On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms

Past studies on laboratory corruption games have not been able to find consistent evidence that subjects make “immoral” decisions. A possible reason, and also a critique of laboratory corruption games, is that the experiment may fail to trigger the intended immorality frame in the minds of the participants, leading many to question the very raison d’être of laboratory corruption games. To test this idea, we compare behavior in a harassment bribery game with a strategically identical but neutrally framed ultimatum game. The results show that fewer people, both as briber and bribee, engage in corruption in the bribery frame than in the alternative and the average bribe amount is lesser in the former than in the latter. These suggest that moral costs are indeed at work. A third treatment, which relabels the bribery game in neutral language, indicates that the observed treatment effect arises not from the neutral language of the ultimatum game but from a change in the sense of entitlement between the bribery and ultimatum game frames. To provide further support that the bribery game does measure moral costs, we elicit the shared perceptions of appropriateness of the actions or social norm, under the two frames. We show that the social norm governing the bribery game frame and ultimatum game frame are indeed different and that the perceived sense of social appropriateness plays a crucial role in determining the actual behavior in the two frames. Furthermore, merely relabelling the bribery game in neutral language makes no difference to the social appropriateness norm governing it. This indicates that, just as in the case of actual behavior, the observed difference in social appropriateness norm between bribery game and ultimatum game comes from the difference in entitlement too. Finally, we comment on the external validity of behavior in lab corruption games.     

New insights into the nonlinearity of Okun's law

We estimate Okun's relationship for four European countries (France, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain) with a nonparametric procedure, without imposing a previous specific functional form. We apply the non parametric MARS methodology that endogenously detects multiple thresholds and therefore is able to identify multiple possible regimes. In addition, we control for the Euro area crisis to capture possible effects of the economic activity of neighbour countries on domestic unemployment rate variations. Our results confirm the existence of two regimes in each country but significantly different thresholds across countries. The form of Okun's relationship for Germany, France and the Netherlands are similar and quite different from Spain where it is much steeper. Differences between Okun coefficients below and above the threshold are consistent with the “firm's risk aversion hypothesis”, but different thresholds across countries may be related to the “labour hoarding hypothesis”. The negative value of the threshold in Spain may reflect the “institutional rigidity hypothesis”. Finally, the fact that the Euro area crisis may affect the domestic Okun's law is consistent with decision makers with risk aversion who use information from the economic area they are operating in. These results not only potentially enrich Okun's law estimations but also open the debate over how the different theoretical hypothesis intervene and shape Okun's law for each country.     

ON THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF BARRIERS TO TRADE*

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher–Ohlin trade model into an optimal‐growth framework. The model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity. Furthermore, there is a “selective development trap” to which countries may or may not converge, depending on policy. Income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase. Hence, cross‐country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per capita income observed across countries. The effects are quantified, and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of TFP and long‐run income differentials across countries.     

Fiscal Discipline as a Social Norm: The European Stability Pact

This paper reviews the arguments for and against the “Stability and Growth Pact.” We find the theoretical debate to be inconclusive, as both externality and credibility arguments can be used to yield opposite and plausible conclusions. Empirical evidence in favor of a Pact‐like rule is also scant. We therefore suggest the view that the Stability Pact is a public social norm, that countries obey in order to preserve reputation among the other members of the European Union. Using this extreme—but not implausible—hypothesis, we build a simple model similar in spirit to Akerlof's (1980) seminal work on social norms, and we show that reputation issues may cause the emergence of a stable but inferior equilibrium. Increased heterogenity generally has the effect of further reducing aggregate welfare; we conclude that the problems posed by the Pact/social norm are likely to increase following the enlargement, when a number of countries anxious to prove their “soundness” joined the club.     

新工业革命背景下多元智能组织研究——以GE和海尔为案例

新工业革命背景下组织需要从一元集权制向多元治理转变,本文通过对通用电气公司(GE)和海尔的跨案例研究发现组织从一元集权制向多元治理转变的“四反”演进路径。其中,“反集权”的本质是组织权利分化,组织演进逻辑是从“垂直”到“水平”,以构建赋权赋能为核心的扁平网络化组织。“反边界”的本质是组织边界扩张,组织演进逻辑是从“有形”到“无形”,以构建动态无边界的虚拟组织。“反分工”的本质是组织流程再造,组织演进逻辑是从“分散”到“整合”,以构建人机融合智能型组织。“反范式”的本质是管理范式转变,组织演进逻辑是从“有序”到“无序”,以构建平台为主要特征的后现代管理范式。进一步对“四反”路径进行整合分析,构建了基于“四反”的多元智能组织理论模型,该模型以后现代管理哲学为理论基础,符合新工业革命背景下组织发展的“与时俱进”的时代特征,将引领未来的组织发展方向。     

