Public spending and outcomes: Does governance matter?

This paper studies the links between public spending, governance, and outcomes. We examine the role of governance–measured by the level of corruption and the quality of bureaucracy–in determining the efficacy of public spending in improving human development outcomes. Our analysis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between public spending, governance and outcomes, and helps explain the surprising result that public spending often does not yield the expected improvement in outcomes. We show empirically that the differences in the efficacy of public spending can be largely explained by the quality of governance. Public health spending lowers child mortality rates more in countries with good governance. Similarly, public spending on primary education becomes more effective in increasing primary education attainment in countries with good governance. More generally, public spending has virtually no impact on health and education outcomes in poorly governed countries. These findings have important implications for enhancing the development effectiveness of public spending. The lessons are particularly relevant for developing countries, where public spending on education and health is relatively low, and the state of governance is often poor.     

Corruption and public spending on education and health

Existing country and regional studies show that the effect of corruption on public spending on health and education is mixed. This letter reveals that the effect of corruption on health and education spending is significant and non-linear in a panel of 134 countries observed over two decades: For an overwhelming majority of countries, corruption has a positive effect on the share of public resources spent on public health and a negative effect in the case of education. The results presented are robust to several econometric challenges ignored in the literature.     

Female political representation and substantive effects on policies: A literature review

The share of women in political offices has increased considerably over the past few decades in almost every country in the world. Does this matter for policy outcomes? This is the first paper to provide a literature review on the substantive effects of female representation on policies. In developing countries, the increase in female political representation has caused a better provision of public goods, especially with regard to education and health. In developed countries, higher female representation has not affected public policies as measured by spending patterns. However, more recent evidence shows that female representation has induced changes in parliamentary deliberations and specific policy choices (e.g. more public child care) that may not be reflected in the observable composition of public spending. Finally, higher female representation has improved institutional quality by reducing corruption and rent-extraction by those in power.     

Corruption and military spending

Anecdotal evidence relates corruption with high levels of military spending. This paper tests empirically whether such a relationship exists. The empirical analysis is based on data from four different sources for up to 120 countries during 1985–1998. The association between military spending and corruption is investigated by using cross-section and panel regression techniques. The results suggest that corruption is associated with higher military spending as a share of both GDP and total government spending, as well as with arms procurement in relation to GDP and total government spending. The results can be interpreted as evidence that defense spending may be used as a component of an indicator of the quality of governance.     

Is health care a luxury? The debate revisited with new evidence from emerging economies

This paper studies the long-run relationship between health care expenditure and income using a panel data set of emerging economies over the period 1995–2012. The results show that expenditure on health care and income are non-stationary and cointegrated. After controlling for cross-sectional dependence and unobserved heterogeneity among different countries, we find that the income elasticity of health care is less than 1, indicating that health care is a necessity and not a luxury. Government expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure turn out to be important determinants of health care expenditure. Among non-monetary factors, results show that old age dependency and female education seem to have significant bearings on health care expenditures. Policy recommendations suggest that government should increase spending on health care in emerging economies since higher incomes may not automatically translate into higher health care spending by the people of these countries.     

Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938

This paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in Western Europe during the period 1830-1938. Our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate, the election rule, and electoral participation, as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries. We estimate panel regressions, and find that (1) the gradual lifting of socio-economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security; (2) the female suffrage had a weak positive effect, through spending on health, education and welfare; (3) the change from majority to proportional rule, which took place in 10 of the countries, did not contribute to growth in government spending, and held back spending on health, education and welfare; (4) there exists (weak) complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy.     

How a race to the bottom can make you fat

This article measures the effect of fiscal competition on obesity rates in the United States through education and health spending. We hypothesize that fiscal competition to attract firms results in lower business tax revenues and higher public infrastructure spending which crowds out education and health spending leading to an increase in obesity rates. We empirically test this hypothesis. We find that there is significant fiscal competition to attract firms. Next, we show that when business tax revenues are lowered and public infrastructure spending favouring businesses increased, public health and education spending declines and obesity rates significantly increase. Thus, fiscal competition significantly contributes to obesity rates through the education and health spending channel.     

