Efficiency of Screening and Labor Income Inequality

We analyze the importance of information about individual skills for understanding human capital accumulation and income inequality. The paper uses the framework of an overlapping generations economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Agents in each generation differ by random individual ability, or talent, which affects the screening process. The human capital of an agent depends on both his talent and his investment in education. The investment decision is based on a public signal (test outcome), which screens all agents for their talents. We analyze how a better information system, which allows more efficient screening, affects investment in education and, hence, income inequality in equilibrium. As a main result, we find that, typically, less inequality in the distribution of actual incomes can only be achieved at the expense of more inequality in the distribution of income opportunities.     

Institutions, education, and development: The role of entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs are instrumental for structural transformation. They create and organize new firms and hire workers with a minimum level of human capital. Entrepreneurs encourage workers to invest in their own education in order to move into the modern production sector. Better institutions lead to less income diversion, which creates a greater supply of entrepreneurs, a larger demand for human capital, and faster structural transformation. Education policy alone is not as effective, although it, too, raises the number of entrepreneurs. Simulations and evidence from Brazilian states support the theory.     

Managerial capital,occupational choice and inequality in a global economy

This study proposes a simple theory of trade with endogenous firm productivity, occupational choice and income inequality. Individuals with different managerial talent choose to become entrepreneurs or workers. Entrepreneurs enhance firm productivity by investing in managerial capital. The model generates three income classes: low‐income workers facing the prospect of unemployment, middle‐income entrepreneurs managing domestic firms and high‐income entrepreneurs managing global firms. Trade liberalization policies raise unemployment and improve welfare. A reduction in per‐unit trade costs raises top incomes and generates labour‐market polarization. A reduction in fixed exporting costs has an ambiguous effect on top incomes and personal income distribution. Policies reducing labour‐market frictions or the costs of managerial‐capital acquisition create more jobs and improve welfare. The income distributional effects of labour‐market policies depend on which policy is implemented.     

A Positive Theory of Income Redistribution

This article examines how redistribution of human capital expenditure can come about voluntarily. A model is developed in which, in the absence of redistribution, human capital expenditure is financed through tax revenue collected locally. However, circumstances are shown under which transfers of human capital expenditure across neighborhoods can take place voluntarily, even in the absence of interfamily altruism. These transfers can eliminate absolute inequality and reduce relative inequality. In addition, the effect on aggregate income of such human capital funding transfers across neighborhoods is evaluated. Empirical evidence supporting the model's implications for the impact of redistribution of human capital expenditure on the persistence of income inequality is presented     

Occupational Mobility and Wage Inequality

In this article we argue that wage inequality and occupational mobility are intimately related. We are motivated by our empirical findings that human capital is occupation specific and that the fraction of workers switching occupations in the U.S. was as high as 16% a year in the early 1970's and had increased to 21% by the mid-1990's. We develop a general equilibrium model with occupation-specific human capital and heterogeneous experience levels within occupations. We find that the model, calibrated to match the level of occupational mobility in the 1970's, accounts quite well for the level of (within-group) wage inequality in that period. Next, we find that the model, calibrated to match the increase in occupational mobility, accounts for over 90% of the increase in wage inequality between the 1970's and the 1990's. The theory is also quantitatively consistent with the level and increase in the short-term variability of earnings.     

Multistage public education,voting, and income distribution

This paper proposes a theory to study the formulation of education policies and human capital accumulation. The government collects income taxes and allocates tax revenue to primary and higher education. The tax rate and the allocation rule are both endogenously determined through majority voting. The tax rate is kept at a low level, and public funding for higher education is not supported unless the majority of individuals have human capital above some threshold. Although public support for higher education promotes aggregate human capital accumulation, it may create long-run income inequality because the poor are excluded from higher education.     

