Currency Boards when Interest Rates are Zero

In a fixed exchange rate system, any expectation that the peg may be abandoned will normally be reflected in an interest rate differential between instruments denominated in domestic and anchor currencies: the possibility of a revaluation will drive domestic interest rates below those in the anchor currency, for example. However, when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, there is limited scope for exchange rate expectations to be reflected in interest rate differentials. Here we introduce a new mechanism, based on the central bank balance sheet, which works to bring about equilibrium in currency markets even when interest rates are zero. An expectation of exchange rate appreciation will cause foreign exchange reserves to swell, increasing the cost to policy‐makers of allowing an appreciation and, therefore, lowering the likelihood of the fixed exchange rate being abandoned. Under normal circumstances, this channel reinforces the equilibrating effect of interest rate differentials. When interest rates cannot adjust only this channel operates, implying that much larger changes in reserves are required to equilibrate currency markets. We develop a simple model to illustrate these arguments and find support for the predictions of the model using data for Hong Kong, the world's largest economy with a currency board.     

UNEMPLOYMENT PERSISTENCE AND THE SUSTAINABILITY OF EXCHANGE RATE PEGS

It is commonly thought that an open economy can accommodate output shocks through either exchange rate or real sector adjustments. We formalize this notion by incorporating unemployment persistence into a two‐sided escape clause model of currency crises. We show that unemployment persistence makes a currency peg more fragile and undermines the credibility of the monetary authority in a dynamic setting. The fragility is captured by a devaluation premium in expectations that increases the average inflation rate when the currency peg is more vulnerable to ‘busts’ than ‘booms’. This interaction between macroeconomic and microeconomic rigidities suggests that a policy reform can only be consistent if it renders either exchange rates or the economy more flexible.     

Exchange rate sensitivity of the demand for money in developing countries

There is consensus among researches that under the present floating exchange rate system although developing countries peg their exchange rate to a major currency, they cannot avoid fluctuation in their effective exchange rates as long as major currencies fluctuate against one another. Few authors have investigated the effects of changes in effective exchange rates of developing countries on their imports, exports, trade balance, demand for international reserves, inflation etc. In this paper we try to inestigate the effects of effective exchange rates of developing countries on their demand for money. Previous authors who have estimated a money demand function, inclusive of an exchange rate variable (bilateral or effective), have restricted themselves to industrial countries only. By using quarterly data over the 1973–85 period, it is shown that in most developing countries, while the short-run effcts of depreciation could be in either direction, its long-run effects are negative indicating that depreciation causes a decline in the demand for domestic currency.     

Bilateral Exchange Rates and Jobs

We study the labor market effects of realignment in fixed bilateral exchange rates, such as China's peg to the US dollar. We employ the open economy model by de Melo and Robinson to identify the core parameters of the real, trade side of the economy driving the unemployment effects of bilateral exchange rate realignment. A small open economy version of the model is explored analytically and a large multicountry version numerically. Analytics in the small open economy model show that unemployment effects of adjusting of a bilateral peg hinge on the fraction exported to and imported from the trading partner. A larger fraction exported to and a smaller fraction imported from the trading partner make it more likely that revaluation of a trading partner's currency has beneficial effects. Numerics in the large economy model show that Chinese revaluation can generate both positive and negative unemployment effects depending upon underlying parameter values. Adverse unemployment effects can go along with an improving trade balance.     

汇率制度与宏观经济政策环境——以加拿大为例

加拿大属于典型的资源性经济,加元的汇率变化多受国际商品和石油价格的影响,超出了国内货币政策的控制范围,是独立浮动或是固定汇率？经过两次试验后,加拿大政府坚定地选择了独立浮动汇率制度,并最终实现了汇率政策与货币政策脱离,以此给予了加拿大银行较大的决策空间,使后者专注于维持较低的通货膨胀环境。同时,加拿大政府努力为汇率制度创造有利的宏观经济政策环境,财政政策和货币政策分工明确、相互支持,为汇率制度和经济增长奠定了可持续的坚实基础。本文以加拿大浮动汇率制度为主线,从财政政策、货币政策、政策搭配角度讨论其宏观经济政策框架,分析加元汇率制度的运行环境。在此基础上,本文探讨加拿大汇率政策及浮动汇率制度的作用与功能。本文第五部分对加拿大银行提出的汇率预测模型作出了较深入的分析。     

On the Exchange Rate as a Nominal Anchor: The Rise and Fall of the Credibility Hypothesis

The credibility hypothesis, which was used to support the use of a pegged exchange rate arrangement as a nominal anchor mechanism, is based on restrictive analytical foundations that circumscribe its real world applicability. While all pegged exchange rate arrangements are subject to circumstances that can undermine the sustainability of the peg, exchange rate nominal anchor pegs are especially fragile because such arrangements introduce problems that are endogenous to that particular type of regime. The East Asian crisis is used to demonstrate the fragility of exchange rate nominal anchor pegs, while the case of Australia demonstrates how a floating currency escaped the contagion of the East Asian crisis.     

