The impact of government debt on the long-run natural real interest rate – a quantitative evaluation

Persistently low natural real interest rates are a problem for monetary policy and financial stability. I analyse to what extent a permanent increase in government debt that is financed by higher taxes could raise the long-run natural real interest rate. As a measurement tool, I use an incomplete markets model with capital and government bonds. Increasing the public debt/GDP ratio by one percentage point raises the real interest rate by between 0.4 and 1.5 basis points, depending on the degree of inequality generated by the model and the tax instrument used to balance the government’s budget constraint. I also show that the interest rate effect of a change in public debt/GDP predicted by the model is significantly smaller than its empirical counterpart for the US, due to the fact that the model understates the empirical fraction of households that are constrained in their consumption decision.     

Inflation and Exchange Rate Targeting Challenges Under Fiscal Dominance

Countries have significantly increased their public-sector borrowing since the Global Financial Crisis. As a consequence, monetary authorities may face pressure to deviate from their policy targets in ways designed to ease the debt burden. In view of this consideration, we test for greater fiscal dominance over 2000-2017 under Inflation Targeting (IT) and non-IT regimes. We find that evidence of fiscal dominance varies across countries and debt configurations. Higher ratios of public debt-to-GDP may appear associated with lower policy interest rates in advanced economies. However, a declining natural rate of interest largely explains the pattern of lower rates and higher debt in these countries. The most robust evidence of fiscal dominance lies among emerging markets under non-IT regimes, composed mostly of exchange rate targeters. For these countries, policy interest rates are non-linearly associated with public debt levels, depending on both the level of hard-currency public debt-to-GDP and the currency composition of public debt. We also show that emerging market economies with greater exchange rate volatility, inflation volatility, and underlying commodity exposure exhibit stronger associations between public debt and policy interest rates.     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Central bank instruments, fiscal policy regimes, and the requirements for equilibrium determinacy

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s results for interest rate feedback rules [Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2001. Monetary policy and multiple equilibria. American Economic Review 91, 167–185], the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for one with inflation when the primary surplus is raised with public debt. Under an exogenous primary surplus, money supply should be accommodating—such that real balances grow with inflation—to ensure local equilibrium determinacy. When the central bank links the supply of money to government bonds by controlling the bond-to-money ratio, an inflation stabilizing policy can be implemented for both fiscal policy regimes. Local determinacy is then ensured when the bond-to-money ratio is not extremely sensitive to inflation, or when interest payments on public debt are entirely tax financed, i.e., the budget is balanced.     

Housing market dynamics and macroprudential policies

In this paper, we analyze the implications of macroprudential and monetary policies for credit cycles, housing market stability and spillovers to consumption. We consider a countercyclical loan‐to‐value (LTV) policy that responds to a credit‐to‐income ratio, and we compare its effectiveness with a permanent tightening of the LTV ratio and a monetary policy rule that responds to credit. To this end, we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with housing market, household debt and collateral constraints, and we estimate it with Canadian data using Bayesian methods. Our study suggests that a countercyclical LTV ratio is a useful policy to reduce spillovers from the housing market into consumption and to lean against housing market boom–bust cycles. It performs better than the permanent tightening of the LTV ratio—a policy that has been used in a number of countries—and the monetary policy rule, both in terms of the stabilization of household indebtedness and spillovers into consumption. Monetary policy that leans against the wind is the least desirable due to its large adverse consequences on the real economy.     

An inventory of simple monetary policy rules in a New Keynesian macroeconomic model

We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for simple monetary policy rules that guarantee equilibrium determinacy in the New Keynesian monetary model. Our modeling framework is derived from a fully specified optimization model that is amenable to analytical characterisation. The monetary rules analyzed are variants of the basic Taylor rules ranging from simple inflation targeting (current, forward, backward) to canonical Taylor rules with and without inertial nominal interest rates. We establish that determinacy obtains for a wide range of policy parameters, especially when the monetary authority targets output and smoothes interest rates. Contrary to other results in the literature, we do not find a case for super-inertial interest rate policy.     

