企业替代市场还是市场的升级演进?

从科斯的“一个契约对一系列契约的替代”到张五常的“一种契约形式取代另一种契约形式”,再到杨小凯和黄有光的“企业和市场是劳动分工的两个不同的侧面”,他们对企业与市场关系的认识是一脉相承、不断深化的。本文就他们对企业本质的论述进行了综述性的讨论,在辨析了“替代”的两重含义、阐述了分工经济概念的基础上,指出了企业对市场的替代并不意味着企业是用非市场的力量代替市场力量;权威的出现并不会导致企业成为反市场的     

人力资本产权与企业制度创新

一、引言 现代企业理论认为，企业是以一种契约类型（企业契约）代替另一种契约类型（市场契约），代替的原因则在于与市场契约相比，企业所采取的这种新的契约类型能节约交易费用。企业这种新的契约与一般市场契约的本质区别在于，企业包含对人力资本的交易（购买），长期雇佣人力资本的契约一方（权威方）拥有对另一方的指挥，而市场契约不存在这一点（张五常）。     

关于企业的本质——兼评交易费用学派的企业理论

文章分析了企业的功能和本质、企业与市场的联系与区别及“企业契约论”对企业本质的错误认识。     

论企业品牌建设的道德观

一、品牌的本质 品牌是一种识别标志，是企业的市场符号。从本质上说，品牌代表着企业与顾客间的一种契约关系，是企业向顾客长期提供的一组特定的特点、利益和服务的承诺。菲利浦·科特勒认为，“品牌的要点是销售者向购买者长期提供的一组特定的特点、利益和服务。     

否定企业的企业理论:"企业契约论"批判

科斯所开创的现代企业理论因科斯本人的含混表述和自相矛盾为后来演变成为企业契约论开了方便之门。企业契约论的共同特征是，从泛化是交易概念出发，用契约分析的方法，试图将企业组织还原为一组契约，因而把企业的性质说成是“一组契约关系的联结”。科斯之后，张五常、詹森和梅克林等将企业契约论推到极端境地，企业因彻底“契约化”而“非组织化”了，这实际上否定了企业作为社会实体的存在本身。企业的本质规定性，应从要素集结之后的企业内部的经济活动以及在活动中所形成的人与人之间的各种社会和经济关系中去寻找。这些活动与关系， 恰恰正是新古典经济学企业“黑匣子”里面所隐藏的内容。     

企业性质:基于修正科斯企业取代对象作出的考察

文章认为,科斯企业性质理论是存在有症结性问题的,这个症结就是,科斯把企业取代的对象理解错了。企业取代的真正对象其实不是市场而是单干经济。修正这一对象重新考察企业性质,它实质是一种包含有要素市场交易合约的特殊团队生产。     

企业所有权安排的博弈分析

一、企业不同于市场的特性科斯认为,市场是一种短期的契约关系,而企业是一种长期的固定的契约关系,是一种间接的定价制度。在企业之外,价格变动决定生产,这是通过一系列市场交易来协调的。在企业之内,市场交易被取消,伴随着交易的复杂的市场结构被企业家所替代,企业家指挥生产(Coase,1990)。事实上,企业是一个人力资本与物质资本订立的长期生产性契约,这种契约订立的目的是什么呢?笔者认为是进行边际报酬递增的生产,而不仅仅是市场的一种替代。企业与市场具有根本不同的契约特性。企业的产生源于分工协作,企业的存在源于合作产生的剩余,我…     

信息技术、交易成本与企业组织

科斯认为从本质上讲,企业与市场一样,也是一种资源配置的机制,企业之所以取代市场成为一种资源配置的机制是由于交易成本的存在。科斯认为:市场机制是靠价格来运行的,它具有较高的成本,而企业可以节省这些成本。由此可以看出交易成本决定了组织形式的选择:市场还是企业。     

企业员工"心理契约"式管理模式的构建

企业员工“心理契约”式管理模式是契约式管理模式的一种类型，是对文件契约式管理模式的补充完善。本文试图从准确理解把握心理契约的科学内涵着手，在简要阐述构建“心理契约”式管理模式的价值取向的基础上，提出构建企业员工“心理契约”式管理模式的初步设想。     

分析我国国有企业的性质运用交易成本理论─—兼论非生产性资产的剥离

分析我国国有企业的性质运用交易成本理论─—兼论非生产性资产的剥离管理年一、问题的提出：中国国有企业到底是什么？１、科斯关于企业本质的一般理论与几个基本假定。关于“企业的本质”，科斯给出如下命题：认为，企业和市场是两种不同而又可相互取代的交易体制。市场...     

