Context effects: A representation of choices from categories

This paper studies a model of reference-dependent choice from sets of options grouped into categories. The proposed model is consistent with experimental evidence documenting context effects in a variety of choice situations. In our model, the reference point for any given category is subjective, and corresponds to the least preferred element in the category under consideration. Every object in a category is evaluated relative to the corresponding reference point; this may distort the objective ranking of options across different categories, and thus possibly give rise to a context-effects bias. The resulting representation is essentially unique. We also provide an economic application of the preferences that we axiomatize to principal-agent models. We show how sellers facing consumers exhibiting the context-effects bias can increase their profits by exploiting their bounded rationality.     

Imperfect financial integration and asymmetric information: competing explanations of the home bias puzzle?

Abstract This paper shows that imperfect financial integration and informational asymmetries are not competing theories but rather complementary ideas to a single explanation of the home bias puzzle. We develop a rational expectations model of asset prices with investors that face informational constraints and find that informational advantages arise endogenously as a response to small financial frictions. We also present empirical evidence that (i) international financial frictions are correlated to observed patterns of US investors’ attention and that (ii) the attention US investors allocate to foreign stocks helps explain home bias towards those countries, even after controlling for financial integration levels.     

A note on internal and external reference in efficiency wage models

According to Bewley, a workers’ morale depends on being treated fairly within firms. This implies that the internal comparison of the own wage with wages paid to other workers within the firm affects individual effort determination. By contrast, the standard efficiency wage models only consider a comparison of the own wage with external income opportunities as the only determinant for individual effort. We provide a simple efficiency wage framework in which both the internal and external perspectives can affect individual effort determination. Our framework suggests that the internal reference is essential for the existence of real wage rigidity while the external reference ensures an upward-sloping wage-setting curve.      

The shadow of death model revisited with an application to French firms

This article provides an empirical model of the shadow of death in which the exit probability of a firm depends on the firm’s productive performance and the firm’s level of sunk costs, which are viewed as barriers to exit. The shadow of death effect is treated by assuming a relationship between the propensity to exit and both the contemporaneous and lagged values of efficiency and sunk costs. To estimate the unobserved productive efficiency, we use the Ackerberg et al. (2006) estimator extended by the addition of a correction for selection bias. We use an unbalanced sample of approximately 100 000 French firms over the period 1997 to 2002. Our results indicate that the probability of exit is negatively affected by unobserved individual efficiency and the level of sunk costs. The shadow of death effect applies mainly in manufacturing, where both productive efficiency and sunk costs decrease during several years before exit. In service sectors, the exit process seems to occur more suddenly.     

Cointegration analysis for cross-sectionally dependent panels: The case of regional production functions

This paper employs recently developed non-stationary panel methodologies that assume cross-section dependence to estimate a production function for Italian regions over the 1970–2003 period. The analysis consists of three steps. First, unit root tests for cross-sectionally dependent panels are applied. Second, the existence of a cointegrating relationship among value added, physical capital and human capital-augmented labour is investigated, fully allowing for cross-section dependence. Then, the appropriate Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square estimators developed by Bai and Kao [Bai, J., Kao, C. 2006. On the Estimation and Inference of a Panel Cointegration Model with Cross-Sectional Dependence. In: B.H. Baltagi (Ed) Panel Data Econometrics: Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Applications, Elsevier Science: Amsterdam; 2006, pp.3–30.] are used to estimate the long-run relationship. We find that neglecting cross-section dependence can have a strong impact on the estimated long-run input elasticities, generally imparting them an upward bias.     

Aggregation of Directional Distance Functions and Industrial Efficiency

Three main objectives are pursued in this paper. First, we intend to analyze the aggregation problem of directional distance functions from a constructive viewpoint. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions concerning the structural properties of the production technology and of the nature of groups of firms. Indeed, exact additive aggregation holds for a linear technology and for a direction solely defined in the output space. Second, since these conditions are somewhat restrictive, we are interested in providing a measure for the aggregation bias through the relationship between industrial and structural technical efficiency. Finally, we show that this aggregation bias is a lower bound for industrial allocative efficiency.     

