A theory of search with deadlines and uncertain recall

We ask how the ability to recall past prices affects the dynamics of search and price formation. In the model, buyers have limited time to purchase a good and face uncertainty regarding the availability of past price quotes in the future. Sellers cannot observe a potential buyer’s remaining time until deadline nor her quote history, and hence post prices that weigh the probability of sale versus the profit once sold. We find that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, reducing the consumer’s recall ability may actually improve his expected utility because it lowers the average expected price in the market and reduces the duration of search.     

Pre‐sale information and hammer prices for Australian Indigenous art

Using sales data from 1987–2011 we investigate the role that pre‐sale price information plays in determining hammer prices for Australian Indigenous artworks. Importantly, we control for the degree of market concentration as this might influence buyers’ perceptions of fairness in relation to price estimates which are provided by auction houses. Auction houses therefore act as important intermediaries between art sellers and art buyers. The results suggest that pre‐sale estimates and market concentration have a differential impact on hammer prices, depending on the point in the conditional realised price distribution under examination.     

Overconfidence in the Markets for Lemons

We extend Akerlof's “Market for Lemons” (1970, Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, 488–500) by assuming that some buyers are overconfident. Buyers in our model receive a noisy signal about the quality of the good that is on display for sale. Overconfident buyers do not update according to Bayes' rule but take the noisy signal at face value. We show that the presence of overconfident buyers can stabilize the market outcome by preventing total adverse selection. However, this stabilization comes at a cost: rational buyers are crowded out of the market.     

DIRECTED SEARCH,COORDINATION FAILURE,AND SELLER PROFITS: AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF POSTED PRICING WITH SINGLE AND MULTIPLE PRICES

We experimentally examine posted pricing and directed search. In one treatment, capacity‐constrained sellers post fixed prices, which buyers observe before choosing whom to visit. In the other, firms post both “single‐buyer” (applied when one buyer visits) and “multibuyer” (when multiple buyers visit) prices. We find, based on a 2 × 2 (two buyers and two sellers) market and a follow‐up experiment with 3 and 2 × 3 markets, that multibuyer prices can be lower than single‐buyer prices or prices in the one‐price treatment. Also, allowing the multibuyer price does not affect seller profits and increases market frictions.     

The roles of relative prices,interest rates,and bequests in the consumption function

This paper investigates the roles of relative prices, interest rates, inflation expectations and bequests in the determination of consumer expenditures for four goods in the U.S. The framework employed is a life-cycle extension of the Linear Expenditure System, in which relative prices, wealth, labor income, the nominal interest rate, and anticipated rates of inflation for each good are major arguments. The results provide strong empirical support for the expenditure system employed and suggest a significant role for relative prices and for the bequest motive in shaping saving decisions. We also find that expenditure decisions respond to both interest rates and anticipated inflation in a “Fisherian” fashion, but that the interest elasticity of saving is quite low and of uncertain sign. Our model also provides an estimate of the consumer's “horizon,” defined in the sense of Friedman.     

DO “CAPITALIZATION EFFECTS” FOR PUBLIC GOODS REVEAL THE PUBLIC'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY?

This article develops a welfare theoretic framework for interpreting evidence on the impacts of public programs on housing markets. We extend Rosen's hedonic model to explain how housing prices capitalize exogenous shocks to public goods and externalities. The model predicts that trading between heterogeneous buyers and sellers will drive a wedge between these “capitalization effects” and welfare changes. We test this hypothesis in the context of changes in measures of school quality in five metropolitan areas. Results from boundary discontinuity designs suggest that capitalization effects understate parents’ willingness to pay for public school improvements by as much as 75%.     

Ready to run: price determinants of thoroughbreds from 2 year olds in training sales

This article utilizes data from the complete set of U.S. thoroughbred 2-year-old in-training sales held in 2013 and estimates the determinants of prices for 1806 two-year-old thoroughbreds. The results reveal that the time in which these prospective racehorses run a standardized distance is the most statistically significant determinant of market price. Other individual horse characteristics, pedigree quality variables and sale quality are also found to be price determinants. An additional result of interest is the significant premium buyers are willing to pay for horses by sires of unknown quality.     

