集群企业的合作绩效提升路径实证研究——以中关村高科技集群企业为例

战略合作已经成为集群企业竞争优势的重要来源。结合联盟理论的研究成果,基于对中关村高科技产业集群中78家IT企业的问卷调查数据,本文实证研究了企业间资源依赖性和关系质量对战略合作绩效的影响。研究表明,（1）在影响因素上,资源依赖性与关系质量（包括信任、承诺和沟通）均对合作绩效有显著正的影响;（2）在影响机制上,关系质量作为中介变量影响资源,依赖性与合作绩效的关系。     

中小企业协作网络:性质、特征与演进过程

运用新制度经济学的交易成本理论分析中小企业协作网络的经济性质,认为中小企业协作网络是一种比市场机制有效、比大型科层制组织灵活的中间组织形式,它能通过网络内企业之间重复交易产生的信任和承诺的协调,节约交易成本;我国的中小企业协作网络除具有一般企业网络的基本特征外,其网络结构呈现出浓厚的中国传统家族文化色彩。由于合作关系的复杂性,中小企业在加入网络的不同阶段都需要对协作中的风险进行谨慎的管理。     

纵向一体化:分工代价的视角

分工在促进效率提高的同时,却导致了企业和个人经济行为的异化,降低企业和个人的独立性.笔者从分工代价的视角讨论企业和员工进行纵向一体化的原因与条件,以期对纵向一体化行为给出了一个新的解释.在企业的生命周期结束而不得不转行时,专业化分工将迫使企业以及员工支付较高的转换成本,为了有效降低或者规避分工所导致的转换成本,企业和员工都将积极支持进行纵向一体化.     

从多元化到集中化：全球大型工业企业的经营战略演变

本文根据1980、1990和2000年的数据分析，发现在全球17个行业排名前12位的工业企业中，多元化：企业数量逐步减少，而集中化企业数量逐步上升。这种由美国企业主导的从多元化到集中化的战略变革，促使企业经营业务集中并获得市场份额的增长和竞争力的提升。这种战略演变源于追求绩效、集中于企业核心能力和简化企业组织的需要。同时全球化竞争以及机构股东的力量迫使多元化企业转向集中化经营。     

个体异质性与公共物品治理的关系研究

公共物品治理如何摆脱囚徒困境?研究者试图通过建立数理模型讨论个体异质性对公共物品治理成功的作用。梳理了个体异质性与公共物品治理的关系研究思路,基于前人的相关理论模型和实证工作,给出了公共物品治理中如何将个体间异质性纳入形式化讨论、并用经验现实予以检验的一个展望。     

核心高管特征与公司成长性关系研究——基于中国沪深两市上市公司数据的经验研究

本文以我国沪深两市2004—2006年的上市公司为样本,从核心高级管理人员的人力资本特征视角,对高管特征与上市公司成长性的关系进行了经验检验。本文发现,在其他条件不变的情况下,上市公司成长性与核心高管的平均年龄、平均任职时间显著相关,而与核心高管平均学历的相关性不显著。进一步的研究还表明,在国有控股公司和非国有控股公司中,核心高管特征与公司成长性的关系具有显著差异。本文的研究有助于深化认知人力资本特征在公司发展过程中的重要地位,对强化核心高管遴选、完善人力资源管理具有积极的借鉴意义。     

Financial constraints and cash–cash flow sensitivity

This article explores the cash–cash flow relationship by comparing financially constrained and financially unconstrained companies. Unlike previous research, we test the sensitivity of cash to cash flow by considering unlisted firms as constrained and listed firms as unconstrained. Our empirical evidence is based on findings from Spanish firms and is consistent with the core rationale that unlisted firms face more difficulties than their listed counterparts when looking for funding from external markets. As a result, unlisted firms tend to hoard significant amounts of cash out of the generated cash flow, while listed firms do not. Our findings are robust to a number of additional empirical tests.     

劳动新论

劳动的内涵深奥、复杂,外延很宽泛。笔者首创出三组概念：外化劳动与内化劳动、场内劳动与场外劳动、订制劳动与自主劳动。对劳动过程（价值形成过程）与生产过程、劳动与劳动力,以及工资与利润的性质做了新的阐释,并就劳动（价值）计量问题发表了独特看法。     

进口竞争与中国制造业就业动态：基于中国从美国进口的经验分析

在当前中国主动扩大进口和中美贸易摩擦频发的双重背景下,本文基于高度细分的中国制造业企业微观数据,从企业就业的二元边际视角评估了2000—2012年中国制造业企业就业动态,并实证检验来自美国的进口竞争对制造业就业动态的影响。研究发现,来自美国的进口竞争对制造业净就业无显著影响,但对其背后的就业动态影响显著;进口竞争对中国制造业企业就业动态的影响主要表现在抑制企业进入和促进企业退出,且该影响随着地区、企业所有制、贸易模式的变化而呈现差异。机制检验表明,进口竞争通过抑制企业生产率阻碍企业进入、增加企业退出。此外,考虑上下游产业关联后,进口竞争对就业动态的影响进一步扩大。研究结论表明,除了就业总量增长外,微观企业层面的就业动态对于“稳就业”目标的实现也至关重要。     

WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS

This paper examines the behaviours of a profit‐maximizing firm and a labour‐managed profit‐per‐worker‐maximizing firm in a two‐stage quantity‐setting model with a wage‐rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper then shows that there exists a unique equilibrium that coincides with the Stackelberg solution where the profit‐maximizing firm is the leader and the labour‐managed firm is the follower.     

Does Gibrat's Law hold among young,small firms?

According to Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect, the growth rate of a given firm is independent of its size at the beginning of the examined period. Aimed at extending this line of investigation, the present paper uses quantile regression techniques to test whether Gibrat's Law holds for new entrants in a given industry: that is for new small firms in the early stage of their life cycle. The main finding is that for some selected industries in Italian manufacturing Gibrat's Law fails to hold in the years immediately following start-up, when smaller firms have to rush in order to achieve a size large enough to enhance their likelihood of survival. Conversely, in subsequent years the patterns of growth of new smaller firms do not differ significantly from those of larger entrants, and the Law therefore cannot be rejected.JEL Classification: L11, L60Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 27th Annual EARIE Conference (Lausanne, 7-10 September 2000) and at seminars held between 2000 and 2003 at the Economics Department of Harvard University, the Catholic University of Milan, the University of Ferrara, the University of Bologna, the Bank of Italy, and Athens University of Economics & Business. We would like to thank Carlo Bianchi, Giuseppe Colangelo, Giovanni Dosi, Steven Klepper (Editor), Stephen Martin, Ariel Pakes, Aman Ullah and, in particular, Helen Louri and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts. Financial support from MIUR (Year 2000; protocol #MM13038538_001; project leader: E. Santarelli) is gratefully acknowledged.Correspondence to: E. Santarelly     

Intra-Jurisdictional Tax Competition

While much has been written about inter-jurisdictional competition for tax revenues, especially concerning the choice between harmonization and competition, the literature has largely ignored intra-jurisdiction issues. The few articles examining this issue focus on how lower level governmental entities react to the tax decisions of a national government. However, in some instances, multiple co-equal taxing authorities might share the same base. These bodies face a dilemma over whether to harmonize their policies or to compete. We present a simple model of revenue maximizing tax authorities and derive the conditions under which harmonization dominates competition.