Fiscal position and the financing of productive government expenditures: an application to Latin America

Government spending on public infrastructure, education, and health care can increase economic growth. However, the appropriate financing depends on a country’s fiscal position. We develop a two-sector endogenous growth model to explore how variations in the composition and financing of government expenditures affect economic growth. We find that, when tax rates are moderate, funding public investment by raising taxes may increase long-run growth. If existing tax rates are high, public investment is only growth enhancing if funded by restructuring the composition of overall public spending. Additionally, public investment that is debt financed can have adverse effects on long-run growth due to the resulting increases in interest rates and debt-servicing costs.     

Corruption and growth in Africa

A major concern in the development of African economies is the impact of corruption on economic growth and while there is general agreement on its detrimental effects, there is considerable debate over its nature and importance. In particular there is little work on the interaction between corruption, government expenditures and how this influences economic growth in countries in the region. This paper takes an endogenous growth model, extends it to include different categories of government spending and then introduces the possibility of corruption, which is allowed to have different effects on each of the categories. The results confirm the negative effect of corruption and military spending, but also show that corruption interacts with military burden, through indirect and complementary effects, to further increase its negative effect. The policy implications are that the effects of corruption on economic growth are worse than was thought in countries which have high military burdens.     

What happens to social spending in IMF-supported programmes?

This article finds that education and health spending has risen during International Monetary Fund (IMF)-supported programmes at a faster pace than in developing countries as a whole. The analysis is based on the most comprehensive dataset assembled thus far for this purpose, with data covering 1985 to 2009 for 140 countries. Controlling for other determinants of education and health spending, including macroeconomic conditions, the results confirm that IMF-supported programmes have a positive and significant effect on social spending in low-income countries. Over a 5-year period with IMF-supported programmes, spending for education increases by about ¾ percentage point of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and for health, by about 1 percentage point of GDP. IMF-supported programmes are also associated with increases in the share of government spending allocated to education and health.     

The impact of fiscal consolidations on the functional components of government expenditures

This paper analyses how the functional components and sub-components of government expenditures are affected by fiscal consolidations. A fixed-effects estimator is employed over a panel of 15 European Union countries during the period 1990–2012. The results show that spending on public services increases during fiscal consolidations, while spending on defence, public order, health, education and social protection is significantly cut. A more disaggregated analysis proves that fiscal consolidations are harmful for important social expenditures, in particular, for those related to citizens’ safety, health assistance, social protection and investment in human capital. This evidence is even stronger in a particular group of countries, known in the literature as PIIGS. Hence, fiscal consolidations can have important implications on the living standards of the more economically vulnerable citizens.     

Public financing of health expenditures,insurance, and health outcomes

The effects of public financing of health expenditures, insurance coverage and other factors on health outcomes are examined within health production models estimated using 1960–1992 data across 20 OECD countries. Mortality rates are found to depend on the mix of health care expenditures and the type of health insurance coverage. Increases in the publicly financed share of health expenditures are associated with increases in mortality rates. Increases in inpatient and ambulatory insurance coverage are associated with reduced mortality. The effects of GDP, health expenditures and age structure on mortality are similar to those in previous studies. Tobacco use, alcohol use, fat consumption, female labour force participation, and education levels are also significantly related to overall mortality rates. Increases in income inequality are associated with lower mortality rates, suggesting that the negative relationship between inequality and health outcomes suggested by some previous studies does not remain when a more complete model is estimated. The result that increases in public financing increase mortality rates is robust to a number of changes in specifications and samples. Thus, as countries increase the level of their health expenditures, they may want to avoid increasing the proportion of their expenditures that are publicly financed.     

Short- and long-term relation between economic development and government spending: the role of quality of institutions

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending considering an international database over the 1996–2012 period. By using indicators on the level of country control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, the paper analyses the economic performance-public spending nexus controlling for the quality of the institutions. The empirical evidence supports the existence of the Wagner’s law, showing that, in the short-run, public spending positively reacts to a positive shock in national income, with a lower magnitude for democratic countries. In the long run, the error-correction model shows the convergence between public spending and national output occurring less quickly for non-democratic, low-income and to a smaller extent for non-OECD countries. Institutional quality, such as effort in controlling corruption and the presence of regulations that permit and promote private sector development, may help reducing the amount of per capita public spending and making it more productive. Higher expenses in compositional amenities such as public services for the elderly may explain why public spending per capita will increase the most in economies with a higher share of the population that need healthcare facilities.     

