浅析企业偷漏税原因及防范措施

随着市场经济的发展，目前无论我国企业是经营模式还是经营质量都发生了根本性的变化，但是商业经济发展的同时，企业税收并没有同步增长。究其根源，企业偷逃税款是主要原因。纳税人通过在销售、结算、生产成本费用、损益和发票方面偷逃税款，使得国家在税收方面损失严重，大家都知道税收支撑着政府的正常运转，依法纳税是每个公民应尽的义务。本人针对企业偷税漏税种种原因，其中包括税务机关的原因也包括纳税人的原因，建议国家应该出台一些防范政策，如完善税收征管模式，提高执法人员的素质；增强处罚力度；加强税法宣传，提高纳税人的纳税意识等。在对企业偷税漏税行为进行识别的基础上，进行国家与税务机关的双重防范工作，只有这样才能改变企业偷税漏税泛滥的现状，维护国家的经济基础。     

试谈加强内部控制遏制会计信息失真

当前，会计信息失真的现象比较严重，主要表现是：或为业绩考核，或为骗取银行贷款，或为达到偷税漏税等非法目的，人为地捏造会计事实，篡改会计数据，伪造、变造会计凭证、会计账簿，粉饰财务会计报告，极大地损害了各方的权益，     

缩小贫富差距促进社会公平

1.通过强化税收征管,完善税制,缩小收入差距。具体措施是:(1)强化税收征管。针对偷漏税可能发生的领域和环节,设计相应的征管措施,以杜绝偷税漏税的发生。为起到警示作用,还应严肃查处偷税漏税行为。(2)完善税制。根据我国目前的情况,应尽快修订个人所得税法,将现     

关于外资的几个重要问题

关于外资的几个重要问题马宇（外经贸部国际经济合作研究所）曾几何时，外资在中国备受青睐，积极招商引资就是思想解放的象征，引进外资的多少成为政绩大小的标志；一段时期，外资却又备受非议和责难，如外商投资企业高进低出转移价格偷税漏税，实物作价投资虚报损害国家...     

中小企业税负乱象

“此前媒体也曾披露，一些小业主不偷税漏税已无法生存。更有私营企业主在网络上发帖晒税负，如果规规矩矩把所有该上的税都上完，那么结果将是近乎于白干。”老曹说，“从我的厂子和一些朋友的情况来看，这一点都不夸张。”     

加强个人所得税征管的五大措施

随着国民经济的持续、快速增长,我国个人所得税也保持着较高增长态势,特别是部分高收入者个人所得税增幅更高,成为发展最快、增幅最高、潜力最大的税种之一。然而,由于个人所得税征收面广、收入项目多、收入相对不够透明、不同税目负担差距大,因而个人所得税征收管理还存在不少困难,偷税漏税相当普遍,特别是部分高收入者偷税漏税特别严重,因此,必须采取切实有效措施加强个人所得税征管。     

创建中国的经济伦理学问题诌议

创建中国的经济伦理学问题诌议范满红随着我国改革开放在广度和深度上的拓展，社会生产力的巨大进步，经济现实中各种关涉伦理道德的现象日益引起社会的关注。严重的腐败现象（贪污受贿、以权谋私、假公济私、公款消费旅游等），大量的假冒伪劣产品、普遍的偷税漏税行为、...     

私企财务的“公共管理”

私营企业由于种种原因，会计核算及财务管理中往往存在许多问题，如业主重视不够，会计制度不健全，提供的会计信息不真实，进行虚假的纳税申报等，在一定程度上扰乱社会经济秩序，造成偷税漏税，滋生腐败和助长不正之风，引发社会信用危机等。加强对私营企业财务的“公共管理”，有助于建立有序的经济秩序，公平纳税环境。     

房地产开发企业纳税筹划的可行性探析

近年来，房地产开发企业出现了偷税漏税情况较为严重的现象。为此，各地税务杌关已将房地产行业纳税情况纳入税收监管的重点。此外，国家税务机关还将加大对房地产涉税违法行为的处罚力度。由此可见，房地产开发企业涉税违法所付出的代价将进一步加大，纳税筹划也因此成为企业在低纳税风险下降低税负的一个重要选择。     

关于外资的几个重要问题

关于外资的几个重要问题马宇（外经贸部国际经济合作研究所）曾几何时，外资在中国备受青睐，积极招商引资就是思想解放的象征，引进外资的多少成为政绩大小的标志；一段时期，外资却又备受非议和责难，如外商投资企业高进低出转移价格偷税漏税，实物作价投资虚报损害国家...     

Tax evasion policies and the demand for cash

This paper analyzes the relationship between tax evasion and the demand for cash by studying the effects of two measures to fight evasion: accessing taxpayers’ bank data and imposing thresholds for cash payments. We study the effects of these policies in Italy, where visibility of bank data and cash thresholds were recently increased. We show that both significantly affected cash holdings, which grew by about 1.5 percent of the GDP. Using unique high frequency data on cash operations and exploiting regional heterogeneity in tax evasion propensity, we find that accessing bank data pushes regions with higher propensity to evade taxes to convert more deposits into cash. On the contrary, higher cash thresholds do not increase cash holdings more in these regions. We rationalize the findings with a simple model of tax evasion and payment choices, where cash and deposits have different degrees of privacy.     

