补偿、政府目标与民营化障碍--对我国国有企业民营化改革障碍的思考

中国的经济体制改革形成了一个竞争性市场,在这个竞争性市场上,民营企业具有较国有企业更高的效率,那么,在实践中民营化改革何以依旧争议不断,阻碍重重?改革是一个利益博弈过程,处理好各利益相关者的利益关系是改革成败的关键。从直观上看,只要效率提高了,就可以实现对利益受损者进行补偿,使各利益相关者都能从中受益,共同利益空间越大,改革的阻力就越小。但是,帕累托改进要求原企业经营者和职工得到完全补偿,这抬高了新所有者收购价格的下限,而政府的多重目标又使改制的利益空间收缩。文章从补偿和政府职能目标对改制的利益空间产生影响这一角度,来分析民营化的障碍,指出补偿要求和多重政府职能会影响改制的利益空间,从而阻碍了国企民营化的顺利推进。     

国有企业民营化改制的理论和实践约束

民营化作为国有企业产权改制的主要方式不能动摇,但必须重点研究国有企业民营化的约束机制.其中,产权理论难有实质性突破和企业内部利益均衡模型难以真正形成构成了国企民营化的理论约束;部门间就业转移阻滞、分级所有的国资管理体制、利益集团行为刚性、财政资源紧张与补偿制度缺失形成对国有企业民营化的实践约束.摆脱这些约束,国有企业民营化才能顺利地进行下去.     

国有企业整体改制影响职工稳定的因素分析及对策

国有企业实施整体改制 ,实现企业产权转让到位、职工劳动关系调整到位、法人治理结构运作到位的改制标准 ,是加快转变企业经营机制 ,适应市场竞争 ,实现国有资本退出的重要举措。文章指出 ,国企职工作为国企的中坚力量 ,改制的参与者 ,在企业改制的同时 ,其思想观念受到冲击 ,利益受到调整 ,容易产生抵触情绪。若不加重视 ,势必影响企业稳定 ,关系到改制的成败。     

风险投资退出决策模型研究

以风险项目产生的现金流为基础,建立了针对风险投资家和风险企业家的风险投资最优退出时机的一般模型。分析了不同的退出方式所产生的退出费用损益,分别讨论了在不同的退出方式下风险投资家和风险企业的最优风险投资退出时机模型。     

国有企业效率与退出选择——基于部分竞争性行业的经验研究

本文对2000-2008年期间中国部分竞争性行业国有企业的退出及其主要决定因素进行了研究。通过非平衡面板企业数据,在计算企业效率和界定不同退出行为的基础上,本文运用多项选择Logit模型分析发现,企业效率是决定国有企业退出的重要变量。其中,效率较高的企业更愿意选择民营化退出,而效率低的企业更有可能选择破产清算或打散重组的方式,完全退出国有部门。然而,在2000-2008年的后期,效率对于企业退出的影响程度明显降低。国有企业退出行为的变化,表明了在其背后政府目标的调整。     

企业改制中的几个难点分析

国有经济要从高竞争领域逐步退出控股地位已经成为中央的既定方针。随着改革的进一步深入 ,处在高竞争领域的国有企业改制问题 ,已经开始摆到了各级政府和国有企业职工面前。怎样改制 ?股份卖给谁 ?什么人可以控股 ?职工怎么办 ?企业改制以后如何管理等等一系列的问题摆在了政府、国企职工和民族企业家面前。这对于政府、职工和民族企业家来讲都是前所未有的挑战。改得好 ,企业发展了 ,职工收入增加了 ,政府税收增加了 ,国力增强了。改得不好 ,就会影响国民经济的持续稳定发展和安定团结的大局。下面根据我们对改制企业的调查研究 ,对改制过…     

多目标条件下国有企业产权转让的机制设计——基于我国东、中、西部三地区不同行业典型案例的实证分析

企业产权转让往往牵涉到企业各利益相关者利益的重新调整,如何从机制设计上保护和实现各利益相关者的合法权益,成为理论界与实践部门共同的心声。本文基于我国东、中、西部三地区不同行业有代表性的企业产权转让现实案例,详细考察了多目标条件下国有企业产权转让供求双方面临的现实约束以及相应的行为选择,提出了一种三位一体化的产权转让机制,该机制通过对协议转让、招投标和拍卖三种转让方式的创新组合与安排,在一定程度上实现了潜在投资者在产权转让价格与非价格两个维度上的竞争,从而使产权转让能够很好地兼顾不同的目标,满足各利益相关者的合法权益。     

