The wage and non-wage costs of displacement in boom times: Evidence from Russia

This paper analyzes the costs of job loss over the years of a booming economy, 2003–2008, using unique data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. In addition to analyzing standard labor market outcomes, such as forgone earnings, employment, hours worked and wage penalties, our unique data set allows us to investigate additional non-wage costs of displacement, in particular, fringe benefits, the propensity to have an informal employment relationship or a temporary contract. We find that displaced individuals face large foregone earnings following displacement, which are heterogeneous across education and ownership type of firm from which the worker separated. There is no evidence of wage penalties for re-employed displaced workers. However, we find an increased probability of working in informal or temporary jobs if previously displaced and a reduction in the number of benefits.     

Earnings losses of displaced workers in times of crisis

We utilize data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Bureau of Labor Statistics to study how the earnings losses experienced by displaced workers vary in times of economic crisis. Relative to an economy that operates at full potential, our results show that a 1% increase in the real gross domestic product gap observed at the time of displacement is associated with an additional increase in the estimated earnings losses experienced by displaced workers of approximately 4.3% in the year immediately following displacement, and with similar increases in the estimated losses for up to 5 years after.     

Earnings losses of displaced workers and the business cycle: An analysis with administrative data

This paper examines the earnings losses of displaced workers over the business cycle. Long-term earnings losses for these workers during a recessionary period are 1.7 to 3.9 times larger than for those observed during a period of economic growth.     

The pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of job displacement—The risky job of being back to work

This paper investigates the effect of displacement on workplace injury risk and earnings using Italian administrative data on work histories merged with data on individual job-related accidents. Compared to a control group of non-displaced workers selected with propensity score matching techniques, re-employed displaced workers are exposed to moderate earnings losses and experience approximately a 79% increase in workplace injuries. This sizeable reduction in the quality of non-pecuniary working conditions is driven by the transition to new occupations and the risk imposed by new work environments.     

Earnings Instability and Tenure

We study the effect of tenure on earnings instability in Italy using the reforms of temporary employment contracts, which affected the average tenure of workers differentially across cohorts. We develop a model of earnings dynamics, and we exploit the variation of tenure and instability over time and across birth cohorts to estimate policy‐relevant parameters. Our results indicate that each year of tenure on the job reduces earnings instability by 11 percent; the drop is faster in the first three years of the match. Workers on a temporary contract have an earnings instability up to 100 percent higher than workers on a permanent contract.     

JOB DISPLACEMENT AND THE INTER‐TEMPORAL MOVEMENT OF WORKERS THROUGH THE EARNINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS

This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine how job displacement influences intragenerational earnings and income mobility. Job displacement increases the probability of downward labor earnings mobility for several years after separation occurs. Furthermore, the probability of being in the bottom half of the earnings distribution increases significantly, not only in the year of displacement, but also for several years afterwards. However, after considering additional measures of financial well‐being (income from other family members and government transfer payments), the short‐ and long‐term impact of displacement on movements throughout the distribution is reduced. (JEL J63, J65)     

Worker displacement during the transition: Experience from Slovenia1

The Slovenian transition created labor displacements that were bigger than those experienced in North America in the 1980s. In Slovenia, probability of both layoffs and quits fell with worker tenure, firm profitability and expected severance costs. Individuals facing a higher probability of displacement accepted slower wage growth than otherwise comparable workers. The incentives to avoid displacement were strong – workers that actually were displaced faced a slow process of transiting out of unemployment with only one‐third finding re‐employment. Correcting for selection, real wage losses for displaced workers are comparable to those reported for displaced workers in North America.     

Job displacement and the transitions to re-employment and early retirement for non-employed older workers

Despite the relatively higher frequency of job displacement among older workers in Europe, little is known about its effect on the work-retirement decision. Employing individual data from the European Community Household Panel for a number of countries with differences in their institutional environments, the effect of job displacement for non-employed workers is identified separately for the transitions into re-employment and retirement. The findings suggest that in countries with relatively more generous unemployment insurance provisions for the older unemployed, which offer a pathway to early retirement, older displaced workers exhibit lower re-employment and higher retirement rates compared to the non-displaced. These results are robust to dynamic selection due to unobserved heterogeneity and to the endogeneity of displacement.     

The Effects of Marginal Employment on Subsequent Labour Market Outcomes

Abstract. Unemployed workers in Austria do not lose their unemployment benefits (UI) if they work in a job where their earnings are below a certain threshold [‘marginal employment’ (ME)]. ME might improve their labour market status by signalling effort, or worsen it through reduced job‐search effort. Those who work in ME while claiming UI have less employment and lower earnings afterwards than those who do not. The penalty lessens over time but is still present after three years.     

When a Door Closes,a Window Opens? Long‐Term Labor Market Effects of Involuntary Separations

This study estimates the earning losses of workers experiencing an involuntary job separation. We employ, for the first time in the earning losses literature, a Poisson pseudo‐maximum‐likelihood estimator with fixed effects that has several advantages with respect to conventional fixed effects models. The Poisson estimator allows considering the full set of involuntary separations, including those with zero labor market earnings because of unemployment. By including individuals with zero earnings and by using our new method, the loss in the year of separation becomes larger than in previous studies. The loss starts with roughly 30% and, although it quickly shrinks, it remains at around 15% in the following years. In addition, we find that compared to other reasons for separation, the earning loss pattern is unique for involuntary separations, because no other type of separation implies such permanent scarring. This latter finding makes us confident that the self‐reported involuntariness of a separation is a reliable source of information.     

