply conflict-laden. These issues are illustrated empirically via the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, which demonstrates the possibilities for a stable constitutional order emerging from a fragmented and volatile party system.

Buchanan’s constitutional political economy: exchange vs. choice in economics and in politics

This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange. Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect, adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.

Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interests are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

Constitutional choice and European immigration policy

The EU’s immigration policy is evaluated from the standpoint of constitutional economics. The main conclusion is that European immigration policy is trapped in a system of constitutional regulations that is too rigid as it is exclusively oriented towards the protection and securitisation of European borders. As such, it is not capable of allowing the development of a problem-solving capacity based on successive trials, and this produces negative outcomes for the whole of the EU.

Taxonomy: racism versus fiscal conservatism in voting on segregationist provisions in Alabama’s constitution

On Election Day 2004, a razor-thin majority of Alabama’s voters rejected a proposed amendment to remove overtly segregationist language from the state constitution. Opponents had contended that approval would have opened the legislative door to significantly higher taxes. We employ the results from two earlier special elections to analyze the outcome. In 2000, voters supported repealing a constitutional provision prohibiting interracial marriages. Three years later, Alabamians were asked to reveal their preferences with respect to additional taxation. The evidence suggests that opposition to higher taxes rather than bigotry was decisive in the rejection of Amendment 2 in 2004.

“Deja Vu All Over Again:” Constitutional Economics and European legal Integration

Existing theories of regional integration do not satisfactorily explain European legal integration. Like the bears’ porridge, one explains too much, another too little, and yet another requires unnecessary information. Constitutional economics, viewing regional integration as a process producing a constitution, is able to explain both momentum toward and resistance to legal integration in a parsimonious fashion. Further, it produces a unique analysis of the current circumstances of European legal integration, revealing that the Kompetenz–Kompetenz debate addresses the fundamental dilemma of compound republics. This also discloses that European integration has produced a novel answer to this old question.

Social Market Economy: origins,meanings and interpretations

This paper investigates various possible meanings of ‘Social Market Economy’—60 years after its political initiation in Germany. We focus on the variety of intellectual sources that influenced the formation and interpretation of the concept in Germany during the first half of the last century. Our particular attention is on Müller-Armack’s definition of a rather dualistic concept of ‘social’ versus ‘market economy’ and the subtle differences it has with an original (Freiburg School) view of ordo-liberalism that lends itself more easily to a constitutional economics perspective.

Corporate social responsibility and the ‘game of catallaxy’: the perspective of constitutional economics

The paper examines the issue of corporate social responsibility (CSR) from the perspective of constitutional economics, focusing on the distinction between a political community’s constitutional choice of the rules of the “market game,” and the market players’ sub-constitutional choice of strategies within these rules. Three versions of CSR-demands are identified and discussed, a “soft,” a “hard”, and a “radical” version. The soft version is concerned with the issue of how “socially responsible” corporations ought to play the market game within existing rules. The hard version is about how the rules of the market ought to be changed in order to induce “socially responsible” corporate behavior. And the radical version questions the compatibility of CSR and the logic of the market game, calling in effect for adopting some alternative economic regime.

Constitutional moments in Eastern Europe and subjectivist political economy

This article provides epistemic foundations for traditional rational-choice political science, to explain when and how ideas matter. Operational codes, epistemic communities and the structural patterns of ideas demonstrates the constitutional moments that occur during crises, and how ideas can underpin and direct the formation of interest groups. The implications for policy reform are discussed, along with an application to the Constitutional Moments during the transition of Central and Eastern Europe.

America’s neglected debt to the Dutch,an institutional perspective

America’s early constitutional development owes a good deal to the experience and policies of the Dutch republic. Many of the parallels are direct: In the late 16th century, the Dutch fought a successful war to secede from a major empire. They wrote a declaration of independence and adopted a federal model of Republican governance almost exactly two hundred years before the Americans. Somewhat later, the Dutch republic and its political institutions subsequently inspired and protected enlightenment scholars. Its leading political family and army played a crucial role in curtailing English absolutism in England and in England’s American colonies, and its federal template provided a model for early American institutions.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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The complex role of Karl Menger in the Viennese economic theory

This paper is focused on the relation between economics and mathematics in the Wiener Kreis and in the Mathematische Kolloquium. In the 1930s, the economic theory became a part of Otto Neurath’s project of Unified Science, but in Menger’s Kolloquium, the reformulation of the model of general economic equilibrium (GEE) distanced it greatly from the Kreis’s neopositivist point of view. The role of Karl Menger is fundamental to understand the methodological and epistemological cleavage that arose in Mathematische Kolloquium. His role was very important also for understand the relation between the economic theory of the Austrian school and mathematical economics.

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley’s benevolent despot

This paper is an assessment of Besley’s attempt to orchestrate a rapprochement between public choice theory and conventional public economics—with its characteristic normative orientation towards public policy. In this paper, I first try to set the Besley enterprise in the context of earlier work—focussing on my own work with Buchanan (The Power to Tax and The Reason of Rules). I then direct attention to three aspects of the Besley enterprise: whether selecting for competence depends on having solved the motivation problem (either by incentive or selection means), how selection mechanisms might be supported institutionally and the possibility that selection processes might create incentives at the ‘dispositional’ level.

Robert Heilbroner and the Growing Concern with Poverty in the US

This paper examines Robert Heilbroner’s 1950 article in Harper’s Magazine on poverty in the USA. It argues that this piece was the first attempt to raise popular concerns about poverty in the USA after World War II, and in many ways sought to do what John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society and Michael Harrington’s The Other America accomplished. Heilbroner was not successful in bringing the issue before poverty to public attention because he wrote at a time of great economic growth and at a time before TV brought images and ideas to a large fraction of the American public. He also wrote in a very conservative era, where McCarthyism reared its ugly head and where calls to eradicate poverty were met with intimations of a Communist conspiracy.

Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

Benchmarking Corporate Social Responsibility within Spanish Companies

In this paper, the authors focus on the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) upon business profitability. In order to be capable of working with homogeneous data, the authors’ starting point is to use the criteria defined by PricewaterhouseCoopers’ work on the subject, and published by the Spanish journal Actualidad Económica. In this work, an index was created which assigns between one and five points to the companies depending on the importance given by them to CSR. The CSR measurement published by the Observatorio de la RSE will also be considered. In order to measure companies’ profitability, this paper will take into account their return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA) of 2005 and 2006. The authors’ purpose is to demonstrate that the relationship between CSR and business profitability is neutral.