制度效率、家族化途径与家族投资偏好

文章以家族企业投资决策为研究对象,考察了转轨与新兴双重特征下家族控制影响企业投资决策的机理。研究发现,家族控制人的风险规避偏好在投资决策中占主导,家族企业的长期投资规模小于非家族企业,其偏好于实体资本投资而限制高风险的R&D投资活动;家族风险规避偏好的短期投资行为在通过并购重组实现家族控制和职业经理人担任CEO的家族企业中更为显著;较高的制度效率可以减少家族控制人的风险规避动机,促进企业投资活动增加。     

家族高管、控制权结构与公司股价同步性——基于A股中小板家族企业的检验

本文基于中小板家族企业,探讨了家族企业高管来源对企业股价同步性的影响。具体来说,本文检验了家族企业的CEO是否由本家族成员担任与企业股价同步性之间的关系,以及所有权结构对这一关系的影响,研究发现:相对于外聘CEO,家族成员担任CEO的企业有着更低的股价同步性;进一步检验发现,家族成员担任CEO对股价同步性的负向影响只在控制权和现金流权没有分离的样本中存在。     

中国家族企业家族所有权配置效应研究

本文研究中国家族企业家族所有权的配置效应,从家族整体、家族成员个体以及两者之间关系的视角研究家族所有权的配置方式对公司业绩的影响。研究发现,我国家族企业中家族持股会显著影响公司业绩,家族利益与公司业绩正相关;但是,家族所有权在家族成员之间的配置集中度与公司业绩呈U型关系,且单人持股家族企业比多人持股家族企业的业绩更好。最后,本文还检验了家族企业传承过程中以家族亲缘关系为基础的家族冲突对家族所有权配置效应的影响,发现传承冲突越高的家族企业业绩越差、家族所有权配置效应被削弱。本文的研究结果表明,我国家族企业需要在家族整体和家族成员个体层面同时合理配置家族所有权,以避免家族内部冲突对企业的不良影响。     

家族企业管理层行为对企业创新绩效的影响——长期导向的中介效应与组织惯例的调节作用

家族企业在世界经济中扮演着重要角色,备受国内外学者关注。通过研究家族参与管理和CEO长期任职与企业创新绩效之间的关系,探讨了长期导向的中介效应与组织惯例的调节作用。基于浙皖家族企业样本实证分析,得出以下结论:家族参与管理和企业创新绩效之间存在倒“U”型关系;家族企业CEO长期任职对长期导向的形成有积极正向影响;长期导向在CEO长期任职与家族企业创新绩效间起中介作用;组织惯例正向调节家族参与管理对创新绩效的影响,正向调节长期导向对创新绩效的影响。通过探究管理层行为对企业创新绩效的影响,丰富了国内家族企业研究成果,也为家族企业响应不断变化的外部环境、实现可持续创新发展提供了有益启示。     

急功近利抑或行稳致远:CEO薪酬差距与企业研发效率——基于地理邻近性视角北大核心CSSCI

地理邻近性促进了个体间的社会互动和信息传递,加剧了社会比较效应,从而影响个体的决策行为。本文以2011—2019年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,通过测度企业间的空间距离来划定地理邻近区域,实证检验了地理邻近性视角下CEO薪酬差距对企业研发投资效率的影响。研究发现,地理邻近性CEO薪酬差距降低了企业研发投资效率。通过变换代理变量和研究样本、改变估计方法、采用安慰剂检验和工具变量法等稳健性检验和内生性处理后,研究结论保持不变。影响路径检验表明,地理邻近性薪酬差距增加了CEO的过度冒险倾向和CEO主动离职,进而降低企业研发投资效率。异质性分析发现,地理邻近性薪酬差距对企业研发投资效率的负面效应在非国有企业、未实施CEO股权激励的企业、董事会治理水平低的企业以及经理人市场竞争弱的地区企业中更为显著。区别于高管薪酬差距的行业研究视角,本文从地理邻近性视角出发,既拓展了高管薪酬差距的研究视野,也为如何提升企业研发投资效率提供了新的思考。     