Monitoring Job Offer Decisions,Punishments, Exit to Work,and Job Quality

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part‐time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.     

The Incidence and Consequence of Worker Displacement in Australia

This paper analyses displacement risk and its consequences for re-employment in Australia using data from the Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns (SEUP). We confirm overseas evidence that older workers and those from lower skill occupations are, in general, at a greater risk of displacement. By contrast, unlike US studies, no systematic link between tenure in job and displacement risk was found. Consistent with previous Australian research ( Borland and McDonald, 2001 ) we find that males face a higher incidence of displacement than females. Decomposition of the gender difference revealed that industry effects are an important source of disparity in displacement rates. Analysis of re-employment hazards indicated that workers displaced from manufacturing faced increased periods of non-employment. Hence, it appears that there is a role for provisions to help workers in industries where the effects of structural reform have been concentrated ( Kletzer, 1998 ).     

Earnings, Education, and Fixed-Term Contracts

We explore the relationship between earnings, education, and fixed‐term contracts using data from the 1997 British Social Attitudes Survey. We find that the log hourly wage of workers employed under such contracts is approximately 13% lower than that of their ‘permanent’ counterparts, even after controlling for a plethora of personal and job characteristics. Standard decompositions indicate that the vast majority of this differential (more than 70%) is attributable to price effects, which may reflect discrimination on the part of the employer. Such findings may, therefore, suggest that employment protection is appropriate for individuals employed under fixed‐term contracts.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

NEW EVIDENCE ON REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY WITHIN EMPLOYER–EMPLOYEE MATCHES

In the most thorough study to date on wage cyclicality among job stayers, Devereux's (2001) analysis of men in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) produced two puzzling findings: (1) the real wages of salaried workers are noncyclical, and (2) wage cyclicality among hourly workers differs between two alternative wage measures. We examine these puzzles with additional evidence from other sources. Devereux's finding of noncyclical real wages among salaried job stayers is not replicated in the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) data. The NLSY data, however, do corroborate his finding of a discrepancy for hourly workers between the cyclicality of the two alternative wage measures. Evidence from the PSID Validation Study contradicts Devereux's conjecture that the discrepancy might be due to a procyclical bias from measurement error in average hourly earnings. Evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment survey supports his hypothesis that overtime work accounts for part (but not all) of the discrepancy. We conclude that job stayers' real average hourly earnings are substantially procyclical and that an important portion of that procyclicality probably is due to compensation beyond base wages.     

Occupations,fields of study and returns to education

This paper considers several possible channels behind the well‐documented effect of education on earnings. The first channel is that education makes workers more productive on a given task, as in a conventional human capital framework. The second channel is based on the idea that education helps workers get assigned to higher‐paying occupations where output is more sensitive to skill. A third and final channel is that workers are more productive and earn more when they are matched to a job related to their field of study. Using data from the 2005 National Graduate Survey and the 2006 Canadian Census, I find that channels two and three account for close to half of the conventionally measured return to education. The results indicate that the return to education varies greatly depending on occupation, field of study and the match between these two factors.     

Is a Policy of Free Movement of Workers Sustainable?

In this paper, we study the costs and benefits of the adoption of a policy of free movement of workers. For countries to agree on uncontrolled movements of workers, short‐run costs must be outweighed by the long‐term benefits of better labor‐market flexibility and income smoothing. We show that such a policy is less likely to be adopted when workers are more impatient and less risk‐averse, when production technologies display stronger decreasing returns, and when countries trade a significant share of their products.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH,PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS,AND THE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS PROCESS*

Individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex, highly persistent dynamics. We investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with on‐the‐job search, wage renegotiation by mutual consent, and i.i.d. productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earnings, the evolution of individual earnings mean, and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment, or the distribution of year‐to‐year earnings changes. Structural estimation of our model on a 12‐year panel of highly educated British workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure that is remarkably consistent with the data.     

Does Occupational Training by the Trade Adjustment Assistance Program Really Help Reemployment? Success Measured as Occupation Matching

The Trade Adjustment Assistance Program provides various retraining opportunities to workers displaced due to import competition. This paper investigates whether successful skill acquisition through training—as opposed to general exposure to federal assistance—improves the post‐participation outcomes using the Trade Act Participant Report. Success in skill acquisition is indicated by a match between occupations of training and entered employment. The average matching rate for the sample is 37.53%. Trainees with a match display wage replacement rates that are 2 to 3 percentage points higher than those without one, while they display very similar post‐participation earnings that are inferior to that of non‐trainees. This generally indicates that participants with limited skill sets with lower pre‐participation earnings select into training, and successful skill acquisition offsets the negative impacts of their lack of marketable skills. Matching itself does not improve the retention at the job. However, participation in various training programs improves retention.     

LONG‐RUN INEQUALITY AND SHORT‐RUN INSTABILITY OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS IN CANADA

This paper examines the variability of workers’ earnings in Canada over the period 1982–2006. We decompose the total variance of workers’ earnings into a ‘permanent’ component between workers and a ‘transitory’ earnings instability component over time for given workers. We then investigate the statistical relationships between these components and indicators for the business cycle. The most marked change in earnings variances in Canada since 1982 is the general rise in total earnings variance, which is essentially driven by a quite dramatic rise in long‐run earnings inequality. The patterns across age categories of the two variance components are almost opposite. Long‐run earnings inequality generally rises with age, but earnings instability is seen to generally decline with age, so that earnings instability is markedly highest among entry age workers. Unemployment rate effects are positive on almost all variance measures, while higher unemployment is associated with widened long‐run earnings differentials and greater short‐run earnings instability.