Monetary policy regime change and regional inflation dynamics: looking through the lens of sector‐level data for Korea

This paper explores the impact of the adoption of inflation targeting (IT) on the dynamics of city‐level inflation in Korea using both aggregate and sector‐level data. When looking at aggregate regional inflation, we find that the mean, volatility and persistence fell in all cities in the wake of the monetary policy regime change, consistent with other evidence in the literature. Delving more deeply into the disaggregate data reveals additional insights however. For most of the changes we observe in the dynamics of regional inflation, we find that the aggregate effects are being driven primarily by sectors that fall into the ‘Services’ category. We posit that the impact of better anchored inflationary expectations is primarily on the less‐traded services sectors of the economy, where the domestic monetary policy framework has a relatively larger influence. When it comes to the increased co‐movement observed across regions under an IT regime, however, it is the ‘Commodities’ sectors rather than ‘Services’ that are responsible, probably because services inflation becomes relatively more influenced by local factors once it has stabilized within the target range. Therefore, adoption of IT may not necessarily increase all measures of regional synchronization even when the goal of better‐anchored inflationary expectations is achieved.     

Nonlinearity in monetary policy: A reconsideration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation

The proponents of the ‘opportunistic’ approach to disinflation suggest that, when inflation is close to the target, the central bank should not counteract inflationary pressures. Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) formalize this idea through a simple policy rule that prescribes a nonlinear adjustment to a history-dependent target for inflation. This embodies a regime change in monetary policy, which reacts to inflation only when this is far from the inflation target. Here we study the opportunistic approach in a New-Keynesian model with sizeable nominal and real rigidites in the form of a positive money demand and adjustment costs for investment. We find that the welfare gains delivered by the opportunistic rule arise from the time-varying inflation target, when welfare is measured by a quadratic approximation of household utility. The nonlinear zone of inaction on inflation improves welfare outcomes only when a central bank loss function with the absolute value of the output gap is used, as proposed by Orphanides and Wilcox (2002).     

Firms’ money demand and monetary policy

Standard New Keynesian models for monetary policy analysis are ‘cashless’. When the nominal interest rate is the central bank's operating instrument, the LM equation is endogenous and, it is argued, can be ignored. The modern theoretical and quantitative debate on the importance of money for monetary policy conduct, however, overlooks firms’ money demand. Working in an otherwise canonical New Keynesian setup, we show that macroeconomic dynamics are critically affected by the firms’ money demand choice. Under the conventional Taylor‐rule framework, we prove that equilibrium determinacy may require either an active interest rate policy, overreacting to inflation, or a passive interest rate policy, underreacting to inflation, depending on the elasticity of production with respect to cash balances. We then develop a numerical analysis to evaluate our theoretical results. We find that macroeconomic stability is more likely to occur under an active, but not overly aggressive, monetary policy stance. We also examine the dynamic effects of forward‐looking feedback rules. We show that, in this policy regime, indeterminacy is likely to be induced by both active and passive rules, even for relatively low productivity effects of money.     

An overhaul of Federal Reserve doctrine: Nominal income and the Great Moderation

The Great Moderation is often characterized by the decline in the variability of output and inflation from earlier periods. While a multitude of explanations for the Great Moderation exist, notable research has focused on the role of monetary policy. Specifically, early evidence suggested that this increased stability is the result of monetary policy that responded much more strongly to realized inflation. Recent evidence casts doubt on this change in monetary policy. An alternative hypothesis is that the change in monetary policy was the result of a change in doctrine; specifically the rejection of the view that inflation was largely a cost-push phenomenon. As a result, this alternative hypothesis suggests that the change in monetary policy beginning in 1979 is reflected in the Federal Reserve’s response to expectations of nominal income growth rather than realized inflation as previously argued. I provide evidence for this hypothesis by estimating the parameters of a monetary policy rule in which policy adjusts to forecasts of nominal GDP for the pre- and post-Volcker eras. Finally, I embed the rule in two dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with gradual price adjustment to determine whether the overhaul of doctrine can explain the reduction in the volatility of inflation and the output gap.     

