Tax Competition and Economic Integration

This article examines the role of tax competition and economic integration in a core–periphery setting, where agglomeration forces are present. I present a New Economic Geography model, which accounts for firm entry/exit and international mobility of skilled labor employed in the public R&D sectors. In contrast to other literature on tax competition, I focus on its impact on labor migration and net earnings of skilled and unskilled labor. Economic integration is modeled as trade liberalization, an easing of factor mobility restrictions and technology diffusion. I find that tax competition favors skilled labor when trade costs are reduced. In contrast, unskilled labor benefits when factor mobility restrictions are eased and technology diffusion is enhanced.     

The Optimal Asymptotic Income Tax Rate

This paper shows that a policy maker needs only two types of information to set the optimal income tax rate at the top: a measure of labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution. We find that the asymptotic tax rate is not affected by the degree of inequality aversion as long as the marginal utility of consumption converges to zero. By using empirically plausible estimates for the compensated labor supply elasticity and the shape of skills distribution, we find that the optimal marginal tax rate at the top should be between 33% and 60%, which is in line with the existing rates in the real world.     

Second‐Best Taxation of Incomes and Non‐Labor Inputs in a Model with Endogenous Wages

This paper considers a Mirrleesian optimal income tax model wherein labor inputs are not perfect substitutes and their wages are determined endogenously. It shows: (i) If skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth complements, skilled workers will necessarily face a marginal subsidy and unskilled workers a marginal tax on their incomes (these may not be the case if skilled and unskilled workers are Edgeworth substitutes); and (ii) redistributive concerns call for taxation of those inputs whose elasticity of complementarity with skilled labor is larger than with unskilled labor, and subsidization of those whose elasticity of complementarity is smaller.     

Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?*

This paper concerns optimal nonlinear labor income taxation in an economy with union wage setting and endogenous hours of work. The purpose is to study the determinants of tax progression. We show that the optimal degree of progression of the labor income tax depends on the extent to which the government can influence the wage rate via tax policy as well as on its ability to redistribute income across individuals. In addition, the argument for progressive labor income taxation depends on whether hours of work are chosen by the employed themselves or the union.     

The optimal public employment policy

This paper studies optimal public employment in a model with two types of labor, unskilled and skilled, and a single consumption good. A linear income tax is used to redistribute income. It is shown that, if the income tax and public employment levels are optimal, then there is less unskilled labor and more skilled labor in public production than is necessary to minimize costs at the prevailing gross wage rates. The robustness of this result is investigated by examining a second model.     

Nutritional efficiency wages and child labor

This paper formally analyzes the incidence of child labor by employing an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model of a small open economy. An individual's ability determines whether or not he/she becomes a skilled worker. The supply side of the economy is composed of two sectors: a modern sector that produces a homogeneous good using skilled labor and physical capital; and an agrarian sector that produces a traditional good using unskilled adult labor, child labor, and land. An increase in foreign direct investment and improvements in education reduce the incidence of child labor. Emigration of skilled (unskilled) workers reduces (raises) the supply of child labor, while trade sanctions reduce the demand for child labor. Child wage subsidies have an ambiguous effect on the incidence of child labor while education subsidies are effective in reducing the incidence of child labor. Simulation analysis is used to investigate the welfare effects of the aforementioned policies.     

An Analysis of Income Distribution between the North and the South: the Grossman–Helpman and Lai Results Re‐examined*

This paper studies the effects of labor supply on relative wages in a dynamic North–South model of trade. Lai (1995 )—a generalization of the Grossman and Helpman (1991a,b , ch. 11) models—showed that the relative wage of skilled (unskilled) labor in a region is positively (negatively) related to the supply of skilled (unskilled) labor in that region. These surprising results depend crucially on the specification of the functional form of the Southern imitation activity. We will show that these results (except for the relative wage of unskilled labor in Lai) are reversed in the case where the productivity of imitation depends only on the number of products the North manufactures.     