经济转轨时期国有企业民营化研究述评

本文结合国外既有相关研究,重点从国有企业民营化的外部推力、内生机制、最优均衡模型以及超产权论与最优经济转轨路径等五大方面,对中国经济转轨中的国有企业民营化既有相关研究进行了梳理与述评;并指出,就中国经济转轨及中国经济重构的绩效而言,国有企业民营化其实只是一个相对表面的初始变量,如何基于市场竞争结构与相关制度供求的变化而将国有企业民营化整合于企业治理优化的控制系统中,才是一个更深层面的问题.     

城市公用事业民营化改革理论探讨

随着城市公用事业民营化改革的不断深入,从政府、企业到学术界,以不同的角度对改革进行了探讨,政府的规制方法、民营化的经营模式、定价问题等等,一直是研究的重点内容,而经营企业的逐利性,使商业目标与公用事业的公益目标产生了冲突,在民营化经营过程中既要满足社会公众的利益,又要满足企业盈利性的目的,文章就从民营化改革方式角度入手,使公益目标和商业目标达到均衡。     

科学发展观下的我国企业利益相关者均衡

在利益相关者理论及其应用中,对相关者的界定及各相关者间利益均衡是两个基本问题.从表象上看,前者是基础,后者是问题的归属.在明确企业利益相关者集合存在的前提下,具体所指的模糊不会影响到相关者间的均衡问题,作者将重点探讨后者.本文从博弈论的角度分析了在科学发展观下我国企业利益相关者均衡的可能性及均衡的实现,通过讨价还价模型及智猪模型的构建与分析,可以看出这种均衡是可能的;同时,现实中这种均衡的有效实现需通过建立相关者间明确的代理关系;并分析了政府充当代理人的必要性及充当代理人的方式.     

经济转轨、跨国公司进入与国有企业改革

任何转轨国家向市场经济过渡都要面临改革与开放的问题.因此,本文在经济开放的背景下,着重突出跨国公司与转轨国家之间经济的紧密联系,建立跨国公司、转轨国家政府、国内企业三者之间的混合寡占博弈模型,并以市场开放、自由化、私有化等政策变量作为影响转轨进程的外生变量,分析开放程度和经济调控手段以及跨国企业的投资策略等对转轨国家国有企业民营化进程和转轨国家国有企业竞争力的影响.研究表明,转轨国家在经济开放的条件下,对国有企业完全民营化并非是改革的最优方案,而对国有企业的部分民营化效果反而会更好,也符合社会福利最大化的原则.而税率、技术、转移价格等也是影响转轨国家社会福利和转轨国家企业产量和竞争能力的重要因素.     

英国国有企业民营化改革及对中国的启示

英国从20世纪80年代开始对国有企业进行了大规模、且比较成功的改革。英国的国有企业改革前所面临的困境与中国国营企业有着相似之处,改革打破了原有国有企业的垄断,注重股权分散化,以放松规制来促进民营化的顺利展开。借鉴英国的经验,对中国国有企业的改革与发展大有裨益。     

From federalism, Chinese style to privatization, Chinese style

In 1995, China began a profound reform of its state-owned enterprises. We first describe and characterize this progress in two areas: privatization of small state-owned enterprises at the county level and mass lay-offs of excess state workers at the city level. Local governments have initiated these reforms, which are proceeding in economically and politically sensible ways. We then argue that privatization, Chinese style, rests on an adequate economic and political foundation - federalism, Chinese style. We suggest a range of incentives that propel local governments toward state-owned enterprise reform, including their harder budget constraints and increased competition from the non-state sector. In this sense, federalism, Chinese style, has induced privatization, Chinese style.
JEL classification: H7, L30, P3.     

An analysis of entry-then-privatization model: welfare and policy implications

This study formulates a new model of mixed oligopolies in free entry markets. A state-owned public enterprise is established before the game, private enterprises enter the market, and then the government chooses the degree of privatization of the public enterprise (termed the entry-then-privatization model herein). We find that under general demand and cost functions, the timing of privatization does not affect consumer surplus or the output of each private firm, while it does affect the equilibrium degree of privatization, number of entering firms, and output of the public firm. The equilibrium degree of privatization is too high (low) for both domestic and world welfare if private firms are domestic (foreign).     

Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly

This paper explores the optimal environmental tax and level of privatization in an international duopolistic market. We show that when the government is able to control the environmental tax and the extent of privatization, the optimal environmental tax is lower than the standard Pigouvian level. We also show that the optimal level of privatization of state-owned enterprises is partial privatization. Further, the optimal level of privatization is inversely dependent on the cleanup cost of past environmental contamination.     

Environmental Liability and Privatization in Central and Eastern Europe: Toward an Optimal Policy

It has been estimated that the costs of remediating contaminated sites in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will be very high. These contingent environmental liabilities have emerged precisely at the time CEE countries are attempting to privatize their capital stocks, creating major challenges for privatization agencies. It is also generally agreed that an inadequate handling of these liabilities in the past has reduced sales of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe.This paper uses an analytical model to identify optimal policies for minimizing the damage to privatization processes from environmental liabilities. Policy simulations are conducted which evaluate the effects of the use of liability indemnifications and environmental audits on privatization sales, prices and government revenues net of environmental costs. The major finding of the paper is that goals to mitigate the effects of environmental liability on privatizations and maximize government net revenues from privatization sales require equivalent environmental liability policies. Both goals require optimal provision of information and indemnifications to investors, and moreover it is found that the two policies are complementary rather than substitutes.     

经济转型理论评析

经济转型之初 ,一些经济学家基于新古典经济学信条提出 ,可以通过“激进”措施将原来的计划体制一次性破除而重建一个全新的市场经济。但迅速私有化并没有带来企业治理结构的改善和原国有资产的有效重组。与此形成鲜明对照的是 ,中国的渐进改革却取得了成功 ,并得到了越来越广泛的认可。 2 0世纪 90年代中期以来 ,经济转型理论开始发生变化 ,“制度演进主义”的影响日渐扩大 ,经济学家开始强调市场经济支持性制度的重要性以及制度变革的长期性 ,认为分权、激励、竞争、良好的司法和会计制度等比私有化更重要 ,并在政治经济学层面上分析了不确定性、利益集团、政府、改革秩序与步骤对制度变迁的影响。     

Privatization's impact on private productivity: The case of Brazilian iron ore

A major motivation for the recent wave of privatizations of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was a belief that privatization would increase SOE productivity. There are now many studies showing most privatizations achieved this goal. Our theme is that the productivity gains from privatization are much more general and widespread than has typically been recognized in this literature. In assessing the productivity gains from privatization, the literature has only examined the productivity gains accruing at the privatized SOEs. But privatization may have significant impact on the private producers that often exist side-by-side SOEs. In this paper we show that this was indeed the case when Brazil privatized its SOEs in the iron ore industry. That is, after their privatization, the iron ore SOEs dramatically increased their labor productivity, but so did the private iron ore companies in the industry.     

SOE Reform under Oligopolistic Market Structure: The Optimal Choice of State Shares

This paper examines the effect of the change of state shares in a state-owned enterprise (SOE) on the efficiency of the whole society and the payoff of the government. This issue is addressed by setting up a mixed oligopolistic competition model and dividing the analysis into two cases: closed economy and open economy. The basic results are as follows: If the relative production efficiency of an SOE is too low, complete state ownership is not optimal, and privatization will be a necessary step; however, if the relative production efficiency of an SOE is not too low, complete privatization is not optimal both for the government and from the perspective of social welfare. The results can, to a certain extent, provide theoretical support to the governments idea on the SOE reform. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2004, 1 (in Chinese)     

The role of state enterprises in the transition from command to market economies

In transition from command to market economies total privatization has proved to be impossible to achieve, and a substantial part of large enterprises are likely to remain in full or partial state ownership. Hasty privatization has in many cases even proved to be destructive. There is a need to reconsider the basic approach to transition. Contrary to conventional wisdom prevailing in mainstream economics state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not necessarily inferior to private firms in economic efficiency. J. Kornai's soft-budget constraint is reconsidered. Two models are suggested under which SOEs may prove to be viable in the long run and serve to promote a smoother physical transition. Under Model One (which is the general case) SOEs are largely separated from the state and operate on the basis of profit maximization. Under Model Two (which applies to certain industries) different objective functions are chosen for purposes of economic efficiency. Finally, preserving SOEs is seen as an alternative means of reducing inequitable income distribution at the source where primary incomes are created.