Public goods provision and redistributive taxation

This paper studies the relationship between redistributive taxation and tax-deductible charitable contributions. Redistribution has two opposite effects on voluntary giving. The price of charitable giving decreases with the degree of redistribution, and this has a positive effect on the total amount of giving (substitution effect). However, redistribution leads to lower consumption for the contributors and therefore has a negative effect on contributions to the charity (income effect). The theoretical model developed in this paper demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases with the tax rate. In purely egalitarian societies, the public good is provided efficiently and the total welfare is maximized independent of the ex-ante income inequality. However, the positive impact of taxation on charitable giving and welfare may disappear if individuals generate their income levels in anticipation of taxation and redistribution does not take into account the cost of effort.     

技术进步与产业结构升级的就业效应

基于我国2000-2014年省级面板数据,对技术进步、产业结构升级与就业的关系进行理论和实证分析,引入交互项进一步说明基于技术进步的产业结构升级对就业的影响。结果表明,技术进步对就业具有明显的抑制效应,产业结构升级对就业具有促进效应,而基于技术进步的产业结构升级对就业具有负向影响。此外,在不同区域,技术进步与产业结构升级的就业效应也存在明显差异。因此,在新一轮工业革命条件下,应采取相应政策措施,在追求技术进步与产业转型升级的同时,实现就业增长。     

Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects

This paper provides direct evidence that income comparisons exert a significant impact on subjective well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types of benchmarks. Internal comparisons to one's own past living standard outweigh any other comparison benchmarks. Local comparisons (to one's parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more powerful than self-ranking in the social ladder. The impact of comparisons is asymmetric: under-performing one's benchmark always has a greater welfare effect than out-performing it (in absolute value). Comparisons, which reduce satisfaction also increase the demand for income redistribution, but there, the relative impact of subjective ranking is preponderant.     

A Positive Theory of Income Redistribution

This article examines how redistribution of human capital expenditure can come about voluntarily. A model is developed in which, in the absence of redistribution, human capital expenditure is financed through tax revenue collected locally. However, circumstances are shown under which transfers of human capital expenditure across neighborhoods can take place voluntarily, even in the absence of interfamily altruism. These transfers can eliminate absolute inequality and reduce relative inequality. In addition, the effect on aggregate income of such human capital funding transfers across neighborhoods is evaluated. Empirical evidence supporting the model's implications for the impact of redistribution of human capital expenditure on the persistence of income inequality is presented     

Populist policies in the transition to democracy

This paper develops a political economy model that provides an explanation as for why ruling elites in oligarchic societies may rely on income redistribution to the poor (the masses) in order to prevent them from attempting a revolution. We refer to this kind of redistribution as populist redistribution because, first it does not increase the poor's productive capacity (human capital), and second it seeks to “buy” political support (peace) to perpetuate the elite's control of political power. We examine the conditions under which ruling elites choose to deter the poor (by means of military repression and/or populist redistribution), to engage in a dispute with the poor for the control of political power, or, alternatively, to extend democracy. According to the results of the model populist redistribution (or military repression), if any, increases with initial wealth inequality and with the amount of redistribution that the poor can undertake under democracy, and decreases with the relative importance of a human capital externality in production. The model explains why in some cases the use of an apparently inefficient policy of populist redistribution turns out to be optimal for both groups (the ruling elite and the poor class) when the alternative is the use of military repression or default to conflict.     

Years of life lost to revolution and war in Iran

How was life expectancy in Iran affected by the Islamic Revolution and subsequent war with Iraq? This study examines the joint effect of regime change and the war against Iraq on life expectancy in Iran between 1978 and 1988. If there had been no revolution and war in Iran, how would the life expectancy of Iranians have developed? To answer this question, we use a synthetic control model to construct a counterfactual Iran based on a weighted average of other comparable countries, which reproduces the situation of pre-revolution Iran but does not experience the revolution and war. We then compare the life expectancies of the counterfactual and actual Iran that underwent a regime change and war with Iraq. Our results indicate that an average Iranian's total life expectancy would have been approximately five years longer without the revolution and war. The revolution had a moderate long-term impact on total life expectancy at birth, with the most significant influence being attributed to the war itself, particularly on male life expectancy. Our main findings are robust to a series of tests, including placebo tests. We investigate possible reasons that may explain the impact on longevity.     

