The strategic value of recall

This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.     

Time varying CAPM betas and banking sector risk

This paper employs the [Bai and Perron, 1998] and [Bai and Perron, 2003] structural break methodology to investigate whether the CAPM betas for banking sector stocks are time invariant. I find evidence for three large structural shifts in my monthly (1941.02-2008.01) sample. The third break corresponds with a decline in the perceived riskiness of banking stocks in the period starting in 2000.04. The banking sector was thus priced to be less risky during the period associated with rising leverage and financial sector risk.     

Doubts or variability?

Reinterpreting most of the market price of risk as a price of model uncertainty eradicates a link between asset prices and measures of the welfare costs of aggregate fluctuations that was proposed by Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini [17], Tallarini [30], Alvarez and Jermann [1]. Prices of model uncertainty contain information about the benefits of removing model uncertainty, not the consumption fluctuations that Lucas [22] and [23] studied. A max-min expected utility theory lets us reinterpret Tallarini's risk-aversion parameter as measuring a representative consumer's doubts about the model specification. We use model detection instead of risk-aversion experiments to calibrate that parameter. Plausible values of detection error probabilities give prices of model uncertainty that approach the Hansen and Jagannathan [11] bounds. Fixed detection error probabilities give rise to virtually identical asset prices as well as virtually identical costs of model uncertainty for Tallarini's two models of consumption growth.     

Currency equivalent monetary aggregates as leading indicators of inflation

This study examines whether the Currency Equivalent (CE) Monetary Aggregates proposed by [Hutt, 1963] and [Rotemberg et al., 1995] can perform better in predicting inflation as compared to their simple sum counterparts. The components of four official measures of monetary constructs - M1, M2, M3 and L1 - are used to construct monthly CE monetary aggregates for the period from April 1993 to June 2009. The empirical evidence indicates that the growth rate of CE aggregates has an edge over their sum counterparts in predicting inflation. Moreover, the predictive power of the growth rates of CE aggregates improves as the level of aggregation increases. These evidences suggest that observing the movements in the growth rates of weighted monetary aggregates can be a better option within the “multiple indicator approach” which is being currently practiced by the Reserve Bank of India.     

Robustness and ambiguity in continuous time

We use statistical detection theory in a continuous-time environment to provide a new perspective on calibrating a concern about robustness or an aversion to ambiguity. A decision maker repeatedly confronts uncertainty about state transition dynamics and a prior distribution over unobserved states or parameters. Two continuous-time formulations are counterparts of two discrete-time recursive specifications of Hansen and Sargent (2007) [16]. One formulation shares features of the smooth ambiguity model of Klibanoff et al. (2005) and (2009) [24] and [25]. Here our statistical detection calculations guide how to adjust contributions to entropy coming from hidden states as we take a continuous-time limit.     

On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules

We study information aggregation in large elections. With two candidates, efficient information aggregation is possible (e.g., Feddersen and Pesendorfer [5], [6] and [7]). We show that this result does not extend to elections with more than two candidates. We study a class of simple scoring rules in voting games with Poisson population uncertainty and three candidates. No simple scoring rule aggregates information efficiently, even if preferences are dichotomous and a Condorcet winner always exists. We introduce a weaker criterion of informational efficiency that requires a voting rule to have at least one efficient equilibrium. Only approval voting satisfies this criterion.     

Comment on “Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents” [J. Econ. Theory 123 (2) (2005) 210–217]

We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210–217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Crémer and McLean [J. Crémer, R. McLean, Full extraction of the surplus in bayesian, dominant strategy auctions, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of their signals about other agents? types. Instead, such an interpretation is warranted only when the weights used to span an agent?s set of beliefs stand in a singular relation with the prior type distribution that is known as an alternative characterization of Blackwell dominance.     

Accounting for the effect of health on cross-state income inequality in India

We perform development accounting in accordance with [Weil, 2005] and [Weil, 2007] in a cross-state analysis of India. Results of similar magnitude are found, demonstrating that health can account for 1% to 18% of income differences depending on the health measure.     