Exchange Market Pressure and Monetary Policy in Emerging Market Economies: New Evidence from Treatment‐effect Estimations

The way central banks react to exchange market pressure is likely to affect the subsequent economic development and the associated economic costs. In a situation of currency pressure the central bank can in principle decide to let the currency float freely, to maintain the peg or to implement a managed float policy, i.e. a mix of depreciation and intervention. As the central bank's choices are subject to self selection and endogeneity, we use propensity score matching to adequately cope with these methodical challenges. We find that monetary authorities have two options to keep down the economic costs in terms of output, namely stabilizing the exchange rate or letting the currency float freely. In contrast, a managed float under currency pressure is accompanied by the worst possible outcome with an average loss of gross domestic product (GDP) between 5% and 6%.     

Optimal exchange rate policy for a small oil-exporting country: A dynamic general equilibrium perspective

This paper examines the choice of optimal exchange rate regime for an oil-exporting small open economy using a welfare-based model. The paper extends the standard New Keynesian Small Open Economy model to include three countries: a small oil-exporting country and two large foreign countries. The model also features three sectors: traded, non-traded, and primary-commodity (crude-oil). The sources of uncertainty are random monetary (demand), productivity (real), and real oil price (supply) shocks. Despite the absence of a non-oil traded sector in this primary-commodity economy, the welfare analysis suggests that flexible exchange rate regimes can reduce external shocks and consumption volatility given certain caveats about pricing-schemes. The analysis also suggests that a basket peg is more welfare-improving than a unilateral peg, as higher volatility of the anchor currency reduces consumer welfare.     

External Shocks, Balance Sheet Contagion, and Speculative Attack on the Pegged Exchange Rate System

A simple monetary model is built to illustrate that the pegged exchange rate system will collapse under an unstable external environment via the balance sheet contagion and the "boiling frog" effect, even if the domestic policy and the fundamentals are sound. If agents anticipate this happening, a speculative attack may still occur. This result is different from that of the first-generation currency crisis model, where the inconsistent domestic policy brings in the collapse of the peg. The policy options to defend the peg in the author's model depend on the nature of the shock. Effective capital control can only be implemented for capital outflow shock. Capital account deregulation is more stabilizing under a current account deficit shock, however. This paper also distinguishes the effect of capital mobility with that of the asset substitutability, as they have completely different impacts on the peg.     

Real exchange rates: are they dominated by fundamental factors?

Using Bayesian model averaging, we determine which fundamental pair-wise differences suggested by the literature on optimum currency areas give the best explanation of medium-term variability of bilateral real exchange rates. The intercept in the best specification is statistically insignificant, implying that for a hypothetical pair of economies for which the differences were zero, the bilateral real exchange rate would not move. Thus, the ‘non-fundamental’ element of the medium-term real exchange rate variability is, in our sample at least, negligible on average. In other words, floating exchange rate does not in itself imply, on average, more real exchange rate variability in the medium term than an exchange rate peg.     

The demand for money and the real exchange rate misalignments in emerging European countries: A nonlinear approach

This paper investigates the extent to which domestic and foreign money balances in emerging European countries are influenced by foreign exchange considerations. A well-specified and stable relationship between real money demand and the exchange rate can be perceived as an important part of a successful monetary policy. This study examines the long-run determinants of real exchange rates (RERs) associated with the behavioral equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) approach and identifies currency misalignments in these countries. The misalignment is later used to test the nonlinear behavior of the demand for money. The results indicate that the RER misalignments have a significant impact on domestic money demand. When the currencies are overvalued, there is a reduction in domestic money demand, and when they are undervalued, there is an increase in domestic money demand. Furthermore, it can be concluded that overvaluation causes an increase in foreign money demand indicating a shift of preference from domestic to foreign currency.     

Identification of a basket peg: the model specification controversy

A controversy has been triggered by the Chinese exchange rate regime shift from a single currency peg to an alleged basket peg. The controversy is about the specification of the model used to represent the basket as three models have been used: levels, log levels and first log differences. It is suggested that one way to confirm the validity or otherwise of a model is to use data on the special drawing rights exchange rate since the currency weights are known. The results show that the estimated weights are almost identical no matter which model and which numeraire is used. However, nonnested model selection criteria show that the best model is that written in levels, simply because this is what is used in practice by central banks adopting basket pegs.     

