Leisure goods,education attainment and fertility choice

This paper proposes a novel mechanism for the fertility decline that occurred across the world since the late nineteenth century. It suggests that the rise in the cost of children relative to leisure goods in the process of development contributed to the decline in fertility. The paper develops a unified growth model in which children are substitutes for leisure goods in the parental utility function. The theory suggests that the rise in income, the decline in the relative price of leisure goods and the increase in educational attainment in the process of development speed up the demographic transition from high to low fertility and contributed to the transition from stagnation to growth.     

Does demographic change matter for growth?

How important is the demographic transition for economic growth? To answer this question, this paper constructs a general equilibrium overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. The model is calibrated to data from Taiwan, a country that experienced rapid economic growth while undergoing significant demographic transition. Our results suggest that more than one-third of the output growth in Taiwan during the past four decades can be attributed to demographic transition, while TFP growth explains another third and the remainder is mainly due to skill-biased technological progress. Our results show that demographic change is an important driver of the growth process in countries undergoing rapid fertility decline.     

The trade-off between fertility and education: evidence from before the demographic transition

The trade-off between child quantity and quality is a crucial ingredient of unified growth models that explain the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth. We present first evidence that such a trade-off indeed existed already in the nineteenth century, exploiting a unique census-based dataset of 334 Prussian counties in 1849. Furthermore, we find that causation between fertility and education runs both ways, based on separate instrumental-variable models that instrument fertility by sex ratios and education by landownership inequality and distance to Wittenberg. Education in 1849 also predicts the fertility transition in 1880–1905.     

Demographic links to savings in life cycle models: identification of issues for LDCs

The author considers the potential for a link between the recent pattern of demographic transition and intertemporal and inter-country variations in savings rates. Fertility, infant mortality, life expectancy, and levels of female and child labor force participation are among the various demographic factors which affect national savings rates through their effects upon age structure, age-specific individual savings behavior, and their general equilibrium effects upon interest rates, wage rates, and income distribution. The author establishes a simple discrete time life cycle model of savings, explains the issues related to age structure, and discusses the effect of age-specific savings functions, the general equilibrium effects of demographic factors, the effects of life expectancies and child mortalities, and the nature of social security coverages in less developed countries, as well as issues which are especially important for less developed countries. A new strategy for empirically evaluating demographic policies is proposed. That is, one can estimate the age profile of earnings, saving and fertility rates from household survey data. The life tables can then be used to compute the aggregate savings rate and population size. Any demographic policy which affects the fertility rate, life expectancy, and investment in the quality of children will change the aggregate saving and population growth rates. These two aggregate effects could be compared to evaluate demographic policies. The author stresses, however, that changes in different demographic factors will have different short-run and long-run effects upon the savings rate which will also depend upon whether such changes are transitory or permanent.     

Primary education and fertility rates

Unified growth theory advances that the transition from a Malthusian regime to sustained economic growth is characterized by technological progress and, amongst other things, by an increase in demand for human capital which in turn creates incentives for lower fertility rates. Bearing that in mind, I ask the question: has southern Africa escaped the Malthusian stagnation? Specifically, I study whether primary school completion rates have played any role in total fertility rates in all countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) during the 1980–2009 period. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the results, based on dynamic panel time‐series methods, suggest that primary education is associated with lower fertility in the SADC, or that the community is already trading‐off quantity for quality of children. Although I do not claim causality, overall the results are significant because, in accordance with unified growth theory, they suggest that the SADC is experiencing its own transition from the Malthusian stagnation epoch into sustained growth, or that the SADC is going through its own post‐Malthusian regime.     

The Galor–Weil model revisited: A quantitative exercise

The long-run growth model of Galor and Weil [Galor, O., Weil, D., 2000. Population, technology, and growth: From Malthusian stagnation to the demographic transition and beyond. American Economic Review 90, 806–829] is examined quantitatively. We first give parametric forms to some functions which were only given on general form in the original article. We then choose numerical parameter values in line with calibrations of related long-run growth models, and with data. Finally, we simulate the model. We find, inter alia, that the time paths for population, and other variables, display oscillatory behavior: they move in endogenous cycles. As the economy transits from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth these oscillations die out. This is consistent with population growth rates fluctuating considerably in historical data, but having stabilized in modern economies. We also show that these cycles are not an artifact of the two-period life setting: allowing adults to live on after the second period of life with some probability does not make the oscillations go away. Rather, the cycles are driven by fertility being proportional to per capita income minus the parental subsistence requirement. When population is large, and per capita incomes close to subsistence, fertility is therefore sensitive to changes in population levels.     

Demographic change,human capital accumulation and R&D‐based growth

Employing an overlapping generations model of R&D‐based growth with endogenous fertility and education decisions, we examine how demographic changes induced by an increase in life expectancy influence the long‐run growth rate of the economy. We demonstrate that life expectancy, when relatively low (high), positively (negatively) affects economic growth. This paper also compares the growth implications of child education subsidy policies (i.e., policies for enhancing basic education) and child rearing subsidy policies (i.e., pro‐natal policies) and demonstrate that while the child education subsidies consistently foster economic growth, child rearing subsidies may negatively affect economic growth.     

Barro's fertility equations: the robustness of the role of female education and income

Barro and Lee (1994) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find that real per-capita GDP and both male and female education have important effects on fertility in their cross-country empirical studies. In order to assess the robustness of their results, their estimated models are subjected to specification and diagnostic testing, the effects on the model of using the improved Barro and Lee (1996) cross-country data on educational attainment of the population aged 15 and over are examined, and the different specifications used by Barro and Lee and by Barro and Sala-i-Martin compared. The results obtained suggest that their fertility equations do not perform well in terms of diagnostic testing, and are very sensitive to the use of different vintages of the educational attainment proxies and of the Summers-Heston cross-country income data. A robust explanation of fertility, to link with empirical growth equations, has, therefore, not yet been found; further work is required in this area.     

Demographic Transition and Fertility Rebound in Economic Development*

Recent evidence on the “fertility rebound” offers credence to the idea that, from the onset of early industrialization to the present day, the dynamics of fertility can be represented by an N-shaped curve. An overlapping generations model with parental investment in human capital can account for these observed movements in fertility rates during the different stages of demographic change. A demographic transition with declining fertility emerges at the intermediate stage, when parents engage on a child quantity–quality trade-off. At later stages, however, the process of economic growth generates sufficient resources so that households can rear more children while still providing the desirable amount of education investment per child.     

The past and future of knowledge-based growth

This paper consolidates two previously disconnected literatures. It integrates R&D-based innovations into a unified growth framework with micro-founded fertility and schooling behavior. The theory suggests a refined view on the human factor in productivity growth. It helps to explain the historical emergence of R&D-based growth and the subsequent emergence of mass education and the demographic transition. The model predicts that the erstwhile positive correlation between population growth and innovative activity turns negative during economic development. This “population-productivity reversal” explains why innovative modern economies are usually characterized by low or negative population growth. Because innovations in modern economies are based on the education of the workforce, the medium-run prospects for future economic growth—when fertility is going to be below replacement level in virtually all developed countries—are better than suggested by conventional R&D-based growth theories.