Collective vs. individual lobbying

This paper presents a menu-auction model in which firms lobby the government to make an environmental regulation less burdensome. In this lobbying game, industrial interests are opposed by an environmental interest group. We compare political outcomes under two institutional arrangements. In the first, firms must join an organization that represents the interests of the industry. In the second, firms would lobby the government individually. The two arrangements result in strikingly different equilibrium outcomes. Only a small fraction of firms join the lobby group under collective lobbying, but all firms participate in lobbying activities when there is no such group. Thus, an attempt by firms to solve the apparent collective action problem through coordination would effectively backfire. The reason is that coordination among firms would increase the leverage available to the government, to demand high political contributions. We also evaluate the desirability of the two lobbying regimes from the private perspective of individual firms, and from the perspective of society as a whole. This permits us to evaluate possible restrictions on lobbying activities.     

ON THE EMERGENCE OF NON‐PROFIT FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT*

It is well known that many non‐profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non‐profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non‐profit firm emerges only when the residents’ median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non‐profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non‐essential.     

群体规范、集体行动发生与共享资源合作治理

特定群体面临共享资源自发治理的需求时,需要通过群体合作的集体行动来实现,因而集体行动的主要特征是共享资源治理的成本分摊和收益分享问题。本文从近年来逐渐受到重视的群体规范对于集体行动实现的影响机制入手,在清晰界定群体规范的含义基础上分析其在集体行动中的作用机制,并且通过模型说明群体规范的内生性形成问题,从而完整的得出群体规范促进集体行动实现的一般性理论,以期对当今社会和谐治理给出政策含义。     

产业集群内生性集体行动影响因素案例研究与效度检验

基于利益集团等多重主流理论视角和半开放性编码技术的部分探索性案例研究，发现产业集群内生性集体行动受到内生需求、长期导向、本地嵌入、政策激励、同行反应、协会治理、集群规模和集群类型等因素的综合影响。经因子分析和逐步回归等方法检验，上述影响因素组合具有较为理想的建构效度和效标效度。其中，内生需求、长期导向、本地嵌入、政策激励、同行反应和协会治理等属于正面激发因素，对集群企业参与内生性集体行动具有积极促进作用，而集群规模和集群类型等则属于负面阻碍因素，对集群企业参与内生性集体行动具有消极抑制作用。     

Equal treatment and socially optimal R&D in duopoly with one‐way spillovers

This paper examines the standard symmetric two‐period R&D model with a deterministic one‐way spillover structure: know‐how flows only from the high R&D firm to the low R&D firm (but not vice versa). Though firms are ex ante identical, one obtains a unique asymmetric equilibrium (pair) in R&D investments, leading to interfirm heterogeneity in the industry. R&D cooperation by means of a joint lab is considered and compared to the non cooperative solution. The main part of the paper provides a second‐best welfare analysis in which we show that the joint lab yields a socially optimal R&D level subject to an equal treatment (of firms) constraint, which also coincides with the noncooperative solution in the absence of spillovers. We also investigate the welfare costs of this equal treatment constraint and find that they can be quite significant.     

Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

COOPERATIVE FIRMS AND THE CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM SOME ITALIAN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES

We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to compare the behaviour of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003–2010 and 1994–2011 and we contrast co‐ops behaviour with the overall trend in the industries in which they operate. Our sample's evidence suggests that the cooperative's behaviour has a stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike profit‐maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment when facing shocks. Production co‐ops look better equipped than their profit‐maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have significantly increased their own equity during ‘good’ years instead of distributing large dividends to their members.     

Staggered wages,unanticipated shocks and firms’ adjustments

This paper empirically investigates the employment and wage effects of contract staggering, i.e., the asynchronous and infrequent way in which wages adjust to changes in the economic environment. Using an identification strategy based on exogenous start dates of collective agreements around the Great Recession, we estimate the effect of increases in base wages on firms’ labor cost adjustments. Our analysis is based on a large employers-employees dataset merged to collective agreements in the Netherlands, a country in which collective bargaining is dominant and contract staggering is relatively pervasive. The main result is that staggered wage setting has no real effect on employment. We find significant employment losses only in sectors covered by contracts with much longer durations than those normally assumed in macroeconomic models featuring staggered wages. Instead, we show that firms adjust labor costs by curbing other pay components such as bonuses and benefits and incidental pay. The overall result supports the idea that wage rigidities are not the main source of employment fluctuations.     

ARE COOPERATIVES MORE PRODUCTIVE THAN INVESTOR‐OWNED FIRMS? CROSS‐INDUSTRY EVIDENCE FROM PORTUGAL

We analyse empirically whether cooperatives and investor‐owned firms differ in terms of productive efficiency. Using rich Portuguese panel data covering a wide range of industries, we apply two different empirical approaches to estimate potential differences in productive efficiency. The results from our benchmark random‐effects model show that cooperatives are significantly less productive, on average, than investor‐owned firms, both at the aggregate level and for most of the industries considered. However, the results derived from a System‐GMM approach, which is our preferred empirical strategy, are much less conclusive, and we cannot conclude that cooperatives are generally less efficient that investor‐owned firms. With either approach, though, we find no evidence that cooperatives are more productive than investor‐owned firms in any industry.     