PUBLIC PROGRAMS PARE POVERTY: EVIDENCE FROM CHILE

This study examines the effect of government health care and education programs on the poor in Chile from 2000 to 2006. Results are obtained from a country-wide provincial-level panel data set with information on poverty and indigence head-count ratios, measures on the severity of poverty as captured by the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke P ₂ statistic, per capita public expenditures on health and education, as well as other variables that are thought to influence well-being. We use fixed-effects techniques to correct for time-invariant province-specific characteristics that may affect program placement. Our analysis demonstrates that per capita public health and education expenditures significantly reduce the incidence of poverty and indigence in Chile. In particular, for a 10,000 pesos (about $23) increase in provincial per capita health spending, the poverty head-count ratio decreases by 0.48 percent. Per capita education expenditures are particularly important to reducing the severity of poverty. Our results indicate that for a 10,000 pesos increase in education spending, the severity of poverty declines by as much as 1.53 percent. Furthermore, we provide evidence that public spending in Chile is non-random. In particular, government education expenditures may be allocated in keeping with compensatory motives.     

Corruption: what are the effects on government effectiveness? Empirical evidence considering developed and developing countries

This study analyses the impact of corruption on government effectiveness for a sample of 130 countries. The findings suggest that less-corrupt countries have better quality of public service, better quality in the formulation and adoption of policies and greater credibility and government's commitment to such policies. The findings also suggest that the effect of corruption on government effectiveness is higher in developed countries. Moreover, the estimates also reveal that countries with the most indebted governments and with higher inflation rates have less-efficient governments, and an increase in rule of law represents a good strategy to improve government effectiveness. In turn, regarding developing countries, the findings show that countries with more democratic regimes have a higher degree of government effectiveness.     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

Macroeconomic changes and mortality in Mexico

While previous studies examine how the business cycle affects mortality in developed countries, less is known about this relationship in developing countries. In this paper, we investigate whether the procyclical nature of mortality in developed countries found by Ruhm (Q J Econ 115(2):617–650, 2000) and others is also present in Mexico. We assemble a unique panel data set that contains state-level data on mortality rates by age and cause of death, GDP per capita, and socioeconomic status. We find that for Mexico total mortality rates are procyclical, with the largest impact on those aged 20–49. While these findings are similar to those in Ruhm (Q J Econ 115(2):617–650, 2000), the effects of business cycles on mortality rates differ for several specific causes of death. These results suggest that whereas total mortality may be procyclical in both developed and developing countries, significant differences may exist for some causes of death.     

Does Urbanization Mean Bigger Governments?

In this paper, we introduce urbanization as an important driver of government size. Using panel data for 175 countries from 1960 to 2010, we find that there is a close link between urbanization and the size of the public sector, especially when looking at education, health care, and social issues. Various robustness checks confirm this finding. An analysis of state‐level public spending in Colombia and Germany confirms our hypothesis on the subnational level. On the microeconomic level, people in urban areas acknowledge that governments should take more responsibility, and they are more in favor of redistribution. This finding can help to explain the evolution of government size, and it can also predict the present and future needs of urbanizing areas.     

Endogenous mortality, human capital and economic growth

We consider growth and welfare effects of lifetime-uncertainty in an economy with human capital-led endogenous growth. We argue that lifetime uncertainty reduces private incentives to invest in both physical and human capital. Using an overlapping generations framework with finite-lived households we analyze the relevance of government expenditure on health and education to counter such growth-reducing forces. We focus on three different models that differ with respect to the mode of financing of education: (i) both private and public spending, (ii) only public spending, and (iii) only private spending. Results show that models (i) and (iii) outperform model (ii) with respect to long-term growth rates of per capita income, welfare levels and other important macroeconomic indicators. Theoretical predictions of model rankings for these macroeconomic indicators are also supported by observed stylized facts.     

Corruption and growth: The role of governance,public spending,and economic development

This paper analyses how the quality of governance, the size of public spending, and economic development affect the relationship between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth. The analysis shows that the interaction between corruption and governance shapes the efficiency of public spending, which in turn, determines the growth effects of corruption. Specifically, corruption improves economic efficiency only when the actual government size is above the optimal level. It implies that a growth-maximising level of corruption is possible. This paper also finds that the incidence of corruption declines with economic development. This is because with economic development the wage rate rises and makes private rent seeking costs higher, thereby, discouraging corruption. The main policy implication is that targeting tax evaders instead of bureaucrats is more effective in terms of both reducing corruption and improving the growth potential of an economy.