The welfare implications of exchange rate choices in developing agricultural economies

This paper analyzes the appropriate choice of an exchange rate regime in agricultural commodity-exporting economies. In an estimated open economy model that incorporates key structural characteristics of agricultural commodity exporters including dual labor markets and imperfect asset markets, the benefits of exchange rate flexibility are shown to depend on the extent of labor and product market development. With developed markets, flexible exchange rates are preferred as they allow for greater relative price fluctuations, which amplify the transmission mechanism of labor re-allocation upon commodity price volatility. When labor and product markets are not well-developed, however, international relative price adjustments exacerbate currency and factor misalignments. A nominal exchange rate peg, by mitigating relative wage and price fluctuations, increases welfare relative to a float. Given the current low level of labor and product market development across most agricultural commodity exporters, the study provides a novel rationale as to why exchange rate targeting is implemented in many developing agricultural economies.     

Choice of currency basket weights and its implications on trade balance

This paper seeks to find an optimal choice of currency basket weights for emerging economies that peg their currencies to a currency basket, and to examine the long-run relationship between the real exchange rates of a group of trading partners. A general equilibrium model is set up to establish an optimal set of currency basket weights, coupled with the choice of fiscal policy, to simultaneously stabilize trade balance and aggregate price level of an economy. This optimal set of weights is a weighted average of two sets of weights; each targets at one policy goal (stabilizing either balance of trade or aggregate price level) at a time. Empirical studies including vector autoregression (VAR) analysis and cointegration analysis on the long-run relationship between the Thai baht and the real exchange rates of its major trading partners are presented.     

Fixed exchange rate credibility with heterogeneous expectations

After disinflation has been achieved, agents who form more sophisticated forecasts have lower confidence in the sustainability of a peg compared to less sophisticated agents. Furthermore, sustained financial stability leads to a declining proportion of sophisticated agents. Thus, the credibility of a fixed exchange rate regime grows over time partly because fewer people pay attention to the workings of the monetary regime. These results are derived in a rules-versus-discretion model of a fixed exchange rate regime with heterogeneous agents. We provide unique supporting evidence using data on expectations and information about the monetary regime from Bulgaria’s currency board.     

Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy

We lay out a small open economy version of the Calvo sticky price model, and show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a simple representation in domestic inflation and the output gap. We use the resulting framework to analyse the macroeconomic implications of three alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small open economy: domestic inflation and CPI-based Taylor rules, and an exchange rate peg. We show that a key difference among these regimes lies in the relative amount of exchange rate volatility that they entail. We also discuss a special case for which domestic inflation targeting constitutes the optimal policy, and where a simple second order approximation to the utility of the representative consumer can be derived and used to evaluate the welfare losses associated with the suboptimal rules.     

Choice of Exchange Rate Regime: Currency Board (Hong Kong) or Monitoring Band (Singapore)?

Following the East Asian crisis, a number of observers have advocated that small and open economies in Asia adopt an irrevocably fixed regime. Such a hard peg, it is argued, signals greater commitment to rule out arbitrary exchange rate adjustments as well as the authorities’ willingness to subordinate domestic policy objectives such as output and employment growth to the maintenance of the pegged exchange rate. But is this a reasonable position to adopt? In order to answer this question, we consider and contrast the experiences of Hong Kong and Singapore. While both of these economies share a number of broad similarities, the former operates a US dollar–linked currency board arrangement and the latter maintains an adjustable peg in the form of a monitoring band arrangement with the central parity based on an undisclosed trade–weighted currency basket.     

Bi‐currency versus Single‐currency Targeting: Lessons from the Russian Experience

This paper examines how the 2005 shift in Russian exchange rate policy from US dollar (USD) single‐currency to USD–EUR (euro) bi‐currency targeting has impacted domestic interest rates. The finding show that this policy shift has disconnected Russian interest rates from US dollar‐denominated interest rates, while instead linking them to a synthetic interest rate composed of USD and EUR rates at the same proportion as that of these two currencies in the currency basket against which the ruble's exchange rate is set. The Russian experience shows that while the adoption of bi‐currency targeting may help ensure that domestic interest rates are less dependent on the monetary cycle of a single country, these rates are instead likely to reflect financial developments in all countries whose currencies are included in the currency basket. This insight is likely to be relevant for other countries that pursue basket‐targeting policies.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

The structure of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime

Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the denomination of public debt and the choice of exchange rate regime. Three types of debt (nominal, indexed, and foreign) and two regimes (fixed and flexible) are considered. Indexed debt is insulated against unexpected inflation. The real (domestic‐currency) value of foreign debt is subject to valuation effects from real exchange rate shocks. The ‘fear‐of‐floating’ result, that foreign debt makes pegging more attractive, is shown to hold unambiguously only if the peg is fully credible. If the peg lacks credibility, a critical factor is the perceived likelihood of using the ‘escape clause’ of a switch to a float, which raises the costs of pegging. Foreign debt increases the temptation to resort to the escape clause, so when a peg is not fully credible (as is almost always the case in reality), pegging tends to be less attractive than floating in the presence of foreign debt.