THE RESPONSE OF STATE‐OWNED ENTERPRISES TO IMPORT COMPETITION: EVIDENCE FROM CHINESE MANUFACTURING FIRMS

We examine the wage and employment impact on Chinese firms of an increase in import competition associated with China's WTO accession in December 2001, with an emphasis on state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that both wage and employment are negatively impacted by an increase in import competition, but firms with high state ownership cut employment less and reduce wages more than their private counterparts, suggesting that they prioritize the protection of employment over that of wages. This finding supports the notion that SOEs may have ‘multitask’ responsibilities in terms of protecting employment as well as achieving efficiency. We also find that firms with higher capital intensity reduce their wages less but cut employment more in response to intensified import competition. This provides empirical support for the efficiency wage theory.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

Local Government Debt and Firm Leverage: Evidence from China

China's local government debt financing has been expanded aggressively to support infrastructure investment, especially since the enactment of four‐trillion‐yuan stimulus plan to stimulate the economy post global financial crisis. At the same time, the rapid increase of firm‐level leverage ratio of state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and the decline of leverage ratio of non‐SOEs jointly deteriorated China's credit misallocation problem. In this study, we empirically test the effect of local government debton firm leverage in China. We find that an expansion of local government debt significantly crowded out the leverage of non‐SOEs, while crowded in that of SOEs. Moreover, the effect differed across industries and sectors.     

The political economy of tariff protection in China: evidence from the WTO accession

We analyze China's tariff rates at WTO accession using a political economy approach. A model drawing on Branstetter and Feenstra ( 2002 ) is used to derive an optimal tariff rate for each industry. The model predicts that a government would set a high tariff rate if an industry is of large state‐owned enterprise (SOE) share, multinational share, or small foreign import share. From the model we reveal the Chinese government's preference towards different interest groups under the binding tariff constraint from the WTO commitments. The estimated structural parameters imply that the political weights on both the SOE profits and consumer income diminish with the economic opening. More important, the government still favours SOEs over consumer income. Our findings are consistent with the special features of China's economy.     

Male–female wage discrimination in Chinese industryInvestigation using firm‐level data1

We use firm‐level data to analyze male–female wage discrimination in China's industry. We find that there is a significant negative association between wages and the share of female workers in a firm's labour force. However, we also find that the marginal productivity of female workers is significantly lower than that of male workers. Comparing wage gaps and productivity gaps between men and women, we notice an intriguing contrast between state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms. The wage gap is smaller than the productivity gap in SOEs, while the converse is true for private firms. These results suggest that women in the state sector receive wage premiums, whereas women in the private sector face wage discrimination.     

Evaluating Partial Reforms in the Chinese State Industrial Sector: a stochastic frontier cost function approach

China's phenomenal economic growth since 1979 is seen by many as a challenge to the belief that the clarification of property rights is a necessary step of successful transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Instead of mass and rapid privatization, reforms in the Chinese state industrial sector in the 1980s were attempted to reconstruct the incentive structure of enterprises by linking rewards to performance, expanding managerial freedom and exposing enterprises to market influences. This paper investigates the extent to which the partial reforms have transformed the behaviour and performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Using a panel of observations on 769 SOEs from ten manufacturing industries during 1980 and 1989, a stochastic cost frontier function is estimated to measure the effect of various reform measures on both technical and allocative efficiency. We found that the average cost efficiency level increased by 1.18% per annum during the decade. The efficiency effects of the industrial reform programme are mixed. While performance-related bonuses and market competition appear to have had the intended impact, there is evidence that devolution of decision-making power to the firm level has led to deterioration in efficiency. Therefore, although the partial reforms have met with some success, the issue of an adequate structure of incentives for SOEs remains unresolved.     

The impact of Africa‐China's diplomatic visits on bilateral trade

This article documents that African leaders’ state visits to China could stimulate China's exports to Africa in capital intensive manufacturing goods. We further find that state visits significantly increase official aid and exports by state‐owned enterprises to African countries which contribute to the trade growth after state visits.     

Pyramidal structure,risk‐taking and firm value

This article investigates the relationship among pyramidal layers, risk‐taking and firm value using a sample of local state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find that state‐pyramidal layers have a positive and significant impact on firm risk‐taking and firm value, suggesting that the pyramidal structure formed by the state protects SOEs from political intervention. Risk‐taking is conducive to enhancing firm value and is one of the important channels through which state‐pyramidal layers increase firm value. By exploring the role of state‐pyramidal organizational structures in improving SOEs' risk‐taking, our results contribute to both corporate governance and corporate finance literature.     

