对我国土地承包经营权“永佃权化”的几点思考

现行的农村土地承包经营权制度凸现一些问题,一方面,农村基本经营制度不够稳定;另一方面,土地承包经营权权能不够完整。由于永佃制与现行的土地承包权有着天然的相通性,引入永甸制有利于明晰农地产权,实现现有制度平稳过渡,减少改革成本。文章通过对我国现有农地制度进行评价,提出对我国土地承包经营权"永佃化",并设计了制度的初步方案。     

基于演化博弈视角的融资平台公司寻租行为研究

基于政府主导制度的安排,运用演化博弈理论,建立相应支付矩阵,分析地方融资平台公司寻租行为的演化规律。研究结果表明,地方融资平台公司寻租行为的演化随着市场经济的发展而不断变化,最终在市场经济发展的成熟阶段,理性的融资平台公司会选择不寻租的行为路径。建议从调整中央政府与地方政府事权和支出责任、改革官员政绩考核机制和加强信息公开化、透明化等方面入手,提高地方融资平台公司的经营管理水平。     

我国农地制度改革的双层次互动进化博弈模型分析

文章分析我国农地制度改革过程中中央政府、地方政府和农民之间的双层次互动进化博弈关系,探讨三个主体的行为和策略选择特征,为我国农地制度改革提供理论依据.研究认为,我国农地制度改革本质上是通过宏观层次的"选择"和微观层次的"突变"而逐步达成进化博弈均衡的动态过程.为了顺利推进我国农地制度改革,需要解决三个方面的问题:同时兼顾三个主体的利益;保证宏观"选择"机制的健全;鼓励微观层次的"突变".     

利益集团博弈分析——当前我国汇率改革的一个新视角

当前我国汇率问题有两个难点：人民币汇率制度改革和人民币升值路径快慢的选择,利益集团之间的博弈是其中关键的影响因素。目前的人民币汇率改革和人民币升值路径快慢是维护旧制度的利益主体和用新制度挑战旧制度的利益主体及政府之间的一种博弈。作者从利益格局变化的角度构建一个非完全信息动态博弈模型,主张我国汇率制度的改革以及人民币升值路径快慢要考虑不同利益主体的覆盖人数、改革过程中相关利益主体的成本收益以及政府在此过程中的主导性作用。     

利益集团博弈分析——当前我国汇率改革的一个新视角

当前我国汇率问题有两个难点:人民币汇率制度改革和人民币升值路径快慢的选择,利益集团之间的博弈是其中关键的影响因素。目前的人民币汇率改革和人民币升值路径快慢是维护旧制度的利益主体和用新制度挑战旧制度的利益主体及政府之间的一种博弈。作者从利益格局变化的角度构建一个非完全信息动态博弈模型,主张我国汇率制度的改革以及人民币升值路径快慢要考虑不同利益主体的覆盖人数、改革过程中相关利益主体的成本收益以及政府在此过程中的主导性作用。     

中国农村土地市场发展与改革创新

本文论述了中国农村土地市场的发展。提出在中国建立永佃制土地制度,土地法律所有权归国家,经济所有权归农民。法律所有和具体经济所有相分离,在经营制度上形成农民土地承包经营权与经济所有权相结合的格局。     

民国福建永佃制的分布——从对《全国土地调查报告纲要》中福建永佃比例的质疑说起

本文首次利用福建各县市的大量档案资料,考察民国时期福建永佃制的分布状况及比重.民国时期福建永佃制广泛存在,比重达到了20％以上,但永佃制在省内各地区的发展并不平衡,同一县市内不同乡镇或村庄的分布也不平衡.这是由省内土地紧缺、农民对地主人身依附关系松弛、各地经济结构和租佃程度不同等因素共同促成的.     

对于我国土地承包经营权“永佃权化”的几点思考

现行的农村土地承包经营权制度凸现一些问题:一方面,农村基本经营制度不够稳定;另一方面,土地承包经营权权能不够完整,为此应引入永佃制.因为它有利于防止土地征用中的利益侵害,有利于劳动力的转移,有利于避免集体行动的困境,有利于和现有制度实现平稳过渡,有利于明晰和稳定农地产权,有利于减少改革成本.文章指出了我国现有土地承包经营权的制度缺陷,提出了对我国土地承包经营权"永佃化"的现实可能性,并设计了该制度的初步方案.     

