我国利率市场化改革的原因、时机、方式、切入点和步骤

(一)为何要推进利率市场化改革。1.利率市场化改革的原因。改革开放二十多年来,我国在价格领域,尤其是商品价格领域的改革取得了巨大成就,但在要素价格领域,约束依然存在,比如作为重要要素价格的资金价格--利率仍然受到管制。利率在我国宏观调控中的作用已经得到广泛认可。但是,它的灵敏     

关于利率市场化的思考

利率根据国内和国外资金市场供求关系,由市场的主要参与者决定利率水平,它反映的是资金真实价格,这就是利率市场化。为适应加入世界贸易组织的需要,中国人民银行加快了利率市场化改革的步伐。中国人民银行宣布,从2000年9月21日开始改革我国外币存贷款利率管理体制,即放开外币存款利率;大额外币存款利率由金融机构和客户协商研究;小额外币存款利率由银行业协会统一制定,各金融机构统一执行。这是我国银行业在利率市场化改革方面迈出的实质性一步,而且可以相信,利率市场化改革的深度和广度还将进一步扩大。尽管中央银行在利率市场化方面进行一…     

商业银行应对利率市场化改革的几点思考

利率是借贷资金的价格,是调节金融资源配置的重要手段,是政府宏观调控的重要工具。利率市场化主要是指利率形成机制的市场化,即借贷资金价格由市场主体自主决定。从制度范畴来说,利率市场化应包含以下几个方面的内容:一是利率生成机制和利率水平由市场主体决定。资金供需双方根据市场利率情况和各自特点决定利率水平,利率水平能充分反映市场资金供求状况。二是与利率相关的载体如资金借贷对象、规     

利率市场化成功的条件及对中国的启示

资金是重要的生产要素,利率是资金的价格,利率市场化是生产要素价格市场化的重要方面,也是中国金融改革的重要内容。文章通过分析世界各国在推进利率市场化进程中遇到的各种问题以及出台的相关措施,提出对我国利率市场化进程的主要启示:我国采取"渐进式"利率市场化改革是内外部环境的"必然"要求以及我国采取"渐进式"利率市场化改革需要重点考虑的几个方面的问题。     

浅析利率市场化改革对我国经济的影响

在我国,利率作为资金的价格,是市场经济中未攻克的最后一块价格堡垒。随着市场经济进程的加快,利率亦将在市场经济中发挥更大的作用。利率市场化的根本目的就是要建立一个以中央银行基准利率为基础,货币市场利率为中介,主要由市场的资金供求决定的市场利率体系。     

实行利率市场化改革的风险及对策

我国金融体制改革的一个重要目标，就是逐步实现信贷资金商品化，融通资金市场化。随着我国金融市场的逐步放开，作为资金使用权转让价格的利率，也应当有控制地逐步放开。本试从实行利率市场化改革的必要性，我国实行利率市场化存在的风险以及实行利率市场化改革的对象等方面进行了论述。     

浅议利率市场化改革

日前 ,中国人民银行行长戴相龙在国务院新闻办举行的记者招待会上宣布 ,中国将用三年时间完成利率开放的整体计划 ,即实现利率市场化。金融体制改革的目标之一就是要实现利率市场化 ,使资金在市场经济条件下按照价值规律进行运动和调节 ,可见 ,利率市场化改革十分重要。1、利率市场化是商业银行真正实现商业化的客观要求。银行商业化关键是资金商品化 ,而资金商品化又是通过市场化来实现的。扭曲的利率机制使得资金供求价格失真 ,商业银行经营管理机制缺乏基础 ,经营动力不足 ,而且由于实际利率较低 ,银行资金来源不足 ,使银行间展开利率大…     

利率市场化对商业银行的挑战

一、利率市场化的特征 (一)利率由市场资金供求状况决定.利率市场化后,政府取消了利率管制,使利率能够充分地反映资金供求状况,并通过价格机制以达到资金的最佳配置和有效使用.利率的高低主要由资金供求关系确定,当市场上资金供大于求时,利率下跌;当市场上资金求大于供时,利率上涨; (二)利率由中央银行间接调控.在市场利率下,利率由资金供求关系决定,商业银行可以自主决定所有利率水平,中央银行通过间接调控来影响利率.中央银行用基准利率来调控全社会各种利率,从而决定社会基础货币量.     

对盘活信贷资金存量的一个建议

<正>我国目前实行的是严格的利率管理体制。流动资金贷款利率一般只有6个月以下和6个月以上两个档次,这样在企业机制改革尚未完善,资金价格严重扭曲的情况下,企业对银行的依赖性依然很大,到期贷款不还、能欠则欠,严重影响了利率杠杆作用,     

利率市场化在我国应渐进推行

利率市场化是所有以市场为导向的转型国家的最终选择,我国也不例外。利率市场化要达到这样的目标：实现市场机制在信贷资金价格决定上的基础性作用,并由此形成相对独立的,调节社会信用资金供求,引导资金合理流动的利率运行、控制和反馈系统。但利率市场化并不排斥宏观调控。在利率市场化条件下,中央银行的宏观调控主要通过公开市场操作或基准利率(通常为再贴现率)的调整来进行。     

浅析利率市场化进程深化背景下我国商业银行的健康发展

在利率市场化改革不断深入推进的背景下,政策性红利逐渐消退,商业银行利率受市场性因素的影响越来越大,银行如果继续以资产外延性为特征的低效率的扩张将不能适应新的形势,以金融创新及市场研究为特点的内涵型的业务发展将决定未来银行的盈利空间。所以,正确把握利率市场化的内涵和发展现状,综合分析利率市场化对商业银行的综合影响,在此基础上采取措施减少利率市场化对商业银行带来的不利影响,是非常有必要的。     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Monetary policy and bank lending in a low interest rate environment: Diminishing effectiveness?

