外资进入与内资企业出口：基于价值链角度的经验分析

本文从价值链角度出发，匹配中国工业企业数据库和投入产出表，将水平和垂直(前向和后向)溢出统一纳入分析框架内，实证检验了外资进入对内资企业出口的影响。研究发现：第一，外资进入对同行业内资企业出口没有显著影响，但抑制了上游内资企业出口，促进了下游内资企业出口，在控制内生性问题及一系列稳健性检验后该结论依然稳健。第二，机制分析表明，外资进入对上游内资企业出口的抑制作用主要源于低端锁定效应，表现为缩短了国内价值链长度和使上游内资企业更依赖进口中间品；而对下游内资企业出口的促进作用则主要通过技术溢出效应实现，促进了其创新；外资对同行业内资企业并未表现出竞争效应。第三，异质性分析表明，外资进入对下游内资企业出口的正向溢出效应在非国有企业和东部及中部地区企业中表现更加明显。     

湖南企业跨国并购策略分析

在分析湖南企业跨国并购动机的基础上,提出湖南企业可优先并购国外资源性企业,提出国外目标企业选择的六原则,并举出湖南企业跨国并购的几个实例。     

跨国并购的国内外研究现状与趋势

近年来,世界出现了跨国并购热潮,国外学者已取得了较丰富的相关研究成果。尽管中国企业的跨国并购金额在2009年上半年跃居至全球第二,但国内学者有关跨国并购的理论研究成果与实务界对跨国并购的热情相比有些滞后,对中国企业开展跨国并购实务存在着制约作用。因此,文章对国内外学者有关跨国并购的研究文献进行归纳梳理,并提出未来的研究趋势,以供其他学者开展相关研究时参考。     

企业上游并购多目标灰色关联度决策模型及应用--以石油石化行业为例

本文通过对石油石化行业上游企业发展趋势的分析,总结出企业通过基于核心竞争力的并购与重组来奠定了行业内的竞争优势和领先地位。并购目标的选择是企业并购成功的关键因素之一。本文根据石油石化企业上游自身以及并购目标选择决策系统的特点和灰色系统理论,给出了石油石化企业上游并购目标评价指标体系及选择最优方案的决策模型。     

信息不对称条件下企业跨国并购的动因探析

信息不对称是促使企业跨国并购的重要原因。跨国Cournot垄断竞争模型考虑产出协调和信息分享两方面。非对称信息下并购发生的可能性超过对称信息情形，外国企业总倾向于与一国内企业分享信息，并购的发生取决于需求波动程度及产品异质性程度。     

我国技术出口的现状及发展战略

中国是一个技术引进大国,在国际垂直分工中长期处于下游水平,产品技术密集度低、附加值低.近年来我国技术出口虽然已经有了很大的发展,但是,与发达国家相比还有很大的差距,为此,我国应大力倡导技术创新,不断提高我国企业技术出口水平,逐步走向垂直分工的上游,并且成为技术出口大国.     

企业在全球价值链中的位置及其结构变化

企业在全球价值链中的位置,关系到企业的治理能力和绩效,进而影响一国的经济发展质量乃至国际地位。本文从增加值视角重新阐述了全球价值链位置测度和结构分解方法,并改进了Chor et al.(2014)的企业位置测度方法,进而实证测算分析了中国企业在全球价值链中的位置及其结构变化。研究发现：(1)2000—2014年中国整体上游度和生产复杂度显著提高,产业链向上游延伸。(2)一般贸易企业的综合进出口位置、出口上游度高于加工贸易企业,但进口下游度低于加工贸易企业。一般贸易企业出口产品更多地用于中间投入品,离最终需求的距离相对较远,进口相对上游产品进行生产,而加工贸易一般进口相对下游的产品进行简单组装加工形成最终消费品再出口。(3)东部地区企业的综合进出口位置、出口上游度相对较低,偏向于最终消费品出口,而进口下游度较大,偏向于进口基本成型的中间品,体现了东部地区的加工组装特点。(4)相对于其他所有制类型企业,国有企业各类出口上游度相对较高但进口下游度相对较低,进而导致国有企业的综合进出口位置最高。此外,企业全要素生产、人均工资水平和资本密集度对企业出口上游度具有正向影响,而企业规模的影响为负。     