Age‐related Optimal Income Taxation*

In most countries, average income varies with age. In this paper we investigate if and how it is possible to enhance the redistributive mechanism by relating tax payments to age. Using an OLG model where some individuals are low skilled all their life while others are low skilled when young but high skilled when old, we first show how an age dependent optimal income tax can Pareto improve upon an age independent income tax. We then characterize the optimal age dependent income tax. A tax on interest income is part of the optimal tax structure.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

Asymptotic Marginal Tax Rate of Individual Income Tax in China

This paper examines the asymptotic marginal rate of individual income tax which maximizes China's social welfare through numerical simulation based on the elasticity of China's labor supply, income distribution and the social objectives of redistribution in accordance with the optimal direct taxation theory. Taking advantage of the optimal direct taxation model with consideration of the income effect, it comes to the conclusion that combined with China's reality, the asymptotic marginal rate of individual labor income tax in China should be between 35% and 40%.     

Public investment criteria under optimal nonlinear income taxation without commitment

In this study, we highlight that the incredibility of the government's commitment to a certain tax policy is a determinant of production inefficiency. We show that if the government cannot commit to a certain tax policy and if the types of taxpayers are completely separated, then the production efficiency theorem could be violated in an optimal solution. In this case, an incremental unit of public or private capital affects taxpayers' labor supply through wage rates. In a situation where public capital is more (less) complementary to labor than private capital, public investment tightens (relaxes) the incentive compatibility constraint more than private investment.     

Trade,environment, and income inequality: An optimal taxation approach

In a small open economy, how should a government pursuing both environmental and redistributive objectives design domestic taxes when redistribution is costly? And how does trade liberalization affect the economy's levels of pollution and inequalities, when taxes are optimally and endogenously adjusted? Using a general equilibrium model under asymmetric information with two goods, two factors (skilled and unskilled labor), and pollution, this paper characterizes the optimal mixed tax system (nonlinear income tax and linear commodity and production taxes/subsidies) with both production and consumption externalities. While optimal income taxes are not directly affected by environmental externalities, conditions are derived under which under‐ or over‐internalization of social marginal damage is optimal for redistributive considerations. Assuming that redistribution operates in favor of the unskilled workers and that the dirty sector is intensive in unskilled labor, simulations suggest that trade liberalization involves a clear trade‐off between the reduction of inequalities and the control of pollution when the source of externality is only production; this is not necessarily true with a consumption externality. Finally, an increase in the willingness to redistribute income toward the unskilled results paradoxically in less pollution and more income inequalities.     

The Impact of Income Taxation on the Labor Supply of Part-time and Full-time Workers

This paper estimates the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of part-time and full-time workers in the United States. Using a model that incorporates the endogeneity of the net wage rate and the virtual income, and correcting for self-selection into part-time and full-time jobs, the results indicate that part-time workers are relatively more responsive to changes in income tax than full-time workers. Estimated wage elasticities are relatively larger for part-time than for full-time workers.The simulation results indicate that income tax has a disincentive effect on both part-time and full-time workers, with part-time and full-time workers reducing their labor supply by 0.87 and 0.58 hours, respectively, if a 5% tax is imposed. However, the percentage reduction in hours of work is very small, and a tax policy may have little effect on the labor supply of workers.The results seem to suggest that female and black part-time workers are more likely to drop out of the labor force at higher levels of income tax. It also tests the hypothesis that the labor supply behavior of parttime and full-time workers differs.The test results indicate that the determinants of the labor supply of part-time workers are different from those of full-time workers. It is noted that there is a significant difference between the labor supply of male part-time and female parttime workers, as well as between the black part-time and white part-time workers. In order to reduce voluntary unemployment in market activities among married females and blacks, the government can encourage part-time work by sponsoring legislation or instituting a scheme that will allow part-time workers to pay relatively less in payroll taxes.     

