Resilience and Dynamism of Embedded Financial Transactions in Cameroon

Following the recent financial crisis, institutional economists have issued a “call” for institutionalist research on alternative financial systems. While suggestions have been forthcoming, (for example, in Volume 48, Issue 4 of the Journal of Economic Issues), most have centered on national-level innovations in advanced capitalist countries, prompting further calls for “community” and individual level anti-capitalist financial relations. With this article, we respond to such calls. We show how networks of finance in Cameroon bridge the formal/informal dualisms in lending/savings activities. We demonstrate that any debates about whether to formalize informal financial institutions or leave them alone weaken in Cameroon because, through networks, people access both formal and informal financial institutions for different purposes and at various stages in the life of these institutions. This dynamism explains why, in spite of the growth of money markets in Cameroon, informal financial institutions have not disappeared, nor declined. In fact, they have expanded, contrary to predictions in existing new institutional economics research. While informal institutions have evolved, they have not necessarily become formal banks, microfinance, or stock markets. Rather, the informal financial institutions have adopted and adapted in terms of both lending and saving practices in a country where growing formal financialization has become the norm. Our findings challenge neoclassical and new institutional economics theories about money, credit, and the actors in the money market.     

信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资

各种形式的非正规金融在发展中国家和地区广泛存在。本文认为,由于中小企业信息不透明,且常常不能提供充分的担保或抵押,正规金融机构难以有效克服信息不对称造成的逆向选择问题,而非正规金融则在收集关于中小企业的“软信息”方面具有优势。这种信息优势是非正规金融广泛存在的根本性原因,金融抑制只是一个强化因素,同时非正规金融市场的各种特征也都源于其存在的根本逻辑。本文构建了一个包括异质的中小企业借款者和异质的贷款者(具有不同信息结构的非正规金融和正规金融部门)的金融市场模型,证明非正规金融的存在能够改进整个信贷市场的资金配置效率。     

The nexus of economic and institutional evolution

The current state of the development economics literature ascribes an indisputable central role to institutions. This paper presents a formal model of institutional evolution that is based on the dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions and economic development; the main features of the model is consistent with the fundamental theories that shed light to institutional evolution, namely the collective action and transaction cost theories, as well as dialectics. As informal institutional quality accumulates like technological know-how, while the level of formal institutional quality is chosen by the government to maximize welfare, subject to the economic and political costs. The solution of the model yields a punctuated trajectory of formal institutional evolution. Simulations reveal that the extent of diversity in informal institutional quality across a country delays formal institutional reforms. We also observe that, both the optimal quality of formal institutions and welfare are higher the more homogeneous is the country with respect to its informal institutions or the cultural attributes.     

Trust,cultural norms and financial institutions in rural communities: the case of Cameroon

The success of the operations of formal and informal financial institutions (IFIs) hinges on a high degree of trust. The pivotal role of trust warrants careful analysis regarding its formation in these financial institutions. Using the case of Cameroon, the paper interrogates trust development between formal financial institutions and their clients, and between IFIs and their members. Trust formation occurs via certain cognitive trust-building processes: calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference processes. The paper argues that trust formation through these processes is predicated upon cultural values and beliefs. It is precisely because of cultural norms that traditional leaders play a role in ensuring that loans granted by formal financial institutions are repaid, thereby serving as principal actors in the functioning of financial capitalism in rural areas. The interplay between culture and financial institutions reconfigures the financial architecture in rural zones. Culture creates a social relational anthropology that is significant for how financial institutions operate.     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

The impact of formal financial inclusion on informal financial intermediation and cash preference: evidence from Africa

This paper examines the effect of formal financial intermediation (inclusion) on informal financial intermediation and the use of cash for economic activities. Using data from the Global Findex 2014, we examine whether the use of formal financial intermediaries reduces cash preference and the use of informal financial intermediaries. Our empirical results show that informal financial intermediation is positively associated with formal financial inclusion. This indicates that the relationship between informal and formal financial intermediation is complementary rather than a trade-off, which demonstrates the importance of informal finance plays in the financial system of Africa. Moreover, the use of formal financial intermediaries significantly reduces the preference for holding cash, implying that a robust financial system infrastructure has the potential of mobilizing excess liquidity in the informal economy of Africa for growth and development.     