Price Adjustment to Exchange Rates and Forward‐looking Exporters: Evidence from USA–China Trade

This paper shows that the pricing behavior of exporting firms exhibits a “forward‐looking” nature with sticky prices. As a result, the expectations of future exchange rates affect current prices at both the product level and firm level. We find evidence by employing both highly disaggregated Harmonized System (HS) 10‐digit product‐level import data of the USA and firm–product level customs data on China's exports to the USA. These findings provide evidence for a previously unexplored micro‐level forward‐looking nature of trade price adjustment as response to future exchange rates, and suggest a potentially important factor in helping explain incomplete exchange rate pass‐through.     

Money in the pure consumption loan model

The purpose of this paper is to show how modern techniques of Temporary competitive equilibrium analysis can be applied to models of the “pure consumption loan model” type. One considers Samuelson's simplest model where traders live two periods and where money is the only store of value. It is proved that a temporary equilibrium exists if price expectations are sufficiently independent of current prices. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to exist if there is a set of traders (i) whose total resources are greater when they are young than when they are old, (ii) who are indifferent between present and future consumption. It is proved that this existence theorem still holds if the economy is sufficiently “close” to an economy which has this property. A stationary market equilibrium is shown to be Pareto optimal if all traders hold positive cash balances. It may be inefficient if this condition is not satisfied, for some traders may then be willing to borrow, which they cannot do in this model.     

Multi-player bargaining with endogenous capacity

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models of equilibrium search with multilateral matching, and offers a rationale for the adoption of single-unit auctions with fixed reservation price.     

Price effects of independent transmission system operators in the United States electricity market

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to “remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” through a series of market rules. A product of these rules was the establishment of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) charged with facilitating equal access to the transmission grid for electricity suppliers. Whether these changes in market structure have succeeded in achieving FERC’s goal to provide “lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” remains an open question. This paper utilizes a panel data set of the 48 contiguous United States and a treatment effects model in first differences to determine whether there have been changes in delivered electric prices as a result of the establishment of ISOs and RTOs. To avoid the confounding effects of electric restructuring, the model is estimated with the full panel data set, and then again without the states that have restructured their electric markets. This estimation shows that electricity prices fall approximately 4.8 % in the first 2 years of an ISO’s operation and that this result is statistically significant. However, this result is dependent on the presence of states that restructured their electricity markets. When these restructured states are removed from the data set the price effects of RTOs become indistinguishable from zero. The paper concludes that rate agreements are the principal source of the observed decrease in prices and that RTOs have not had the desired effect on electricity prices.     

Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game

In this paper, we model private art market agents’ strategic interactions in presence of two types of asymmetric information, about artwork quality and buyer’s knowledge, assuming the seller does not know how informed is the buyer while the buyer does not know the quality of the artwork before purchase. If the seller can choose either a high or a low price and the buyer can signal his type to the seller, we identify the conditions for both equilibria with pooling buyer signalling strategy and with separating strategy, as well as conditions for equilibria where the seller fixes the price according to the actual quality and where he posts prices trying to take advantage of buyer’s limited information. Finally, we identify the condition for the emergence of a “counter-lemon” result, where low-quality artworks and uninformed collectors exit the market, suggesting that seller uncertainty does not directly benefit the buyers, but it can impact the quality traded in the market.     

Hangovers

This paper analyzes a process by which a market boom brought on by a temporary increase in the flow of buyers, can subsequently lead to a collapse of liquidity (speed of sale), prices and production to levels lower than before the onset of the boom. I consider a general model of markets subject to search frictions in the matching of buyers and sellers, where the entry of buyers and sellers (through production) are subject to adjustment costs. The resulting co-movement between unemployment, inventories and sales with the production cycle matches the stylized facts.     

The impact of speculation on house prices in the United Kingdom

When house prices are expected to rise, the representative house mover has an incentive to secure his purchase price (i.e. exchange contracts) on the ‘new’ house before exchanging contracts on the sale price on his ‘old’ house. If all house-movers adopt this stance, the imbalance between buyers and sellers causes a self-fulfilling speculative price bubble. Transactions costs do not represent a barrier to such speculation in the house market, as such costs can be considered as being sunk costs for first-time buyers and owner-occupiers intending to move for non-speculative reasons. This idea is formalised and empirical evidence is presented which suggests that speculation is a significant determinant of house prices in the United Kingdom.     