Financial market imperfections and monetary policy strategy

In a model with imperfect money, credit and reserve markets, we examine if an inflation-targeting central bank applying the funds rate operating procedure to indirectly control market interest rates also needs a monetary aggregate as policy instrument. We show that if private agents use information extracted from money and financial markets to form inflation expectations and if interest rate pass-through is incomplete, the central bank can use a narrow monetary aggregate and the discount interest rate as independent and complementary policy instruments to reinforce the credibility of its announcements and the role of inflation target as a nominal anchor for inflation expectations. This study shows how a monetary policy strategy combining inflation targeting and monetary targeting can be conceived to guarantee macroeconomic stability and the credibility of monetary policy. Friedman's k-percent money growth rule, which can generate dynamic instability, and two alternative stabilizing feedback monetary targeting rules are examined.     

On the welfare implications of nominal GDP targeting

This paper examines the welfare implications of a nominal GDP growth targeting rule, a nominal GDP level targeting rule, and inflation targeting regime in a New Keynesian model featuring positive trend inflation, two measures of welfare, and both high and low growth environments. The paper finds that (i) in general, nominal GDP growth targeting dominates other rules with changes in all dimensions; (ii) nominal GDP growth targeting framework is superior to the level targeting regime for most scenarios; (iii) inflation targeting is preferred to nominal GDP level targeting regime, but to minimize short-run fluctuations, the latter is advantageous; (iv) nominal GDP level targeting may be desirable only in a low growth environment with both low inflation indexation and consumption equivalence criteria. The simulation results provide solid evidence to policy makers on the desirability of nominal GDP growth targeting.     

Public debt indexation and denomination with an independent central bank

This paper examines the interaction between public debt management and the design of monetary institutions. The analysis shows that delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more effective in containing inflationary expectations than the use of foreign currency or inflation-indexed debt. If delegation of monetary policy is viable, the optimal policy is to issue nominal debt. This increases the sensitivity of taxes and output to unexpected inflation, thus minimizing the inflation needed to offset supply shocks. Evidence on central bank independence, debt composition and output variability suggests that the normative argument has some positive content.     

Monetary Policy Coordination and the Level of National Debt

This paper uses the Canzoneri-Henderson benchmark framework of monetary policy coordination in interdependent economies to analyze how high levels of national debt affect monetary policy interactions. Using a two-country model, I first study how central banks interact in a flexible exchange-rate regime. I find that a low-debt country is better off interacting with a country with high debt, when both economies are affected by an aggregate inflationary shock. I also consider a political dependence scenario, in which central banks are subject to political pressure. In the case of a debt-burdened country, the political incentive to reduce interest payments on debt will spur a Gordon–Barro like inflation bias. However, under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the low-debt country will not be affected. Under a monetary union instead, political pressure may affect the low-debt country as well, and possibly create an inflation bias even greaterthan in the flexible exchange-rate regime. This scenario presents another example of how Rogoff's counterproductive monetary cooperation may arise under European Monetary Union.     

Revisiting the case for a populist central banker

It is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an inflationary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. In a recent issue of this Review, Guzzo and Velasco argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation (a ‘populist’ central banker). A conceptual flaw of the latter result is identified here. It is shown that when wages are negotiated in nominal terms the result is true only in the special case of a single, all-encompassing, union. In the more general case of multiple unions, however, inflation increases linearly with their number and a populist central bank may turn out to decrease welfare.     

Stock Market Responses Under Quantitative Easing: State Dependence and Transparency in Monetary Policy

This paper evaluates the effects of unconventional monetary policies adopted by the Bank of Japan from the year 2001 to 2006. A new measure is proposed to identify a nontraditional monetary policy shock from policy packages under the zero lower bound of short‐term nominal interest rates during the quantitative easing period, using data on intraday 3‐month Euroyen futures rates. We find that stock markets do not react to a policy surprise in an expected manner and negatively respond to a monetary easing surprise. Moreover, we find an asymmetric response during a boom and a recession and a nonlinear reaction because of increasing uncertainty concerning future inflation dynamics and the enhancement of monetary policy transparency. Our result suggests that it is difficult to implement unconventional monetary policy to manage agents’ expectations and a ‘lean against the wind’ policy to prevent asset bubbles, particularly at the zero bound.     

