特别保障措施的贸易效应实证研究

本文选取2002-2006年间立案的20个对华特别保障措施案例,利用6位税则号涉案产品的年度数据,构建面板数据模型定量考察了对华实施特别保障措施过程中贸易破坏效应、贸易转移效应的存在和大小,发现特别保障措施不仅导致了指控国从中国的涉案产品进口减少,而且促使从非指控国同类产品的进口增加,产生了贸易转移效应。     

我国反倾销措施的贸易救济效果检验

在当前的国际贸易环境下,反倾销措施已经成为世界各国普遍认可的一种贸易救济手段。反倾销措施贸易救济效果的相关研究也成为了近期学术界所关注的焦点。我国自改革开放以来,对外贸易规模不断扩大,成为反倾销立案调查的主要对象国。随着改革开放程度的深化、经济结构的调整,实现了从贸易大国向贸易强国的角色转变。作为WTO的主要成员国,如何合理运用反倾销措施保护本国利益,维护贸易公平是历史赋予我们新的任务。本文使用中国海关总署的进出口数据,结合商务部公示的对外反倾销措施实施案例,对反倾销涉案国家和地区及涉案产品的市场占有率和贸易额,按照海关税则号整理后,对立案调查、征收反倾销税、无损害结案、撤销调查和价格承诺这几种形式是否存在贸易救济效果,分别进行检验。     

反倾销的贸易转向效应及应对策略分析

反倾销作为国际贸易中的救济措施,会带来多种经济效应,其中尤以贸易转向效应最为明显。结合竞争模型,分析反倾销产生的进口转向效应及其对反倾销的有效性产生的影响。并分析国内外反倾销的贸易转向及产生的问题,根据中国具体情况提出应对策略。     

反倾销被诉贸易效应的实证分析与比较——基于1998-2008年动态面板数据模型的SYS-GMM估计

在整理全球反倾销案件的基础上,通过收集相关贸易数据,利用1998-2008年被诉反倾销案件为样本建立动态面板数据模型,实证分析了12个主要国家和地区被诉反倾销的贸易破坏效应和贸易转移效应,通过SYS-GMM估计进行回归估计得到稳健性结果。实证结果表明,反倾销措施对贸易额和出口市场份额的影响远大于关税措施的影响,成为多数国家限制进口、保护本国国内产业的主要贸易政策。反倾销对中国、日本、中国台湾和俄罗斯的负面影响较大。最后考察反倾销对产业竞争力的影响发现,反倾销申诉和反倾销措施对申诉方的产业竞争力有显著的提升作用,并且反倾销措施的影响远大于反倾销申诉的影响。     

发达和发展中经济体对华贸易救济的比较研究

本文在对发达经济体和发展中经济体对华贸易救济的特征差异进行分析的基础上,运用贸易救济指控指数和贸易救济涉案金额指数两项指标,进一步分析了其对中国出口贸易影响的差异,得出的结论是:发达经济体和发展中经济体在立案数量、措施选取、涉案行业、涉案金额、案件执行率和诉诸WTO等方面呈现出明显的特征差异,相对其在中国出口贸易中的地位而言,发展中经济体的贸易救济对中国出口贸易的影响大于发达经济体。     

中国反倾销申诉寒蝉效应的实证分析——基于动态面板模型的GMM检验

本文基于中国2001年-2008年对外反倾销案例的面板数据,通过构造横截面单元为中国对外反倾销调查的动态面板数据模型,应用一阶差分广义矩估计方法考察了中国实施反倾销措施及其贸易自由化对中国进口贸易的影响。实证结果表明,贸易自由化对中国进口贸易的促进作用效果非常显著;中国反倾销立案调查对进口贸易有一定的震慑作用,但并未起到限制进口贸易的作用,也就是说中国对外反倾销并非是要构筑贸易壁垒体系,更没有将之作为抵消贸易自由化效应的政策工具。     

中国怎样才能更合理的对国外产品反倾销

中国近几年来对国外一些产品采取了反倾销措施,对保护本国产业有一定积极的作用,但是同时也存在着很多不利影响.本文从探讨中国反倾销的特点和原因出发,试图对中国对国外产品采取反倾销措施的实际效果和经济效应的不利影响进行分析,从而为中国如何更合理的利用"反倾销"这一贸易救济手段提出参考建议.     

中国对外反倾销措施对进出口贸易的影响及政策性建议

文章介绍了中国实施反倾销措施的现状和特点,并结合反倾销案例分析了反倾销措施对我国进出口贸易所产生的正面和负面的经济效应。在此基础上,提出了一些政策性建议,以期最大限度地发挥其正面效应,抑制乃至消除其负面效应。     

中国怎样才能更合理的对国外产品反倾销

中国近几年来对国外一些产品采取了反倾销措施,对保护本国产业有一定积极的作用,但是同时也存在着很多不利影响。本文从探讨中国反倾销的特点和原因出发,试图对中国对国外产品采取反倾销措施的实际效果和经济效应的不利影响进行分析,从而为中国如何更合理的利用“反倾销”这一贸易救济手段提出参考建议。     