家族企业形成方式、风险偏好与对外直接投资

以2009—2020年中国A股上市家族企业为样本，系统考察家族企业形成方式如何影响其对外直接投资。研究发现，创业家族企业与改制家族企业的对外直接投资存在明显差异，前者更倾向于在东道国以新设实体的方式进行对外直接投资，而且投资规模更大。特别地，当家族所有权较高、家族化年限较短以及董事不存在海外背景时，家族企业形成方式影响对外直接投资的效应更强。进一步地，机制检验表明改制家族企业具有良好的制度环境，其投资决策更加审慎、稳健。相较而言，创业家族企业具有更强的创业导向和风险偏好，承担风险进行对外直接投资的意愿更强。在克服模型内生性、排除竞争性解释和一系列稳健性测试后，研究结论依然成立。研究验证了家族企业形成方式的组织印记效应，有助于理解家族企业之间的对外直接投资行为差异。     

家族涉入异质性与家族企业创新绩效关系研究

基于2013—2019年深沪A股家族企业数据，构建家族涉入与企业创新绩效关系模型，关注研发投入的中介作用，探究家族涉入对企业创新绩效的影响机制。其中，将家族涉入重新界定为家族所有权涉入、管理权涉入和代际传承涉入3个维度，将创新绩效按照创新成果范围划分为技术创新绩效和产品创新绩效两个维度。结果表明：①家族管理权涉入、代际传承涉入均与企业研发投入和创新绩效显著正相关，家族所有权涉入抑制研发投入，对企业创新绩效无显著影响；②家族管理权涉入、代际传承涉入通过研发投入对企业创新绩效产生间接影响，即研发投入在其中表现出部分中介作用。由此,建议家族企业适当降低家族所有权涉入程度，摒弃以限制型社会情感财富的思维逻辑权衡企业创新问题的做法，加大研发投入力度以促进企业创新绩效提升。     

家族涉入异质性与家族企业创新绩效关系研究

基于2013—2019年深沪A股家族企业数据，构建家族涉入与企业创新绩效关系模型，关注研发投入的中介作用，探究家族涉入对企业创新绩效的影响机制。其中，将家族涉入重新界定为家族所有权涉入、管理权涉入和代际传承涉入3个维度，将创新绩效按照创新成果范围划分为技术创新绩效和产品创新绩效两个维度。结果表明：①家族管理权涉入、代际传承涉入均与企业研发投入和创新绩效显著正相关，家族所有权涉入抑制研发投入，对企业创新绩效无显著影响；②家族管理权涉入、代际传承涉入通过研发投入对企业创新绩效产生间接影响，即研发投入在其中表现出部分中介作用。由此,建议家族企业适当降低家族所有权涉入程度，摒弃以限制型社会情感财富的思维逻辑权衡企业创新问题的做法，加大研发投入力度以促进企业创新绩效提升。     

CEO类型、战略选择与家族企业经营绩效——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究

家族CEO和非家族CEO谁能带来更好的企业绩效?这是家族企业经营实践中的重要问题;同时,家族管理和职业化经营的绩效差异在学术研究中也存在较大争议.本文基于中国445家上市家族企业、3439个观测值的面板数据,从分殊偏待和社会情感财富的理论视角,探讨家族CEO和非家族CEO在战略选择偏好上的差异及其对企业经营绩效的影响.研究发现:相比非家族CEO,家族CEO经营管理下的中国家族企业绩效更优;家族CEO不同于非家族CEO的战略选择(如对多元化战略的低偏好和对国际化战略的高偏好)积极影响企业的经营绩效.本研究为家族管理和职业化经营的效率之争提供来自新兴转型市场的一种实证检验,并基于战略选择的视角拓展了家族企业"组内"的异质性研究成果,为家族企业寻求管理者类型与企业战略的有效匹配提供参考.     

