MONETARY–FISCAL INTERACTIONS WITH A CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK

We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary–fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities – output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.     

STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY

Using a New Keynesian framework, this paper shows that, under optimal discretion and optimal pre‐commitment in a timeless perspective, imperfect transparency about the relative weight assigned by the central bank to output‐gap stabilization generally reduces the average reaction of inflation to inflation shocks and the volatility of inflation, but increases those of the output gap in static and dynamic terms, and more so when inflation shocks are highly persistent. When inflation shocks are moderately persistent, opacity could improve social welfare if the weight assigned to output‐gap stabilization is low and this is more likely under pre‐commitment than under discretion.     

The impact of fiscal-monetary policy interactions on government size and macroeconomic performance

This paper analyzes the relationship between inflation, output and government size by reexamining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money à la Neiss (Neiss, Katharine S. (1999), Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 31(3), pp. 357–374.), and public expenditure financed by means of a distortive tax. It is shown that, with predetermined wages, the equilibrium rate of inflation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate is below the efficient level. In particular, the discretionary rate of inflation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related to the degree of central bank conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment leads to welfare improvements over a regime with discretion.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Inflation Targeting versus Nominal Income Targeting

In this paper we analyze two different target regimes, flexible inflation targeting and nominal income targeting, under discretion in a simple dynamic macro model. The key results of our paper are: First, for both targeting regimes optimal monetary policy response leads to a shock-dependent feedback rule. Second, a demand shock is completely offset by both monetary strategies. Third, in case of a supply shock there is a significant difference between the two different targeting regimes. Under inflation targeting the policy makers face a trade-off between inflation and output stabilization. This trade-off depends on the weight Φ the policy makers attach to output stabilization relative to inflation stabilization in the loss function. In contrast, under nominal income targeting policy makers face a constant trade-off between inflation and real output growth: an increase in inflation leads to a fall in real output growth by an equal amount. Furthermore, in Appendix A we analyze a (linear) commitment solution for inflation targeting and compare it with the discretionary case. Under commitment, inflation is smaller and the output gap is larger than under discretion. In Appendix B, we investigate inflation targeting in a two-period time-lag version of the model. The qualitative results on the trade-off between inflation and output growth remain the same as in the basic model without time lag. Received May 3, 2000; revised version received December 3, 2001 Published online: February 17, 2003     

Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation for New Zealand?

This paper measures the benefits of commitment-based monetary policy over discretion for a small open economy inflation targeting country—New Zealand. Significant gains accrue from commitment policy. If commitment-based policy is unavailable, the government can recoup much of the gains to commitment through optimal delegation, asking the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to care more about inflation stabilisation. The 1999 PTA, the core of the policy contract between the New Zealand government and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, placed an increased emphasis on stabilisation of output, interest rates and the exchange rate. This is inconsistent with a shift to optimal delegation behaviour and must stem from a changed perception of the welfare costs of macroeconomic stabilization on the part of the Government. This is shown to be true when the definition of inflation is extended to a medium term measure.     

Common Currencies vs. Monetary Independence

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy makers; (b) common currencies with a centralized policy maker.
Our findings suggest that: (i) monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) the inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) the welfare losses from higher long-term inflation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to shocks.     

Animal spirits and optimal monetary policy design in the presence of labour market frictions

Using a New Keynesian DSGE model with labour market frictions, we compare outcomes for backward-looking animal spirits expectations with rational expectations after technology and demand shocks. For optimal monetary policy, major differences arise only for technology shocks, and discretionary policy performs better than commitment policy under animal spirits expectations. If Taylor rule parameters are chosen to best replicate optimal monetary policy outcomes, inflation targeting is only appropriate for technology shocks, particularly for large labour frictions, while targeting only economic activity is appropriate for demand shocks. Fault tolerance analysis shows high costs from failing to identify true animal spirits expectations and technology shocks.     

On discretion versus commitment and the role of the direct exchange rate channel in a forward-looking open economy model

Abstract

This paper compares optimal monetary policy under discretion and commitment in an economy where the direct exchange rate channel is operative. The stabilization bias under discretion is shown to be weaker in an open economy relative to a closed economy. In an open economy, a ‘less conservative central banker’, one that attaches a smaller weight to the variance of inflation in the loss function, can be appointed to replicate the behaviour of real output that eventuates under commitment. Evaluating the social loss function under discretion and commitment, we find that the existence of a direct exchange rate channel in the Phillips Curve mitigates the pronounced differences between the two strategies in case of high persistence in the stochastic shocks.     

Inflation bias and markup shocks in a LAMP model with strategic interaction of monetary and fiscal policy

This paper investigates the effects generated by limited asset market participation on optimal monetary and fiscal policy, where monetary and fiscal authorities are independent and play strategically. It shows that: (i) both the long run and the short run equilibrium require a departure from zero inflation rate; (ii) in response to a markup shock, fiscal policy becomes more aggressive as the fraction of liquidity constrained agents increases and price stability is no longer optimal even under Ramsey; (iii) overall, optimal discretionary policies imply welfare losses for Ricardians, while liquidity constrained consumers experience welfare gains with respect to Ramsey.     