Human capital investment with competitive labor search

We study human capital accumulation in the presence of labor search frictions. Given that unemployed workers can default on their education loans, skilled individuals with a larger debt burden prefer riskier but better paid careers than is socially desirable. A higher level of employment risk in turn depresses the skill premium and the incentives to invest in education. The equilibrium allocation is characterized by too low employment, underinvestment by the poor, and too little investment in skill-intensive technologies. A public education system funded by graduate taxes can restore efficiency, and it would also reduce wage inequality.     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.      

Human capital investment,credentialing, and wage differentials

This study considers how individuals determine at what ratio they will invest in two different types of education. The first type contributes to the development of labor skills, while the other does not. We refer to the former as human capital investment and the latter as unproductive investment, which improves test scores but has no beneficial effect on students' human capital. We formulate an overlapping‐generations economy in which the rich and poor households invest in both types of education. We find that the ratio of human capital investment to unproductive investment is lower in the economy with medium size of the wage differentials. In a dynamic analysis, we identify two patterns of stable steady states for the dynamics of the wage differentials, namely, no‐inequality and high‐inequality steady states. Further, we show that a rapid increase in the level of skill‐biased technology may cause a switch from a steady state with no‐inequality to one with high inequality. This causes at least a temporary increase in the ratio of unproductive investment during the transition to the new steady state.     

The impacts of education investment on skilled–unskilled wage inequality and economic development in developing countries

Four-sector general equilibrium models are established to investigate the impacts of increased governmental investment in education capital on skilled–unskilled wage inequality and economic development. The basic model, which assumes perfect competition in the producer services sector, shows that increased education capital investment from the government will unambiguously reduce skilled–unskilled wage inequality and conditionally promote economic development. Then the robustness of the basic model is substantiated by the extended model that incorporates the monopolistically competitive feature of the producer services sector.     

科技型企业创业风险、堑壕效应与控制权配置

将创业者事后敲竹杠和创业成功后堑壕效应的前向延伸作为影响因素，构建模型对科技型企业创业过程中投资者和创业者之间风险分担、收益分配及控制权配置的影响进行分析。结果发现：完全信息下创业者最优努力水平和帕累托最优风险分担可以实现，投资者和创业者主要矛盾前移至创业开始前的收益分担；信息不对称下帕累托最优风险分担不可能实现，创业者有动机通过采取降低努力水平、事后敲竹杠和事前堑壕效应行为取得额外收益，以此分散人力资本风险；创业者首先倾向于选择后两种行为获取更高的控制权配置收益，失败时将倾向于回到降低努力水平选择上。因此，投资者适度分权可避免创业者出现降低努力水平的行为，从而提升创业成功概率。     

Redistribution as a selection device

This paper studies the role of the wealth distribution for the market selection of entrepreneurs when agents differ in talent. It argues that the redistribution of initial endowments can increase an economy's surplus because more talented individuals get credit for their risky investment projects. Moreover, the redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a Pareto-improvement although all agents are non-satiable. An agent's entrepreneurial ability is his private information and there is moral hazard in production. I find conditions such that unproductive rich entrepreneurs crowd out productive poor ones on the capital market. Then redistribution of initial endowments may lead to a new equilibrium where market participants are better informed about the entrepreneurs’ ability. The new equilibrium is characterized by (i) the selection of better entrepreneurs, (ii) a higher riskless rate of return on capital, (iii) lower repayments of successful entrepreneurs to their creditors and (iv) the fact that all agents are better off.     

High skills pay off: the changing wage structure during economic transition in Poland

Economic transition turns the inherited wage structure upside down. Changes are rapid and dramatic. The Polish example shows that even in the first year of market-oriented reforms, there was a marked increase in earnings inequality, a dramatic rise in the wage premium for white-collar skills, and a significant jump in the returns to education. In contrast, skills acquired under the old system lost their value. It is younger workers who are rewarded with higher wages. The changes are spearheaded by the private sector, where inequalities and the educational premium are higher than in the public sector. Privatization, thus, has its social aspects in that it strengthens the incentive for human capital investment. This paper documents these changes and sets out possible explanations.     

