竞争战略对资本结构影响的实证研究

基于交易成本经济学和战略管理理论,本文分析了竞争战略对资本结构的影响,并形成研究假设。通过建立多元回归模型进行实证分析,实证结果表明竞争战略是资本结构的重要影响因素,负债比率与差异化战略和成本领先战略存在显著的正相关关系。公司竞争战略的制定与实施应考虑其财务影响,资本结构决策也应该考虑如何与公司战略相配合,以从资本结构决策中获得竞争优势。     

资本结构与产品市场竞争策略——以上海三爱富为例

近年来,资本结构与产品市场竞争之间的关系引起了财务理论界和产业经济界的高度重视,对其研究有很大的理论和现实意义。以中国化工行业作为分析对象,结合其发展状况、竞争格局及趋势,研究其代表企业上海三爱富的融资方式、产品竞争策略和资本结构。结果表明：较高负债不一定存在很大风险,它是基于产品市场竞争环境、公司竞争战略、行业特征的合理选择。     

基于产业组织视角的融资结构分析

企业资本结构和产品市场竞争策略之间的关系已有许多经济学家进行了论述。由于各自采用不同的假设条件，得出了各不相同的结论。我们在一个寡头竞争的框架中，对以上问题作出一个统一的解释，从而对企业融资结构与产品市场竞争战略问题给出一个一般性的结论。在得出一般结论的基础上，我们将根据理论对中国上市公司的股权偏好给出一个新的角度的解释。     

资本结构与产品市场竞争策略——以东阿阿胶为例分析

近年来,资本结构理论中出现了一个新的重要研究领域——资本结构与产品市场竞争之间的关系。因此,以东阿阿胶为研究对象,结合它所在行业的发展状况、趋势及竞争格局,并根据财务数据分析它的资本结构和竞争战略。最后结论表明,资本结构是一个不断优化的结果,它根据内外部环境的变化不断进行动态调整、改变竞争策略,从而实现企业价值最大化。     

论企业资本结构与产品市场竞争战略的关系——基于西北五省上市公司年报数据的实证分析

西方国家的实证研究表明,企业的资本结构和产品市场竞争战略之间存在密不可分的关系。本文运用多元回归模型,利用中国西北五省2003年-2005年的上市公司年报数据,对企业资本结构与产品市场战略的关系进行了回归分析。结果表明,企业的产品市场决策与企业债务水平（DEBT）正相关,与长期负债水平（LDEBT）负相关,企业的盈利性水平（FIT）、企业规模（SIZE）和企业的产品市场竞争力（PET）正相关。我国企业应从资本结构和产品市场竞争相结合的角度制定企业战略,从而获得更大的竞争优势。     

资本结构与公司产品市场策略互动关系的实证研究

现在有关资本结构与产品市场策略关系的研究仅限于资本结构与公司产品市场策略之间相互关系的一个侧面,对公司的资本结构与其产品市场竞争策略之间互动关系的全面分析基本上没有。文章以广告投入作为公司的产品竞争策略,从更加广义的资本结构(包括公司的短期负债)角度探讨了它们之间的相互关系。我们发现公司的资本结构与其广告投入之间存在着正相关的互动关系。     

企业资本结构、融资能力与市场竞争力

企业的资本结构对整个企业起着至关重要的作用,它影响着企业的融资能力、竞争能力乃至企业的整体利益.面对不同的内部环境与外部环境,企业应选择合适的资本结构,有效地利用财务杠杆功能,帮助企业在产品市场竞争中获得竞争优势.本文以融资能力作为桥梁,通过分析资本结构与融资能力,融资能力与市场竞争力之间的关系,最终揭示出企业资本结构与市场竞争力之间的相互影响.     