The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.     

Manipulation through political endorsements

We study elections with three candidates under plurality voting. A candidate is a Condorcet loser if the majority of the voters place that candidate at the bottom of their preference rankings. We first show that a Condorcet loser might win the election in a three-way race. Next we introduce to the model an endorser who has private information about the true probability distribution of the preferences of the voters. Observable endorsements facilitate coordination among voters who may otherwise split their votes and lead to the victory of the Condorcet loser. When the endorser has an ideological bias towards one of the candidates, the coordination impact of endorsements remains unaltered, moreover the endorser successfully manipulates the outcome of the election in favor of his bias, even if his ideological bias is known by the voters. The results are true for any endorsement cost and any magnitude of bias as long as the electorate is large enough.     

On the Effect of Skewness and Kurtosis Misspecification on the Hedging Error

Using a result in Angelini and Herzel (2009a) , we measure, in terms of variance, the cost of hedging a contingent claim when the hedging portfolio is re‐balanced at a discrete set of dates. We analyse the dependence of the variance of the hedging error on the skewness and kurtosis as modeled by a Normal Inverse Gaussian model. We consider two types of strategies, the standard Black–Scholes Delta strategy and the locally variance‐optimal strategy, and we perform some robustness tests. In particular, we investigate the effect of different types of model misspecification on the performance of the hedging, like that of hedging without taking skewness into account. Computations are performed using a Fast Fourier Transform approach.     

Overconfidence as a social bias: Experimental evidence

The overconfidence bias is discussed extensively in economic studies, yet fails to hold experimentally once monetary incentives and feedback are implemented. We consider overconfidence as a social bias. For a simple real effort task, we show that, individually, economic conditions effectively prevent overconfidence. By contrast, the introduction of a very basic, purely observational social setting fosters overconfident self-assessments. Additionally, observing others’ actions effectively eliminates underconfidence compared to the individual setting.     

Income distributions and decomposable divergence measures

Inequality indices evaluate the divergence between the income distribution and the hypothetical situation where all individuals receive the mean income, and are unambiguously reduced by a Pigou–Dalton progressive transfer. This paper proposes a new approach to evaluate the divergence between any two income distributions, where the latter can be a reference distribution for the former. In the case where the reference distribution is perfectly egalitarian – and uniquely in this case – we assume that any progressive transfer reduces the divergence, and that the divergence can be additively separated into inequality and efficiency loss. We characterize the unique class of decomposable divergence measures consistent with these views. We derive the associated relative and absolute subclasses, and we illustrate the applicability of our results. This approach extends the generalized entropy studied in inequality measurement.     

Gender Power,Fertility, and Family Policy

The birth of children often shifts the balance of power within a family. If family decisions are made according to the welfare function of the spouses, this shift in power might cause a time‐consistency problem. In a model of cooperative family decision‐making, we show that this problem can lead to a systematic downward bias in fertility. By keeping fertility low, spouses mitigate the ex ante undesired shift in the balance of power that results from the presence of children. This provides scope for welfare‐enhancing policy intervention. We discuss to what extent existing family policy measures are suitable for overcoming the bias.     

A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries

We model voting in juries as a game of incomplete information, allowing jurors to receive a continuum of signals. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game, and give a condition under which no asymmetric equilibria exist under unanimity rule. We offer a condition under which unanimity rule exhibits a bias toward convicting the innocent, regardless of the size of the jury, and give an example showing that this bias can be reversed. We prove a “jury theorem” for our general model: As the size of the jury increases, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero for every voting rule except unanimity rule. For unanimity rule, the probability of making a mistake is bounded strictly above zero if and only if there do not exist arbitrarily strong signals of innocence. Our results explain the asymptotic inefficiency of unanimity rule in finite models and establishes the possibility of asymptotic efficiency, a property that could emerge only in a continuous model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72.     

