A Convoluted Path

In the first part of this paper, I described the events that led me from psychology into economics, and how the Association for Social Economics provided the ideal setting for someone attracted to economics but who disagreed with the normative conclusions of the mainstream. In the second part, I suggest three areas that will be of increasing importance in the near future—addictive behaviors, rising inequality, and global warming—each of which social economists are particularly well-suited to tackle.     

Eriksson on Critical Realism: a rejoinder

Abstract

In this response to Andrew Mearman I argue that his critique suffers from a series of misrepresentations of my paper. For example, Mearman generalizes my arguments about Keynes to be about Critical Realism (CR), and he challenges my criticism of Tony Lawson's arguments by claiming that I have misrepresented CR. In fact the text of my 1998 paper does not support Mearman's claims. Furthermore, since (i) the principal aim of my paper was to question the interpretation of Keynes as a realist, and (ii) Mearman does not present any arguments suggesting how CR in its current form would refute my conclusions, his criticism must be judged doubly misdirected.     

Communication and coordination in the laboratory collective resistance game

This paper presents a laboratory collective resistance (CR) game to study how different forms of non-binding communication among responders can help coordinate their collective resistance against a leader who transgresses against them. Contrary to the predictions of analysis based on purely self-regarding preferences, we find that non-binding communication about intended resistance increases the incidence of no transgression even in the one-shot laboratory CR game. In particular, we find that the incidence of no transgression increases from 7 percent with no communication up to 25–37 percent depending on whether communication occurs before or after the leader’s transgression decision. Responders’ messages are different when the leaders can observe them, and the leaders use the observed messages to target specific responders for transgression.

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Electronic Supplementary Material The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modelled as a multi-lender coalition, as the trade-off between economies of scale in monitoring and a ‘cost’ associated with the partial loss of control over the investments the multi-lender coalition makes. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g., Williamson in J Monet Econ 18:159–179, 1986), the model can account for the coexistence of financial intermediation and direct lending (a non-trivial equilibrium). We prove the existence of such non-trivial equilibria and provide a complete characterization of them. In particular, the stronger the diversity of opinions, the smaller the coalition size is. I owe Pierpaolo Battigalli and Larry Samuelson a special debt for their insightful comments and encouragements. I am also grateful to the co-editor, Stephen Williamson, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. I also like to thank Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch, Guillaume Carlier, Pascal Courty, Martin Hellwig, Bart Lipman, Jean-Marc Tallon and Anne Villamil for helpful discussions. Finally, I thank the THEMA, University Cergy-Pontoise, where part of this paper was written, for their hospitality.     

Back to the future. Is industry 4.0 a new tecno-organizational paradigm? Implications for Latin American countries

ABSTRACT

The objective of this article is to establish a dialogue between the recent ‘Industry 4.0’ (I4.0) literature and evolutionary neo-Schumpeterean studies about techno-organizational paradigms. In that direction, we wonder whether I4.0 constitutes a new paradigm, as it is assumed by the first group of literature, or it represents – until the moment – an intensification of key features of the information and communication technology (ICT) paradigm, following the second group of studies. Some questions are raised about the implications of I4.0 for developing countries (DEC), afterwards. Specifically, we reflect on the possibilities of these countries to identify and take advantage of new windows of opportunity, opened by the development and diffusion of these technologies. In this regard, the review of recent Latin American experience raises strong concerns regarding I4.0 as a new source of intra- and international heterogeneity, linked to the severe difficulties these countries have in appropriating these technologies in the form of productivity gains and quasi-rents. It seems that this is partially derived from weak technological, organizational, and connectivity capabilities paths of accumulation between institutions and actors.     

Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains

We give a complete characterization of preference domains over which the plurality rule is strategy-proof. In case strategy-proofness is required to hold under all tie-breaking rules, strategy-proof domains coincide with top-trivial ones where the range of the plurality rule admits at most two alternatives. This impossibility virtually prevails when strategy-proofness is weakened so as to hold under at least one tie-breaking rule: unless there are less than five voters, the top-triviality of a domain is equivalent to the (weak) non-manipulability of the plurality rule. We also characterize the cases with two, three or four voters. I am grateful to Attila Tasnadi for his thorough reading of the paper and pointing to an error in an earlier version. I thank Levent Kutlu, Clemens Puppe, Arunava Sen, an anonymous referee and an anonymous AE for their comments. This research is part of the project “Social Perception—A Social Choice Perspective” supported by Istanbul Bilgi University Research Fund. I also acknowledge the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBA-GEBIP).     

Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism

In this paper, I provide a defence of Robert Sugden’s contribution to evolutionary game theory against Donald Ross’s accusation of eliminating the individual’s autonomy by denying the explanatory role of rationality, utility maximization and rational beliefs. In this regard, I claim that Sugden’s methodological remarks on evolutionary game theory do not imply a characterization of real agents as automata. On the methodological level, Sugden claims that it is not correct to conceive the empirical phenomenon of social evolution in terms of normative concepts, whose empirical status is not obvious. However, Sugden proposes a theory that explains the agent’s behaviour in terms of inductive reasoning, adaptive beliefs, salience and pattern recognition. The latter are psychological features that describe the way agents manage to self-determine their own actions. From these clarifications, I draw the conclusion that Ross’s critique misunderstands Sugden’s contribution both on the methodological and empirical level.     

Sociology of economics or sociology of economy? theoretical-methodological arguments for sociological economics

This paper makes a proposal for reintroducing sociological or social economics into contemporary economic science. Such a reintroduction is proposed to be substantive, by analyzing the social structuring of the economy, and formal, by including sociological/social economics in the current (JEL) classification system of economic disciplines (code A.15). Both epistemological and ontological arguments can be presented to support the proposal. Epistemological arguments invoke the presence of essential components of sociological economics in the development of economic thought, and ontological arguments stress the role of social factors in economic life. In this paper I present primarily epistemological (theoretical-methodological) arguments for sociological economics, and secondarily ontological ones. I show that the present designation, sociology of economics, is something different from sociological or social economics in that the former refers to economic epistemology (knowledge) and the latter to economic ontology (reality). I conclude that, in addition to a sociology of economic science, we need a sociology of economic life. There is nothing surprising in the habit of economists to invade the sociological field. A major part of their work—practically the whole of what they have to say on institutions and on the…[social] forces which shape economic behavior—inevitably overlaps the sociologist’s preserves. In consequence, a no man’s land or everyman’s land has developed that might conveniently be called economic sociology … [or sociological economics] (Schumpeter 1956:134). The author is grateful to two anonymous referees for their constructive comments on an earlier version of this article.     

From weight watchers to state watchers: Towards a narrative of liberalism

Alan Kahan’s Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishers, 2010) treats intellectuals as a class and tells of intellectuals’ yearning to play the role of cleric and aristocrat. Kahan says that intellectuals are necessarily alienated from “capitalism.” In this essay, I discuss Kahan’s erudite and insightful—though sometimes exasperating—work, and I take the opportunity to develop some ideas on the topic, ideas in line with Hayek’s thought.     

Riker and Federalism

Forty years since its publication, William Riker’s Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964) remains one of the most influential volumes on the politics of federalism. However, in assessing Riker’s federal theory, scholars tend to focus on the specific hypotheses, the famous claim that the “military threat” constitutes a necessary condition for federal success, and upon rejecting the validity of that claim, by association, quickly dismiss the general theoretical argument. But Riker’s federal theory does much more for our understanding of federalism as a form of government than simply connect, rightly or not, federal success with the presence of a military threat. In the paper I argue that the most innovative feature of Riker’s analysis, defining for his contribution to the field and accountable for the emergence of new and original insights was the successful application for the first time of the principle of methodological individualism to institutional and constitutional analysis. Riker’s theory of federalism, when viewed in the context of his intellectual contribution to the studies of democratic institutions, is, indeed, the original point of departure. In the paper, I review Riker’s theory of federalism as embedded in and an integral part of his broader theory of democratic institutions, in order to highlight some of its merits that remained underappreciated until current research has generated the conceptual framework consistent with Riker’s insights. Second, I draw some implications from Riker’s theory for the contemporary challenges of federal constitutional design. For correspondence: filippov@artsci.wustl.edu JEL classification: H77, K1     

Worksharing and Access Discounts in the Postal Sector with Asymmetric Information*

This paper analyzes the optimal worksharing and access amounts granted to mailers and entrants in a liberalized postal sector when there is asymmetric information about the Post Office’s (PO) costs. I show that when the regulator is unable to ascertain which part of the total cost of sorting has to be attributed to each sorting facility, the optimal “access discount” given to entrants is set in a pro-competitive way. This facilitates the entry of firms that are less efficient than the PO. However, the optimal “worksharing discount” may prevent the entry of mailers that are more efficient than the PO.     