The Bernanke and Blinder Model in an Open Economy: The Italian Case

Abstract. This paper analyzes the functioning of monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Italy from 1984 to 1998, highlighting the role performed by the credit system. We extend the Bernanke and Blinder model (1988) to the case of an open economy under a quasi‐fixed exchange rate regime, deriving analytically the conditions for the functioning of the three monetary policy channels generally identified in the literature (‘money’, ‘exchange rate’ and ‘credit’). These conditions explain the partial effectiveness of monetary policy in achieving price and income targets, while maintaining external equilibrium. By means of a structural VECM analysis, we evaluate the effectiveness of the transmission of monetary policy through the three channels.     

Real and nominal effects of monetary policy shocks

Abstract.  We employ the identification scheme of Kahn, Kandel and Sarig (2002) to analyse the impact of Canadian monetary policy on ex ante real interest rates and inflationary expectations. First, we decompose nominal interest rates into ex ante real rates and inflationary expectations using the methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989) . Then we estimate a recursive VAR model with innovations in a monetary aggregate and the overnight target interest rate as alternative measures of monetary policy shocks. We find that a negative policy shock raises both nominal and ex ante real interest rates, lowers inflationary expectations and real industrial output, and appreciates the Canadian dollar.     

NOMINAL WAGE INDEXATION,QUASI‐EQUILIBRIA AND REAL WAGE DYNAMICS

In contrast to the traditional static approach to indexation, this paper analyses the dynamic consequences for real wages of the mechanism that links nominal wages to inflation. Revisiting a contribution by Dehez and Fitoussi on macroeconomic fluctuations , I analyse a monetary overlapping generations small open economy in which full indexation is interpreted as the occurrence of a dynamic ‘quasi‐equilibrium’. In the suggested framework, the nominal wage is linked to the inflation rate by a specific indexation formula whose shape relies on unions' bargaining positions. Assuming a constant peg for the real interest rate and the superneutrality of money, I show that the economy has a unique long‐run quasi‐equilibrium allocation whose stability depends only on the behaviour of the monetary authority. Moreover, I show how the operating of a ‘wage‐aspiration effect’ might lead to the persistence of involuntary unemployment.     

Inflation and Relative Price Variability in a Low Inflation Country: Empirical Evidence for Germany

Abstract. The recent literature on the welfare cost of inflation emphasizes inflation's effect on the variability of relative prices. Expected and unexpected inflation have both been proposed to increase relative price variability (RPV) and, thereby, to distort the information content of nominal prices. This paper presents new evidence on the impact of inflation on RPV in Germany. Our results indicate that the influence of expected inflation disappears if a credible monetary policy stabilizes inflationary expectations on a low level. Yet the significant impact of unexpected inflation suggests that even low inflation rates can lead to welfare losses by raising RPV above its efficient level.     

Estimated general equilibrium models for the evaluation of monetary policy in the US and Europe

In this paper we derive a general equilibrium model based on optimising behaviour, which also implies a data consistent framework for monetary policy analysis. Specifically, our model accounts for nominal inertia in both price and wage setting as well for habits in consumption. Using US and European data from 1970 to 1998 our parameter estimates reveal that (i) price contracts last for 8 months and 13 months in the US and Euro-area, respectively; (ii) wage contracts have a length of 7 months and 1.75 years in the US and Europe, respectively; (iii) the extent of backward-looking behaviour in price setting is statistically significant in both economies with 41% of price contracts in the US and 28% in the Euro-area set according to a simple rule-of-thumb; (iv) backward-looking wage setting is only present in Europe with 17% of contracts set in a backward-looking manner; and (v) similar habits effects are present in both European and US consumption. Finally, we simulate the effects of monetary policy by considering the impact of a 1 point increase in nominal interest rates for one quarter. Our parameter estimates imply that there is a relatively muted inflationary response to interest rate increases in Europe (price inflation falls by -0.08% in Europe and 0.11% in the US) and there is a correspondingly large output response (-0.2% in the US and -0.6% in Europe).     