Parental nurturing and adverse effects of redistribution

This paper suggests that if parental nurturing is a dominating force in human capital formation then income redistribution may not promote economic growth. In particular, if, consistently with empirical evidence, parental human capital complements investment in a child’s education and yields increasing returns in the intergenerational production of human capital, income redistribution may have an adverse impact on the growth rate of average human capital. Redistribution shifts resources towards the less educationally-productive families and thus in the presence of credit markets imperfections and increasing returns, it reduces the aggregate level of investment in human capital. Moreover, if the degree of increasing returns is sufficiently large to produce sustained growth, this adverse effect on human capital formation may outweigh the conventional beneficial effects of redistribution that arises from the interaction between a production technology exhibiting diminishing returns and credit market imperfections.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

Exchange Rate,Income Distribution and Technical Change in a Balance-of-Payments Constrained Growth Model

This article develops a formal model that accounts for the net effect of an exchange rate devaluation on the long-term balance-of-payments constrained growth rate. Such a model investigates how a currency devaluation impacts on the home country non-price competitiveness via changes in income distribution and the rate of technological innovation. The model is built upon two plausible hypotheses. First, it is assumed that the rate of technological innovation is directly related to the income elasticity of demand for exports and inversely related to the income elasticity of demand for imports. Second, it is assumed that a redistribution of income between labor and capital has an ambiguous direct impact on the income elasticities ratio. The model shows that the net impact of a currency devaluation on growth can go either way depending on the institutional framework of the economy.     

巴菲特与索罗斯财富策略评析

巴菲特通过股票市场投资实体经济企业,获得财富长期稳定增长的事实,证明了马克思主义财富来源于实体经济以及实体经济对虚拟资本起决定作用的观点;索罗斯虚拟资本投机获得财富快速波动性增长的事实,则证明虚拟资本市场运作是财富的分配与再分配,虚拟资本对实体经济有反作用。     

Polarisation, uncertainty and public investment failure

In a political economy model, the effect of political polarisation on a government's intertemporal choice between redistribution and public investment is shown to be similar to the effect of political uncertainty. Moreover, polarisation and uncertainty reinforce one another in their impact on public underinvestment and may ultimately lead to no investment at all.     

Redistributive choices and increasing income inequality: experimental evidence for income as a signal of deservingness

We explore the relation between redistribution choices, source of income, and pre-redistribution inequality. Previous studies find that when income is earned through work there is less support for redistribution than when income is determined by luck. Using a lab experiment, we vary both the income-generating process (luck vs. performance) and the level of inequality (low vs. high). We find that an increase in inequality has less impact on redistribution choices when income is earned through performance than when income results from luck. This result is likely explained by individuals using income differences as a heuristic to infer relative deservingness. If people believe income inequality increases as a result of performance rather than luck, then they are likely to believe the poor deserve to stay poor and the rich deserve to stay rich.     

Investment subsidies and redistributive capital income taxation in a neoclassical growth model

How do investment subsidies bear on pure redistribution when coupled with capital income taxes? In a heterogeneous agent, neoclassical growth framework it is found that on impact, with no optimizing behavior, investment subsidies are good for growth but bad for redistribution. The opposite holds for capital income taxes. But when the government acts as a Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector (the follower), the optimal feedback policy is by construction time-consistent and implies that in a long-run optimum the tax scheme does not distort accumulation. This holds regardless of social preferences. For the feedback Stackelberg equilibrium I find that (pure) redistribution can go either way and capital income taxes are nonzero in the long-run, time-consistent optimum, depending on the social weight of those who receive redistributive transfers, the distribution of pretax factor incomes, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. It is argued that investment subsidies may be an important indirect tool for redistribution, and may allow for the separation of “efficiency” and “equity” concerns.     