中国国企高管薪酬制度改革的路径分析——基于制度变迁理论的视角

国企高管薪酬制度改革是中国国企改革的一个关键环节,它经历了一个复杂的制度变迁过程。国企高管薪酬制度的变迁具有强制性和渐进性的特征,变迁具有路径依赖性,是正式约束和非正式约束相互作用的结果,也是利益各方博弈的结果。国企高管薪酬制度仍需改革,其改革的路径选择是:要坚持走以国家为主导的渐进性道路;要重视非正式制度建设,注意路径依赖的问题;效率与公平要相互协调。     

增强城市群整体竞争力:路径选择与学习策略——基于城市群集体学习的演化博弈视角

在经济全球化和知识经济迅猛发展的背景下,知识是区域发展最具战略性的资源,学习是区域最重要的过程.区域整体竞争力源于比其它区域更快地创新、获得和利用知识的能力即区域集体学习的能力.本文从城市群集体学习演化博弈的视角,简述我国城市群的集体学习特征,构建城市群集体学习的演化博弈模型,阐述城市群集体学习演化博弈均衡的稳定性.在此基础上,提出增强城市群整体竞争力的路径选择与学习策略.     

Insecurity of property rights and social matching in the tenancy market

This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency and equity costs because of the way it affects matching in the tenancy market. A principal-agent framework is used to model the landlord's decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land to the tenant and when contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with the tenant. These effects are quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic lines, severely limiting the size of the rental market and the choice of tenants for landlords, both with efficiency costs. Social segmentation reduces access to land for the rural poor, with high equity costs. Simulations suggest that improving tenure security would increase rental transactions by 21% and the area rented to the poor by 63%. Increased property rights security is hence beneficial not only to asset owners, but also to those with whom they might interact in the market.     

Land Tenure Insecurity and Formalizing Land Rights in Madagascar: A Gender Perspective on the Certification Program

This contribution examines Madagascar's land tenure reform – aimed at reducing land tenure insecurity – from a gender perspective. In particular, it investigates the certification program issuing formal land title deeds (land certificates) to landholders. Drawing on a household survey with gender-disaggregated asset data conducted in the rural municipality Soavinandriana, the analysis suggests that the certification program has strengthened both men's and women's formal claims to individually held land. However, the lack of gender equality principles and, in particular, of mechanisms to ensure that couples’ jointly held land is jointly secured, seems to have reinforced primary ownership of land by male household heads, at the expense of women's land rights. Furthermore, the land tenure reform does not address some of the most important threats to tenure security such as colonial titles and commercial pressure on land, and large parts of the country are still not covered by the certification program.     

韩国的土地利用规划体系和农村综合开发规划

韩国的土地国情和农业经营特点与我国十分相似。文章分析了韩国土地利用规划体系的构成及其主要特点,以及在农村综合开发和农村城市化过程中的作用。最后简要论述了乡村土地利用规划在中国国土规划中的重要性和迫切性,希望能为我国的农村综合开发和城镇化发展提供一些借鉴。     

农业土地制度和经济发展机制:对二十世纪中国经济史的一种理解

本文提出了农业土地制度决定经济发展机制的假说,并用二十世纪中国经济史对该假说作了初步论证。本文指出二十世纪上半叶中国经济发展机制是地主所有制下的古典二元经济机制,五十年代初中国实行了土地改革,但到七十年代末的计划经济发展机制依然类似于古典二元机制,而八十年代初的中国农业改革最终把中国经济建立在准自耕农制度上,中国经济发展从此表现出工资上升、工资和利润共同储蓄的新机制。     

农村建设用地使用权流转的制度障碍与制度构建

中国现行土地法律制度与农村建设用地流转的现实已经不相适应。城乡分割的二元土地制度、农地的产权残缺及其所承栽的社会保障功能的日益强化限制了农地的流转。因此，需要对农村建设用地使用权流转的相关法律进行修改或调整，明晰农村土地产权，明确土地流转的收益分配，改革土地征用制度，建立和逐步完善农村社会保障体系。     