This paper analyses the effectiveness of monetary policy on bank lending in a low interest rate environment. Based on a sample of 108 large international banks, our empirical analysis suggests that monetary policy is less effective in stimulating bank lending growth when interest rates reach a very low level. This result holds after controlling for business and financial cycle conditions and different bank-specific characteristics such as liquidity, capitalisation, funding costs, bank risk and income diversification. We find that the impact of low rates on the profitability of banks’ traditional intermediation activity helps explain the subdued evolution of lending in the period 2010–14.     

What Monetary Policy after the Crisis?

The objective of this paper is to reflect on some of the implications that recent economic experience has for monetary and financial stability policies. We contend that the financial crisis and the upsurge in inflation 2007–08 have shown that the policy model based on the new consensus in macroeconomics, which largely held sway over the past decade or more, is broken. It is argued that inflation targeting cannot deliver low inflation. We argue that fine-tuning through interest rates should not be attempted, but rather a constant real interest rate target based on the output growth rate should be adopted. The key objective of monetary policy should be shifted to financial stability, the independence of central banks should be brought to an end, and their decision making should be coordinated with other macroeconomic policy initiatives.     

利率市场化视角下的货币政策风险承担渠道问题研究*

利率市场化进程的深入可能会对我国货币政策传导、金融稳定等产生不可忽视的影响。基于此,本文研究了利率市场化对货币政策风险承担渠道的影响。结果表明：（1）我国存在货币政策风险承担渠道,且从利率市场化间接度量的维度来看,在考虑以直接效应来衡量的贷款利率市场化之后,银行的实际风险承担水平上升;但是在考虑以价格约束效应来衡量的存款利率市场化之后,其效果并不明显。（2）从利率市场化直接度量的方法来看,直接引入虚拟变量的研究发现贷款利率市场化会使得货币政策对银行风险承担水平的影响变得明显;进一步从利率市场化综合度量的维度,引入整体的利率市场化指数的方法则发现,随着利率市场化进程的深入,银行的实际风险承担水平会上升。（3）利率市场化对货币政策风险承担渠道的影响在不同类型银行间存在差异。     

The effects of the monetary policy on the U.S. housing boom from 2001 to 2006

This paper presents a DSGE model to test the relative significance of monetary policy and financial market innovations in creating the U.S. housing boom between 2001 and 2006. The model generates a trajectory of house price that mimics the Case–Shiller index well when actual Federal Fund rates are taken as inputs. It fails to do so when the monetary policy follows the Taylor rule even if MBS are introduced. We identify several transmission mechanisms of monetary policy with an emphasis on the financial accelerator. The model predicts that banks’ lending standards will go down with the benchmark interest rate.     

我国利率变动对股票价格影响效应的实证分析

变动利率通常是各国中央银行最常用的货币政策工具,而利用利率调节股票市场价格也是各国央行经常使用的政策方法。利率变动通过对投资者和上市公司的影响而传导到股票价格。对中国的实证分析表明我国利率变动与股票价格有一定的影响作用,但由于二者之间的传导机制存在问题,所以这种影响的具体效应是不确定的。     

我国商业银行利率风险及其管理研究

我国商业银行将面临越来越大的利率风险,从目前国内商业银行所处的金融环境出发,我国商业银行应从利率风险管理的流程、利率预测,利率风险度量技术和利率风险控制工具等方面控制利率风险.     

Asset-based Reserve Requirements: Some Reservations

Abstract

Thomas Palley's (2004) paper ‘Asset-based reserve requirements: reasserting domestic monetary control in an era of financial innovation and instability’ has radical implications for monetary policy and the operations of central banks in the money markets. This comment argues that Palley's proposal may be impractical today because it overlooks banks' holding of excessive reserves (or claims on such reserves), and because reserves allocated for particular kinds of business cannot be isolated in bank balance sheets or markets. In particular, once differential reserves are imposed on particular kinds of business, banks may respond to changes in reserve requirements by varying their assets in less predictable ways than the scheme suggests. A central bank's willingness to use differential reserve requirements will be inhibited by the current policy doctrine that emphasises control of a stable money market rate of interest. In any case, it is doubtful if interest rates or reserve requirements could have the specific targeted effects that Palley's model suggests.     

Inflation targeting and financial stability in emerging markets

This paper aims at investigating whether emerging market inflation targeters are more financially vulnerable than their non-targeting counterparts. It further assesses the extent to which targeting central banks are less responsive to financial imbalances, compared to those implementing alternative policy strategies. Based on a sample of 26 emerging countries, including 13 targeters, the analysis suggests that monetary policy in targeting countries is relatively more sensitive to financial risks. However, despite stronger central banks’ responses to financial imbalances, the financial sector appears to be more fragile for targeters. Our conclusion therefore challenges the view that central banks, through their policy interest rates, can guarantee the stability of the financial system. It rather suggests that the control of inflation should remain the primary monetary policy objective, while a (macro)prudential authority would be in charge of the financial stability objective.