替代、互补及互嵌:企业与市场关系的新考察

在现实世界中,企业市场关系呈现出替代、互补及互嵌等多种特征,使得单一的“替代”说或“互补”论均缺乏足够的解释力。本文从交易费用角度将交易关系分为三种类型并指出企业和市场谁更有利于交易费用的节约,主要取决于交易品的特征以及交易本身的具体职能。企业其实是一种通过非人力资本和人力资本、人力资本和人力资本间相互交易以实现生产功能的特殊履约机制。这样就不难理解,只有部分交易可以通过企业与市场间的相互替代来提高效率,而更多的交易则须通过改善企业内部管理或改进市场制度本身来提高其效率。     

Strategic incentive in mixed oligopoly

This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type, or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market. Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision.     

连锁经营共生机制探究

从消费者角度出发,分析连锁经营共生机制及成功条件后就会发现,连锁经营共生会降低消费者在选购过程中的交易成本和选择成本。由于连锁经营厂商选择具有合适条件的其他品牌相互作用、相互影响构成共生体,因而能够提高共生体品牌信用度,降低消费者选择成本,提高连锁经营厂商市场需求量。连锁经营共生成功的条件有二:第一,连锁经营厂商就近选择与自身品类相匹配的共生客体品牌;第二,连锁经营厂商尽量选择具有高品牌信用度或高于自身品牌信用度的共生客体品牌。连锁经营共生案例也验证了相关结论的正确性。     

Price or Quantity? A New Irrelevance Result for Mixed Markets

Earlier studies for mixed markets have established a series of so‐called irrelevance results. While previous results relate to the attainment of the first‐best allocation for welfare, we provide a new irrelevance result in terms of the choice of strategic variable in the product market. We show that regardless of whether a public or private firm is the market leader, the leader always chooses the price contract whereas the follower is indifferent between the price contract and the quantity contract. The identity of the leader and the follower firm is therefore irrelevant for the equilibrium mode of competition. Implications for economic models in mixed market settings emerge, which are also discussed.     

企业:一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织

本文沿着科斯的思路 ,把企业理解为一种人力资本使用权交易的粘性组织。企业用权威关系替代价格机制 ,而权威关系能够减少交易费用的原因在于“组织粘性”的存在。企业是一种有粘性的契约 ,而市场是一种无粘性的契约。企业的组织粘性把关键员工和企业联在一起 ,并使企业在引入企业家才能时有更低的临界交易效率。企业的边界由交易费用和组织粘性共同决定。     

科斯《企业的性质》之质疑

企业是资源所有者的取得更多的收益而建立起来的经济组织，交易成本的存在并不是企业存在的根本原因，科斯将企业定义为不同于价格调节机制的企业家计划调节机制，源于其错将企业计划混同于计划经济，事实上，企业是以市场合约为基础形成的，按市场运行原则运作的市场性组织，其资源配置并不独立于市场价格机制之外，价格调节机制与企业家调节机制是不可分割的两个方面，任何企业作为市场参与者与市场都是互动的。     

Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly

This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.     

Endogenous Choice of Strategic Contracts in a Mixed Duopoly with Bargaining Over Managerial Delegation Contracts

We revisit the endogenous choice problem of strategic contracts for the public firm and the private firm in a managerial mixed duopoly with differentiated goods. We consider the situation wherein the managerial delegation contracts are determined by maximising social welfare within the public firm, which is equal to the objective function of its owner, and through bargaining over the content of managerial delegation contracts between the owner and manager within the private firm. We show that, in equilibrium, when the manager of the private firm has high bargaining power relative to that of the owner, the public firm chooses a price contract, while the private firm chooses a quantity contract. However, there is no equilibrium market structure under the pure strategic contract class when the manager has sufficiently low bargaining power relative to that of the owner.     

LONG‐TERM AND SHORT‐TERM CONTRACT IN A MIXED MARKET*

With a two‐period mixed oligopolistic framework, this paper analyses the interaction between the length of incentive contracts and market behaviour. Assuming an environment in which firms choose either a long‐term or short‐term contract, we examine how contracts differ between public and private firms. The results show that the contracts would differ completely among firms; public firm prefers to make a short‐term contract while private firm makes a long‐term contract.     

Oligopolistic Competition, Technology Innovation, and Multiproduct Firms

Firms' proliferation behavior in a differentiated product market is studied using an oligopolistic competition model with multiproduct firms. The model has the following characteristics: (1) the elasticity of substitution across firm's own products and the elasticity of substitution across different firms are allowed to differ; (2) the product managers of the same firm behave cooperatively rather than independently; (3) the number of firms is determined by a free-entry condition and so is endogenous. If the elasticity of substitution across the firm's own products increases, it is shown that the firm proliferates less and the number of firms in the market increases. If the elasticity of substitution across different firms increases, firms proliferate more and the number of firms in the market decreases.