Intra‐industry Knowledge Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in Research and Development: Evidence from China's “Silicon Valley”

This study examines a specific channel of technology diffusion from multinational enterprises to domestic firms in less developed regions: research and development (R&D) activities of multinational enterprises in the host country. Using firm‐level panel data from a Chinese science park, known as China's “Silicon Valley,” we find that the R&D stock of foreign‐owned firms has a positive effect on the productivity of domestic firms in the same industry, while the capital stock of foreign firms has no such effect. These results suggest that foreign firms' knowledge spills over within industries through their R&D activities, but not through their production activities. In addition, we find no evidence of spillovers from domestic firms or firms from Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan, suggesting that the size of knowledge spillovers is larger when the technology gap between source and recipient firms is larger.     

Understanding china's economic performance

Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have emerged to interpret China's rapid growth since 1978: the experimentalist school and the convergence school. The experimentalist school attributes China's successes to the evolutionary, experimental, and incremental nature of China's reforms. Specifically, the resulting non-capitalist institutions are claimed to be successful in (a) agriculture where land is not owned by the fanners; (b) township and village enterprises (TVEs) which are owned collectively by rural communities; and (c) state owned enterprises (SOEs) where increased competition and increased wage incentive, but not privatization, have been emphasized.

The convergence school holds that China's successes are the consequences of its institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market economies, and that China's economic structure at the start of reforms is a major explanation for the rapid growth. China had a high population density heavily concentrated in low-wage agriculture, a condition that was favorable for labor-intensive export-led growth in other parts of East Asia. The convergence school also holds that China's gradualism results primarily from a lack of consensus over the proper course, with power still divided between market reformers and old-style socialists; and that the “innovative” non-capitalist institutions are responses to China's political circumstances and not to its economic circumstances.

Perhaps the best test of the two approaches is whether China's policy choices are in fact leading to institutions harmonized with normal market economies or to more distinctive innovations. In this regard, the recent policy trend has been towards institutional harmonization rather than institutional innovation, suggesting that the government accepts that the ingredients for a dynamic market economy are already well-known.     

Domestic segment of global value chains in China under state capitalism

This paper studies the relationship between the changing domestic segment of global value chains and the return of state capitalism in China. To this end, we propose a method to estimate an extended input-output (IO) table that tracks inter-sector transactions between different types of firms in a domestic economy. The method is an application of constrained optimization, which relies on basic information from a country's national IO table, as well as sector- and firm-level data. We also propose a way to construct bootstrapped standard errors for any global value chain (GVC) measures estimated from the extended IO tables. We then use the extended IO table to study the domestic segment of GVC in China. We find that, not only is state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) domestic value-added to gross exports ratio much higher than those of other firms, but it also increased significantly from 1.2 in 2007 to 1.7 in 2010. Our findings suggest that, even after years of privatization, SOEs still play an important role in shaping China's exports.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.     

Does competition cause government decentralization? The case of state-owned enterprises

This paper examines the causal effects of competition on governments’ incentives in decentralizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By using the shocks to product market competition caused by China's trade liberalization, we find that competition substantially improves SOEs’ decentralization. Furthermore, we also provide evidence of the incentive to exploit local information and roll out an alternative interpretation that government divests itself of SOEs because they become burdensome. Finally, we find that the effect of competition on decentralization is augmented when governments are geographically distant from their SOEs or when SOEs are located in regions characterized by low social trust, high dialect diversity, or heavy pressure for economic growth.     

Outward foreign direct investment by Polish state-owned multinational enterprises: is ‘stateness’ an asset or a burden?

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are commonly associated with undue advantages due to preferential treatment by the state. Simultaneously they are often quoted as handicapped given the notorious state interference, management problems and agency tensions. They used to be regarded as a mainly domestic issue but in the context of globalisation and the fact that states enter treaties with new obligations, SOEs’ performance ceased to be solely a domestic problem, increasingly so as state-owned multinational enterprises (SOMNEs) emerge. This article presents the results of research on Polish SOEs’ outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). It offers an overview of overseas activities of nine major Polish firms with a state stake and aims to contribute to the conceptual literature on foreign investments conducted by SOMNEs. We distinguish between FDI by SOMNEs as specific – privileged (facilitated) or discriminated (hampered) – investments subject to the home country’s state power and the host country’s state perception.     

Formal and real ownership structure of the Polish economy: state-owned versus state-controlled enterprises

This article analyses the difference between the state’s formal and real shares in the Polish economy. We identify two basic types of corporate control exercised by the state over enterprises through ownership (in the case of majority ownership) and non-ownership tools (in the case of minority ownership). Consequently, we distinguish between two types of state enterprises: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-controlled enterprises (SCEs). In post-communist economies, SCEs mainly originate from so-called reluctant privatisation, in which the transfer of ownership rights takes place without the appropriate transfer of control rights. We discuss the tools of non-ownership control used by the state. Our estimates of the real share of state enterprises in the Polish economy (which include both SOEs and SCEs) show that it is almost two times higher than the formal share (only SOEs). The share of state enterprises is also highest in the group of Poland’s largest and most important firms. We conclude that the real importance of state enterprises in the Polish economy is much higher than might be expected if only the formal share of state ownership is taken into account.     