环境规制对中国对外贸易影响的实证分析

中国与其他国家之间环境规制的差异对贸易会产生一定的影响。当环境规制相对变得更严时，“环境规制的成本贸易效应”发生作用，中国会进口更多的污染密集型产品；当环境规制变得相对较松时，中国会向发达国家出口更多的污染密集型产品。然而，由于世界各国都有加强环境管制的趋势，再加上“波特假设”的存在以及“环境规制的创新贸易效应”发挥作用，适当的加强环境管制虽然可能会增加污染密集型产品的进口，但是也能够有效地促进本国商品的出口，从而带来收益。     

The signaling power of trade protection

This paper proposes an empirical analysis to provide new insight into the trade diversion effects of antidumping (AD) policy. Trade diversion is the shift in trade from named countries in an AD investigation to non-named countries. Previous studies have concluded that AD action causes a considerable drop in exports from named countries, however the extent to which trade is diverted to non-named countries is still an open debate. This paper examines to see whether AD action on named countries can have signaling effects on non-named countries. To examine the trade effects on non-named countries, a time series data at an 8-digit product level is constructed for all cases initiated between 1997 and 2003 in the European Union. The paper provides evidence that antidumping policy has signaling effects on non-named imports.     

Differences in the determinants and targeting of antidumping: China and India compared

Despite both being developing countries, China and India have markedly contrasting patterns in their use and targeting of antidumping (AD) measures. We explore the factors driving AD use by these two countries, considering in turn macroeconomic, strategic and other determinants. We find more regular or systematic features of AD use by China, while India displays a less systematic pattern of AD use. Economic growth, AD club effect and free trade agreement participation are shown to constrain AD use by China. Compared to India, AD use by China is also more sensitive across industries. Furthermore, China targets developed countries more than developing countries, while India is less discriminating with respect to the country type it targets.     

The chilling trade effects of antidumping proliferation

Advocates of antidumping (AD) laws downplay their negative effects by arguing that the trade flows that are subject to AD are small and their distortions negligible. But while the adverse effect of AD on product-level trade has long been established, the question remains whether there are trade effects at the aggregate level. The recent proliferation wave of AD laws and their use provides us with a unique policy change to estimate the true trade effects of adopting and enforcing AD laws. For this purpose, we estimate the effect of AD on bilateral trade flows between the “new adopters” of AD laws and their trade partners. Using a gravity model of annual observations (1980-2000) our estimates show that AD has trade chilling effects on aggregate import volumes but the impacts are heterogeneous across sectors. We find that new tough users experience a chilling of their aggregate imports of 14 billion US$ a year (or 5.9%) as a result of AD measures. For some countries like Mexico and India, the dampening effects of AD laws on trade flows are found to substantially offset the increase in trade volumes derived from trade liberalization.     

THE WTO AND ANTIDUMPING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping (AD) trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine sector-level use of nine of the major "new user" developing countries, matching data on production in 28 different three-digit ISIC industries to data on AD investigations, outcomes, and imports at the six-digit Harmonized System product level. We present economically significant evidence consistent with theory that developing-country industries that seek and receive AD import protection are responding to macroeconomic shocks, exhibit characteristics consistent with endogenous trade policy formation, and face some changing market conditions consistent with requirements of the WTO Antidumping Agreement. However, the evidence also suggests substantial heterogeneity in determinants of AD use across developing countries, which highlights the flexibility of this policy as a protectionist tool responsive to many different types of political-economic shocks.     

Chinese firm and industry reactions to antidumping initiations and measures

China has been the subject of large numbers of both antidumping initiations and measures. This article explores the reactions of Chinese firms and industries to these actions by using dynamic system GMM estimator and industrial panel data on all Chinese firms in the industry, foreign firms operating within China and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for aggregated firms group between 1997 and 2007. We find that antidumping actions by developed and developing countries negatively impact industrial profits and employee and firm numbers and also exports, but improve labour productivity. We also find that different kinds of firms show different responses. All firms together in an industry react to antidumping the most, and foreign and SOE firms show a much smaller response. Further, antidumping effects from different countries are different. Developed countries’ antidumping actions have more negative impact than developing countries’ actions; the effects of US actions are different from the European Union’s.     

Testing the effect of an anti-dumping duty: The US salmon market

Anti-dumping measures have been increasingly common. When imposed, the measures will always reduce trade with named countries. Depending on market structure, there can also be price effects and increased imports from non-named countries. In this paper we investigate relationships between prices to obtain information about the market structure. Using only prices will in many cases be an advantage because of the greater availability of price data. An empirical example is provided using the US case against Norwegian salmon. First version received: April 1999/Final version received: May 2000     

The impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection

This paper examines the impact of preferential trade agreements on the duration of antidumping protection. We employ a two-step selection model where the first step accounts for the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the original antidumping determination and the second step estimates the impact of membership in a preferential trade agreement on the duration of the measures. We find the duration of antidumping protection is about 17% shorter for preferential trade agreement members compared with targeted countries that are not preferential trade agreement members. The impact on duration depends largely on whether preferential trade agreements have rules related specifically to antidumping. Preferential trade agreements with rules are associated with a 28% reduction in the duration of protection, whereas the duration for preferential trade agreements without rules is not statistically different from the duration for non-preferential trade agreement countries. While the duration of antidumping measures against China is longer than for other countries, the impact of preferential trade agreement rules is robust to controlling for China.