Demographic links to savings in life cycle models: identification of issues for LDCs

The author considers the potential for a link between the recent pattern of demographic transition and intertemporal and inter-country variations in savings rates. Fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, and levels of female and child labor force participation are among the various demographic factors which affect national savings rates through their effects upon age structure, age-specific individual savings behavior, and their general equilibrium effects upon interest rates, wage rates, and income distribution. The author establishes a simple discrete time life cycle model of savings, explains the issues related to age structure, and discusses the effect of age-specific savings functions, the general equilibrium effects of demographic factors, the effects of life expectancies and child mortalities, and the nature of social security coverages in less developed countries, as well as issues which are especially important for less developed countries. A new strategy for empirically evaluating demographic policies is proposed. That is, one can estimate the age profile of earnings, saving and fertility rates from household survey data. The life tables can then be used to compute the aggregate savings rate and population size. Any demographic policy which affects the fertility rate, life expectancy, and investment in the quality of children will change the aggregate saving and population growth rates. These two aggregate effects could be compared to evaluate demographic policies. The author stresses, however, that changes in different demographic factors will have different short-run and long-run effects upon the savings rate which will also depend upon whether such changes are transitory or permanent.     

How do epidemics induce behavioral changes?

This paper develops a theory of optimal fertility behavior under mortality shocks. In an OLG model, young adults determine their optimal fertility, labor supply and life-cycle consumption with both exogenous child and adult mortality risks. We show that a rise in adult mortality exerts an ambiguous effect on both net and total fertility in a general equilibrium framework, while child mortality shocks unambiguously lead to a rise in total fertility, leaving net fertility unchanged. We complement our theory with an empirical analysis using a sample of 39 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the 1980–2004 period, examining the overall effects of the child and adult mortality channels on both total and net fertility. We find child mortality to exert a robust, positive impact on total fertility but no impact on net fertility, whereas a rise in adult mortality is found to negatively influence both total and net fertility. Given the particular demographic profile of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (killing essentially young, active adults), we then conclude in favor of an unambiguous negative effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on net fertility in SSA.     

Accounting for Fertility Decline During the Transition to Growth

In every developed country, the economic transition from pre-industrial stagnation to modern growth was accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country variations in the timing and speed of the demographic transition. What accounts for falling fertility during the transition to growth? To answer this question, this paper develops a unified growth model that delivers a transition from stagnation to growth, accompanied by declining fertility. The model is used to determine whether government policies that affect the opportunity cost of education can account for cross-country variations in fertility decline. Among the policies considered, education subsidies are found to have only minor effects, while accounting for child labor regulation is crucial. Apart from influencing fertility, the policies also determine the evolution of the income distribution in the course of development.     

Fertility choice under child mortality and social norms

In most demographic transitions, declines in child mortality precede declines in net fertility rates. Variants of the Barro-Becker model of fertility fail to deliver this link. A simple extension, the inclusion of social norms regarding fertility, generates the desired effect.     

Social classes,demographic transition and economic growth

This paper analyzes the role of the demographic transition in the emergence of sustained economic growth, and shows that these two processes are related. Unlike previous contributions which have focused on the importance of human capital, this paper suggests that capital accumulation, and the existence of different social classes may provide an alternative explanation for the observed pattern of output, fertility rates and wages during the 19th century. The framework presented shows that during the first phase of industrialization, a decline in capital–labor ratio reduces the wage rate and increases the dependency of the family unit on child labor, increasing fertility rates. However, in later phases the increase in the capital–labor ratio, due to the saving of the business elite, reduces the necessity of child labor bringing about the demographic transition.     

Education budget savings from ending child marriage and early childbirths: the case of Niger

Ending child marriage and early childbirths would reduce total fertility rates and population growth especially in countries with a high incidence of child marriage, early childbirths, or both. Savings for public budgets could be large. This article relies on demographic projections and a UNESCO costing model for the provision of education by governments to estimate savings that could result from ending child marriage and early childbirths for public education budgets. The analysis is conducted for Niger, the country with the highest rate of child marriage in the world.     

Can child allowances improve fertility in a gender discrimination economy?

While it is believed that child allowances can improve fertility in principle, this paper shows that the effects of child allowances with gender discrimination should be reconsidered. It points out that gender wage discrimination can inhibit the positive effects of child allowances on fertility. With high gender wage discrimination, assuming that both parental time and market childcare goods are indispensable for childrearing, child allowances significantly increase maternal childcare time. On the other hand, child allowances also reduce childcare expenditure due to the decline in female labor time and increase in the relative price of market childcare goods, which eventually decreases fertility. We show that when the gender discrimination factor is greater than a certain cutoff, the effects of child allowances on fertility become negative. Moreover, male childcare time also plays an essential role in increasing fertility rates. Therefore, gender equality is a prerequisite for increased child allowances to be effective.     