Is the Efficiency Wage Efficient? The Social Norm and Organizational Corruption

The effectiveness of efficiency wage incentives is often jeopardized by perverse organizational corruption. We model organizational corruption as a phenomenon of social interaction and relate the substantial psychological role characterizing the social norm to the corruption problem. We find that if the status quo bribery rate within the firm is high, social norms can no longer serve as a sufficient sanction against a corrupt supervisor; pandemic organizational corruption tends to generate a critical mass effect—the snowball effect—which intensifies the corruption effect. This intensified effect, due to the snowballing character of social norms, may more than offset the usual incentive effect of wages, resulting in more widespread shirking in the firm.
JEL classification : D 82; J 41     

Economic growth,corruption and tax evasion

In this paper, we explore tax revenues in a regime of widespread corruption in a growth model. We develop a Ramsey model of economic growth with a rival but non-excludable public good which is financed by taxes which can be evaded via corrupt tax inspectors. We prove that the relationship between the tax rate and tax collection, in a dynamic framework, is not unique, but is different depending on the relevance of the “shame effect”. We show that in all three cases — “low, middle and high shame” countries, the growth rate increases as the tax rate increases up to a threshold value, after which the growth rate begins to decrease as the tax rate increases. But, for intermediate tax rates, the rate of growth for “low shame” countries is lower than that of “uniform shame” countries which is, in turn, lower than that of “high shame” countries. This happens because the growth rate is more sensitive to variations of t in an honest country rather than in a corrupt country.     

Work values,endogenous sentiments redistribution

We examine the interactions between individual behavior, sentiments and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution. Agents have moral “work values”. Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined simultaneously. The equilibria feature different degrees of “social cohesion” and redistribution depending on pre-tax income inequality. In clustered equilibria the poor are held partly responsible for their low income since they work less than the moral standard and hence redistribution is low. The paper proposes a novel explanation for the emergence of different sentiments and social contracts across countries. The predictions appear broadly in line with well-documented differences between the United States and Europe.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption–Inflation: Evidence From Panel Vector Autoregression

This paper aims to explain the mixed causality nexus between corruption and inflation. For that, we apply a panel vector autoregression model on a large sample of 180 countries over the period 1996–2014. Using two corruption indexes and subsample estimations, results provide evidence that the inflation–corruption nexus is bidirectional. The causal effect is more important from corruption to inflation. Interactions remain significant but heterogeneous across subsamples with different income levels. The corruption effect is persistent only in low–middle income economies and its adverse effect on inflation is weaker in high‐income economies. The two‐way relationship between inflation and corruption reflects the inability to control inflation and the situation of the poverty trap in some countries.     

EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?

We model EU countries' bank ratings using financial variables and allowing for intercept and slope heterogeneity. Our aim is to assess whether “old” and “new” EU countries are rated differently and to determine whether “new” ones are assigned lower ratings, ceteris paribus, than “old” ones. We find that country‐specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) are a crucial determinant of ratings. Whilst “new” EU countries typically have lower ratings than “old” ones, after controlling for financial variables we also discover that all countries have significantly different intercepts, confirming our prior belief. This intercept heterogeneity suggests that each country's rating is assigned uniquely, after controlling for differences in financial factors, which may reflect differences in country risk and the legal and regulatory framework that banks face (such as foreclosure laws). In addition, we find that ratings may respond differently to the liquidity and operating expenses to operating income variables across countries. Typically ratings are more responsive to the former and less sensitive to the latter for “new” EU countries compared with “old” EU countries.     

What Do Corruption Indices Measure?

Evidence from the International Crime Victimization Survey and the World Business Environment Survey suggests that actual corruption experience is a weak predictor of reported corruption perception, and that some of the factors commonly found to “reduce” corruption, such as economic development, democratic institutions or Protestant traditions, systematically bias corruption perception indices downward from corruption experience. In addition, perception indices are influenced by absolute (as opposed to relative) levels of corruption, which tends to penalize large countries, and they exhibit diminishing sensitivity to both absolute and relative corruption, indicating that they may better capture differences among countries with low levels of corruption than among highly corrupt ones. Individual characteristics such as education, age, or employment status, and firm‐level characteristics such as the number of competitors are also found to influence corruption perceptions holding experience constant.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Fiscal forecast errors: Governments versus independent agencies?