Consequences of a tax on the brain drain for unemployment and income inequality in less developed countries

Welfare implications of an income tax paid by emigrant skilled workers are analyzed in a model which assumes international capital mobility and allows for unemployed labor in the modern sector of a developing country. The tax discourages overinvestment in education and also contributes to the welfare of those remaining through the direct revenue effect. However, expected earnings of unskilled workers decline as a result of the tax, while those of non-migrant skilled workers rise. The tax may thus exacerbate domestic income inequality. In addition, modern sector employment, output, and capital stock may fall.     

The Effect of Better Information on Income Inequality

We consider an OLG economy with endogenous investment in human capital. Heterogeneity in individual human capital levels is modelled by a distribution of innate ability across agents. This distribution is common knowledge but, at young age, no agent knows his/her ability. The production of human capital depends on each individual’s investment in education. This investment decision is taken only after observing a signal which is correlated to his/her true ability, and which is used for updating beliefs. Thus, a better information system affects the distribution of human capital in each generation. Assuming separable and identical preferences for all individuals, we derive the following results in equilibrium: (a) If the relative measure of risk aversion is less (more) than 1 then more information raises (reduces) income inequality. (b) When a risk sharing market is available better information results in higher inequality regardless of the measure risk aversion. We are grateful to Alex Cukierman, Zvi Eckstein, Yona Rubinstein and Daniel Tsiddon. An anonymous referee made extremely useful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development (GIF) is gratefully acknowledged.     

How much does schooling disutility matter?

Studies on structural education choice models are often inconsistent in choosing whether and how to include a disutility of education, especially in an environment with risk and wealth inequality. We show that adding a disutility term to the education decision, a human capital investment option, is equivalent to assuming a relationship between wealth, risk, and education. Utility gain from education is increasing in the riskiness of future consumption. A riskier environment further propels an agent to choose the human capital investment option that maximizes future income. If the degree of risk increases heterogeneously across multiple human capital investment options, risk aversion and the precautionary savings motive can compound or negate each other depending on which option has a greater increase in risk.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Accumulation and distribution of human capital: the interaction between individual and aggregate variables

The paper analyses the joint evolution of accumulation and distribution of human capital in an OLG framework. Dynamics arises from the interplay between human capital distribution and individual variables—inherited human capital and inborn ability. Such interaction drives individual investment in human capital and accumulation in the economy. According to initial distribution the model provides different dynamical behaviours linking growth and inequality; in general economies with a more equal initial distribution grow faster but other cases are possible. Moreover, since the model provides an endogenous threshold for investing in human capital, the distribution is characterised by multi-modality.     

心理资本对创业坚持的影响——内在动机与创业榜样的调节作用

创业坚持是创业成功的重要前提。作为复杂的决策行为,创业坚持受到多方面因素的共同作用。基于社会认知理论,探讨乐观、韧性、自我效能感和希望等心理资本对创业坚持的影响,以及内在动机和创业榜样发挥的情境效应。通过对我国202名创业者进行问卷调查发现：创业者的乐观、韧性、自我效能感和希望均能够显著促进其坚持创业;内在动机正向调节乐观、韧性、自我效能感各自与创业坚持的关系;创业榜样对乐观、韧性、自我效能感各自与创业坚持的关系发挥正向调节作用。将个体因素（心理资本和内在动机）与环境因素（创业榜样）纳入同一理论框架,讨论其对创业坚持的影响,以期为创业坚持研究提供新颖和全面的视角。     

Credit crunch in a model of financial intermediation and occupational choice

In this paper, we introduce a dynamic general equilibrium model with numerous and heterogeneous investment projects and endogenous occupational choice to study a credit crunch. Asset accumulation of assets by households as they face various employment and return risks over a long lifetime determines whether they are entrepreneurs or workers. The origin of a credit crunch may be found in the conservative lending by banks during periods of financial duress and reduced profitability because of capital requirements. Using an example from Canada, monetary policy is shown to be largely ineffective in alleviating the credit crunch, while flexible loan regulation can erase it.