Public and Private Hospitals,Congestion, and Redistribution

This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as both an in‐kind and in‐cash redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in productivity and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a noncongested private one at a higher price. With pure in‐kind redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public hospital is higher than optimal. When productivities are not observable but the social planner can assign agents across hospitals, the optimal congestion is higher than in the full information case in order to relax incentive constraints and foster income redistribution. Finally, if agents can freely choose across hospitals, the optimal subsidy on the private hospital price may be negative or positive depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns. In this case, redistribution is limited if the quality of the public facility depends on the number of users.     

存在收入差异的社会保障制度选择--基于一个内生增长世代交替模型

社会保障制度选择是经济协调发展中的重要课题.本文建立了一个考虑存在收入差距的异质性个体的内生增长世代交替模型,综合考察了社会保障制度选择对经济增长和收入再分配的影响.分析表明,现收现付制对稳定状态的经济增长率有负面影响,但其收入再分配功能对提高社会总福利存在正向作用,通过数值模拟发现当收入差距较小时,现收现付制对经济增长的抑制作用较强,随着收入差距的拉大,收入再分配功能将逐渐居于主导地位,其综合效应可以改善社会福利.在一定的收入差异程度范围内,存在一个使社会福利最大化的最优现收现付制比率.基于对中国实际的分析,本文认为我国未来的社会保障制度改革应该注重发挥现收现付制的再分配功能.     

Misperceiving inequality

A vast literature suggests that economic inequality has important consequences for politics and public policy. Higher inequality is thought to increase demand for income redistribution in democracies and to discourage democratization and promote class conflict and revolution in dictatorships. Most such arguments crucially assume that ordinary people know how high inequality is, how it has been changing, and where they fit in the income distribution. Using a variety of large, cross‐national surveys, we show that, in recent years, ordinary people have had little idea about such things. What they think they know is often wrong. Widespread ignorance and misperceptions emerge robustly, regardless of data source, operationalization, and measurement method. Moreover, perceived inequality—not the actual level—correlates strongly with demand for redistribution and reported conflict between rich and poor. We suggest that most theories about political effects of inequality need to be reframed as theories about effects of perceived inequality.     

Immigration,Conflict, and Redistribution

In this paper, we analyze how the possibility of conflict between natives and immigrants shapes income redistribution in developed democracies. This possibility can generate income redistribution towards immigrants even if they have no voting rights. We show that the threat of conflict between natives and immigrants lowers vertical income redistribution (from the rich to the poor) as the level of immigration increases. The opposite holds for horizontal income redistribution (from natives to immigrants), which increases with the level of immigration. Income inequality weakens the negative effect of immigration on vertical redistribution, but it also reduces horizontal redistribution. These theoretical predictions are consistent with the results of our empirical analysis on data from 29 European countries: larger immigrant populations are associated with more redistribution towards immigrants and lower vertical redistribution.     

中国居民消费需求不足原因研究——基于中国城乡分省数据

This paper uses Chinese urban and rural panel data for 30 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (except Tibet and Taiwan) on the consumption of Chinese urban and rural households in 1995–2005, by constructiong a random effect model, to analyze the impact of sources of household’s consumption demand on the Chinese economy. The quantitative analysis reveals that the per capita disposable income of households is highly relevant in explaining households’ per capita consumption expenditure, in these eleven years, and that China’s consumption function was fairly stable. On the basis of flow of funds accounts (barter transaction) data in 1992–2004, the paper further reveals that, since 1997–1998, China’s consumer demand remains in the doldrums because of the following distribution and redistribution process of the national income: The Government’s share of total income and disposable income is becoming ever larger, while the share of households is declining. Aside from the result that a rise in the burden of personal tuition has a negative impact on per capita consumption demand for urban households, we have not found that housing reform or medical expenses significantly reduce consumer demand in China. We believe that low household consumption demand is caused mainly by the income redistribution between households, government, and corporations rather than the inequality in income distribution across households.