We present evidence pointing to the fact that international agencies' fiscal forecasts were affected to some extent by the same type of problems that the literature widely acknowledges for governmental ones. Informational shortages may lead independent agencies' staff to internalize “political biases” in governmental forecasts when trying to grasp genuine “private information”. Our study is based on a real-time database of EC, OECD and national governments' public deficit forecasts for 15 European countries over the period 1999–2007 and four vintages of projections per forecasted year. Against this background, independent national fiscal institutions might be a natural option, to the extent that they may have better access to inside national information than international organizations. Our results also provide some support to policy positions that claim a closer monitoring of official budgetary projections, in particular as regards transparency requisites, accountability and the threat of sanctions.     

Exploring differences in corruption: the role of neighboring countries

The aim of this paper is to study whether corruption spreads across neighboring countries. Spatial econometric techniques are used to analyze corruption interactions, testing whether the perception of corruption in neighboring countries affect a country’s own corruption once other variables are controlled for. For a given country it is found that corruption varies neither with the behavior of its neighbors (there is no endogenous interaction) nor with their exogenous characteristics (there is no contextual interaction). Corruption is therefore not contagious, but neighboring countries tend to show similar levels of corruption because they face similar characteristics and similar institutional environments.     

Sustainability,Optimality, and Development Policy

Considering sustainability a matter of intergenerational welfare equity, this paper examines whether an optimal development path can also be sustainable. It argues that the general “zero‐net‐aggregate‐investment” condition for an optimal development path to be sustainable in the sense of the maximin criterion of intergenerational justice is too demanding to be practical, especially in the context of developing countries. It further argues that while the maximin criterion of sustainability may be appealing to the rich advanced industrial countries, for the poor developing countries it implies equalization of poverty across generations, and as such is too costly a moral obligation to be acceptable. The paper suggests that a compromise development policy that follows the optimal growth approach but adopts certain measures to mitigate both the intergenerational and intragenerational welfare inequalities may be more appropriate for these countries. Some of the principal elements of such a policy are highlighted.     

Future organizations: A model of structural response to organizational environment

Recent literature, devoted to organizations and their management, is virtually replete with references to the structure of future organizations. Most articles on the subject are little more than speculation and lack the foundation of a conceptual model. This article is an attempt to provide a model for forecasting future organizational structure. Basic dimensions of organizational environment and structure were identified to develop a model of environmental-structural relationships. By changing assumptions regarding environmental dimensions, various structural responses (organizational forms) may be forecast using the model. When the future is regarded as simply another possible environment, future structure may be forecast by using the model. The model reveals a wide variety of possible organizational forms as environmental dimensions are changed. A poll of experts was used to “test” the model. Questionnaire responses from members of the Academy of Management, the World Future Society, and top corporate executives resulted in a projected future organizational structure which is congruent with that predicted from the model.     

Labor immobility and the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in a monetary union

It is believed that a common monetary policy in a monetary union will have identical effects on different countries as long as these countries have identical fundamentals. We show that, when there is specialization in production, the terms of trade react to the shock. The transmission mechanism of a monetary shock has in this case an additional channel, the terms of trade. This is the case even if state contingent assets can be traded across countries. For a reasonable parametrization, the differential on the transmission across countries is quantitatively significant when compared with the effect on the union's aggregates. Monetary shocks create cycles with higher volatility in “poor” countries than in “richer” ones.     

Urbanization with and without industrialization

We document a strong positive relationship between natural resource exports and urbanization in a sample of 116 developing nations over the period 1960–2010. In countries that are heavily dependent on resource exports, urbanization appears to be concentrated in “consumption cities” where the economies consist primarily of non-tradable services. These contrast with “production cities” that are more dependent on manufacturing in countries that have industrialized. Consumption cities in resource exporters also appear to perform worse along several measures of welfare. We offer a simple model of structural change that can explain the observed patterns of urbanization and the associated differences in city types. We note that although the development literature often assumes that urbanization is synonymous with industrialization, patterns differ markedly across developing countries. We discuss several possible implications for policy.     

Unfair inequality,governance and individual beliefs

Unfair inequality arises when incentives are not fairly tied to effort or investment across the socio-economic spectrum. The actual limitations on economic activity from this failure may depend on whether people believe the system is unfair, and how well governing institutions safeguard fair-play. In this paper, I study whether unfair wealth inequality is correlated with beliefs about fairness, and whether good governance can be a substitute in belief formations for decreases in unfair inequality. I find a that people in countries with recent increases in unfair wealth inequality are less likely to believe that inequality is due to fair processes. This relationship holds when“fair” determinants of inequality include effort, as well as moral and meritocratic components. The relationship is strongest in countries with poor quality governance. In countries with high quality governance, people appear to be more tolerant of unfair inequality, as it is only weakly reflected in their beliefs about process fairness.     

Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption?: Cross-country quantile regression estimates

We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.