ECONOMIC AND BUDGET ISSUES FOR DEFICIT POLICY

Much of the controversy about reducing the federal deficit has arisen because policymakers lack a deficit policy that is a consistent part of broader macroeconomic policy. This is not surprising since economists have not reached a consensus about such a policy.
This paper sketches the analytical controversy about monetary and fiscal policies and traces it to issues about how the economy works. Although aspects of the deficit question are controversial, there is general concern about the buildup of federal debt implicit in the projection of persistently large deficits. A growing body of research suggests that the increase in the federal debt-to-income ratio may impinge dangerously on the credit available to finance private capital formation. Also, the rising federal debt may indirectly generate inflation through monetization.
Several criteria and approaches to a deficit policy are identified. The paper suggests that changing the "policy mix" by tightening fiscal policy and loosening monetary policy to reduce interest rates is unlikely to succeed to the extent that expansive monetary policy increases real interest rates by raising inflationary expectations and uncertainty.
Since the potential ill effects of the federal debt buildup, are essentially long-run and bear on capital accumulation, any tax increases should avoid disincentives to saving, investment, and to growth generally. Depending on revenue requirements, fundamental changes in the tax system may be necessary. Further reductions in spending appear to be inevitable if the projected rise in the debt-to-GNP ratio is to be halted. Defense, retirement, and medical care programs are most likely candidates for reduction.     

The non-linear impact of monetary policy on international reserves: macroeconomic variables nexus

This paper employs panel smooth transition regression models to investigate the nonlinear effects of two monetary policy proxies (i.e., real exchange rate return and real interest rate differential) on the international reserves—macroeconomic variables nexus. The panel data set includes the fourteen G-20 countries during the period 1991–2012. Empirical results show that the marginal effects of the macroeconomic variables (savings, terms of trade, public debt, capital account liberalization, economic growth, and trade openness) on international reserves are non-linear and vary with time, the proxies and countries, not linear and constant derived from traditional linear model. Currency devaluation policy (against the US dollar) can non-linearly enlarge the positive contribution of trade openness and public debt on international reserves, and non-linearly reduce the negative impact of terms of trade on international reserves, as the Marshall–Lerner condition holds. Expansionary monetary policy (through the decrease in domestic interest rates) can strengthen the positive effects of public debt, trade openness, and economic growth on international reserves. The precautionary and mercantilist views of reserves holdings are partially supported.     

Countercyclical taxes in a monopolistically competitive environment

In the context of a neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, this paper studies the stabilizing effects of countercyclical tax policy when the income tax rate has an additional role of financing government budget deficits. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, countercyclical taxes generally reduce aggregate volatility, unless the fiscal response to debt accumulation is weak. The presence of monopoly power enhances these effects. Even when automatic stabilizers successfully stabilize business cycle fluctuations, countercyclical taxes are welfare inferior, due to reduced precautionary saving motives. While, if the fiscal response to debt is weak and countercyclical tax policy destabilizing, the increased precautionary saving motive is not welfare enhancing as the asset accumulated is government debt rather than capital. These results are generally robust. Nominal inertia may, however, dominate the precautionary saving mechanism.     

Index-linked bonds from an academic,market and policy-making standpoint

The view put forward in this paper is that the index-linking of long-term public debt today represents a financial instrument thatfostersa low average rate of inflation. In particular, bonds that are fully linked to the prices of a representative basket of goods and services permit a reduction in the inflation risk premium, which weighs significantly on the nominal cost of the public debt and,ex post, gives rise to substantial real costs that distort the mechanisms of allocation and distribution and, ultimately, could lead to the debt becoming unsustainable. After re-examining the reasons for the “orthodox ” aversion to index-linking —notably on the part of the monetary authorities of the more stable countries and especially the Bundesbank —the case is put for the leading industrial countries, and notably Italy, to issue index-linked government bonds. By issuing such bonds, the Treasuries of the various countries would send a strong stabilizing signal to the markets because recourse to the inflation tax in the future would no longer be advantageous, reduce the real cost of government borrowing by eliminating the inflation risk premium that currently has to be paid on issues with fixed nominal interest rates, benefit from the positive correlation between the quality of revenue and expenditure, and obtain valuable information on forward inflation rates and the real interest rates implicit in the prices of the bonds. The long-term real interest rate offered by index-linked bonds would act as a sort of “lighthouse ” set up by the monetary authorities to illuminate the path of economic growth and enable operators and markets to co-ordinate their actions more effectively.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION,DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY,AND THE SOCIAL COST OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE*