家族信托设立影响家族企业创新投资吗

以家族企业创新投资决策为研究对象，考察家族信托设立如何影响家族企业创新投资，以及两者关系是否在不同成长经历的企业主之间存在差异。结果发现：家族信托设立有助于促进家族企业创新投资；在有过贫困生活经历的企业主中，家族信托与家族企业创新投资间的正向关系更显著。同时，相对于具有体制内工作经历的企业主，在没有体制内工作经历的企业主中，家族信托与家族企业创新投资间的正向关系更显著。研究结论可为理解如何激励家族企业创新投资提供新的研究视角和理论解释。     

How do the combined effects of CEO decision horizon and compensation impact the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment?

Although relevant literature has been accumulated, how earnings pressure from stock analysts affects a firm's innovation expenditures remains unclear. In order to make this relationship more clear, this study investigates the impact of earnings pressure on a firm's research and development (R&D) investment by considering the combined effects of CEOs’ decision horizon and incentives. Our hypotheses were tested by firms from the S&P 1500 during the period from 2000 to 2012. The findings reveal that earnings pressure has a detrimental effect on a firm's R&D investment, and also that it goes worse when CEOs have a shorter decision horizon. However, when it comes to compensation incentives, we found that either CEOs equipped with higher stock ownership or fewer stock options can reduce the adverse effect of a shorter decision horizon on the relationship between earnings pressure and R&D retrenchment.     

公司高管人员薪酬与绩效的相关性研究——基于家族企业与非家族企业的比较分析

家族企业与非家族企业的差异一直是家族企业学研究领域的一个热点问题。现有的研究多是基于资源基础观理论,从家族性角度进行分析。本文则基于委托代理理论和管家理论,从高管薪酬与企业绩效关系的视角对家族企业与非家族企业之间的差异进行深入的研究。论文以2008年年报中的100家家族上市公司与100家非家族上市公司为样本,从高管年薪和高管持股比例这两个方面探讨高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性。实证研究表明：非家族上市公司与家族上市公司除了在高管年薪上差异不是很大,其余变量皆有显著的差异,其中家族上市公司的高管持股、企业绩效皆高于非家族上市公司。家族上市公司与非家族上市公司高管年薪对公司绩效影响都显著,且都呈正相关,但家族上市公司高管年薪对公司绩效的影响比非家族上市公司大。高管持股比例对公司绩效影响则都不显著。     

R&D Returns,Spillovers and Firm Incentives: Evidence from China

Using a new data set of 12,000 firms in China, this paper estimates the returns to R&D investment and its spillover effects, and investigates how the returns to R&D depend on firm incentives. For the firms in the sample, the results show that on average firm output increases around 0.4 yuan for each additional 1 yuan spent on R&D in the previous year, and there is high R&D return regardless of whether the endogeneity of R&D intensity is dealt with or not. Interestingly, the marginal return to R&D is significantly higher in firms whose CEOs were not appointed by the government, and lower when CEO pay is directly related to annual performance. The return to R&D is higher in relatively poor regions and for firms with worse access to finance. There are also non-trivial R&D spillover effects.     

CEO自恋、研发投资与企业价值

基于高阶梯队和资源依赖理论,以2009-2016年A股上市公司为研究对象,实证检验了CEO自恋对研发投资及企业价值的影响。结果表明：CEO自恋对企业价值有显著正向影响;研发投资在CEO自恋与企业价值间关系中发挥中介作用,CEO自恋可以通过研发投资对企业价值产生正向影响;相对于非国有企业,国有企业CEO自恋对研发投资及企业价值具有更为显著的正向作用。研究结论不仅丰富与拓展了CEO自恋相关理论,而且对我国企业价值提升及公司高管选择具有重要的实践意义。     

International talent inflow and R&D investment: Firm-level evidence from China

Using firm-level R&D data with regional international talent data, we find that international talent increases the R&D investment of Chinese manufacturing firms, a result that is further confirmed with patent data and under a number of robustness checks. These findings stem from two mechanisms: international talent boosts human capital accumulation and provides a diversified labor force. Further, the R&D promoting effect is stronger if firms are located in eastern China rather than in other regions, of small and medium-sized rather than large-sized, of domestic ownership rather than foreign ownership. The policy implication is, the introduction of international talent can be a new way to promoting R&D investment, especially for skilled-labor constrained countries.     