文化产品出口、文化认同与企业跨国并购

文化贸易是中华文化“走出去”的主要方式,弱化文化壁垒对企业跨国并购的阻碍、促进形成企业跨国并购增速和成效的协同发展格局,对于建设更高水平的开放型经济新体制具有重要意义。本文以文化贸易中的产品出口为基准,通过构建理论模型与跨国并购指标,研究阐释了文化贸易对企业跨国并购存在的多重复杂性影响与作用机制,为衡量文化因素对企业跨国并购的影响提供了新的思路。通过多种稳健性估计,本文发现：文化贸易出口对于企业跨国并购规模、数量以及成效呈现正向促进效应,这种促进效应主要来源于文化贸易出口对贸易伙伴国价值观趋同性的推动作用,即文化产品出口带来了双边文化认同效应;区分文化产品类型看,核心文化产品贸易的影响效应更为显著;此外,在文化差异大、制度环境质量差的东道国,文化贸易对跨国并购的“增量提效”的作用更强。     

中国对外跨国并购投资的现状与潜力

随着中国综合经济实力的增强,对外开放政策已经从单纯的吸引外资转向鼓励国际投资的双向流动,支持有条件的中国企业“走出去”,以对外跨国并购为手段获取国外的技术、资源与市场,推动国内产业结构升级。文章对中国对外跨国并购投资现状进行了系统分析,研究发现,中国对外跨国并购目前尚还处在初级阶段,在国际并购市场上的地位偏低,并明显滞后于国内经济发展的整体水平,展望未来,中国跨国并购巨大潜力。     

基于决策模型的石化上游企业并购目标选择研究

文章通过对石油石化行业上游企业发展趋势的分析,总结出企业通过基于核心竞争力的并购与重组来保持行业内的竞争优势和领先地位。根据石油石化上游企业自身以及并购目标选择决策系统的特点和灰色系统理论,给出了石油石化上游企业并购目标评价指标体系及选择最优方案的决策模型。     

高技术产业国家价值链网络结构与省域增加值分解——来自电子信息产业的证据

为破解我国在高技术产业全球价值链中面临的低端锁定困境,需要构建并完善国家价值链分工体系。构建中国高技术产业国家价值链内生增值传导网络结构分析框架,并以电子信息产业为例,对省域国内增加值进行分解。结果表明,现阶段中国电子信息产业上游技术研发能力较弱,整体增值能力不强;下游间接关联产业部门数量及关联系数值仍待提高;除中游外,上下游出口国内增加值偏低,国际竞争力较弱;东、中部省域国内完全增加值占据优势,内生增值能力方面各有所长,东北、西部省域国内完全增加值及其内生增值能力均较弱。同时,中国省域国际垂直专业化程度未表现出显著地理地区特征,即使同一地域的省域之间也存在不同程度差异。     

Using Market Structure to Regulate a Vertically Integrated Monopolist

A natural monopolist whose cost is private information produces a good which is combined with another good that can be produced by the monopolist or by other firms. The agency that regulates the monopolist can impose any of several different market structures in the industry: integrated monopoly, vertical separation with free entry downstream, or liberalization downstream (both integrated and independent production). When several firms produce downstream, a Cournot quantity-setting game with free entry determines the market price. We derive the optimal contracts to offer the monopolist under all three market structures and examine the influence of downstream cost differences on access prices.We then study the optimal regulatory policy where the regulator can condition the downstream market structure on the monopolist's cost report to the regulator. The optimal regulatory policy awards a monopoly to a low-cost upstream firm, but requires free entry downstream if the monopolist reports high upstream costs. Thus, the choice of market structure is an additional tool to limit rent extraction by the monopolist. Simulation analysis reveals the possibility of significant welfare gains from this additional regulatory tool.     