Does formal financial development crowd in informal financing? Evidence from Chinese private enterprises

The relationship between formal and informal finance is uncertain. They serve as substitute for high-quality borrowers but are complement for low-quality borrowers. As formal financial institutions expand, they may concentrate on high-quality borrowers or diversify among borrowers of different qualities. Using unique survey data from Chinese private firms, we are allowed to investigate the relationship for a group of borrowers who were considered as low-quality. We find that formal financial development imposes a crowd-in effect for private firms’ informal financing, especially in East China. There is heterogeneity between East and West China. We document that the crowd-in effect is greater for private firms with bank access or of large size.     

Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina

This article uses survey data to investigate the relationship between citizens’ confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). We find an endogenous substituting relationship and that the different institutional structures currently existing in the two entities in BiH are significantly linked to respondents’ confidence in formal and reliance on informal institutions. In addition, perceptions of higher indirect costs of institutions and a lack of their improvement are associated with a lower confidence in formal and a greater reliance on informal institutions; the minority ethnic groups in each region are less confident in formal and rely more on informal institutions compared to the majority group; and more reliance on informal institutions is found amongst males and respondents from urban areas.     

Information, Informal Finance, and SME Financing

Informal finance exists extensively and has been playing an important role in small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) financing in developing economies. This paper tries to rationalize the extensiveness of informal finance. SME financing suffers more serious information asymmetry to the extent that most SMEs are more opaque and can only provide less collateral. Informal lenders have an advantage over formal financial institutions in collecting “soft information” about SME borrowers. This paper establishes a model including formal and informal lenders and high- and low-risk borrowers with or without sufficient collateral and shows that the credit market in which informal finance is eliminated will allocate funds in some inefficient way, and the efficiency of allocating credit funds can be improved once informal finance is allowed to coexist with formal finance. Translated from Economic Research Journal, 2005, 7 (in Chinese)     

农业补贴对农村金融市场的“挤出效应”——理论分析与实证检验

针对我国农村金融机构年贷款增长率远低于政府农业年度补贴增长率的现实,本文构建一个理论分析框架,并基于农户调研数据进行实证分析。研究发现,农业补贴依次对非正规金融市场和正规金融市场形成挤出效应;政府提高贷款利息虽可压缩非正规金融市场的生存空间,但却会引致农户福利流失;非挂钩性农业补贴会强化(弱化)非正规金融市场(正规金融市场)的挤出效应。因而,政府不应单一地寄希望于制度创新,而应更多地关注农业补贴对农户借贷决策行为的影响。     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

我国三十年来农村地区金融改革的逻辑轨迹——基于新比较经济学分析框架的研究

文章基于新比较经济学的分析框架,从正规金融和非正规金融两个方面来论述三十年来中国农村地区金融改革的基本逻辑。研究认为,农村金融发展滞后于农村经济发展的原因是政府对农村金融的控制方式不尽合理。文章充分肯定了国家2005年至今的改革措施,认为新型金融机构的引进将成为建立完善的农村金融体系的契机。     

论非正规金融之于农村反贫困的作用机制与制度安排

一直以来,非正规金融处于被打击的状态,但是,作为一种诱致性制度变迁的产物,它顽强地生存了下来,并在许多地区呈扩大之势。非正规金融的制度优势使其在农村反贫困中发挥了正规金融难以替代的作用。基于此,本文探讨了农村非正规金融对于反贫困的作用机制,并提出了相应的制度安排。     