Products and Productivity*

When firms make decisions about which product to manufacture at a more disaggregated level than observed in the data, measured firm productivity reflects both characteristics of the firm and attributes of the products that are non‐randomly chosen by the firm. This paper develops a model of industry equilibrium in which firms endogenously sort across products and characterizes the resulting bias in measured firm and aggregate productivity. Calibrating the model's parameters, we show that endogenous product selection can have quantitatively important effects on measured firm and aggregate productivity and their response to changes in parameter values.     

Who is Deprived? Who Feels Deprived? Labor Deprivation,Youth, and Gender in Morocco

The paper provides a method to better understand how objective conditions of deprivation are translated into subjective feelings of deprivation using a strand of the recent literature on relative deprivation, and applies this method to labor deprivation in Morocco. We postulate that gender norms are associated with identity and the reference group that people compare themselves with. We find that the reference group plays a pivotal role in understanding how feelings of labor deprivation are generated and this can explain the apparent mismatch between objective conditions of deprivation and subjective feelings of deprivation related to joblessness among young men and women. It can also potentially help governments design public policies that address objective conditions of deprivation, such as unemployment, with a better understanding of subjective implications.     

Home bias in divestment decisions of multinational corporations in the EU

We empirically investigate the claim that multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from a “home bias” in divestment decisions: MNCs prefer to divest from foreign subsidiaries because the “emotional involvement” and the commitment in divesting from domestic subsidiaries is larger. This issue has not been yet empirically explored in the economic literature, although it is quite recurrent in the political debate on MNCs and FDI. Using detailed company‐level data on the EU corporate groups during the economic crisis (2008–2014), we show that, in spite of prima facie empirical evidence of a home bias, the bias disappears when firm‐, country‐, and sector‐specific factors are accounted for.     

A comparative analysis of the change in R&D efficiency: a case of R&D leaders in the technology industry

This paper measures the cumulative change in research and development (R&D) efficiency of globally leading R&D companies in the technology industry. We use Data Envelopment Analysis /Malmquist index to analyse 49 such companies. The change in R&D efficiency is analysed by decomposing the Malmquist index into ‘catch-up’ and ‘frontier shift’ indices, and by comparing cumulative indices to those at the starting period. Those cumulative indices are obtained at both a firm and an industry level. Results indicate that the overall R&D efficiency of these globally leading R&D companies declined slightly during the period 2007–2013. At a firm level, this study determines in detail how the trend of each firm in R&D activities differs from other companies.     

THE INTERPLAY OF INEQUALITY AND REFERENCE DEPENDENCE WITH TRUST AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

Using a canonical trust game, we investigate whether the inequality of endowment between trustor and trustee and the acquired versus permanent financial state affect trust and trustworthiness. We found that trust and trustworthiness are reference‐dependent and that individuals with permanent financial state receive more trust and are more trustworthy than others. In our experiment, unequal endowments do not significantly affect trust, but trustworthiness increases significantly when the trustor is poorer.     

Does reference point matter in the leverage–return relationship? Evidence from the US stock market

The leverage–return relationship is supported by inconclusive empirical evidence in terms of its sign and significance. In this study, we argue that such a puzzling relationship can be understood by extending the traditional theoretical framework in a way that captures the reference dependence characteristics of prospect theory. We postulate that a firm’s leverage position relative to its reference point (i.e. target leverage) combined with market conditions places firms in either a gain or a loss domain, thereby resulting in different leverage–return relationships. Leverage and expected equity returns generally exhibit positive and negative relationships in gain and loss domains, respectively. Three hypotheses are derived and tested using 1998–2013 empirical data from the US stock market. This article contributes to the existing literature by confirming the applicability of prospect theory in explaining expected returns in the stock market.     

Testing the ‘Quiet Life’ Hypothesis in the Italian Banking Industry

In this paper we test the so‐called ‘quiet life’ hypothesis (QLH), according to which firms with market power are less efficient. Using data on the Italian banking industry for the period 1992–2007, we apply a two‐step procedure. First we estimate bank‐level cost efficiency scores and Lerner indices. Then we use the estimated market power measures, as well as a vector of control variables, to explain cost efficiency. Our empirical evidence supports the QLH, although the impact of market power on efficiency is not particularly remarkable in magnitude.