Optimal versus realized policy rules in a regime-switching framework

In this paper we compare a deterministic model and a Markov switching model to analyze the behavior of the US economy and the Federal Reserve. We examine both optimal and empirical monetary policies for the US Federal Reserve between 1960 and 2008. We compare the optimal monetary policy to the actual interest rates and to the empirical reaction function. We also evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the preferences assigned to each objective. We find that there is no unique optimal solution that fits the Federal Reserve behavior over the entire period. The best fit to the actual interest rates is obtained by an optimal policy with preference switches following the rule: a high-volatility regime coincides with a priority on inflation alone while in a low-volatility regime there is equal policy priority on output stabilization and inflation.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Price and Wage Rigidities

In this paper, I search for an optimal configuration of parameters for variants of the Taylor rule by using an accurate second‐order welfare‐based method within a fully microfounded dynamic stochastic model, with price and wage rigidities, without capital accumulation. A version of the model with distortionary taxation is also explicitly tested. The model is solved up to second‐order solution. Optimal rules are obtained by maximizing a conditional welfare measure, differently from what has been done in the current literature. Optimal monetary policy functions turn out to be characterized by inflation targeting parameter lower than in empirical studies. In general, the optimal values for monetary policy parameters depend on the degree of nominal rigidities and on the role of fiscal policy. When nominal rigidities are higher, optimal monetary policy becomes more aggressive to inflation. With a tighter fiscal policy, optimal monetary policy turns out to be less aggressive to inflation. Impulse‐response functions based on second‐order model solution show a non‐affine pattern when the economy is hit by shocks of different magnitude .     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy in China

In the past decade Chinese inflation was not high on average, but it was quite volatile. Back in the 1980s and 1990s, high inflation was a very real problem. What explains the inflationary dynamics in China? In particular, does monetary policy account for the substantial run-ups of inflation, followed by the equally substantial dis-inflation? In the absence of commitment technologies, the monetary authorities may create surprise inflation to achieve higher growth, while private agents would anticipate that and adjust their decisions accordingly, leading to accelerated inflation without a real impact. Do these types of simple time-inconsistency models of monetary policy explain the dynamic pattern of inflation in China? I show that the long-run and short-run restrictions imposed by discretionary policy, when the time-inconsistent policymaker has a desire to push output above potential, are largely rejected by the data. The estimates of the inflation bias under discretion when the policymaker is asymmetrically averse to recessions are not statistically significant either. The analysis contributes to the understanding of Chinese monetary policy and its inflationary implications and also points to the need of further investigation of inflationary behavior during the economic transition.     

A small estimated euro area model with rational expectations and nominal rigidities

We estimate a small model of the euro area to be used for evaluating alternative monetary policy strategies. Starting with the relationship between output and inflation we compare the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (J. Political Econom. 88 (1980) 1) and the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (The Manchester School 49 (1981) 211; reprinted in Buiter (Ed.), Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilization Policy, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1989) and estimated with U.S. data by Fuhrer and Moore (Quart. J. Econom. 110 (1995) 127). While Fuhrer and Moore reject nominal contracts in favor of relative contracts, which induce more inflation persistence, we find that both specifications fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that nominal contracts fit German data better, while the relative contracting model does well with respect to formerly high inflation countries such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the implications of nominal versus relative contracts for the inflation-output variability tradeoff when monetary policy follows Taylor's rule.     

Inflation Targeting as a Framework for Monetary Policy: A Cross-Country Analysis

This study makes use of a dynamic Taylor‐type model to examine the conduct of monetary policy by central banks that profess to engage in inflation targeting. Previous research regarding inflation targeting and Taylor‐type rules is reviewed and a dynamic Taylor‐type model is developed. Tests for regime shifts upon the adoption of inflation targeting indicate a significant change in policy in each of the nations in the study for which sufficient data were available. Next, the central bank reaction functions were estimated. Results suggest that most of the central banks conducted a policy of inflation targeting by seeking to contain inflationary pressures rather than reacting to current inflation.