Rethinking the allocation of macroprudential mandates within the Banking Union – a perspective from east of the BU

This paper argues that reforms of the Banking Union should be aimed at increasing efficiency of the single market as well enhance financial stability in the European Union. We argue that this can only be achieved if the Banking Union becomes more accommodative to non-Eurozone Central and Eastern European countries. It can be achieved if within BU institutions, the allocation of competencies reflects the subsidiary demands of CEE governments. Using the example of macroprudential regulation, we develop a number of reform options that could result in the better functioning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism and thus benefit all EU member states.     

Going out of the Great Recession? Contrast between the United States and Europe: Proposed work from economic history, 1960–2014

In recent work, the authors have proposed to the United States a model that explains the trend behavior of the rate of profit from share surplus, capital productivity, and the coefficient of financialization. The main results of the explanatory model allow the authors to affirm that with the change of control of Keynesianism to neoliberalism since 1980, there has been a substantial fall in the profit rate to half the values achieved in the years of Keynesian regulation (1945–1973). This significant fall in the level of benefits is due to a substantial fall in capital productivity. The authors are currently working on adapting the explanatory model for the U.S. economy to the main countries of the European Union (Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Spain). The results show that the pattern of behavior of the variables described in the reference country—the world capitalist economic system, the United States—is repeated more or less precisely in the main countries of the European Union; Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom, and Spain.     

International law as a negotiation tool in Banking Union; the case of the Single Resolution Fund

EU’s response to the recent Euro-crisis has involved a mixture of EU and international law, with the latter being linked to all the arrangements that may have fiscal implications for national Member States. The SRF embodies all the controversial characteristics of Banking Union. This article illustrates the legal implications that this political choice creates, and how the interrelation between the SRM, the SRF and the ESM, allows leading economies, including Germany, to control the resolution framework both before and after crisis. This raises questions as to the direction that European Integration is taking and its highly nationalised character.     

A common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund

During the establishment of the Banking Union it has been agreed to develop a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund. The following key principles constitute the point of departure of this paper:

1. Fiscal neutrality in the medium term;

2. Instrument of last resort;

3. Equivalent treatment across all Member States in the Banking Union; and

4. No costs for non-Banking Union Member States.

For each aspect the legal and regulatory background as well as the economic implications are provided. They significantly influence the common backstop’s final design and the choice of an adequate provider for the steady state.     

Is public capital productive in Europe?

This paper addresses the issue of whether and by how much public investment or public capital can increase GDP. In comparison with the literature on the subject, we apply many different methodologies to answer these questions. A vector autoregressive (VAR) model (for France, Italy, Germany, the UK and the USA), a panel composed of 6 European countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and a regional panel (French regions) are estimated. Public investment is shown to be a significant determinant of output; this is also true for public capital but to a lesser extent than public investment with a VAR methodology. The size of the estimated coefficient is also more realistic than those obtained in the literature. This empirical result confirms that the focus of some economists on safeguarding the level of public investment is not misplaced. The debate on the introduction of a ‘golden rule of public finance’ in the European Monetary Union is legitimate in this respect.     

Eurowinners and Eurolosers: The distribution of seigniorage wealth in EMU

The European Monetary Union (EMU) will involve socialization of the existing seigniorage wealth of the national central banks. This socialization will create windfall gains for countries with relatively low monetary bases such as France and the UK and it will be disadvantageous for countries like Germany, Austria, Spain or the Netherlands which will suffer per capita wealth losses of between 406 and 182 ecus. The paper quantifies the gains and losses in seigniorage wealth under alternative membership and bank regulation scenarios.     

世界多国政府对处方药物定价和报销规定的法律问题研究

处方药的价格对世界各国的医疗体系都至关重要,笔者研究了9个国家公共医疗体系对处方药定价和报销政策的规定,包括欧盟四个成员国法国、德国、意大利和英国,还有澳大利亚、巴西、印度、日本和韩国,总结出这些国家对处方药定价和报销政策规定中普遍存在的法律问题,并提出立法建议。     

Output,consumption and the stock market: implications for European convergence

This paper investigates the nature of the relationship between output and stock prices, and consumption and stock prices, with respect to the different financial structures that exist primarily in the European Union (EU). Evidence is found of a long-run relationship for both relationships, with the exception of Germany and to an extent France, which is argued is due to their bank dominated financial systems. Kalman Filter estimates reveal that both relationships have increased in strength, although little evidence is found of any convergence in the strength of the relationship across the EU.     

The single supervision mechanism and contagion between bank and sovereign risk

Journal of Regulatory Economics - The objective of this article is to analyse how the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of the European Banking Union, affects contagion between...     

The monetary transmission mechanism: evidence and implications for European Monetary Union

We provide some evidence consistent with a heterogeneous credit channel of monetary policy transmission in the European Union. Using the techniques of cointegration and Error Correction Models, we have shown that the external finance premium is one important leading indicator of real economic activity in Germany and Italy. No evidence is found for France and the UK. Therefore, a common monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank might be transmitted in different ways across the member countries of the monetary union, thus exacerbating existing regional disparities among the member countries.     

AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS AND (PARTIAL) LABOUR MARKET REFORMS

European labour markets have undergone several important innovations over the last three decades. Most countries have reformed their labour markets since the mid‐1990s, with the liberalization of fixed‐term contracts and temporary work agencies being the common elements to such reforms. This paper investigates the existence of a change in the dynamic behaviour of the aggregate employment for major European Union countries – France, Germany, Italy and Spain. According to our results, partial labour market reforms have made the response of the aggregate employment to output shocks larger and quite comparable to that found for the UK – the most flexible labour market in Europe since the Thatcher reforms.     