Optimal social security in a dynastic model with human capital externalities,fertility and endogenous growth

In this paper we investigate the optimal scale of pay-as-you-go social security in a dynastic family model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth. Human capital externalities reduce the return to human capital investment and hence lead to under-investment in human capital and over-reproduction of the population. If the taste for the number of children is sufficiently weak relative to the taste for the welfare of children, social security can be welfare enhancing by reducing fertility and raising human capital investment per child.     

Human capital and economic development

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of fertility and human capital investment with young adult mortality. Because young adult mortality is negatively related to average young adult human capital, human capital accumulation lowers mortality, inducing demographic transition and industrial revolution. Data confirm that young adult mortality is related negatively to schooling, and the rate of return to schooling, and positively to fertility. The data indicate a negative relationship between TFP growth and schooling accumulation. The model fits the data on country populations, per capita incomes, human capital, total fertility rates, infant mortality, life expectancy and conditional life expectancy.     

RELIGIONS,FERTILITY, AND GROWTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

We investigate the extent to which the pronatalism of religions impedes growth via the fertility/education channel. Using Southeast Asian censuses, we show empirically that being Catholic, Buddhist, or Muslim significantly raises fertility, especially for couples with intermediate to high education levels. With these estimates, we identify the parameters of a structural model. Catholicism is strongly pro‐child (increasing total spending on children), followed by Buddhism, whereas Islam is more pro‐birth (redirecting spending from quality to quantity). Pro‐child religions depress growth in its early stages by lowering savings and labor supply. In the later stages of growth, pro‐birth religions impede human capital accumulation.     

Fertility and mortality changes in an overlapping-generations model with realistic demography

Many overlapping-generations models assume only working and retirement stages and are “not capable of representing the most basic feature of the human economic life cycle: that it begins and ends with periods of dependency, separated by a long intermediate period of consuming less than is produced” (Bommier and Lee, 2003). To examine the economic consequences of fertility and mortality changes in a common framework, we incorporate realistic demographic features into a continuous-time overlapping-generations model with childhood, adulthood and retirement stages. Using parameter values appropriate for industrial countries (such as the USA), we find that a fertility increase and a mortality decline, while both causing a rise in the population growth rate, have opposite effects on capital accumulation. We also consider simultaneous fertility and mortality changes, and find that the effect on capital accumulation of a mortality change dominates that of a fertility change.     

Pension and child care policies with endogenous fertility

This paper presents an examination of effects of a child allowance on fertility under a pay-as-you-go pension system. In these analyses, the child allowance is financed by taxation of two kinds: an income tax and a consumption tax. Comparative static analyses show that a child allowance financed by income tax revenues can always raise fertility. Similarly with income tax, a child allowance financed by consumption tax can always raise fertility. Furthermore, our paper presents examination of optimal child allowance and transfer for older people.     

The response of fertility to the expectations of death: implications for the demographic transition

The authors present an economic explanation for the first stage of events often experienced by a society entering the demographic transition, namely, declining death rates coupled with high or rising birth rates. The explanation is based on the response of fertility to the expectation of child death and on a distinction between actual and desired family size     

代际流动约束下生育率与收入不平等关系的国际检验

收入不平等问题和人口生育率过低问题是当下中国面临的两大难题,但目前理论界关于人口因素与收入不平等关系的研究,很少从生育率视角来考察以及考虑代际收入流动在其中的作用.文章从理论与经验两个方面来考察生育率对收入不平等的影响,理论模型表明:在关于代际收入流动的假设下,一个经济体中生育率的提高会使穷人比重提高,进而拉大收入不平等.进一步地,文章利用1970-2011年76个国家(地区)面板数据的经验研究发现:(1)总和生育率的提高会拉大收入不平等,如果每个妇女平均多生育一个孩子,将会使基尼系数增加0.025;(2)以出生率作为总和生育率替代指标的实证结果与基准结果基本一致,这说明不同生育率测算指标高度相关且可相互替代;(3)对于代际收入流动弹性越高、收入水平越低或生育率越高的国家(地区),其生育率提高对收入不平等的拉大作用越大.文章关于生育率对收入不平等影响的作用机制和异质性特征的考察,对于我国如何在实施"全面二孩"政策下寻求应对严峻的收入分配问题之策提供了国际经验和启示.     

Ageing,government budgets,retirement, and growth

We analyze the short and long-run effects of demographic ageing – increased longevity and reduced fertility – on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects, working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening, and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending components and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to accelerate. If the retirement age was held constant, the growth rate in politico-economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social-security transfers and crowding out of public investment.     