个体认知、权威决策与中国农地制度变迁——一个动态演化博弈模型的构建及检验

超越"强制性-诱致性变迁"二分法,构建动态制度变迁模型是制度经济学研究的前沿和难题。本文初步构建了一个以个体和权威为主体,包含制度变迁成本的动态演化博弈模型,并以中国农地制度变迁历程中的两个典型案例进行实证检验。研究表明,权威决策是正式规则的主要来源,个体共同认知则是非正式约束的主要来源,二者共同决定了制度变迁的方向;制度变迁成本是重要的激励约束因素,制度变迁的速度则取决于制度变迁成本与个体认知、权威决策三者的一致性程度,一个高效、有序的制度变迁过程应尽量避免三者的背离和冲突。因此,政府主导进行的农地制度改革应特别关注农民认知,尊重农民意愿;对具有高变迁成本的制度变迁采取渐进改革的方式,适时建立过渡性的制度安排,并在改革的速度与质量之间做好权衡,以减少改革阻力,提高改革效率。     

Land Tenancy and Non-Contractible Investment in Rural Pakistan

Commitment failure lies at the core of incomplete contract theory, yet its quantitative significance has rarely been assessed. Using detailed plot-level data from rural Pakistan, we find that non-contractible investment is underprovided on tenanted land, even after controlling for the endogeneity of leasing decisions. Our evidence also indicates that moral hazard in investment effort alone cannot explain this inefficiency. Instead, imperfect commitment appears to be the driving mechanism, since even plots taken on fixed rent contracts where all the rent is paid upfront receive lower investment than owner-cultivated plots. We further show that a considerable portion of the variation in tenancy duration, and hence in the security of tenure, is due to heterogeneity across landlords. One interpretation of this finding is that landlord reputation is important in mitigating hold-up.     

宏观调控中的土地转让问题

国家通过调控土地使用,以调控固定资产投资过快的政策频繁出台,但是地方政府却因对土地财政的深度依赖,与中央政府博弈,致使土地违法严重,宏观调控政策难以很好到位.分析原因,现行土地批租存在诸多弊端.改革土地转让制度,完善现行一次性收租的政策,实行土地年租制是解决问题的有效办法.     

Tenure Security and Long‐term Investment on Tenanted Land: Evidence from Colonial Taiwan

We use farm diary data from Taiwan in the 1920s and 1930s to estimate the impacts of a state‐wide tenancy reform on tenants’ investment in the farmland and production outcome. The reform, commencing in 1922, enhanced the tenure security for the tenants by promoting written contracts that extended tenure length from 1 year to 5–6 years, and by establishing government‐sponsored organizations for dispute settlements. Our estimations rely on a difference‐in‐difference framework, where self‐cultivated farms are used as the control group. We find that the reform encouraged tenants to make investments in the irrigation and drainage system of the farms, which is expected to have long‐lasting benefits for production. The improved irrigation/drainage system led to significant efficiency gains for the farms. In contrast, the reform did not affect tenants’ usage of fertilizer much, which benefits production for only a crop season or a year.     

Land rental markets and rural poverty dynamics in Northern Ethiopia: Panel data evidence using survival models

There is growing interest in understanding the links between land reforms, land markets, and poverty reduction in Africa. The study uses four‐wave panel data from the northern highlands of Ethiopia to assess the dynamics of rural poverty taking into account the status of participation of rural households in the land rental market. Applying both nonparametric (Kaplan–Meier estimator) and semi‐parametric survival models that control for duration dependence of poverty transition, results show participation and degree of participation on the supply side of the tenancy market (landlords) have highly significant and positive effect on the chances of escaping poverty while the same cannot be said about the demand side of the tenancy market (tenants). The empirical evidence also confirms that households headed by older and literate people have relatively larger exit rates from poverty as compared with households headed by younger and illiterate ones. Though transacting farmers may engage themselves in win–win rental arrangements by the time they join the tenancy market, results indicate that gains are unequal as those tenants who enter the markets from low economic leverage (were poor) are liable to face a lower margin of net gains, which may limit their ability to move out of poverty.