Tax Liability and Tax Evasion in a Competitive Labor Market

In a competitive labor market, a change in the legal incidence of a tax on labor will not alter employment if tax obligations are fulfilled. However, this irrelevance result may no longer apply if taxes can be evaded. In particular, a shift from payroll to income taxes will lower employment. This will be the case if workers exhibit constant absolute risk aversion, have a utility function, which is strongly separable in income and the disutility from working, and the penalty for evasion is not proportional to the amount of taxes evaded. Accordingly, tax evasion opportunities can make the legal incidence of a tax on labor an important determinant of its economic incidence.     

Income Tax Evasion in a Unionised Labour Market

Labour market outcomes can depend on tax evasion since the returns from working are affected by the amount of taxes paid. In this paper, unionised workers are assumed to select the income which they declare. The rational trade union takes this decision into account. It is shown that the employment effects of a linear income tax are not altered qualitatively by tax evasion if the fine for evasion is a function only of the evaded tax. Moreover, the consequences of changes in the tax enforcement system are determined by the ability to choose evasion activities optimally. The existence of unrestricted tax evasion opportunities lowers wages.     

Tax evasion by tax deferment: Sham litigation with an informal credit market

We show theoretically how tax evasion is facilitated by informal credit market through tax deferment. Our model is empirically based. Using sham litigation, tax evaders earn a higher rate of return than the stipulated penalty rate for tax evasion while the government loses tax revenue. We propose an upfront part–payment of the disputed amount of tax as a solution to the form of tax evasion we describe.     

Tax Amnesties In A Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion

We present a dynamic model of tax evasion, where tax liabilities last for two periods and the probability of an inspection decreases with the sum of taxes evaded this period plus taxes evaded last period. We show that a tax amnesty that pardons more than the evasion penalties (an extensive amnesty) can temporarily improve compliance. Whenever the inspection technology improves, steady state compliance also improves, but the economy takes time to transit from one steady state to the other. We show that an amnesty may accelerate this transit, or even make it instantaneous if the amnesty is extensive enough.     

Tax evasion,social norms,and economic growth

We propose a theoretical model to account for the negative relationship between tax evasion and economic development. More precisely, we integrate tax morale into a dynamic OLG model of tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. We show that accounting for such nonpecuniary costs of evasion may explain (a) why the share of evaded taxes over GDP decreases when countries grow and (b) that tax morale is positively correlated with the level of GDP per capita. Finally, a higher tax rate increases aggregate evasion and the number of evaders when taxpayers decisions are interdependent.     

Evasion Effects of Changing the Tax Mix*

This study assesses claims that shifting toward greater indirect taxes will reduce evasion, thereby improving the distribution of real net incomes and generating a 'fiscal dividend'. Practical considerations suggest that industry sectors which evade income taxes will also be strongly inclined to evade indirect taxes on their output. A general equilibrium analysis finds that changing the tax mix will have little or none of the claimed anti–evasion or distributional effects. Increased indirect taxes on evaders' consumption purchases will be shifted onto suppliers in the compliant sector. Evaders will end up evading less income taxes but evading more indirect taxes     

Tax Evasion,Corruption and Market Entry

We analyze the impact of tax policy on the market entry of firms in the presence of corruption and tax evasion. In a world with corruption, firms must bribe corrupt officials to enter the market. For a given level of bribes, higher tax rates and stricter enforcement of taxation decrease tax evasion but typically reduce market entry. However, when the level of bribes reacts to tax policy, higher taxes and stricter enforcement of taxation can have a double benefit. Up to a certain threshold, for which we develop a simple rule, stricter enforcement increases market entry and reduces tax evasion.     

A quantitative theory of tax evasion

I present a simple, unified approach to study the tax evasion practices often observed in developing countries. I develop a general equilibrium model where heterogeneous establishments optimally select themselves into informality, tax compliance, and formal tax evasion. Informal firms evade taxes by staying small, while larger, formal firms can engage in costly tax evasion. In equilibrium, tax revenues rely on medium-sized firms, which are scarce. In a calibration exercise using data from Mexico, I find that reducing the returns to tax evasion by formal firms increases tax revenues by up to 68%. However, economies where such returns are too high face a trade-off between tax collection and aggregate efficiency, as cracking down on formal tax-evading firms pushes some firms into informality. Last, as the economy develops, the informal sector shrinks, while the tax-evading sector expands, thus limiting potential collection. If lower informality is a byproduct of development, and not vice versa, a solid tax base can be achieved by fiscal authorities effectively by focusing on formal tax evasion.     

HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION

A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.