Corrigendum to “School choice: An experimental study” [J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]

We correct an inconsistency in the efficiency comparison reported in [Y. Chen, T. Sönmez, School choice: An experimental study, J. Econ. Theory 127 (1) (2006) 202-231]. The efficiency comparison of the three school choice mechanisms in our paper is based on recombinant estimation with an identical set of 10 tie-breakers, while the statistics reported in Table 7 is computed using 14,400 tie-breakers.     

Corrigendum to “Stable matchings and preferences of couples” [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75–106]

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in [B. Klaus, F. Klijn, Stable matchings and preferences of couples, J. Econ. Theory 121 (2005) 75–106] or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings [KK05, Theorem 3.3] and a maximal domain result [KK05, Theorem 3.5] are adjusted accordingly.     

On the Nash bargaining solution with noise

Suppose two parties have to share a surplus of random size. Each of the two can either commit to a demand prior to the realization of the surplus - as in the Nash demand game - or remain silent and wait until the surplus was observed. Adding the strategy to wait results in two strict equilibria, in each of which one player takes almost the whole surplus, provided uncertainty is small. If commitments concern only who makes the first offer, the more balanced Nash bargaining solution is approximately restored. In all cases, commitment occurs in equilibrium - despite the risk of breakdown of negotiations.     

Structural models, information and inherited restrictions

The derived structural estimates of the system βY = γZ + δU impose identifying restrictions on the reduced form estimates ex post. Some or all of the derived structural estimates are presented as evidence of the model's efficacy. In fact, the reduced form inherits a great deal of information from the structure's restrictions and hypothesized sign patterns, limiting the allowable signs for the reduced form. A method for measuring a structural model's statistical information content is proposed. Further, the paper develops a method for enumerating the allowable reduced form outcomes which can be used to falsify the proposed model independently of significant coefficients found for the structural relations.     

Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization

Starrett (1972) [33] and Boyd and Conley (1997) [7] approaches to externality modeling are unified by distinguishing between producible and nonproducible public commodities. Nonconvexities are associated with detrimental producible public commodities but not with nonproducible public commodities in Boyd and Conley (1997) [7]. Disposability properties (costly or costless) imply that producible public commodities are either by-products (e.g., pollution) or joint-products (e.g., national defense). Markets fail for both beneficial and detrimental by-products. Nonconvexities imply that price-based equilibria, e.g., Pigovian tax equilibrium, may not be Pareto-efficient. Foley's (1967, 1970) [17] and [18] “public competitive equilibrium” combines price and quantity signals with a unanimity criterion and restores the equivalence between equilibrium and efficiency.     

Alternative unit root testing strategies using the Fourier approximation

Two alternatives to  and  Fourier unit root testing strategy, which incorporates pretesting for nonlinearity, are considered. One is based on the union of rejection (UR) approach, and the other is a hybrid strategy that combines the UR approach with the use of extra information from nonlinearity pretesting. Simulation results show that the two proposed strategies, especially the hybrid, frequently outperform the original pretesting strategy.     

Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 × 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.     

The macroeconomic performance of the inflation targeting policy: An approach based on the evolutionary co-spectral analysis (extension for the case of a multivariate process)

This paper proposes a new methodology to check the economic performance of a monetary policy and in particular the inflation targeting policy (ITP). The main idea of this work is to consider the ITP as economically efficient when it generates a stable monetary environment. The latter is considered as stable when a long-run equilibrium exists to which the paths of economic variables (inflation rate, interest rate and GDP growth) converge. The convergence of the variables' paths implies that these variables are more predictable and implies a less uncertainty in the economic environment. To measure the degree of convergence between economic variables, we propose, in this paper, a dynamic time-varying variable presented in the frequency approach named cohesion. This variable is estimated from the evolutionary co-spectral theory as defined by Priestley and Tong (1973) and Priestley (1969, 1981, 52 and 53). We apply this theory to the measure of cohesion presented by Croux et al. (2001) to obtain a dynamic time-varying measure. In the last step of the study, we apply the Bai and Perron test (1998, 2003a,b) to determine the change in the cohesion path. The results show that the implementation of the ITP generates a high degree of convergence between economic series that implies less uncertainty into the monetary environment. We conclude that the inflation targeting generates a stable monetary environment. This result allows us to conclude that the ITP is relevant in the case of industrialized countries.     