我国农村正规金融与非正规金融效率分析

高效率的金融制度对经济发展提供强有力的资金支持,可以提高经济的总体竞争力,促进经济增长。对农村信用社、农业银行、农业发展银行和邮政储蓄银行等正规金融机构和村镇银行、小额贷款公司等非正规金融组织的效率进行调查,从资金配置效率、适应性效率和运行效率方面进行分析,结果显示：正规金融制度的效率偏低,非正规金融组织的效率偏高;两种金融制度的效率有各自的空间,在规模和范围较小时,非正规金融制度效率更高,而超出一定的发展范围和规模,正规金融制度的优越性则进一步凸显。     

正规金融与非正规金融合作会提高农户期望收益吗?——理论分析和实证检验

文章区分三种不同的市场结构从理论上分析了农户、正规金融机构和非正规金融机构三个主体的决策行为和期望收益,认为只有在正规金融部门与非正规金融部门共存且实现合作的市场中,农户的融资需求才能得到有效满足,农户的期望收益才能最大化。文章还利用遍布我国东、中、西部地区近10 000家农户的实地调研数据进行实证检验,为建立正规金融与非正规金融间的合作机制提供了经验证据。     

非正规金融市场:反应性还是自主性?——基于温州民间利率的经验研究

关于温州非正规金融市场利率的大多数典型事实都可以在"反应性"非正规金融范畴内得到合理的解释.支持温州非正规金融具有"反应性"的有力证据来自于对相关变量进行Granger因果关系检验及其脉冲响应分析.这些实证分析表明,正规金融对中小企业的信贷扩张将深刻改变非正规金融市场资金价格的短期走势.然而协整分析表明,在非正规金融市场利率与中小企业信贷水平之间并不存在一种长期的均衡关系.一个整合的分析框架应该被应用于理解温州非正规金融.在该框架中,非正规金融的"反应性"与"自主性"是互为补充的.     

Explaining informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe: an institutional asymmetry perspective

The aim of this paper is to propose and evaluate a new institutional theory explanation for patients making informal payments for health services in Central and Eastern Europe. This views informal payments by patients to healthcare professionals as arising when formal institutional failures lead to an asymmetry between the laws and regulations of formal institutions and the unwritten rules of informal institutions. Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of the prevalence of informal payments by patients in Central and Eastern European countries, a strong association is revealed between the level of asymmetry between the formal and informal institutions, and the propensity to make informal payments. The association between informal payments and various formal institutional imperfections is then explored to evaluate which structural conditions might reduce this institutional asymmetry, and thus the propensity to make informal payments. The paper concludes by exploring the implications for tackling such informal practices.     

制度对区域技术创新的影响

利用2006—2011年我国31个省级行政单位的相关数据,采用分层回归分析方法探究正式制度和非正式制度对区域技术创新效率的影响。研究结果表明:研发投入对区域技术创新有显著的积极影响;正式制度和非正式制度正向调节研发投入与区域技术创新的关系,即正式制度和非正式制度更完善的地区的研发投入对区域技术创新的促进作用更强。     

非正规金融与正规金融:互补还是替代?——基于DSGE模型的相互作用机制研究

文章通过建立四部门动态随机一般均衡模型,分析了二元金融体系下正规金融与非正规金融部门之间的作用机制,并对模型进行数值模拟。研究发现,在居民消费偏好冲击和技术冲击两种情况下,正规金融与非正规金融部门之间主要是互补关系,表现为两部门贷款利率和贷款规模的同向变动;而在货币政策冲击下,两部门短期内呈现相互替代的关系。     

A tale of two federalisms: Germany,the United States and the ubiquity of centralization

This paper offers a comparison of government centralization in the United States and in Germany. After briefly laying out the history of federalism in both countries, we identify the instruments of centralization at work. It is argued that an initial constitutional framework of competitive federalism does not prevent the long-term centralization of competencies. Against a background of historical evidence, we discuss the political economics of government centralization. It is argued that formal institutions clearly have an effect on the pathways of government centralization, but not necessarily on the broader trend of centralization. The conclusion is reached that preservation of state and local autonomy may eventually hinge on informal political institutions.