Collective knowledge production costs and the dynamics of technological systems

Technological knowledge can be understood as a collective good only when its production requires the absorption and integration of external knowledge. Such external knowledge is the outcome of R&D investments that cannot be fully appropriated by firms and generate spillovers. The exploitation of such knowledge spillovers requires specific investments in knowledge communication and absorption, which brings about specific costs. These costs are affected by the structural and dynamic characteristics of technological systems in terms of the knowledge base, the variety of actors and the communication infrastructures and processes. This paper analyzes the costs of collective knowledge production and their implications for the way in which the firm chooses the mix of internal and external knowledge. This choice in turn shapes the evolution of technological systems.     

OWNERSHIP,CONTROL, AGENCY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMS IN HEALTHCARE: INSIGHTS ON COOPERATIVES AND NON‐PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Many issues surrounding healthcare entities’ performance can be traced to their governance and ownership. Increasingly, public services are being provided by non‐profit organizations and/or cooperatives, particularly in the healthcare sector. This is not unproblematic. We draw on the conceptual separation of ownership and control, and the notion of firm ownership to derive a taxonomy of dimensions along which a contractual‐ and property rights theory of the firm can be structured, in order to determine the nature of firms’ differences. We utilize the taxonomy to illustrate important distinctions between non‐profit and cooperative firms in the primary healthcare sector and propose testable hypotheses. Funders and regulators must recognise the differences between these firms, if public funding of healthcare is to achieve the expected outcomes.     

A corporation’s culture as an impetus for spinoffs and a driving force of industry evolution

We offer a theory of spinoffs that explains some salient aspects of these important market entrants. In infant industries, a great share of new market opportunities is depleted by firms that spinoff from incumbents. A model emphasizing the relation between incumbents’ evolving corporate cultures and the generation of spinoffs explains this regularity in industry evolution. By doing so, we capture different patterns in firm development that finally will help explain the evolutionary paths that industries may follow. We show that organizations reach a critical size that entails the collapse of a cooperative culture and triggers the exodus of personnel founding own firms. Thereby, organizations with a cooperative culture active in a dynamic business environment provide ideal training grounds for potential founders. Moreover, we argue that cooperative firm cultures and processes of “entrepreneurial imprinting” are important sources of spinoffs’ superior capabilities concerning their later market performance. We relate our findings to empirical evidence on developmental patterns in industries, such as genealogies and performance of spinoffs.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

International Trade and Collective Bargaining Outcomes: Evidence from German Employer–Employee Data

In theoretical trade models with variable mark‐ups and collective wage bargaining, exposure to international markets might reduce the exporter wage premium. We test this prediction using linked German employer–employee data covering the years 1996–2007. To separate the rent‐sharing mechanism from assortative matching, we exploit individual worker information to construct profitability measures that are free of skill composition. Our results show that rent‐sharing is less pronounced in more export‐intensive firms or in more open industries. The exporter wage premium is highest for low‐productivity firms. In line with theory, these findings are unique to the subsample of plants covered by collective bargaining.     

Synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities: the effects of organisational slack and absorptive capacity

Firms undertaking independent and cooperative research and development (R&D) activities simultaneously often have difficulties to realise their synergistic effects. This study contends that such difficulties are caused by tensions between two types of R&D activities in terms of resource competition and knowledge leakage. Moreover, organisational slack and absorptive capacity may affect these tensions and thereby play important role in synergizing independent and cooperative R&D activities. Based on a survey data of 286 firms, this study finds that such two types of R&D activities jointly have a negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, organisational slack aids in synergizing them, while absorptive capacity has an adverse impact. These findings enrich our knowledge on the interrelation of independent and cooperative R&D activities and shed light on how firms can synergize them.     

COALITION FORMATION WITH LEARNING FROM PREDECESSORS: A CASE OF DYNAMIC POSITIVE EXTERNALITY

We consider a simple multi‐period model where the entry cost varies with respect to the number of firms that have entered previously. In the non‐cooperative outcome, there is clustered entry among the firms in the last period; hence, the full potential of learning is not expropriated. When firms are allowed to form coalitions, the non‐cooperative outcome is dominated; thus, there is a gain in efficiency. We also find that full efficiency is obtained when a grand coalition is formed. The implications of policies on coalitions as well as on individual firms are also discussed.     

A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.     

MORAL HAZARD AND LABOUR-MANAGED FIRMS IN ITALY AFTER THE LAW N. 142/2001

ABSTRACT ** :  Instead of focusing on the difference between a labour-managed (LMF) and a profit maximizing firm (PMF) in terms of final out-come and occupation, this paper considers the actual possibility for a firm to be financed from outside. A simple case of moral hazard in the credit market is analyzed. A bank, for limited funds, can finance one of two potential firms, a LMF or a PMF, both with similar project size. The Italian case is taken into account: the law n. 142/2001 has equalized the position of workers and members of a LMF as (own) firm creditors during a liquidation. This has an effect on the structure of creditors priorities in case a firm goes bankrupt and, in particular, on money-lenders likelihood of getting their loans back. It is argued that, before the law, the LMF had in general an advantage on the PMF, from banks viewpoint, for it faced a lower moral hazard problem on effort contribution. After the law, even though the direct consequence seems to be a draw back in LMF credit-worthiness, the model shows that, on given conditions, this type of firm remains more competitive as a bank borrower.