DOES MARKET‐ORIENTED ECONOMIC TRANSITION ENHANCE ENTERPRISE PRODUCTIVITY? EVIDENCE FROM CHINA'S ENTERPRISES

Using a panel of China's enterprises from 1999 to 2007, this paper examined how market‐oriented economic transition affects the productivity of China's enterprises given the various stages of enterprises in the commercialization process and given the market segmentation among Chinese different regions. The main findings are that: (i) enterprises with higher degrees of commercialization have relatively higher productivity, whereas enterprises with higher degrees of market segmentation have relatively lower productivity; (ii) the commercialization process and market segmentation act indirectly affect productivity through enterprises' capacity to export, innovate and obtain business loans; and (iii) the indirect effects are found to be significantly different between the commercialization process and market segmentation, highlighting the effects of the market‐oriented economic transition on enterprises' productivity. This paper provides reliable enterprise‐level evidence regarding the sources and evolution of enterprise productivity during different stages of market‐oriented economic transition in China.     

RISING WAGES: HAS CHINA LOST ITS GLOBAL LABOR ADVANTAGE?

We document dramatic rising wages in China for the period 1978–2007 based on multiple sources of aggregate statistics. Although real wages increased seven‐fold during the period, growth was uneven across ownership types, industries and regions. Over the past decade, the wages of state‐owned enterprises have increased rapidly and wage disparities between skill‐intensive and labour‐intensive industries have widened. Comparisons of international data show that China's manufacturing wage has already converged to that of Asian emerging markets, but China still enjoys enormous labour cost advantages over its neighbouring developed economies. Our analysis suggests that China's wage growth will stabilize to a moderate pace in the near future.     

The impact of China's millennium labour restructuring program on firm performance and employee earnings1

Around the turn of the century, China experienced perhaps the largest labour restructuring program in the world. This paper uses a new dataset of Chinese industrial enterprises to examine what leads to downsizing, and tries to understand the effects of labour downsizing on firms’ technical efficiency, financial performance and employee wages. We find that downsizing is more prevalent in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), and is more likely when enterprises are older, larger and have higher excess capacity. For both SOEs and private firms, downsizing is more likely when the prices of their products drop, but private firms respond more dramatically. Moreover, downsizing has serious short‐term costs in terms of total factor productivity (TFP). For mild downsizing, private firms suffer more deterioration in productivity. The distribution of surplus after downsizing is more favourable to labour in SOEs. For severe downsizing, both SOEs and private firms exhibit lower TFP growth with similar magnitudes. Our findings imply that private firms emphasize profit goals, while SOEs place a greater weight on labour protection.     

Foreign Exchange Accumulation and the Entrapment of Chinese Monetary Power: Towards a Balanced Growth Regime?

This article criticises the notion that China's foreign exchange reserves have strengthened its monetary power. While some scholars have argued that China's international monetary influence has been ‘entrapped’ by the domestic interests of its export sector, a one-sided focus on the export sector fails to identify the significant constraints on its macroeconomic autonomy. This article proposes an extension of the concept of entrapment that draws attention to the key role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their domestic fixed-asset investment in its growth regime: China's external monetary dependency – which is understood as both export dependency and the need to maintain foreign exchange accumulation – has been caused by a disparity between fixed-asset investment and private consumption that reflects a redistribution of income from the household sector to the SOE sector. In particular, I expose the SOE sector's rising interests in foreign exchange accumulation by uncovering a mutually reinforcing dynamic between China's external monetary dependence and the financial repression of its banking system. By entrenching an investment-led growth regime that provides key benefits the SOE sector, this dynamic is found to have seriously constrained the macroeconomic policy autonomy of Chinese authorities to rebalance growth away from investments and exports towards private consumption.     

China's Capital and ‘Hot’ Money Flows: An Empirical Investigation

We examine time‐series characteristics of China's capital flows during 1998–2014. More specifically, we employ Kalman filtering state‐space models to gauge the relative importance of permanent and transitory components in China's overall foreign direct investment (FDI), equity, bond, other investment and bank credit flows. Our results show that only in the case of FDI are both gross inflow and net flow dominated by a permanent stochastic level, suggesting that this source of capital is largely permanent. Incorporating covariates into the state‐space models, we find that a larger difference between onshore and offshore renminbi interest rates encourages capital inflows that are dominated by a transitory component. Greater global risk perception, proxied by S&P 500's volatility index, in contrast, discourages them. These covariates imply that capital control may not be effective in stemming volatile and speculative flows. Our results on bilateral capital flows between China and the USA also suggest that these flows are less persistent and more volatile during 1998–2014 than previously found based on 1988–1997 data. Our results bear important policy implications as China engages in further reforms in its domestic financial system and greater integration with the world financial system.