An interest income tax and a publicly provided private good are introduced into the Hamada overlapping-generations model consisting of heterogeneous individuals where the government can use a wage-income tax, an identical lump-sum transfer, and the public debt. Two interesting problems are studied: (a) what relation exists between the optimal interest rate and the population-growth rate and (b) how dynamic efficiency affects the optimal-decision rules of taxes and the publicly provided good. We show that (i) if the government can (not) tax the interest income, then the optimal interest rate is (not) equal to the population-growth rate, (ii) without the availability of the interest tax the difference between these two rates is mainly caused by the income-distribution effect of the public debt and (iii) the dynamic efficiency effects on the optimal rules of the wage tax and the publicly provided good depend on not only such a difference but also the average substitute-complement relations among leisure, the second-period consumption and the publicly provided good.     

MONETARY POLICY,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,AND REDISTRIBUTION

This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increased debt limits under lower inflation rates. This novel effect can dominate conventional debt deflation effects. We find that particularly less indebted borrowers as well as potential future borrowers gain and that aggregate welfare can be enhanced under a permanent reduction in inflation.     

A Synthesis of Contour and Flexible Wage Hypotheses

Economic instability has risen in emerging economies after capital account liberalization. A more progressive income tax policy could offer a stabilizing alternative. It could result in more revenue, more countercyclical policy, and more income equality and thus more stable demand growth. We test the effects of progressive taxes on stability using univariate and multivariate analyses based on panel data for emerging economies from 1982 to 2002 and compare those to the effects of a value added tax (VAT). We also consider possible constraints on tax policy design, such as government spending, international tax competition, and openness. Progressive taxes are associated with greater income equality and a higher likelihood of countercyclical fiscal policies. The potential benefits from progressive income taxation, though, are lower with VAT. Tax policy is also constrained by government expenditures and openness, but not by lower corporate taxes, suggesting that all income tax rates are constrained by openness.     

Monetary policy under a fiscal theory of sovereign default

This paper examines equilibrium determination under different monetary policy regimes when the government might default on its debt. We apply a cash-in-advance model where the government does not have access to non-distortionary taxation and does not account for initial outstanding debt when it sets the income tax rate. Solvency is then not guaranteed and sovereign default can affect the return on public debt. If the central bank sets the interest rate in a conventional way, the equilibrium allocation cannot be determined. If, instead, money supply is controlled, the equilibrium allocation can uniquely be determined.     

Should monetary policy respond to asset price misalignments?

This paper analyses the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices using a structural rational expectations open economy model that allows for the effect of asset prices and exchange rates on aggregate demand. We assume that asset prices and exchange rates follow a partial adjustment mechanism whereas they are positively affected by past changes, thus allowing for ‘momentum trading’, while at the same time we allow for reversion towards fundamentals. We then conduct stochastic simulations using two alternative monetary policy rules, inflation-forecast targeting and the standard Taylor rule. The results indicate that, under both rules, interest rate setting that takes into account asset price misalignments leads to lower overall macroeconomic volatility, as measured by the postulated loss function of the central bank.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

“CONVENTIONAL” MONETARY POLICY IN OLG MODELS: REVISITING THE ASSET-SUBSTITUTION CHANNEL

Conventional monetary policy involves actions by the monetary and fiscal authorities: the former sets a nominal interest rate and the latter sets lump-sum taxes to finance the implied flow of interest payments on government debt. We model such policy within an overlapping generations framework and show that absent any other frictions the magnitude of the nominal interest rate gives rise to asset substitution between government debt and either private debt or capital—substitution that has both real and nominal effects. Such substitution is not in standard New Keynesian models because their dynastic specification implies that government debt is not net wealth.     

What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?

The objective of this paper is to reflect on some of the implications that recent economic experience has for monetary and financial stability policies. We contend that the financial crisis and the upsurge in inflation 2007–08 have shown that the policy model based on the new consensus in macroeconomics, which largely held sway over the past decade or more, is broken. It is argued that inflation targeting cannot deliver low inflation. We argue that fine-tuning through interest rates should not be attempted, but rather a constant real interest rate target based on the output growth rate should be adopted. The key objective of monetary policy should be shifted to financial stability, the independence of central banks should be brought to an end, and their decision making should be coordinated with other macroeconomic policy initiatives.