On the Gibson Paradox

This paper uses recent developments in the theory of nonstationary regressors to investigate empirical relationships previously taken to support the Gibson paradox, using quarterly data over the 1957:1–1994:4 period on nominal interest rates and prices for eight European Union countries—Belgium, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, and The Netherlands. Using the methodology suggested by Kydland and Prescott, it is shown that the (relevant) cyclical nominal interest rate—price level contemporaneous correlations are weak, thereby punching a hole in the Gibson paradox. Evidence is also presented, based on the integration properties of the data, that standard Gibson paradox regressions are spurious.     

The EU-Turkey Customs Union and Greece: Who is the loser?

The purpose of this paper is to first apply the theory of trade in vertically differentiated products in a Customs Union context and second to find out the effects of the Customs Union between the European Union and Turkey. This is done both at a theoretical and at an empirical level. Based on these assumptions, the theoretical analysis indicates that the benefits of admitting Turkey into the Customs Union will be unevenly spread between Germany and Greece. In particular, Germany will definitely benefit, whereas Greece may suffer losses. In the empirical part of the paper, it is examined whether the predictions emanating from the theoretical analysis find any empirical support. For this purpose, the behavior of Greek and Turkish exports to the European Union is examined using desegregated data. The evidence is supportive of the theoretical predictions.     

Has the transmission mechanism of European monetary policy changed in the run-up to EMU?

This paper studies empirically the transmission mechanism of European monetary policy by means of time-varying, heterogeneous coefficient models estimated in a numerical Bayesian fashion. Based on pre-European Monetary Union evidence from Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, we find that (i) the long-run cumulative impact on output of a common, homoskedastic monetary policy shock has decreased in all countries after 1991. These declines are statistically significant and accompanied by some changes in the conduct of monetary policy over the same period. At the same time, we also find that (ii) cross-country differences in the effects of this shock have not decreased over time.     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
Gregg S., Robins Banking in Transition. East Germany after Unification
Carmelo, Mesa-Lago Market, Socialist and Mixed Economies. Comparative Policy and Performance – Chile, Cuba and Costa Rica
Anders, Åslund and Georges de, Ménil Economic Reform in Ukraine: The Unfinished Agenda     

A field experiment investigating age discrimination in four European labour markets

In a field experiment investigating age discrimination, pairs of men, aged 27 and 47, inquired about employment as waiters in towns across England, France, Germany and Spain. Statistically significant discrimination against the older waiter was found in all four countries, but it was considerably higher in France and Spain than in England and Germany.     

New European Banking Governance and Crisis of Democracy: Bank Restructuring and Privatization in Slovenia

ABSTRACT

The paper makes three contributions to the understanding of the post-crisis European banking governance. First, it offers a more comprehensive approach to banking governance, beyond the Banking Union, through its concept of ‘New European Banking Governance’ (NEBG) that incorporates EU state aid rules and fiscal regulations. Second, it considers the impact of NEBG on democratic institutions and processes in EU member states, an under-researched topic in the literature on European banking governance. Finally, through its in-depth case study of Slovenia it considers the NEBG in relation to peripheral Eurozone states. It argues that the post-crisis banking governance framework of the EU not only severely constrained the Slovenian state in its policy choices but rearranged its policy-making institutions in a way that restricted and continues to restrict democratic banking policy formation.     

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES OF STAGFLATION AN EXAMPLE: FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1971–79

Stagflation is a combination of an increasing rate of inflation with a decreasing rate of real growth. It appears when the inflationary gap of production costs raises faster than the inflationary gap of expenditures on Gross Domestic Marketable Product. The decomposition of these two gaps into their main elements gives then the possibility of determining the sources of the inflationary increase in costs and the causes of the relative retardation of the inflationary increase in expenditures. The main cause of stagflation in 1974 for France and Germany was the huge rise in oil prices which had not been immediately followed by an equal rise in prices of their exports. The inflationary rise in wages is an almost permanent factor of stagflation in France; in Germany its responsibility is involved only before 1975. In France the insufficient increase in the inflationary gap of expenditures was mainly due to the restrictive monetary policy and to the official price regulation. In Germany the restrictive monetary policy also contributed to the slowdown in demand in 1974 and 1975. In 1977, on the contrary, the main cause of stagflation was the slackening of export demands due to the world recession and the revaluation of the DM.     

Liberal economic nationalism,financial stability,and Commission leniency in Banking Union

This paper demonstrates that protection and promotion of insolvent banks remains a high priority for national authorities in Europe, and the Commission partially accommodates these impulses in the desire to preserve national financial stability. Insolvent banks are kept alive despite Banking Union rules on resolution designed to facilitate their closure at the cost of private investors. Italian and Portuguese cases demonstrate that pressure to relax state aid rules is strongest where problems are the greatest. However, the long-term trend is still an incremental decrease in national leeway to protect and promote national bank ownership.     

What are the prerequisites for a euro area fiscal capacity?

ABSTRACT

This paper discusses a pathway towards achieving fiscal union in the euro area. It outlines three steps and their prerequisites. In the first step, Banking Union would be completed to increase the financial stability of the euro area. It would render the “no bailout” clause more credible and thereby allow to deal better with insolvent governments. In the second step, more centralised funds would be created in order to provide important public goods and in order to deal with large asymmetric shocks. The third step, which is currently unattainable, consists of a true federalisation of important government functions.