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

The impact of corporate debt on long term investment and firm performance

Prior research indicates a linkage between debt, research and development (R&D) and physical investment, and that the relationship varies depending on the type of firm (science versus non–science). Leverage also plays a multidimensional role in corporate performance and growth. The relationship between financial leverage and R&D expenditure is analysed using a sample of large United States (US) manufacturing firms. Then, the impact of leverage on R&D expenditure is studied using corporate performance drivers as intermediate variables. The results indicate that there is a strong negative relationship between the degree of financial leverage and the level of R&D expenditure that firms undertake. The negative relationship is robust to changes in model specifications and sample periods. More importantly, the results show that it is higher leverage that leads to lower R&D expense rather than R&D causing variations in future leverage. In addition, the results indicate that higher leverage adversely influences future investment in R&D which may in turn lead to negative impact on long term operating performance and future growth opportunities.     

Do R&D expenditures matter more than those of marketing to company performance? The moderating role of industry characteristics and investment density

Confronting competitive environment, enterprises differentiate their product by promoting their R&D or marketing capacities. Scholars have verified that there is a direct relationship and a deferred effect between R&D expenditures and firm performance, but that there exists an inconsistency between marketing expenditures and firm performance. However, previous studies have neglected to analyse and compare the impact of corporate R&D and marketing investment on performance, and also ignored the moderating effects of different industry characteristics and investment densities. The study attempts to fill the gap by constructing a model to accommodate all these factors. The empirical results indicate that R&D and marketing expenditures have a positive impact on enterprise operating performance, and that there is a longer deferred effect in R&D expenditures than in marketing expenditures. By investing in R&D expenditures, manufacturing enterprises can increase their performance more than in service enterprises, and electronic enterprises can improve their performance compared with other types of firms. Finally, investments with higher R&D density can result in a higher performance.     

Efficiency and its determinants in pharmaceutical industries: ownership,R&D and scale economy

The purpose of this article is to measure the efficiency of pharmaceutical firms and identify their determinants using Korean and American samples from 1992 to 2004. We document some stylized facts in the patterns and sources of efficiency change in Korean and American pharmaceutical firms. The evidence shows that ownership structure can substantially influence the efficiency of pharmaceutical firms. Especially, institutional ownership rate affects corporate efficiencies negatively, corroborating the myopic institutional investor hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported by both Korean and American samples. However, we find evidence that foreign ownership in Korea promotes efficiency of pharmaceutical firms. It is shown that R&D intensity is positively related to contemporaneous largest ownership rate and prior foreign ownership rate in Korean pharmaceutical firms. In contrast, little evidence is found on the relationship between ownership structure and R&D intensity in the American pharmaceutical industry. These empirical results are robust even after we check the causal links among efficiency, R&D and ownership.     

Corporate governance,environmental regulations,and technological change

This paper investigates the relationship between environmental regulations and innovation by focusing on the automobile industry in a cross-country setting. We provide empirical evidence that the presence of agency problems mitigates the negative effects of environmental regulations on overall R&D activity, which leads to full compensation when the degree of agency problems is sufficiently high. Guiding our empirical analysis, we provide a general model consistent with the structure of existing ownership data. Specifically, we model ownership structure as a combination of two extreme corporate governance types. On the one extreme there are profit maximizers, and on the other extreme there are managers who are only concerned with their private benefits. The model leads to a simple country level ownership indicator and shows that if an economy is dominated by firms with higher agency problems, then pollution tax might even increase overall R&D, while reducing pollution. According to our estimations, such an outcome is possible only for out-of-sample values of the ownership indicator, where the degree of agency problems is extremely high.