Monopolization through endogenous vertical mergers

While endogenous merger analysis has been applied to horizontal mergers, the thrust of vertical merger analysis has been based on exogenous mergers. The goal of this paper is to analyze endogenous vertical mergers. I consider a market structure with a downstream monopolist and an oligopolistic upstream industry. The downstream monopolist chooses to buy a certain number of the upstream firms. Mergers are endogenous, in the sense that the bids made by the downstream firm must be accepted by each of the integrated upstream firms, and must not exceed the increase in the profits of the downstream firm. It is shown that the unique equilibrium is complete monopolization: the buyer buys all the firms in the upstream industry. This result is consistent with the result that vertical mergers are profitable. However, it is in contrast with horizontal endogenous mergers, where complete monopolization is generally not an equilibrium.     

Upstream mergers,downstream mergers,and secret vertical contracts

In an industry characterized by secret vertical contracts, we consider a benchmark case where two vertical chains exist, with two upstream manufacturers selling to two downstream retailers, and show that the equilibrium prices are independent of whether upstream or downstream firms have all the bargaining power. We then analyse two alternative mergers, and show that a downstream merger (which gives the downstream monopolist all the bargaining power) is more welfare detrimental than an upstream merger (which gives the bargaining power to the upstream monopolist). We also show that downstream and upstream mergers have the same effects when contracts are observable.     

Export rivalry,vertically-related markets,and optimal public ownership policy

This paper considers the optimal public ownership policy of an upstream firm which competes with a foreign private rival. Both firms supply a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms that compete in an export market. The paper shows that complete privatization of the domestic upstream firm is never optimal. It will likely be fully nationalized if its market share is high, the domestic downstream firms' market share is low, and the total number of firms in the downstream is large. Simulation results reveal that the public firm's optimal profit margin may be negative and that the government ownership level may exhibit a reswitching phenomenon as the number of domestic downstream firms keeps growing. The paper sheds light on the possibility of using government ownership policy as a pseudo-trade and industrial policy.     

Vertical Integration and Competition Policy

The European Commission has decided to implement a simplified procedure in the context of vertical integration. If the combined market shares of the merging firms is higher than 25% the Commission will investigate the merger thoroughly. Otherwise, the merger is considered harmless. The purpose of this study is to examine the welfare aspects of vertical integration in a simple model and investigate the accuracy of the proposed rule of thumb. Mergers turn out to be harmless from a social point of view when the upstream market is relatively less concentrated compared to the downstream market.     

Vertically Related Markets,Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.     

Downstream merger with upstream market power

We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of a such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised by cross-border merger.     

Aspects of International Fragmentation

The paper uses a specific‐factors framework to address efficiency and distributional implications of international fragmentation which is driven by a low foreign wage rate. Focusing on the cost‐savings linkage between fragmentation and labor demand in the remaining domestic activities, the author establishes a fragmentation surplus. If capital is an indivisible asset specific to the fragment produced abroad, then fragmentation may cause a domestic welfare loss, because outsourcing takes place in discrete steps where it affords firms “quasi‐market‐power” on the domestic labor market. The regime shift from domestic production to fragmentation is modeled as a two‐stage game. In stage one, firms locate indivisible assets at home or abroad; in stage two they choose optimal employment. The share of fragmented firms is endogenously determined. The paper explores conditions under which outsourcing is beneficial for the domestic economy.     

Conjectural Variations, Market Power, and Optimal Trade Policy in a Vertically Related Industry

The paper introduces the conjectural variations and bargaining approaches into a vertical model wherein a foreign upstream firm supplies one input to two downstream firms that produce differentiated products for the export market. Various downstream firms’ competition modes and upstream's pricing schemes emerge as special cases of this formulation. The authors show that the optimal export policy of a downstream country depends crucially on the downstream firms’ conjectures of rivals’ responses, the upstream firm's pricing schemes, their relative bargaining powers, and the degree of product differentiation. If the upstream's pricing or bargaining power is strong (weak) and if the downstream's degree of competition is high (low), a tax (subsidy) is optimal owing to a strong (weak) vertical profit‐shifting effect and a weak (strong) horizontal effect.