The Optimal Perception of Inflation Persistence is Zero

This study shows that, in an economy with inflation persistence, it is always welfare improving for a central bank that operates under discretion to behave as if there were no inflation persistence. Under reasonable assumptions about inflation persistence, all of the inefficiency associated with discretionary policymaking is then removed.     

Games of monetary and fiscal interactions in the EMU

This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries’ most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.     

Timeless perspective versus discretionary policymaking when the degree of inflation persistence is unknown

One major strand in optimal monetary policy analysis considers the robustness of alternative policies under model uncertainty. Another has focused on the appropriate perspective for optimal monetary policy, namely discretion or the timeless perspective (TP). The paper bridges these two parallel lines of research by assessing the welfare consequences of both policy perspectives in the presence of misperceptions about the degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. Contrary to most standard results, discretion can be the more robust perspective, the reason being that the TP exploits the expectations channel. With misperceptions this leads to large deteriorations in welfare.     

Government debt and optimal monetary and fiscal policy

How do different levels of government debt affect the optimal conduct of monetary and fiscal policies? And what do these optimal policies imply for the evolution of government debt over time? To provide an answer, this paper studies a standard monetary policy model with nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition and adds to it a fiscal authority that issues nominal non-state contingent debt, levies distortionary labor income taxes and determines the level of public goods provision. Higher government debt levels make it optimal to reduce public spending, so as to dampen the adverse incentive effects of distortionary taxes, but also strongly influence the optimal stabilization response following technology shocks. In particular, higher debt levels give rise to larger risks to the fiscal budget and to tax rates. This makes it optimal to reduce government debt over time. The optimal speed of debt reduction is missed when using first-order approximations to optimal policies, but is shown to be quantitatively significant in a second-order approximation, especially when technology movements are largely unpredictable in nature.     

Foreign Debt,Foreign Direct Investment and Volatility

We investigate how foreign debt and foreign direct investment (FDI) affect the growth and welfare of a stochastically growing small open economy. First, we find that foreign debt influences the growth of domestic wealth by lowering the cost of capital, while FDI affects the country's welfare by providing an additional source of permanent income. Second, a decline in domestic investment may improve domestic welfare as FDI replaces the gap. Even when the welfare deteriorates, its magnitude is mitigated, leaving more room for discretionary fiscal policy. Third, a fiscal policy aimed to stabilize domestic output fluctuations needs to be conducted not to crowd out the welfare benefit of FDI too much. Fourth, an economy with both types of foreign capital experiences wider welfare swings by external volatility shocks than the one with foreign debt alone, while the welfare effects from domestic volatility shocks are mitigated. The welfare effects of fiscal shocks are much smaller with both types of foreign capital. Lastly, the first-best labor income tax covers the government absorption by the labor's share of total output, and the capital income tax covers the rest. Investment is penalized or subsidized depending on the social marginal cost-gain differential.     

Inflation and interest rates in the presence of a cost channel,wealth effect and agent heterogeneity

As far as the control of inflation is concerned, the interest rate is the most important monetary instrument. This paper examines the effectiveness of the interest rate policy in controlling inflation. The model utilized in this paper considers both demand and supply side effects of interest rate policy. These effects are used to derive not only the relevant impulse response functions but also the welfare loss to the society that arises from the supply side shocks. Based on their ability to control inflation and minimization of the overall welfare loss to the society, three policies are compared: (i) monetary policy with commitment, (ii) Taylor's rule, and (iii) inflation targeting. We argue that, in the presence of a cost channel, it is imperative that the interest rate policy is used with restraint. Our results also suggest that ignoring the cost channel of monetary policy can lead to significant under-estimation of the social welfare loss.     

The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy

Abstract.  This paper studies how the nature of shocks affects the optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy. Three classic rules, fixed exchange rates, monetary targeting, and inflation targeting are studied and ranked by comparing with the optimal monetary policy under commitment. We find that the ranking of the simple rules can be mapped to the terms-of-trade variability that the rule allows relative to what a particular shock optimally calls for. It turns out that inflation targeting dominates the other two rules under productivity or velocity shocks, whereas monetary targeting is the best performer under fiscal shocks.     

Optimal monetary policy and the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets

This study investigates the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets as a solution to the well-known stabilization bias problem that arises under discretionary policies. The analysis shows that social welfare will be improved by employing a weighted average of inflation and price level as one of the central bank's target variables in addition to the output gap growth target. The reason is that imposing the optimal hybrid target will reduce inflation variability in a highly efficient way. In particular, the optimal hybrid regime outperforms other previously suggested regimes when the degree of inflation persistence is moderate.     

Time Inconsistency and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy

This paper analyses time–inconsistency problems related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Within a simple open–economy macroeconomic model, where the exchange rate is the only forward–looking variable, we show that a difference emerges between optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. Moreover, the nature of the time–inconsistency problem resembles that resulting from standard New Keynesian models: when cost–push shocks occur, the exchange rate channel gives rise to excessive output stabilisation and insufficient inertia in monetary policy under a discretionary policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; E 61