效率与公平兼顾的最优所得税:理论框架及最优税率估计

最优所得税主要探讨税收如何兼顾公平与效率问题,以及给定公平偏好程度下,如何确定最优边际税率水平。即使在崇尚罗尔斯社会福利函数的社会里,政府同时兼顾再分配和财政收入目标的基础上,只要略加考虑税收对劳动供给的效应,哪怕是微弱的考虑和兼顾,最高边际税率都不会达到100%。而且,借鉴斯特恩最优线性所得税模型及美国个人所得税制度,估计我国现行个人所得税最高边际税率还可以适当降低到36%左右。     

Supply-Side Economics of Germany's Year 2000 Tax Reform: A Quantitative Assessment

Abstract. The paper provides an assessment of supply‐side economics following Germany's year 2000 tax reform. Investigated are a corporate tax cut, deteriorating depreciation allowances and imputation rules, and a private income tax cut. For this purpose, a neoclassical growth model is augmented by various fiscal policy parameters and endogenous corporate finance and calibrated with German data. The model is used to evaluate consequences of Germany's tax reform on production, firm finance and leverage, investment, consumption and welfare of a representative household.     

Public Provision of Private Goods,Self‐Selection,and Income Tax Avoidance

Redistributive taxation should benefit those with low earnings capacity rather than those who choose a lower income to obtain tax savings. Several contributions have highlighted how public provision of work complements can discourage people from lowering labor supply to diminish taxable income. We show how tax avoidance, previously neglected, can alter the conclusions regarding public provision. Tax avoidance breaks the link between labor supply and reported income. An agent reducing his reported income to escape taxes might no longer forego a publicly provided labor complement, because he can now lower his income by avoiding more rather than working less.     

Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation

I develop a model in which altruistic agents vote over quadratic income tax schedules. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and productivities, and the model incorporates the incentive effects of taxation. The main result of the paper establishes the existence of a self-confirming majority rule equilibrium in which agents' labor supply decisions are optimal given their tax liabilities and the tax policy is a majority rule equilibrium given the labor supply decisions. In equilibrium the actions by all agents confirm their expectations, but such expectations may be incorrect out of equilibrium. The model generates majority rule voting equilibria that involve progressive taxation.     

Corporate profit tax,firm entry with unemployment,and income inequality

In this paper, we provide a general equilibrium analysis of corporate profit tax on income distribution, unemployment, and wage inequality. With firm dynamics in industrial sector, we identify a new channel through which profit tax affects income and wage inequality: profit tax cut will widen not only the wage gap between skilled and unskilled labor, but also exacerbate the wage inequality of unskilled labor among different sectors. The welfare effect of profit tax cut depends on unemployment deepening (labor-distortion effect) and more manufacturing firms enter the market (business-creation effect), eroding the market share of incumbent firms (business-stealing effect).     

Extensive and Intensive Margins of Exports and Labor Heterogeneity

This paper investigates how changes in skilled and unskilled labor supply affect different margins of exports. Using bilateral trade data in manufacturing sectors of 34 countries from 1995 to 2010, we find that most of the impact of skilled labor on exports goes through the intensive margin, whereas most of the effect of unskilled labor works through the extensive margin. These outcomes result from the impact of labor skill composition on the productivity cut‐off of exporters. We also find that the impact of skilled and unskilled labor on trade margins depends on the income level of countries and on the type of products. The results indicate that the effect of skilled labor is greater for low‐income countries and differentiated products, while that of unskilled labor is greater for high‐income countries and homogeneous products.     

社会保障税与社会保障制度优化

社会保障税是指定用于社会保障的工薪税。本文分析了工薪税的税收归宿和劳动供给弹性的影响。当劳动供给弹性较小时 ,税收主要由劳动力负担 ,而且可能会增加就业压力 ;工薪税在劳动同质程度较高时可以取得较好的再分配效应。本文还描述了社会保障制度优化的理论过程。社会保障制度优化是指现收现付计划和强制储蓄计划的最优搭配 ,它以“黄金律”条件下的隔代帕累托改进为标准。就同代收入再分配而言 ,将收入再分配计划的目标定为提高受益人的受教育水平 ,而不是直接为其提供免费的社会福利 ,将有助于缓解收入再分配的代价。