科技型小企业与服务中介机构组织互动影响因素的实证研究

基于社会资本理论、交易成本经济学和组织间关系记忆理论,从组织内、组织间和情境等层面,构建了科技型小企业与服务中介机构间互动的影响因素模型,并提出相关假设。利用调研数据,采用结构方程模型检验理论假设。结果显示:企业家关系风险感知、企业家创新导向、关系专用性资产、竞争环境和产品模块化对两者的互动具有显著的正向影响;企业家创新导向和竞争环境对关系专用性资产有显著的正向影响。     

资本结构与产品市场竞争关系的实证研究综述

文章对近些年来国内外学术界在资本结构与产品市场竞争关系所进行的实证研究做了调查统计,按照非融资股东在资本结构中的相关角色、资本结构与市场结构的相互作用、企业资本结构与企业产品市场的战略行为之间的相互影响以及目前中国学者在这方面的研究进展情况进行了综述。     

战略视角下的资本结构研究

20世纪80年代以来,从战略视角研究资本结构引起了战略管理研究者以及财务理论研究者的关注,从战略的角度看,企业的资本结构决策是基于公司战略、竞争战略以及企业所面临的竞争环境所作出的理性选择。连接战略和资本结构,开辟了资本结构研究的新领域。文章对战略视角的资本结构研究的理论基础,公司战略、竞争战略、竞争环境与资本结构之间的内在联系等内容进行综述,以期为我国开展该领域的研究提供借鉴。     

竞争战略、资本结构与企业业绩

文章认为,对于竞争性行业和垄断性行业的资本结构与企业业绩的相关性,可以尝试从不同的理论出发点来解释,对于竞争性行业而言,其保守的财务政策(低负债率)可能是基于行业竞争程度、资本市场条件以及企业竞争战略的理性商业选择,不一定是以往学者从代理问题出发得出的股权融资偏好。我国监管机构基于抑制股权融资偏好行为而制定的一系列股权融资约束似乎并未考虑到行业竞争程度的不同,这种资本市场的配置低效率使得我国上市公司面临着过度监管和监管不足并存的现象。     

社会资本与企业竞争优势:基于知识的观点

企业如何在网络中获得竞争优势是战略管理学者关注的一个新的研究焦点。知识是企业获取持续竞争优势的一项重要源泉，通过对网络中社会资本的结构维度、认知维度及关系维度对知识存量和知识转移的作用机理分析，提出了基于社会资本的企业竞争优势模型。以集群为网络平台进行案例分析，指出网络中的社会资本是动态演变的，其与企业的成长阶段存在匹配问题，因此，企业在网络中获取竞争优势的关键是要培养自身的知识管理能力和网络管理能力。     

产业资本向金融资本渗透的路径和影响——基于资本市场“举牌”的研究

随着金融市场化的进一步推进,资本市场发挥着产业资本向金融资本渗透的重要作用。文章选取以举牌为核心的产业资本向金融资本渗透的微观案例,分析了产业资本通过金融市场向金融资本渗透的途径和结果。研究显示,产业资本渗透金融资本后被举牌公司的经营业绩得到提高,产品市场份额增强,说明通过产业资本对被举牌企业实施经营管理提高了被举牌企业的经营效率,实现了产业调整。这也说明金融手段能够有效支持产业资本的扩张和结构调整,显示了资本市场在两者转换过程中所起到的关键作用。     

The impact of Chinese monetary policy on co-movements between money and capital markets

From 2010 to 2017, with interest rate liberalization and capital market development in China, the impact of monetary policies on China’s financial markets underwent continuous evolution. Using the DCC-GARCH model, this study investigates the transmission process of monetary policies from the money market to capital markets (stock and bond markets). The results show that in the early stage the instability of the money and stock markets and the downturn in the bond market are primarily caused by the block of monetary policy transmission and the paucity of fund sources in the capital markets. Subsequently, the outbreak of the 2013 money shortage and the 2015 stock market crash are also closely related to monetary policies. In the later periods, the money and stock markets maintain a low degree of correlation for a long time, reducing the impact of destabilizing factors on the stock market. By contrast, with the advancement of interest rate reform and the optimization of bond market structure, the bond market is highly relevant to the money market. The central bank regulates the bond market more effectively using both traditional and innovative monetary policy tools.     