Convergence of the Aumann–Davis–Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets

Summary. Geanakoplos [17] defined a notion of bargaining set, and proved that his bargaining set is approximately competitive in large finite transferable utility (TU) exchange economies with smooth preferences. Shapley and Shubik [26] showed that the Aumann–Davis–Maschler bargaining set is approximately competitive in replica sequences of TU exchange economies with smooth preferences. We extend Geanakoplos result to nontransferable utility (NTU) exchange economies without smooth preferences, and we extend the Shapley and Shubik result to non-replica sequences of NTU exchange economies with smooth preferences.Received: November 11, 1996This revised version was published online in February 2005 with corrections to the cover date.     

Budget institutions and political insulation: why states adopt the item veto

Forty-three of the fifty states of the United States have granted item veto authority to their governors as part of state constitutions. In this paper, I test explanations of why and when a legislature would cede institutional power. Using data from 1865 to 1994, I show that these measures are most likely proposed by fiscal conservatives who fear the loss of power in the future; in order to protect their interests for those periods when they will be in the minority, they implement institutions such as the item veto which will limit future, liberal legislatures. The results therefore shed light on two important substantive areas. First, by showing how the choice of budgetary institutions is endogenous to the political process, it clarifies that political factors must be considered in addition to social efficiency to understand the adoption of budget institutions. Second, it provides evidence in support of theories that have posited that electorally weak groups will heavily ‘insulate’ policies in periods in which they momentarily hold power (e.g. [Moe, 1989] and [de Figueiredo, 2002]).     

Public health impact of comprehensive hepatitis C screening and treatment in the French baby-boomer population

Objective: To estimate the public health impact of comprehensive hepatitis C virus (HCV) screening and access to all-oral, interferon (IFN)-free direct-acting antivirals (DAAs) in the French baby-boomer population (1945–1965 birth cohorts).

Methods: A sequential, multi-cohort, health-state transition model was developed to assess the impact of different hepatitis C screening and treatment strategies on clinical and economic outcomes in the 1945–1965 birth cohorts. Patients newly-diagnosed with chronic HCV were projected each year from 2016 to 2036 under three screening scenarios (70% [low], 75% [intermediate], and 80% [high] HCV awareness in 2036). Healthcare costs and clinical outcomes (number of liver-related deaths, quality-adjusted life-years [QALYs], life-years [LYs] spent in sustained virologic response [SVR] or with decompensated cirrhosis, hepatocellular carcinoma, or liver transplant) were compared among five treatment strategies (no antiviral therapy; IFN?+?ribavirin?+?protease inhibitor for fibrosis stages F2–F4, IFN-based DAAs for stages F2–F4, IFN-free DAAs for stages F2–F4, and IFN-free DAAs for stages F0–F4).

Results: Diagnosis of HCV genotype 1 was projected for 4,953, 6,600, and 8,368 individuals in the low, intermediate, and high screening scenarios, respectively. In the intermediate scenario, IFN-free DAAs for stages F0–F4 had a favorable cost-effectiveness profile vs IFN-based or IFN-free treatment strategies for F2–F4 and offered the greatest return on investment (0.899 LYs gained in SVR and 0.933 QALYs per €10,000 invested).

Conclusion: Comprehensive HCV screening and access to all-oral, IFN-free DAAs is a cost-effective strategy that could help diminish the upcoming burden of HCV in the French baby-boomer population.     

Let me sleep on it: Delay reduces rejection rates in ultimatum games

Delaying acceptance decisions in the Ultimatum Game drastically increases acceptance of low offers. While in treatments without delay less than 20% of low offers are accepted, 60-80% are accepted as we delay the acceptance decision by around 10 min.