Does price dispersion increase with quality? Evidence from the online diamond market

This article empirically investigates the relationship between price dispersion and price level. Searches seem more valuable for products of high quality, but buyers may have little incentive to search since such products are less frequently purchased. The extent of price dispersion is examined using a sample of around 160 000 diamonds offered for sale online. Estimates from a two-stage econometric strategy show that price dispersion increases significantly with quality. An explanation is that buyers of high-quality gemstones pay little attention to the price of these diamonds and even more so if they perceive high prices as signals of quality and rarity of the diamonds they intend to purchase.     

Beauty contest,bounded rationality,and sentiment pricing dynamics

We present a dynamic asset pricing model that incorporates investor sentiment, bounded rationality and higher-order expectations to study how these factors affect asset pricing equilibrium. In the model, we utilize a two-period trading market and investors make decisions based on the heterogeneous expectations principle and the “sparsity-based bounded rational” sentiment. We find that bounded rationality results in mispricing and reduces it in next period. Investor sentiment produces more significant effects than private signals, optimistic investor sentiment increases hedging demand, thus causing prices to soar. Higher-order investors are more rational and attentive to the strategies of other participants rather than private signals. This model also derives the dampening effect of higher-order expectations to price volatility and the heterogeneity expectation depicts inconsistent investor behavior in financial markets. In the model, investors' expectations about future price is distorted by their sentiment and bounded rationality, so they obtain a biased mean from the signal extraction.     

Internet auctions with many traders

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer has private value for the good and wishes to acquire a single unit. Buyers can bid as often as they like and move between auctions. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for this decentralized dynamic mechanism in which, conditional on reserve prices, an efficient set of trades occurs at a uniform price. In a large but finite market, the sellers set reserve prices equal to their true costs under a very mild distributional assumption, so ex post efficiency is achieved. Buyers’ strategies in this equilibrium are simple and do not depend on their beliefs about other buyers’ valuations, or the number of buyers and sellers.     

Toward Reasonable Capitalism: The Role of John R. Commons’s Price and Business Cycle Theories

Abstract

John R. Commons thought that prices should be stable and that the law of supply and demand should be controlled by the power of the state through patent law and by protecting bargaining equality. Commons also thought that prices should be stabilized by macro monetary policy. These means would allow the realization of a “reasonable price.” Commons called the objective and measurable value in money, which is determined by a court ruling, “reasonable value.” Analysis of Commons’s price and business cycle theories point toward the realization of both “reasonable price” and “reasonable value” and toward “reasonable capitalism” that can replace banker capitalism.     

THE HIDDEN COST OF BARGAINING: EVIDENCE FROM A CHEATING-PRONE MARKETPLACE

It is widely believed that successful bargaining helps consumers increase their surplus. We present evidence from a field experiment showing that bargaining over price reduces buyer surplus in a marketplace where sellers cheat on the weight whose value may more than offset the price discount. Our results show that bargaining entails hidden costs since sellers cheat significantly more when buyers bargain than not and they cheat significantly more when bargaining succeeds than fails. Overall bargaining reduces buyer surplus than not bargaining. Our result is relevant for credence goods markets where bargaining over prices may induce sellers to “undertreat” more.     

A structural model of competing sellers: Auctions and posted prices

In an original data set of goods listed for sale online, I observe that both auctions and posted prices are popular with buyers and sellers in the compact-disc market. To explain why these two mechanisms coexist, I estimate a structural model of competing sellers who differ in the value of their outside options. Buyers are allowed to value auctioned and posted-price goods differently but the estimated value distributions suggest that differences across buyers do not explain the mechanism coexistence that I observe. In contrast, differences across sellers' outside options are important: the value of the outside option segments the market with high outside-option sellers choosing to post a fixed price. There are two key forces at work that drive this empirical result. First, competition between sellers favors coexistence over an auction-only or a posted-price-only marketplace because sellers prefer to be in a market with fewer rivals. Second, sellers with more valuable outside options prefer the posted-price mechanism because posted-price goods sell less often than auctioned goods but at a higher price. As a result, a larger outside option reduces the loss from not selling and favors the posted-price mechanism.