What Collusion? Unilateral Market Power as a Catalyst for Countercyclical Markups

This paper presents and tests a simple model of competitive and unilateral market power regimes that yields countercyclical markups. Following a decrease in demand in the short run, capacity-constrained firms may have a strong incentive not to lower their prices to the new competitive price. Demand shocks may introduce market power into a previously competitive market. Experimental posted offer markets support this conjecture with complete information on the market structure. With only private information, there appears to be a hysteresis effect concerning supracompetitive prices, i.e., markets with a history of supracompetitive pricing continue to generate supracompetitive prices following demand shocks. However, competitive markets also remain competitive following demand shocks when firms only have private information on costs and capacities.     

Perfectly competitive markets as the limits of cournot markets

A perfectly competitive, partial equilibrium market for a single homogeneous good with a (bounded) continuum of infinitesimal firms is considered. Cost functions are essentially unrestricted and are allowed to vary smoothly across firms. A sequence (net) of Cournot markets (each with a finite number of firms) which converge smoothly to the perfectly competitive limit in terms of both the inverse demand functions and the distributioon of firm technologies is introduced and it is shown that all markets sufficiently far along the sequence have a Cournot equilibrium and all the Cournot equilibria converge to the perfectly competitive equilibrium of the limit market.     

Why does China protect its labour‐intensive industries more?*

China's tariff structure favours labour‐intensive sectors, and this is at odds with traditional theory of comparative advantage. The paper argues that tariffs in China are a mechanism for protecting technology‐backward domestic – especially state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) from competition technology‐advanced foreign enterprises producing in China. With relatively integrated labour markets and cross‐firm technology differences, SOEs’ subsistence is supported by subsidized credit and limited access of foreign firms’ local production to tariff‐protected domestic markets. Labour market integration and capital subsidies increase the relative cost of labour in SOEs compared to their foreign competitors, hurting more domestic firms in industries that use labour more intensively. Restrictions to FIEs’ (foreign‐invested enterprises) access to tariff‐protected product markets, which protect more labour‐intensive industries, compensate for the greater cost disadvantage of SOEs in labour‐intensive sectors.     

Mean reverting financial leverage: theory and evidence from Pakistan

Grounding concepts of the two competing theories of capital structure (trade-off theory, pecking order theory) are quite opposite to each other. Trade-off theory claims that there is an optimal (target) capital structure and firms try to achieve that optimal (target) point. Whereas pecking order theory argues that there is no optimal (target) capital structure but the firms follow a specific pattern of financing. Using the two competing theoretic frameworks, this study applies Fisher-type panel unit root test to an unbalanced panel data of 13 115 firm-year observations of nonfinancial firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan spread over 38 years (1973–2010). Overall panel test results, for short-term, long-term, as well as total leverage support trade-off financing behaviour while individual firm results do not. Individual firm results show that only 16% of the firms have short-term target, 25% of the firms have long-term target and 12% of the firms have total target leverage ratio. Further, industry results explain that most of the industries do have target leverage ratios and classification of data into profitable and lossmaking firm-year observations explains that profitable firms clearly follow trade-off financing behaviour while the results for lossmaking firms do not support trade-off financing behaviour. Our study indicates that it is important for the government to ensure policies to develop well-balanced financial markets and to improve accountability systems.     

Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms

Recent writers have asserted that firms controlled by workers are rare because workers have diverse preferences over firm policies, while investors all support wealth maximization. However, the source of the asymmetry between capital and labor remains unclear. We resolve this puzzle by arguing that because financial capital is exceptionally mobile, capital markets induce unanimity. The lower mobility of human capital implies that labor markets are monopolistically competitive and hence that unanimity cannot be expected in labor‐managed firms. Moreover, such firms are vulnerable to takeover by investors, while capital‐managed firms are substantially less vulnerable to takeover by workers.     

Emission Permit Trading Between Imperfectly Competitive Product Markets

The present paper analyzes the efficiency of emission permit trading between two imperfectly competitive product markets. Even if firms are price takers in permit markets, the integration of permit markets can decrease welfare because of imperfect competition in product markets. If there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms, the integration of the permit markets could have a positive effect related to the flexibility of an integrated market; this flexibility can justify integrating the permit markets.