Socially Subjective Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

This study provides a new framework and a new equilibrium concept, which are able to describe the situation where people have various images of the society and have various solution concepts for social outcomes, and where people accept the social outcomes. In socially subjective equilibrium, people have a coherence of their own norms in two senses. One is the consistency of the norm itself. Imagined outcomes should satisfy a certain (subjective) solution concept. The other is the consistency between the imagined outcomes and realized one. These are the main features of our equilibrium concept. This paper forms a part of my doctoral thesis, which is titled “On socially subjective equilibrium”. The first person I would like to thank is my direct supervisor Professor Ken Urai (Osaka University). I obtained a basic idea of the main concept of my doctoral thesis, that is, the solution concept scheme, from Professor Urai. I am grateful to Professor Hiroaki Nagatani (Osaka University) and Professor Ken-Ichi Shimomura (Kobe University), who monitored my works and took efforts in providing me with valuable comments on earlier versions of my thesis. I also obtained a fruitful advice from Professor Kenichi Amaya (Kobe University). Lastly, I specially thank to Kozo Shiraishi (Osaka University).     

The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor δ*. In addition, δ* is often used as an intuitive measure for the stability of a tacit cartel, assuming that a collusive equilibrium is more difficult to sustain when δ* increases. However, according to standard theory the distance δ − δ* between the actual and the critical discount factor does not matter for stability as long as δ > δ*. This paper contributes experimental evidence that supports the intuitive idea that a larger critical discount factor makes collusion a less likely outcome.      

Euro area inflation persistence

This paper presents evidence on the lag between monetary policy actions and the response of inflation in the euro area as a whole as well as in some of its core countries, notably Germany, Italy and France. In line with previous findings for the US and the UK, results here show that it takes over a year before monetary policy actions have their maximum effect on inflation both in the euro area and in individual countries and that a lag of this length has existed in Europe at least since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, despite the numerous changes in European monetary policy regime thereafter. Results based on alternative definitions of inflation persistence support these findings and indicate, if any, that transmission lags could be in fact much longer for individual countries and the euro area as a whole, although, at the country level, there is strong evidence over time of a drop in German inflation persistence and a sizeable shift in the mean of inflation – particularly in Italy and France. An examination based on results from this paper reveals that euro area inflation persistence could well be an intrinsic phenomenon rather than a ‘statistical fluke’ due to aggregation.This research was conducted during my visit at the European Central Bank Directorate Research, as part of the Research Visitor Programme. I would like to thank Anna Maria Agresti for providing individual country data from the macroeconomic database of the Monetary Transmission Network; Alistair Dieppe for providing data from the ECB area-wide model dataset; and Michele Manna for supplying me with the area-wide M3 data for the period 1970–1980. I thank Gabriel Fagan, Frank Smets, Ignazio Angeloni, Vítor Gaspar, Michael Ehrmann, Guenter Coenen, Oreste Tristani, Tommaso Monacelli, Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Gerhard Ruenstler for helpful discussions during my stay at the ECB. I would also like to thank seminar participants at the ECB for their input and I am very grateful to Jeffrey Fuhrer, Edward Nelson and Kenneth West, Bernd Fitzenberger and two anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft. Any errors and omissions are mine. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and should not be attributed to the International Monetary Fund, its Executive Board, or its management     

The critical realist conception of open and closed systems

The critical realist (CR) conception of open and closed (O&C) systems is not about systems: it is about (ir)regularities in the flux of events and states of affairs. It has recently been criticised on the grounds that critical realists (CRs) should take on board ideas about the general nature of systems; recognise that genuinely open social systems would be impossible; avoid polarities or dualisms where either there are event regularities and open systems, or there are no event regularities and closed systems and accept partial regularities and partially open systems; and understand that orthodox economics is not based upon event regularities, laws or Humean empiricism. The objective of this paper is to ‘take stock’ of these recent criticisms.     