Soviet theories of economic demography: a survey

At this time Soviet demographic scientists maintain the position that population problems may in fact exist temporarily under socialism but that the planning principle will allow society to resolve population problems, through the use of the administrative, moral, and economic levers (subsidies, government policies, propaganda, education) emphasized by Urlanis (1974) and others. For planners to deal effectively with population management, the determinants of fertility and labor force participation must be established. The foundations of Soviet theories of human capital and fertility were laid by several writers. For the sake of simplicity, these are referred to as the Urlanis-Strumilin model, named after 2 pioneer researchers in Soviet demography and manpower economics. The formulations are based upon the writings of Strumlin (1964) and Urlanis (1974), supplemented by writings of numerous other Soviet researchers. Although their models avoid neoclassical terms such as marginal utility and income and price elasticities, they clearly employ these concepts. The Urlanis-Strumilin model, reduced to its basic elements, is a direct household utility maximizing model. The husband and wife, the household decision makers, must select optimal levels of child "quantity," child "quality," leisure, their own human capital (further education and training), and other goods. The Soviet theory recognizes that an increase in household income will increase relatively the demands for income elastic goods. The model postulates that the demand for child quality is inversely related to the price of children. The price of children is the opportunity cost of children, the major element of which is the income foregone by the mother in the course of childbearing and childrearing. The child quantity demand schedule has elastic and inelastic portions. The marginal utility of the 1st child is great. The marginal utilities of higher order children decline substantially. Families with at least 1 child can make substitutions between having more children and raising the quality of children already born. The question is what does the model predict will happen to fertility with economic development. The positive income effect will be limited as increased income is channelled into child quality and other superior goods rather than child quantity. The Urlanis-Strumilin model of labor supply assumes that the household allocates its time among market employment, household production. The model shows that the effect of children on female labor supply is not ambiguous. The presence of young children raises the value of home services and lowers long run market wages, thereby reducing female market labor supply. According to the model, the socialist state can manipulate labor supplies through several channels. It can reduce the value of home services by providing market substitutes. Soviet writers recognize the linkages between labor supply and fertility without formalizing the simultaneous relationship. The comparative statics of the Soviet model are essentially the same as those of the neoclassical model: an increase in "costs" of children will have, at best, a small positive impact on fertility.     

Demographic change,human capital accumulation and R&D‐based growth

Employing an overlapping generations model of R&D‐based growth with endogenous fertility and education decisions, we examine how demographic changes induced by an increase in life expectancy influence the long‐run growth rate of the economy. We demonstrate that life expectancy, when relatively low (high), positively (negatively) affects economic growth. This paper also compares the growth implications of child education subsidy policies (i.e., policies for enhancing basic education) and child rearing subsidy policies (i.e., pro‐natal policies) and demonstrate that while the child education subsidies consistently foster economic growth, child rearing subsidies may negatively affect economic growth.     

Does the Mortality Decline Promote Economic Growth?

This paper analyzes qualitatively and quantitatively the effects of declining mortality rates on fertility, education and economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that if individuals are prudent in the face of uncertainty about child survival, a decline in an exogenous mortality rate reduces precautionary demand for children and increases parental investment in each child. Once mortality is endogenized, population growth becomes a hump-shaped function of income per capita. At low levels of income population growth rises as income per capita rises leading to a Malthusian steady-state equilibrium, whereas at high levels of income population growth declines leading to a sustained growth steady-state equilibrium.     

Geography,health, and the pace of demo-economic development

This paper investigates the impact of subsistence consumption and extrinsic and intrinsic causes of child mortality on fertility and child expenditure. It offers a theory for why mankind multiplies at higher rates at geographically unfavorable, tropical locations. Placed into a macroeconomic framework this behavior creates an indirect channel through which geography shapes economic performance. It is explained why it are countries of low absolute latitude where we observe exceedingly slow (if not stalled) economic development and demographic transition.     

Human capital and the quantity–quality trade-off during the demographic transition

This paper provides an empirical test of the child quantity–quality (QQ) trade-off predicted by unified growth theory. Using individual census returns from the 1911 Irish census, we examine whether children who attended school were from smaller families—as predicted by a standard QQ model. To measure causal effects, we use a selection of models robust to endogeneity concerns which we validate for this application using an Empirical Monte Carlo analysis. Our results show that a child remaining in school between the ages of 14 and 16 caused up to a 27 % reduction in fertility. Our results are robust to alternative estimation techniques with different modeling assumptions, sample selection, and alternative definitions of fertility. These findings highlight the importance of the demographic transition as a mechanism which underpinned the expansion in human capital witnessed in Western economies during the twentieth century.