Public Policy for Growth and Poverty Reduction

In this paper, I would like to outline an approach to publicpolicy that focused on fighting poverty and is based on an understandingof growth and development. Such a public policy requires answeringtwo key questions. First, what are key determinants of a developmentthat benefits poor people – or what has been labelled"pro-poor growth"? And second, we need to answer the policyquestion: how can public action influence the key determinantswe identify? In putting the questions this way, we are settingourselves the task of building a dynamic public economics –a public economics of development. Given that development isthe objective, this task will require a better understandingof how to measure it. And we must also achieve a better graspof changes of behaviour in the process of development, sincechanging perspectives and behaviour are usually an integralpart of the development story. In laying our task of advancinga dynamic public economics, however, let me emphasise that shouldbe building – on – not overturning – pasttheory. In much of the work I will describe, the empirics seemto be ahead of theory. Thus one of my purposes is to highlightsome elements of an agenda for theoretical research. (JEL E6)     

Wage formation in historical perspective: the French experience

Translator's note: In this article Robert Bayer introduces thenotion ‘regulation’ as a key concept in analysesof the labour market. The term refers to the balance of social,institutional and economic forces which characte rise at a particulartime the economic system as a whole or particular parts of it.I considered translating ‘regulation’ as ‘order’,‘regime’, ‘system’ or ‘formation’;but these terms are either too static or already bear inappropriateconnotations. It was therefore decided to retain the Frenchexpression in the English text.     

On justifying a minimum welfare state

Since anarchy is not viable, limited government is the best that the realistic libertarian can hope for. But limited government will itself always be threatened by an inherent tendency to transgress its limits. In modern western societies the regulatory and redistributive welfare state is the major threat to a constitution of liberty. However, a “minimum welfare state” which redistributes personal income among its citizens may comply with the same principles of individual liberty and the rule of law that are embodied in the protective state. Since any state, including the minimal state, necessarily incorporates regulation and redistribution and thus is a welfare state of sorts the non-anarchist liberal should turn against welfare state privileges rather than against redistribution and regulation per se. He may even have good reason to go beyond the minimal state to found a “minimum welfare state” if this is instrumental in securing liberty under the rule of law. I am grateful to the Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University for hospitality both during the period in which this paper was written and on other occasions. I am deeply indebted to the people at the Center for their criticisms and comments. As far as this paper is concerned Geoffrey Brennan's and Richard Wagner's comments were particularly helpful. I should also like to acknowledge helpful oral comments from Kevin Mulligan and Philip van Parijs, who of course is much more of an expert on demogrant schemes than I am. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. The general caveat applies.     

Transforming structural econometrics: substantive vs. statistical premises of inference

How could one transform structural econometrics with a view to deliver empirical models that generate reliable inferences and trustworthy evidence for or against theories or claims, as well as provide trustable guidance for economic policy makers? Nell and Errouaki, in Rational Econometric Man: Transforming Structural Econometrics, put forward their proposal on how to achieve that, by discussing the effectiveness of alternative proposals in the literature. There is a lot to agree with in this book, but the primary aim of this note is to initiate the dialogue on issues where opinions differ on how to transform structural econometrics. The discussion focuses on what I consider a crucial aspect of empirical modeling—statistical adequacy—but the authors question its practical usefulness for empirical modeling. I will attempt to make a case that ‘methodological institutionalism’ cannot be properly implemented without employing the notion of statistical adequacy.     

The equations unveiled: Sraffa's price equations in the making

In the first part of Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities,four equation systems are introduced: three are drawn up inorder to solve the problem of relative prices; the last oneis devised to define a suitable standard of prices. The bookwas published in 1960, but—as we are told in the preface—its‘central propositions’ and a first version of theprice equations had been originally conceived and written morethan 30 years before, when the author was still in his twenties.Having access now to the Sraffa Papers, preserved in the WrenLibrary, we can ascertain the intellectual origin of the equations.In this paper the analytical path that led to the final draftof the price equation is followed, step by step, and the linkbetween these equations and Sraffa's quest for an ‘invariablestandard of value’ is clarified.